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ABSTRACT
Scientific realists have argued that a realist interpretation of physics is necessary if we 
are to make the results and successes of experimental physics intelligible. This thesis 
presents a phenomenological exploration of the operational metaphysics and 
technological structure of the phenomenon of experimental physics. The purpose of 
this thesis is twofold. It aims to address the transcendental question of how 
experimental physics is possible. It also aims to explore how experimental physicists 
have used technology to understand Nature. I shall present a critical, philosophical 
exploration of the work of experimentalists from the onset of experimental physics in 
the sixteenth century, the nineteenth century experiments on electromagnetism, to the 
contemporary experiments of Ultra-Low Temperature Physics and High Energy 
Physics. This exploration will be used to reveal experimental physics as an art, a 
teleological labour process, and as a mode of Heidegger’s Ge-stell challenged to 
disclose its own possibilities by making them happen. It will critically examine the 
operational metaphysical precepts that are required for experimental physics to be 
presented as a mode of disclosure of “natural mechanisms” and “natural laws”, 
situating them within “the grand experiment” that Jacque Ellul termed ‘"the societal 
gamble”.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE SPIRIT OF THE ENTERPRISE:
“Nothing requires greater nicety, in our inquiries concerning human affairs, than to distinguish what exactly 
is owning to chance, and what proceeds from causes-, nor is there any subject, in which the author is more 
liable to deceive himself by false subtleties and refinements. To say, that any event is derived from chance, 
cuts short all further inquiry concerning it, and leaves the writer in the same state of ignorance as the rest of 
mankind But when the event is supposed to proceed from certain and stable causes, he may then display 
his ingenuity, in assigning these causes; and as a man of any subtly can never be at a loss in this particular, 
he thereby has an opportunity of swelling his volumes, and discovering his profound knowledge, in 
observing what escapes the vulgar and ignorant.”
David Hume (O f the Rise and Progress o f the Arts and Sciences, 1965, pp. 421-422)
“Cause and effect: such a duality probably never exists; in truth we are confronted with a continuum out of 
which we isolate a couple of pieces, just as we perceive motion only as isolated points and then infer it 
without actually seeing it.”
Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay Science, aph. 112)
Entering the Cave of the Shadow-Puppeteers:
On the border between France and Switzerland, just a few kilometres north of Geneva, is the CERN site. At 
ground level there is nothing particularly remarkable about this place. It appears to be a sprawling industrial 
estate of prefabricated warehouses and squat office blocks. People move to and fro, carrying out a day’s 
work in a way that seems as everyday and common as the working day of millions of people all over 
industrialised Europe. What is it that these people are doing? Why are they here? To answer these questions 
we must examine what is hidden from view. One hundred metres below the surface is a twenty-seven 
kilometres in circumference tunnel that has been carved out of the rock. It circumscribes the CERN site. 
Inside that tunnel is a machine called the LEP ring. It is a twenty-seven kilometres in circumference metal 
tube, closely surrounded by electromagnets and radio-frequency cavities. The LEP ring is broken at four 
equidistant points on its circumference by four artificial caves. In each chamber is a massive machine that 
is moved into its position by its own undercarriage caterpillar tracks. These machines are named the 
ALEPH, OPAL, L3, and DELPHI detectors. Each of these machines is a ten metre by ten metre barrel of 
electronics, wires, cells of noxious chemicals, and a huge solenoid, surrounded by a massive yoke of iron.
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When the connected quintet of machines are operational no one is permitted underground People monitor 
the performances of these machines remotely on computer screens and digital read-outs.
In the north west of England, just south of the city of Lancaster, is Lancaster University. In room 
“A522” of its School of Physics and Materials there is an Ultra-Low Temperature Physics laboratory. This 
room is quite large, slightly smells of grease and oil, and there is the constant low hum of pumps. The view 
is of pipes, barrels, gauges, dials, benches, tools, and four separate sealable rooms inside “A522”, as well as 
two tiny offices tucked away at the far end. People move freely between the rooms inside “A522”. They 
talk, joke, laugh, shout, and argue, as they move purposefully between the rooms. The atmosphere is one of 
constant and confident activity. The rooms are entirely screened in a cage of metal gauze; each can be 
sealed by a metal door upon which, on the outside, a sign reads: “If door closed ask permission before 
entry”. 1 Inside each of the four sealable rooms are electronic devices, such as their amplifiers, frequency 
drivers, computers, junction boards, and meters, shelved around the room from the floor to the ceiling. 
There are also pipes, gauges, dials, and wires clustered around each other across one half of the ceiling. 
Wires and pipes radiate to and from a space enclosed by three ten feet walls of concrete blocks. This 
ensemble of fifty tons in weight can be raised on high-pressure jets of air to suspend it millimetres above 
the ground, by building it and turning a valve with one hand Suspended in the partially enclosed space 
between these walls is a dilution refrigerator. This machine is an inverted, slightly conical, eight foot by 
three foot vertical skeleton of thin metal tubes, horizontal circular plates, electronics, screws, and bunches 
of wires, that hangs suspended over a pit in the floor by an ensemble attached to the top of the walls. The 
ceiling pipes and wires lead to and from the dilution refrigerator, via the overhead ensemble. At the very 
bottom of the machine is a small plastic container called “the experimental cell”. The machine is made 
operational by building it, connecting it to the electricity mains, switching it on by pressing buttons, 
pumping cryogenic liquids into it, adjusting the settings on calibrated dials and digital displays by turning 
dials and pressing buttons, and waiting. When it is operational it is encased in a black metal container 
(holding cryogenic liquid nitrogen, which completely surrounds the dilution refrigerator) and is veiled by 
plumes of cold vapour. People monitor the output of these silent machines on computer screens and digital 
read-outs whilst they wait.
What are these machines for? What do they do? What do they produce? What is their function? 
What are these people doing with these machines? What are they waiting for? Why were these machines 
built? These people claim that they are physicists and that they use these machines, as well as other kinds of 
machine, for a very specific purpose. They claim that they are using these machines to find out how nature 
works. They claim that the purpose for building and using these machines is to satisfy their curiosity 
regarding the natural world and how it works. They claim to use these machines to make and refine pictures 
of how change in Nature works in terms of hidden “natural mechanisms”. Furthermore, they claim to be 
able to use these refined pictures of “natural mechanisms” at work to innovate new machines and, by doing
1 I would like to thank the members of the Lancaster Ultra-Low Physics Group for allowing me to enter 
their laboratory, see them at work, and ask them dumb questions.
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so, increase their understanding of how invisible “natural laws” work. These machines are built and used by 
physicists to discover “the truth” about “the fundamental principles of the Universe” by working out how 
these machines work in terms of fundamental principles. It is this use of machines to discover “natural 
mechanisms” and “the truth” that is the subject of this thesis. As well as building and using these machines 
to acquire money, fame, glory, and for its own sake, as a pleasure, physicists also pursue their technical art 
to learn truths and satisfy their curiosity about change and permanence in the natural world. These 
machines are used to disclose the truth of how the natural world works. How is it possible that an artificial 
pursuit such as experimental physics could be taken to be a natural science? How is modem physics 
possible?
The Spirit of the Enterprise:
My purpose, in writing this thesis, is to elucidate the operational metaphysics that was used to make 
experimental physics possible as a means to obtain knowledge about the structures, mechanisms, laws, and 
content of Nature. This metaphysics is distinct from induced or speculative metaphysics, such as 
Gassendi’s seventeenth century atomic theory of matter, or Newtonian absolute space and time, or Everett's 
many-world interpretation of quantum mechanics, for example. These were proposed in order to make the 
results of experimentation intelligible in terms of particular conceptions of Nature. Both kinds of 
metaphysics are necessary for experimental physics to progress but, whereas particular metaphysical 
conceptions of particular experiments are replaceable and contingent, the operational metaphysics is 
universally presupposed by every particular experimental apparatus; it is a requirement for experimentation 
using machines to be a means of ontological access and epistemological warrant. I have termed this 
operational metaphysics as mechanical realism. This metaphysics is a condition for experimental physics to 
be a natural science and has been implicitly presupposed by subsequent induced metaphysics since 
experimental physics began. It has endured through the subsequent paradigm shifts from mechanical 
physics to quantum mechanical physics, and from the indubitability of Euclidean geometry to the 
indubitability of non-Euclidean geometry. The physicists' interpretations of the shadows on the cave wall 
may well have changed, from time to time, but the project of using shadow-puppetry to make those 
shadows has persisted throughout. It is my view that, if we wish to understand the phenomena of 
experimentation, we should try to understand it from within as broad as perspective as possible. This 
involves studying the ways that physics is connected within the wider world of human affairs. It also 
involves studying it within the confines of the laboratory. If we are to understand its external and internal 
trajectories, and how they inter-relate, then we need to study how physics works on both macroscopic and 
microscopic levels. We would also need to understand its histories.
I have assumed, from the onset, that any understanding of the experimental sciences should be 
based upon an understanding of technology, when those sciences use technologies as the means to explore 
the natural world and our understanding of our place in it. The argument of this thesis is not premised upon 
the assumption that technology is a neutral means. The directions, performance, and results of experimental
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research are shaped by the available technologies required to perform particular research projects. Anything 
that can not be disclosed via publicly accepted techniques of disclosure is excluded from being included as 
an object for research by sciences that are premised upon the legitimisation and justification of techniques. 
These techniques, if they are to be candidates for acceptance, must be either comprehensible or repeatable, 
and ideally both. The “objects” of theoretical physics must be both graphically visualisable and 
technologically manipulable in order to be intelligible and available objects for experimentation and 
mathematical modelling. Theoretical and experimental practices are linked by making visual 
representations of “invisible entities” (such as “subatomic particles”, “space-time curvatures”, 
“superstrings”, and “electromagnetic fields”) that can be related to practices through the mediation of 
calibrated instruments and communication. How are theories and experiments linked this way? I shall argue 
that theoretical objects are discursively linked to technological objects by using a conception of mechanism 
as the link between natural causes and effects.2 The internal relationship between theoretical and 
technological practice is a series of implementations of mechanisms to the progressive development of the 
content of both theory and technology. The character of the knowledge that experimental physics is 
directed to achieve is that a complete account of the unchanging first principles of causal change which 
govern the performances of the experimental apparatus. Such performances are the responses of the 
apparatus as a result of human interventions and are taken by experimental physicists to disclose natural 
mechanisms at work. Knowledge of such principles of change have the characteristic form of a theoretical 
knowledge of how change happens due to the actualisation and exercise of natural causes, mechanisms, 
powers, and structures in accordance with natural law. In this thesis this kind of scientific knowledge will 
be analysed in terms of ancient Greek episteme and techne to reveal the implicit metaphysical precepts that 
allow knowledge of "natural laws" to be possible on the basis of technological practices and interventions 
using machines.
Techne (plural: technai) had a loose meaning of art, craft, or science in pre-socratic Greek.3 It had 
the connotation of "device” in the straightforward sense of "ploy" rather than "something devised". It had 
similar meaning to "crafty" and "artful". In ordinary usage techne was used to refer to cleverness and 
cunning in getting, making, or doing, as well as to trades, crafts, and skills of every kind It involved a 
collection of tactics, stratagems, and tacit "know-how" as kinds of activity to achieve specific ends. It was 
in the philosophical writings of Plato and Aristotle that techne was treated as a formal kind of knowledge
2 This is also apparent in the historical development of the sciences of psychology and artificial 
intelligence. See The Mechanization o f the Mind: On the Origins o f Cognitive Science by Jean-Pierre 
Dupuy (trans. DeBevoise, Princeton University Press, 2000) for an excellent discussion of this.
3 Texvn is commonly translated (see OED or the Liddle and Scott Greek-English Lexicon for example) 
from the Indo-European stem tekhn- ("woodwork" or "carpentry") as "art", "craft", "know-how", or "skill". 
The Greek tekton and Sanskrit taksan are translated as "carpenter" or "builder". Sanskrit taksati is 
translated as "forms", "constructs", or "builds". The Hittite takkss- is translated as "to join" or "to build". 
The Latin texere is translated as "to weave".
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which, as a  theoretical kind of knowledge, could be used to guide or govern making. For both Plato and 
Aristotle techne referred to the general, abstract, and communicable first principles of making and 
inscription in the activities of craftsmanship and art It is how techne was related to episteme (commonly 
translated as "science" or "knowledge of eternal and necessary principles") that revealed the difference 
between Plato and Aristotle.
In Plato’s works, techne and episteme were closely related when discussing art and knowledge in 
general and were used interchangeably to characterise geometrical reasoning in particular. In Philebus 
(55c-56d), Statesman (258e), Gorgias (450b-c), and Ion (532), for example, Plato used episteme to describe 
mathematical truth as eternal and necessary knowledge whilst using the word techne to describe 
mathematics (including logic, arithmetic, and geometry) as the highest form of art. Socrates often argued 
that all technai are involved with logoi (words, speech, reason, principles) bearing upon some specific 
subject matter of the art in question, even though some require a great deal of physical exertion and veiy 
little reason (i.e. horse riding, painting, or sculpture) and others require a great deal of reason and very little 
exertion (i.e. arithmetic, logic, or astronomy). Only routine activities (i.e. cooking or persuading), 
unreflectively based upon experience and habit, devoid of logoi were considered to be atechnos (devoid of 
art). Of course such activities, such as cooking or persuading, can be (and are) developed into arts, but for 
everyday purposes the usually are not According to Socrates, what such activities lacked, in order to 
qualify as techne, was knowledge of the cdtcd (intelligible causes) involved in what was made or done. Such 
everyday habitual and unreflective practices were alogos (without words, reason, or principles). A poiesis 
(productive activity) needed to be teachable through logos in order to qualify as techne and henceforth 
techne was the knowledge of all productive activities that could be reasoned about and taught. It was the 
logical and communicable knowledge regarding the causal principles involved in making or doing 
something. It could either proceed by conjecture and intuition based on practice, training, and instruction 
(i.e. music, medicine, or agriculture), or it proceeded through the use of numbering, measuring or 
weighing The later was taken to be the higher form of techne because it involves the greater exactness or 
precision. The mathematical activities of numbering measuring or weighing were taken to be the most 
truly technai because they were taken to involve the greatest precision and were more closely associated 
with the activities of making that operate upon the material world These reasoned activities operated by 
guiding acts of making through the use of mathematics, and the techne of such activities, provided a formal 
knowledge and rules by which material practices were performed, governed, and understood. However, in 
Philebus (56d) epistemoi such as arithmetic were distinguished from technai such as carpentry because the 
former deals with abstract numbers whereas the latter uses numbers to deal with materials. In The 
Statesman (258e) episteme was used to denote pure theory or any knowledge that did not relate to the 
material world in a practical maimer. Episteme was reserved for knowledge learnt for its own sake.
Aristotle, following Plato, also defined techne as a kind of knowledge of making or production 
that informed material practices. He used the word techne (NE 6.4; Meta. 1.1; Rhet. 1.2) to refer to any 
theoretical knowledge concerned with making that was explanatory, generalised, abstract, formal, and
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communicable. Techne was induced from unarticulated particular experiences and practices into 
communicable, formal, and general knowledge of the first principles (or intelligible causes) involved in 
making or producing something. It was to be used to reason about how to make particular things in a 
specific manner. It was the general knowledge of the principles and causes, the know-how and the know- 
why, of any specific art or craft. It was inextricably bound up with an intellectual grasp (consciousness or 
cognition) of first causes that provided the kind of knowledge possessed by a technite (an expert) in any 
one of the specialised crafts. Techne provided "a true course of reasoning” that guided stable dispositions to 
make particular things or bring about a state of affairs in a specific manner (NE 6.4.1140all). It was 
distinct from experience because the latter could only be related to the particular, whereas the former was 
concerned with the general and was to be used to explain the particular. Someone may have the experience 
that outcome B will sequentially follow action A but, without a complete account of why B follows A, that 
person would not possess techne. Praxis (habitual practices) could be learnt from experience and mimicry, 
and be used to develop tacit, non-veibalised skills and beliefs regarding "the best way to proceed". 
However, it was only when this acquisition of experiences and instruction had been completed (inductively 
abstracted in a general true course of reasoning) that techne could be acquired The craftsman needed to 
give a "rational account" of praxis before s/he could be said to be a technite. This "rational account" was to 
facilitate the tracing back of a product to its causes.
Aristotle argued that the materials used in production were distinct from the technite and techne 
was not contained in the produced thing or state of affairs. Aristotle made a distinction between poieta 
(things that find their origin in the maker) and phusika (things that find their origin in themselves). The 
activities of poiesis (bringing-forth, production) were taken to bring about and terminate in a product, 
outcome, or telos (end) that was separate from them. A pot is brought-forth through the actions of the 
potter, whereas a tree is brought-forth in accordance with an internal principle of change. Aristotle 
considered poiesis guided by techne to be distinct from phusis, yet he used his conception of techne as his 
primary analogy in his elucidation of his conception of phusis (whilst maintaining the autonomy of the 
latter).4 He used techne to elucidate his conception of phusis as teleological (frequently requiring tuche, 
meaning luck or chance, as a tripartite division). When telos was introduced through the activity of a 
technite the source of change was separate from the thing in which the change happens, something could be 
considered to be phusika when the source of change was immanent within the thing itself. Techne was the 
possession of the most helpless, unshod, unarmed, unclad, but highest animal who could, through techne, 
turn this weakness around, take advantage of phusis, and even complete that which phusis left incomplete 
(De Part. Anim. 4.10.687a24; Phys. 2.8; Pol. 1337al-2.) For Aristotle, techne was rooted in and a 
completion of phusis (Phys. 193bl0 and 2.1.193al2-17) to the extent that even human nature was 
completed by techne through medicine, crafts, and politics (Pol. 1.2.1253a2). Art imitates and completes 
Nature. It does this by attempting a union of form and matter that achieves a deep union in which the telos 
(the end) comes from within. Thus, for Aristotle, techne was directed towards perfection and the technite
4 See Physics Bk.2, especially 2.2.194a22ff and 2.8.199al5ff.
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must attend to the materials s/he works with. Within Aristotle's four-fold causality of formal, material, 
final, and efficient causes, it was the technite who took on the role of efficient cause. As "a true course of 
reasoning" techne was taken to be contained within "the soul of the craftsman" as "a reasoned state or 
capacity to make" and was consequently taken to be bound up with the maker. It guided the hands to 
perform definite motions that moved the tools and shape the materials into the product. This motion 
embodied morphe (shape) and eidos (form) into hyle (matter) and produced substance (informed matter). 
Hyle should not be confused with the post-sixteenth century conception of matter as inanimate and 
structured material.5 Hyle referred to an unknowable and incognate formlessness, the formless potential to 
receive form that is active in the reception of it (Meta. 7.9.1034al0-ll; Gen. An. 1.22.730M0-20). For 
Aristotle, no two lumps of clay were alike. Hyle was the particularity of any particular lump of clay and did 
not refer to the clay-like properties of the substance called "clay". It referred to the particularity of the 
particular. It referred to the way that a potter was unable to make the same pot twice and the way that each 
and every pot, as well as the experience of making them, were all different even though they were all made 
out of the same substance. It was this active and emergent particularity to which hyle referred (Meta. 
7.8.1033b20-1034a7). Form could not be forced upon (or into) hyle because of this active character in the 
reception of form. The technite had to be responsive to the way that hyle received form and, although the 
form was in the soul of the craftsman, its union with hyle was directed by both techne and hyle. The extent 
to which the technite could impose form upon hyle was not entirely within the control of the technite and 
there was a definite limitation to the extent that techne could guide this union. It was only to the extent that 
hyle could be grasped by "the rational part of the soul", during the reception of form, that it could be known 
and be part of techne. It was for this reason that Aristotle argued that both techne and perception (especially 
touch) were required to guide the activities of making (NE 2.9.1109b23). The technite had to be responsive 
to the receptivity, capacities, tendencies of hyle emergent as the particularities of the materials during 
attempts to impose form upon them, just as much as s/he needed to know the appropriate forms, tools, 
materials, and how to combine them. The receptivity, capacities, and tendencies of hyle emergent during 
poiesis would hot have occurred without the intervention of the technite, but hyle, as the particularity of the 
particular, resists the imposition of the generality of form from having complete sway. Due to hyle, 
individual experiences of making could not be known in their particularity through the general logos of 
techne. Due to the generality of techne, the particularity of individual experiences could be emergent qua 
particularities. For Aristotle, general principles could not apply to all particulars and it was impossible to 
find universal statements that were always correct (NE 5.10.1137bl3-15). It was hyle that resisted the 
characterisation of any praxis or poiesis under a single set of rules (or instructions) that could be 
communicated from technite to apprentice. Although techne was comprised of formal, communicable, 
general, and abstract principles of making, it was primarily learnt through imitation and attending to the 
particularity of the appropriate materials. Theory is an incomplete guide to action and human beings
5 It is for this reason that, as Heidegger, Kuhn, and Feyerabend pointed out, Aristotle and Galileo's physics 
were incommensurable. They are describing two different things differently.
become builders by building (NE 2.1.1103a35). Aristotle defined techne in terms of a knowledge of the 
changeable and temporal, whereas episteme was reserved for knowledge of the eternal and unchanging. The 
subject matters of these two forms of knowledge were distinguished into two distinct realms: the temporal 
realm of Becoming and the atemporal realm of Being (Post. Ana. 2.19.100a6-9).6 Techne was directed 
towards episteme due to its theoretical character as a general knowledge of the unchanging first principles 
of change, but it was distinct because its was directed towards temporal activity. Techne was a general 
knowledge of the Being of Becoming, whereas the particularity of activities evaded complete capture by 
generalities. Thus, for Aristotle, poiesis guided by techne was straddled on a continuum between 
particularity of practice and the generality of theory (Meta. 1.1.980b25ff).
A central problem for any analysis of experimental physics is the relation between theory and 
practice. Neither an uncritical acceptance of the "internal" discourse of working physicists nor a total 
rejection of it is helpful for the project of developing an understanding of experimental physics. Realists, 
such as Bhaskar and Hacking, despite their careful attention to die motivations of physicists, are too 
uncritical of scientific discourse in their analyses of the relations between theory and practice. Sociologists 
of science, such as Latour, Knorr-Cetina, Bloor, and Collins, have not sufficiently attended to the realist 
motivations that are central to the scientific enterprise of experimental physics. I agree with these analysts 
that the relations between theory and practice are those of legitimisation, and, in their terms, physicists are 
working in the context of the justification of their expertise and authority. It is also evidently the case that 
the motivations at play in any social activity are complex and many of the motivations for pursuing 
experimental physics are transcientific. Career, aesthetics, practicality, prestige, economics, pleasure, and 
authority, are all motivations for pursuing experimental physics. It may well also be the case that someone 
is a physicist just because they so happened to be good at it. However, curiosity and the desire for 
knowledge about natural processes are also motivations for pursuing the art of experimental physics. 
Working experimental physicists are also practitioners within the context of discovery. If we aim to 
understand physics then we need to address it from within both the contexts of justification and the contexts 
of discovery. As well as addressing the justificatory role of experimentation, an intelligible and satisfactory 
account should explain the possibility of scientific realist motivations and their satisfaction. The challenge 
for a non-realist interpretation of physics is to analyse the art of experimentation as a process of discovery 
without conceding scientific realism. It is a central aim of this thesis to rise to this challenge. I shall argue 
that the labour processes of experimental physics, like all labour processes, have a teleological character.7 
They aim to satisfy the purposes and challenges, which are central to the setting-up of any experiment. The 
practices and choices adopted in the execution of any experiment are made with the explicit aim of
6 This distinction was central to the analyses of techne presented by Heidegger (1977), Dunne (1993), and 
Steigler (1998).
7 Lukacs (1967) and (1978) argued for the teleological character of labour. He argued that labour processes 
are social processes in which they are organised upon the positing of ends. He termed this positing as 
“teleological positing”. I shall discuss this in chapter four.
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satisfying those purposes and challenges. I shall argue that genuine novelty in experimental physics is the 
product of a technical complex of heterogeneous component inventions combined into an ensemble, which 
is integrated with other ensembles in order to reproduce functionality. It is this integrated ensemble that I 
term as a machine. As Latour has persistently argued, all technological objects are complex and can not be 
understood without addressing their connections and interactions with other technological objects and the 
purposes that they were constructed to satisfy. Converging and integrating their components into a stable 
and unitary centre of transformative power produces all novel technological objects. The labour processes 
of experimentation are the refining processes of stabilisation directed towards producing transformative 
powers. When labour is performed for its own sake then the labour process is an art directed towards its 
own self-perfection. All arts are self-directed labour processes that produce themselves for their own sake. 
Experimental physics is an art aiming to achieve its own techne as well as a manifestation of the 
technological imperative of Hedegger’s Ge-stell8 Heidegger was sensitive to the influence of technology 
upon human freedom and destiny. He recognised historical and life-world distinctions between pre-modem 
and modem technology. Heidegger (1977a) defined “pre-modem technology” as handicrafts {techne) and 
“modem technology” as an enframent {Ge-stell). For Heidegger, modem technology is a mode (attitude) of 
revealing that sets-up and challenges {Ge-stell) Nature to yield energy that can be independently stored and 
transmitted. A coal-fired electric power plant unlocks basic physical energies and then stores them up in 
abstract, non-sensuous thermodynamic forms. Modem technology generates a world of Bestand (resources, 
standing-reserve, stock, or capital) that are available for use. Bestand consists of objects that only have 
instrumental value. Ge-stell, enframing, is the transcendental precondition of modem technology as it 
gathers together human beings, challenges us (or sets us up), to reveal reality as Bestand (resources) 
through a mode (attitude) of Being termed as ordering. Ge-stell is not itself part of technology but is rather 
the attitude (or imperative) that is at the heart of, and wholly present within, modem technology. It is a 
technological attitude towards the world It sets upon human beings and challenges us to set upon and 
challenge the world. Technology cannot be understood in terms of technology because, as Ge-stell, it 
conceals Being and, as a mode of Being, it thereby conceals itself. Modem technology, as a concealed 
mode of Being, enframes and directs the trajectory of human existence. It is a destining. I shall discuss this 
further throughout this thesis. It is through the deepening of this destining in the science of cybernetics, in 
terms of its transparency through embodiment and the illusion of the "steersman" metaphor, which brings 
with it an increasingly unquestioning relationship with modem technology. This brings with destining a 
danger to our chances of developing a free relation with technology. Heidegger (1962) addressed the 
question of technology existentially and emphasised the primacy of practical over theoretical concerns. In 
the 1949 version of his Letter on "Humanism ", Heidegger (1999, p. 259 fn.) noted that modem science had 
become the new metaphysics into which philosophy was becoming dissolved. The unity of this
8 Ge-stell can also be translated from common German to mean “skeleton”, “stand”, “frame”, or “rack”. 
Lovitt (Heidegger, 1977a) translated Ge-stell as “enframing” and emphasises the connotations of gathering 
and ordering in its meaning.
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metaphysics was unfolding, in a new way, in the science of cybernetics. The power of modern science, as a 
consequence of this metaphysics, belonged to Ge-stell, and could not be stopped because Ge-stell obscured 
the place of “the event of appropriation” (the origin of modern science). How does the power of modem 
science belong to Ge-stelll How are modem science and modem technology metaphysically connected? 
These questions are central to my analysis of the metaphysical foundations of modem experimental physics 
as a “technoscience” and I take Heidegger’s clear insights into the characteristics of modem physics and 
modem technology as my starting points. Heidegger's analysis is open to the criticism that it follows the 
traditional prejudice of equating the foundation of modem science with the foundation of modem physics 
(neglecting medicine, anatomy, natural history, and chemistry). However, given that I am limiting my 
discussion to the metaphysical foundations required for the conception of modem experimental physics as 
a natural science, this criticism need not concern me here. Heidegger's characterisation of modem science 
throughout his work was that modem science is an objectification of Nature that represents “it” in 
mathematical terms that can not account for the “earthiness” of the world. For Heidegger, modem science, 
as a theoretical technology, allowed the possibility of producing objects without true individuality (or 
thinghood). This was itself possible because of the characterisation of knowledge as mathematical 
projection, the characterisation of scientific investigation as experimental research, and the characterisation 
of science as an ongoing activity. I shall discuss all three of these characterisations throughout this thesis. 
This direction of research in experimental physics is driven by an imperative towards the novel and 
productive disclosure and implementation of mechanisms in novel kinds of machines. The successful 
implementation of a mechanism in technological practice is taken to be the actual disclosure of those 
otherwise “invisible” theoretical entities as real entities. These entities are disclosed by theoretical- 
experimental practices in terms of technologically manipulable and graphically visualisable “natural 
mechanisms” by which these “invisible entities” interact. The work of novel experimentation is to provide 
visual representations: intelligible pictures of “the invisible world” that allow die “objects” and 
“mechanisms” of theories to become “observable” and technologically manipulable. How do these pictures 
link theoretical and technological practices in experimental physics? Mechanical realism is premised upon 
a set of precepts. These precepts are:
(i) Natural and technological phenomena both share a unitary origin;
(ii) Both natural processes and machine performances come into being by the same causal principles;
(iii) There is a unique, eternal, and universal cause for every effect (or set of effects);
(iv) The connections between causes and effects are the fundamental mechanisms of Nature;
(v) The realisation of any mechanism is governed by a Natural Law and, consequently, the 
performativity of machines is governed by the laws of Nature;
(vi) The mathematical descriptions of the motions of mechanical devices, and machines, are 
mathematical descriptions of the laws of Nature; and,
(vii) The only distinction between natural phenomena and machine performances is that the latter 
require human intervention to come into being whilst the former do not.
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I term these as precepts because they provide principles of action and function as a technical guide for the 
conceptual establishment of a methodology to explore Nature. I shall discuss how they were used to 
construct a methodology in chapters two, three, and four. I term these precepts as metaphysical because 
they provided a unifying conception of “the physical” and were the foundational principles and 
assumptions justifying the whole enterprise of both experimental physics and modem technology. I shall 
discuss this throughout.
The metaphysics upon which experimental physics was premised in the sixteenth century has 
become so widely and deeply accepted that it has ceased to be a metaphysics at all. It has become an 
inarticulated and habitual set of beliefs, values, and presuppositions, that has been inherited and embodied 
in both discourse and practice, via processes of educational mimicry and technological enframing. It has 
become a Kuhnian paradigm or disciplinary matrix. The aim of this thesis is to unmask this inarticulate veil 
of silence by disclosing the metaphysical foundation of the epistemological legitimacy of the enterprise. 
The spirit of the enterprise of experimental physics remains concealed until its metaphysical stepping stone 
has been disclosed. I agree with Nick Maxwell's (1998) argument that physics can not be made intelligible, 
as a human pursuit, without examining the metaphysical assumptions that are required for evidence and 
theories to be comprehensible. For Maxwell, science is only possible because of metaphysical assumptions 
regarding the ultimate nature of the Universe and, echoing Gaston Bachelard, he considered the role of 
philosophy to be that of revealing these assumptions. Without these assumptions the activities of scientific 
inquiry would not have any starting points. He termed this as “the fundamental epistemological dilemma of 
science” (1998, p.4). Physicists are forced to make judgements about the ultimate nature of the Universe 
from a position of complete ignorance in order to inquire into the nature of objective reality. Hence 
Maxwell argued that
“Metaphysics determines methodology. This makes it of paramount importance that a good basic 
metaphysical conjecture is adopted, one that corresponds to how the universe actually is. A bad 
metaphysical conjecture, hopelessly at odds with the actual nature of the Universe, will lead to the adoption 
of an entirely inappropriate set of methods, and the result will be failure, possibly, of a peculiarly persistent 
kind.” (Maxwell, 1998, p.5)
He proposed a ten level hierarchy of levels of metaphysical assumptions which (1) required that the 
assumptions implicit in current scientific methodology are made explicit, and (2) ordered these explicated 
assumptions into increasingly attenuated metaphysical assumptions concerning the comprehensibility and 
knowability of the Universe. He presumed that once we have arrived at indubitable assumptions (that can 
not be doubted without impeding the growth of knowledge) then we have a good reason to believe that we 
are nearing the truth. I wish to put aside the obvious philosophical objections to such a presumption. My 
contention with Maxwell is that he has presumed that physics is successful from the onset. This 
presupposition allowed Maxwell to start with “evidence” as the first level of his ten level system. Thus
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Maxwell only offered us a system for explicating the assumptions of interpretive (or speculative) 
metaphysics by using principles of simplicity and comprehensibility. However, Maxwell’s system does not 
provide us with an account of how “evidence” is selected and produced qua evidence. He did not provide 
us with any account of the operational metaphysics that underlies experimental inquiry as a means of 
producing evidence about the Universe. In my terms, Maxwell’s system presupposes mechanical realism as 
its underlying operational metaphysics. This is required for there to be a level one (labelled by Maxwell as 
“evidence”) on the basis of experiments using machines. It is an implicit “level zero” that allows 
experiments upon machines to be presented as disclosures of natural mechanisms.
It is my intention to challenge physicists, positivists, scientific realists, and philosophers, to attend 
to this metaphysics afresh, from within the context of a more general challenge that we all attend to the 
phenomenon o f making as an existentially and metaphysically important phenomenon for any inquiry into 
the conditions and trajectories of the human character. It is crucial in our understanding of what the human 
character is and how we go about questioning it. This thesis is an attempt to put forward an example of a 
line of questioning by which we can situate experimental physics into a broader and deeper inquiry into 
how reality is explored through making. My argument is that experimental physics can be understood as an 
artificial science (a branch of mathematical engineering) if we understand its essence, and its metaphysical 
heritage, as an art questioning into its own possibilities by making them happen. This understanding is 
based upon a phenomenological questioning of the hitherto neglected essence of the artificial in 
experimental physics. This neglect has led to a false dichotomy: the debate has been restricted to either 
anti-realist or scientific realist interpretations of physics. The knowledge produced through experimental 
physics is supposedly either of human origin or it discloses pre-scientific structures of the natural world 
The argument of this thesis is that we can not sustain an intelligible account of experimental physics if we 
assume that technology is simply “man made”. As a consequence of this assumption, technology is taken to 
be a simple means to ends and has not been given proper consideration within the realist and sociological 
accounts of experimental sciences. For the sociologist, only human beings, embedded in social structures, 
can be causal agents. Scientific change is a product of the struggles between human groups and their 
interests. For the realist, this cannot account for scientific change because humans qua scientists do not 
control the outcome of their experiments and experimental physics achieves considerable predictive 
success. There must be a non-human participant, a causal agent which resists and directs human intentions 
as the thought-independent object of scientific discourse: supposedly the only available candidate is Nature. 
However, in this thesis, I do not presume that technology is simply “man-made”. Sociological accounts 
need to address both the human and non-human aspects of production as distinct but inextricably inter­
related. These accounts either neglect these non-human aspects completely or present them as passive 
objects utilised according to human purposes. Several sociological writers (including Bruno Latour, Michel 
Serres, and Isabelle Stengers) have treated the non-human aspects as inanimate material that is moved by 
social forces into their position on a grid of social networks. I agree with these writers that physics should 
be understood as a social pursuit in social contexts, but they have adopted a form of social Newtonianism
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regarding the non-human aspects of reality by considering them as passive materials shaped by the external 
forces of society. Sociological accounts are necessary but insufficient. An account of the active character of 
the non-human aspects must be addressed, alongside the accounts of the active character of the human 
aspects, in order to address the questions of whether physicists know what they are doing, and whether the 
trajectories and outcomes of experimentation are under human control. In this thesis I shall analyse 
experimentation as an enframent, an ordering, of intellectual and material practices directed towards 
production of both machine prototypes for wider exploitation, and also the production of itself as an art. 
Technology is not completely controlled by human agency but in the context of production, enframes and 
orders human agency. The non-human participants, the non-human causal agents, in experimental physics, 
are machines. Thus the knowledge produced in experimental physics emerges from the theoretical 
interpretation of the performativity of machines. Experimental physics can be understood as an innovative 
artificial process and that the objects of scientific thought discovered by this process are technologically 
innovated artifacts. These technological objects are invariant and transcontextural from within the Ge-stell 
set-upon the machines in which the technological objects are connected. They are not completely controlled 
by human agency, thought, or discourse, because Ge-stell is not controlled by human agency. If the objects 
of scientific reasoning in experimental physics are understood to be artifacts, then experimental physics can 
be understood as a complex technological process that has been culturally constructed as a natural science. 
Experimental physics is not completely controlled by human agency nor does it necessarily have anything 
to do with Nature. This also provides an intelligible non-realist ontology for experimental physics: it is 
produced but not completely controlled by human agency. The ontology of experimental physics is 
produced by the cybernetic processes of attempting to theoretically understand technological innovation in 
terms of the discovery of natural mechanisms. Theorists, such as Andrew Pickering, Donna Haraway, and 
Michel Serres, have alluded to a posthumanist cybernetic theory of physics, but they have not provided a 
detailed and intelligible analysis of experimental physics in terms of technological processes. Drawing upon 
the work of Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, Lukacs, Merleau-Ponty, Pickering, Serres, Gooding, 
sociological studies, historical studies, and experimental physicists, this thesis will provide a theoretical 
groundwork for a non-realist theory of experimental physics as a technological phenomenon. This thesis 
will examine how the contours of human intervention and machine performativity are produced and 
mathematically inscribed; how these inscriptions are used to produce new machines and novel phenomena; 
how knowledge is produced through experimentation; and, how that knowledge is related to natural 
phenomena. I will also address the character of scientific rationality, knowledge, and progress in physics. I 
shall argue that experimental physics can be understood as a cybernetic process that is presented as a 
natural science on the basis of hidden metaphysical precepts. I shall discuss the operation of these 
metaphysical precepts in the mechanics of Moletti and Galileo in chapter two, in the experimental physics 
of Michael Faraday in chapter three, and how it is presumed by all subsequent experimental physics in 
chapters four and five. Once the role of mechanical realism has been addressed, from its origins in the work 
of Moletti and Galileo to the present day, then the conflation, of techne and episteme that lies at the heart of
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physics can be deconstructed and the ontology of physics can be questioned In chapter six I shall discuss 
some implications of this thesis for our understanding of experimental physics, ourselves, and the world- 
picture of Universe in which we situate ourselves.
Does experimental physics achieve knowledge about the world? Or, to be more precise, what kind 
of knowledge, if any, do physicists achieve? And, if physicists achieve knowledge, which parts of the world 
do they achieve knowledge about? In order to address these questions, I will ask the questions: How is 
experimental physics done in practice? How do these practices produce explanations about natural 
phenomena? If experimental physics is an artificial process, an art, and the objects of scientific thought are 
artifacts, then, what do we mean by artifice? How is experimental physics possible? If the experimenters 
are the shadow-puppeteers who learn their art of puppet-making by watching the shadows on the cave wall 
change, as they make their shadow-puppets and pull their strings, and I shall argue in this thesis that they 
are, then what is the fire? What is the fire of the cave? How does it relate to the Sun? And, what is its 
origin? The philosophers of science have spent too long bound, with the shadow-puppeteers behind them, 
arguing about what they see in the shadows on the cave wall. They need to turn around, pay close attention 
to the art of making shadow-puppets, and question how experimental physics is done. How does theory 
relate to technological practices? How do those technological practices relate to Nature? My argument in 
this thesis is that the operational metaphysics of mechanical realism is itself an experimental mode of 
disclosure. The function of this metaphysics is to perform three reductions:
(1) Ontological reduction. Only entities (whether described as particles, forces, waves, or whatever) that 
productively interact with machines, via a mechanism, are taken to be real;
(2) Methodological reduction. The study of natural phenomena is reduced to the search for fundamental 
mechanisms through which such phenomena come into existence and interact; and,
(3) Epistemological reduction. The character of scientific knowledge is reduced to “know-how”. Thus 
experimental physics is premised upon the “how does it work?” question and produces answers by 
attempting to produce and reproduce mechanisms.
The starting point of my argument is a phenomenology of experimental physics. I agree with 
Heidegger's characterisation of modem physics as a metaphysics of mathematical projection that is bound- 
up with modem technology. I shall discuss Heidegger's characterisation throughout this thesis. However, I 
shall be critical of Heidegger for allowing his theoretical preconceptions of what physics is to become an 
obstacle to a deeper inquiry into its essence. I shall argue that Heidegger (despite being highly critical of 
positivists) had a positivislic conception of the object of experimental inquiry and, as a consequence, 
neglected the realist spirit of the enterprise. I shall then attempt a “deeper” inquiry than Heidegger did by 
paying closer attention to this realist spirit and the way that theoretical and technological practices are 
connected. Heidegger explored how the object of modem metaphysical reflection was determined in 
relation to a decision regarding what is and the essence o f truth. What interpretation of truth provided the 
basis for the foundation of modem science and modem technology? What understanding of ontology 
provided the basis for that interpretation of truth? These are important philosophical questions for any
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understanding of physics. In his later work, he began an analysis of the metaphysical connection between 
modem science and modem technology. How are these two phenomena of the modem age connected? 
Under which metaphysics was the essence of modem science and the essence of modem technology 
brought together? Heidegger (1977b, p. 116) considered the interpretation of modem technology "as the 
mere application of modem mathematical physical science to praxis" to be a misinterpretation. Why is this 
interpretation a "misinterpretation"? How did this "misinterpretation" arise? I agree with Heidegger that 
machine technology, as the most visible outgrowth of the essence of modem technology, was not simply 
"the application" of modem science, but as an autonomous transformation of praxis, made demands upon 
and shaped the form and trajectory of modem science. However, Heidegger did not describe how this 
happened. Thus he was unclear about how and why it was possible and, consequently, in my view, he 
equivocated on the connection between modem science and modem technology. Heidegger was correct to 
characterise both modem science and technology as being bound together, but, by exploring the reasons 
why he was correct, I hope to achieve a clearer analysis than Heidegger did. I will then be in a better 
position for criticising scientific realism.
This thesis is critical of scientific realism for two reasons: (i) it is premised upon an uncritical 
acceptance of the neutrality of technology; (ii) this uncritical acceptance is an obstacle to a deeper 
understanding of what is involved in making in general and experimentation in particular. 1 hold a 
philosophical position is a realist one if it holds that:
(1) What is known to be true would be true independently of whether it was known or not, something may 
be real without being apparent, objective knowledge is possible;
(2) It is possible that a claim or belief can be false. We are fallible.
(3) Knowledge may be of non-apparent things, mechanisms, or structures, which endure unchanged, even 
when appearances change.
(4) Knowledge may be of an underlying reality that contradicts appearances.
A realist position is distinct from a scientific realist positioa A scientific realist is a realist who holds that 
knowledge and truth are achieved, or can be achieved, through scientific activities and discourse. It is 
important to note that a philosophical position can be a realist position without being a scientific realist 
position. For instance, if one holds the position that science does not achieve knowledge about a “pre- 
scientific reality” under any circumstances, regardless of whether scientists and certain philosophers of 
science know that or not, then one is holding a realist position that is anti-realist about science. My position 
is a realist one, in this respect. I have merely taken on board the fact that scientists, and also certain 
philosophers of science, try to obtain knowledge. Many “social constructivists” and “relativists” can also be 
considered to be realists about their anti-realism about science but they often neglect the realist motivations 
of working scientists. The scientific realist believes that science gives us, or can give us, knowledge of both 
the observable and the unobservable. S/he argues that indirect evidence, through mathematical and 
experimental practices, can relate the observable effects of unobservable causes. Such arguments take the 
form of “inference to the best explanation arguments” -  if a theory explains some data better than any other
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theory, we supposedly have a good reason to think that it is true. Explanatory power is taken to be a reason 
for belief It is inherent to scientific realism that science progresses by providing increasingly better 
explanations. The current scientific explanations may not be true but they are truer than the previous 
explanations. As Popper put it:
“[scientific realists] not only assume that there is a real world but that also this world is by and large more 
similar to the way modem theories describe it than to the way superseded theories describe it. On this basis, 
we can argue that it would be a highly improbable coincidence if a theory like Einstein’s could correctly 
predict very precise measurements not predicted by its predecessors unless there is ‘some truth’ in it.” 
(1974, pp. 1192-3)
In other words, the observable predictive success of Einstein’s theory underwrites the existence of 
unobservable entities it postulates. These entities, such as regions of space-time curvature and invariant 
metrics, are underwritten by the technological success of using Einstein’s theory in the exploratory work of 
astronomy and physics. The scientific realist argues that if a theory based on unobservable entities produces 
predictions of observable regularities, and expands the boundaries of what can be observed, then what that 
theory has to say about the unobservable world has a good chance of being true.
Generally, three criteria identify a philosophical position as being a scientific realist one:
(1) science aims to provide literally true stories about the world;
(2) scientific theories are constructed using potentially literally true and theory independent entities;
(3) the success of our best scientific theories implies that we have a reason to believe that they could be 
literally true and not just empirically adequate.
Accepting a theory implies accepting all three criteria, it advances our scientific aims, and, therefore, the 
acceptance of a theory involves the tentative and qualified belief that it is true. Given that we have 
predictively successful scientific explanatory theories we supposedly have a reason to think of them as true, 
or at least, approximately true. This kind of argument for a scientific realist interpretation of scientific 
theory acceptance is an argument for methodological scientific realism.9 The scientific realist position is, 
more interestingly in my view, concerned with what science can and cannot do. The scientific realist 
position expresses the hope that we can transcend human perspectives and achieve knowledge of an 
ahistorial and asocial quality. Science is to act as a corrective activity upon the social and historical 
differences in our perceptions of the world into which we are bom. Furthermore, science is to take us much 
further than our limited bodies would otherwise allow. We can extend our powers of observation by using 
instrumentation. It is this very technological power which supposedly provides us with a wider and more 
inclusive world view than our inborn nature would provide, and hopefully will provide us with a less 
relative and more absolute account of the world This position requires, and maintains, a distinction 
between the appearance of the world (according to our sensory experience) and the reality of the world
9 Boyd (1984), Putnam (1973,1975), and Findlay-Hendiy (1995) are examples of variants of this position.
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(possibly experienceable through technological powers and scientific exploration). It is this distinction 
which required the categorisation of the world into primary and secondary qualities or characteristics. Like 
for Locke and Descartes, this position requires the acceptance of the existence of an absolute, complete 
world, as it is in itself, to which any particular modes of perception could, in principle, be related. Any such 
perception would be available to any being of any bodily, cultural, historical and perceptual constitution 
provided any such being was able to perform scientific activity and thinking. This position, or 
psychological disposition, is a modem manifestation of the ancient dream that everything in the world can 
be expressed and known as a universal and eternal principle, or related set of principles. This is an ideal 
which, at least as of yet, science has been unable to actually achieve, nor demonstrate that it is achievable in 
the future. The scientific realist’s position is one of a faith that science will be able to provide episteme 
even though any “epistemoi” so far provided by scientific activity have been short lived and disputable. It is 
this faith that reveals the extent that scientific realism, as a philosophical position, is based on a 
psychological disposition. It is this psychological disposition that makes scientific activities and discourses 
meaningful for scientific realists as being based, if not on knowledge, but on the faith in the possibility of 
achieving knowledge.
Do scientists need to be scientific realists? Does a scientist who adopts scientific realism behave 
differently from one who does not? For Findlay-Hendry (1995) the answer to both these questions was an 
emphatic “yes”. His opinion was based on the argument that scientific realism seeks a literal understanding 
of past and present theories, and the use of concepts underwrites their employment in the construction of 
new theories. He argued that new theories point out - and explain - new phenomena. This achievement is 
that of Bacon’s dream: new knowledge offering new powers. Findlay-Hendry, like Popper, argued that the 
predictive success of scientific theories implies that those theories must have “some truth in them”. 
Findlay-Hendiy’s argument is based on the premises that science is based on scientific realism, and science 
achieves successes in both prediction and communication. He considered it to be absurd to claim that 
science could achieve such successes, being based on scientific realism, without achieving some 
approximation to the truth. Findlay-Hendry, like Popper, Putnam, and Boyd, used instrumentality and 
intelligibility arguments for truth. Rom Harre (1986) termed this kind of scientific realism to be "policy 
realism" and affirmed it. Their arguments presupposed that physics is successful. Let us also assume that 
physics does achieve success in making predictions and achieving new powers. Does it follow from this 
that we should be scientific realists? In A Realist Theory o f Science (1975), Roy Bhaskar argued that it 
does.
Bhaskar is one of the few scientific realists to take experimentation, making, metaphysics, and 
material practice as central to the endeavour of physics. He stands alongside Ian Hacking, David Gooding, 
and Andrew Pickering, in this respect; these contemporary writers have paid close attention to the primacy 
of material practices in experimental work and have examined experimental physics as a form of making. I 
shall discuss the work of Hacking, Gooding, and Pickering, as well as the work of others, throughout this 
thesis. Bhaskar declared his intention "to provide a comprehensive alternative to the positivism that has
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usurped the title of science". (1975, p.8) Bhaskar proposed his transcendental realist theory of experimental 
science as a third position to stand against both positivism and idealism. He also rejected descriptivist, 
instrumentalist, and fictionalist interpretations, as positions that are unable to account for the 
transcontexturality, or transfactuality, of the objects of scientific thought (i.e. theoretical entities, empirical 
regularities, and scientific laws) nor can they explain how science corrects itself (1975, pp42-3). I agree 
with Bhaskar that neither idealism nor empiricism can provide an intelligible theory of experimental 
physics. However, Bhaskar went further than just providing a realist interpretation of experimental physics. 
He claimed that a realist interpretation of science is necessary, if experimental activity is to be intelligible, 
and that his transcendental realism “is the only position that can do justice to science.” (1975, p.26) He 
claimed that “without such an interpretation it is impossible to sustain the rationality of any scientific 
growth or change.” (1975, p. 15) He argued that there is an ontological distinction between scientific laws 
and patterns of events, and that the core of theory has a conception or a picture of a natural mechanism or 
structure at work (1975, p. 12-26). According to Bhaskar, the constant conjunction (or regular patterns) of 
events, produced in experiments, can not be considered as a necessary condition for the assumption of the 
efficacy of a law because, for a scientific realist, a scientific law must exist prior to being actualised within 
a pattern of events. For example, a scientific realist holds the laws of electromagnetism to be existent prior 
to, and independently of, Faraday's experiments on electromagnetic phenomena and Maxwell's 
mathematical formulation of those laws. The purpose of experimentation is to actualise the mechanisms 
that are governed by those laws; those are prior to, and transcend, the experimental activity that actualises 
them. Thus, for Bhaskar, the assumption of the efficacy of a law must proceed the attempts to actualise and 
stabilise a pattern of events if those attempts are to be intelligible. The laying down of a law is basic. I shall 
discuss how physics has laid down its laws in chapters two and three.
In this thesis I shall provide a non-realist model of experimental physics that is able to account for 
the transfactuality of scientific objects, and the rationality of scientific growth and change, without making 
any judgement upon the validity of the metaphysics which is presupposed by scientific realism. In my view, 
Bhaskar’s claims beg the question. It is the concept of the rationality of any scientific growth or change, 
which is at stake for any scientific realist interpretation to get off the ground An interpretation of physics is 
not inherently flawed if it questions, or even rejects, any notion of rational scientific inquiry. Anti-realist 
arguments can not be criticised on the basis that they do not sustain a concept of scientific rationality. They 
are designed to undermine such a concept. The onus is upon scientific realists to provide such a concept 
because without it there is no rational basis for scientific realism. To criticise anti-realist interpretations of 
science because they do not provide the basis for a scientific realist interpretation is an unreasonable 
criticism10 Bhaskar made such an unreasonable criticism of anti-realist interpretations of experimental
10 Norris, for example, based his whole critical realist argument against positivist and anti-realist 
interpretations of quantum mechanics on the premise that anti-realist interpretations of quantum theory 
must be flawed because they are not realist. Cf. Norris (2000) ch.2, esp. pp. 48-9. In my view, Norris 
missed the anti-realists' point about the limitations to what physicists can legitimately say on the basis of
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science. Furthermore, descriptivist, instrumentalist, and fictionalist interpretations can account for scientific 
change by locating the structures of change within the structures of social powers. However, once we take 
technology into account then we can go further than that. I will argue in this thesis that a concept of 
"bounded technical rationality" sustains a notion of rational scientific growth and change, without requiring 
any commitment to scientific realism, providing that this concept is understood in the context of its 
mechanical realist heritage. This provision does not require any commitment to the truth of those precepts, 
on the part of the non-realist, because we only need to address their function within the establishment of the 
template for subsequent scientific practices. It does not matter whether these precepts are true or not All 
that matters is how they function within the discursive and technological practices of experimental 
physicists. Bhaskar limited the concept of scientific rationality to be that which presumes scientific realism. 
This is not necessary for an intelligible account of experimental physics, nor is it sufficient for an 
intelligible account of scientific rationality. I shall provide an interpretation of rationality in experimental 
physics that allows technical growth and change, within the productive contexts in which technical choices 
and selections are made. This does not require the existence (or inexistence) of natural laws or mechanisms 
as anything more than encodified sets of discursive and technical indices for the interactions between 
technological objects. When Bhaskar (1975, p. 114) claimed that he has presented a basis for “rational 
principles of action” he actually offered us a pragmatic principle of action that is characteristic of “bounded 
technical rationality” and a techne.
The constant conjunction of events produced in the closed system of experiment can only be taken 
to be “governed by Natural Law” if we claim that such pragmatic principles are necessary and we have 
metaphorically substituted “Natural Law” for techne. My argument is that physics achieves progress only 
by extending the variety technological objects at its disposal. I shall discuss how it does this in chapters 
three, four, and five. It does not provide necessary and sufficient reasons to presuppose that it does, in fact, 
discover any natural principles that exist a priori to the practices of physics. Thus experimental physics can 
be said to achieve progress only in a context of technological expansion. Contemporary physicists have 
more techniques, materials, tools, machines, and instruments, at their disposal than seventeenth century 
physicists did. Furthermore, the contemporary physicists have the recorded efforts of the previous 
generations of physicists at their disposal. In a technological context, contemporary physicists are able to 
deal, on an everyday basis, with far more complex, sophisticated, and powerful machines, instruments, 
techniques, and tools, than the seventeenth century physicist would have been able to imagine. My 
argument is that it does not immediately follow from this innovative productivity that the contemporary 
physicist has one more iota of knowledge about Nature than the seventeenth century physicist (or a pre- 
socratic Greek, for that matter). Whether physics has progressed in epistemic knowledge is the very 
question at stake. Bhaskar did not establish any argument for a rational dynamic of change. He merely 
asserted that there is one. He can not provide such an argument — no realist can —  because science is
quantum physics if they are to use the results of those experiments to support their discourse. Furthermore, 
his argument begs the question.
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unfinished and we do not have its conclusions at our disposal. It is experimental. Its success is still open to 
question. It has not achieved its own techne and, consequently, physicists do not know what it is that they 
have done and are doing, if we demand of them that they provide a complete causal account of all their 
experiments. After all, as Maxwell pointed out, we cannot say that we are nearing the truth, improving our 
approximations of the truth, until we know what the truth looks like. We can only claim nearness if we 
have pre-empted the final form of truth. In Lukacs terms, the final form of truth was teleologically posited 
from the onset of experimental physics. This pre-emption has been utilised by mechanical realists, since 
Galileo, by assuming that the theoretical interpretation of the successful innovation of any technique to 
make novel technological power is a step nearer the final truth about Nature. It is also an assumption that 
there is any such final truth at all. The formula of “success equals nearness to truth” in the context of 
experimental physics is premised upon a conflation of knowledge with the acceptance of technique. 
Henceforth, objective truth has been replaced with technological power. Bhaskar has neglected the 
constructive role of technology in experimental physics and his argument is premised upon this conflation. 
Consequently his argument is based upon a false ontological dualism between human activity and Nature as 
the only possible poles of control at work in experimental activity. This leaves Bhaskar open to the 
following criticisms:
(i) his transcendental argument for realism is circular and is mere assertion;
(ii) his realist interpretation of the rationale of experimental activity is based on the hidden
presumption of mechanical realism and thus is an “internal” rationale; and,
(iii) if the constructive role of technology is taken into account then we do not have to assume that
either experiments are purely meaningless human constructions or that they must reveal the laws 
of Nature that exist independently of human activity.
I shall argue that if we take technology into account then we can provide an intelligible non-realist 
interpretation of experimental physics in which it is neither purely a human construction nor necessarily 
reveals any laws of Nature. In chapters three and four I shall describe experimental physics as a process of 
inscribing the interactions between human interventions and machine performativity. These inscriptions are 
rhetorically and techno-poetically substituted as mechanisms during the analogical processes of modelling. 
Theories are the metaphorical and abstract representation of those mechanical motions into an interpreted 
cluster of linguistic, conceptual, and mathematical possibilities. These are creatively and interpretively 
extended and manipulated by using analogical and metaphorical connections with other theories, models, 
machine performances, and techniques. Techniques, theories, mathematical functions, and technological 
objects transfer across the boundaries between experimental machines. This allows the innovation of those 
machines and provides transfactual connections between members of the same machine-family. This family 
is a strata of machines that share a common ancestor prototype; each prototype is constructed through trial 
and error processes of integrating heterogeneous technological objects from other machine-families. Due to 
the assumption of mechanical realism, the technological is taken to be transparent and the technographic 
ftmctives are metaphorically presented as abstractions, or representations, of the mechanisms of Nature.
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Through metaphorically based rhetorical, poetical, and visual, techniques, emergent through socially 
mediated communication and argument, these functives can be verbalised, visualised, and conceptualised, 
within models and theories of the causes in operation in the occurrence of natural phenomena. These 
mechanical models and theories are subsequently legitimated through a process of successfully 
implementing these functives and their model-dependent derivatives in the subsequent extension, 
innovation, and invention, of their associated machine-families, and feeding them back into processes of 
guided technological innovation. An acceptance of mechanical realism has allowed this techneic innovation 
of the production of machines and technographe to be epistemologically justified as an epistemic process of 
the discovery of natural mechanisms and laws. This is how physics progresses.
The non-realist argument of this thesis satisfies BhaskaiJs two criteria for the adequacy of an 
account of experimental science (1975, p. 17) because it sustains the idea of knowledge as a produced 
means of production; and, it sustains the idea of the independent existence and activity of the objects of 
scientific thought (providing that the phrase “independent existence and activity” is taken to mean that the 
objects of scientific thought are not entirely mental entities and that they are not entirely controlled by 
human intentionality). The task of this thesis is to describe this “independence” and the possibility of 
innovation without presupposing either technological determinism or scientific realism. The objects of 
scientific thought maintain this independence because they are technological objects and therefore are not 
entirely discursive, nor completely controlled by human agency. It does not follow from this that they are 
natural objects in the sense of coming into existence independently of human existence. It does not follow 
from the fact of the uncontrollable performance of technological objects that they would exist without the 
technological practices from which they are emergent and implemented. In order to understand 
technological objects we need to move beyond linear thinking and address the non-linearity of human- 
machine relationships. I shall discuss this in chapters five and six.
As a technological product, scientific knowledge is a special kind of social product, which has a 
mechanism (or structure) as its object that is existentially contingent upon human technical activity and 
phenomenologically independent from human control. A technological object can not exist without the 
conditions of its production, (which include the inscriptive, discursive, and material practices involved in 
its production) but its trajectories, once implemented in practice, transcend human control and expectations. 
The challenge of this thesis is to understand this kind of object without appealing to the “traditional” 
dualism of categorising it as either “man-made” or “natural”. Such objects are not simply “man-made” but, 
despite their phenomenological reality, they do not independently exist in the realist sense, either. The non­
realist interpretation of experimental physics that is being proposed in this thesis satisfies Bhaskar’s 
criterion (1975, p.24) that experimental physics is engaged in “non-spontaneous production of knowledge”. 
I shall address the ways that technological objects are fedback into the processes of experimentation, and 
the novel extension of the variety of available technological objects. Both technical knowledge and 
reasoning play guiding roles in the production of technological objects and the processes of technological 
innovation. I reject Bhaskar*s criterion that any interpretation of science must accept “structural and
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essential realism”, which is defined as “the independent existence of causal structures and things (in the 
intransitive dimension)”, if that criterion is premised upon the uncritical presumption that this “intransitive 
dimension” is Nature. Do we know that Nature is intransitive? I shall argue that the “intransitive 
dimension” is itself intelligible as a product of the “transitive dimension” of organised, non-linear, 
productive agency. Intransitivity is existentially contingent upon productive agency but is not controlled by 
productive agency because the transitive dimension is itself a non-linear process that is not under control. 
The uncontrollability of technological objects, which is characteristic of their intransitivity, is due to the 
uncontrollabihty of the whole process of innovation. Technological objects have degrees of autonomy once 
they are embodied in productive practices. It is this autonomy that is the “intransitive dimension” and the 
subject matter of this thesis. My intention is to satisfy all of Bhaskar’s structural requirements for a theory 
of experimental physics and show how the process of experimentation can be made intelligible, without 
appealing to “Nature” or “Natural Law” as a ground of that process, whilst attending to the “realist spirit” 
of the efforts of physicists. Provided that technological objects are not presumed to be controlled solely 
through human agency then we can bring the ontological status of “the intransitive dimension” into 
question. My argument is that “the intransitive dimension” is emergent from the technological processes of 
experimental physics, and is only categorised as natural once mechanical realism is assumed. If we do not 
assume mechanical realism then “the intransitive dimension” is nothing other than an enduring 
technological trajectory and, despite its phenomenological reality, it is not real in a realist sense.
Bhaskar’s claims go too far. His argument only shows that experimental physicists, aiming to 
discover causal laws, cannot be empiricists or idealists. Nothing else. He presented a false dichotomy: we 
either have scientific certainty or poetic intuition (1975, p.44). Examining the role of technology in 
experimental physics prevents the need for this either/or thinking. Technology provides the concrete and 
material dimensions for experimental physics and the knowledge of these dimensions is techne. We do not 
need to restrict the debate to either laissez-faire humanism or deterministic realism. My interpretation of 
physics extends this debate to include the nature, significance, and behaviour of machines in terms of a 
metaphysics of mathematically inscripted human-machine interactions. Once human imagination and 
metaphysical justification have been culturally embodied in these machinic interactions then the 
technographical inscriptions can be poetically metaphorised as “Natural Law” and the “book of Nature” can 
be read from sheets of mathematics and diagrams. By reducing Nature to a set of mechanical causal 
principles, and technological objects, episteme and techne have been conflated through the metaphysical 
precepts of experimental physics since the sixteenth century. It was this conflation that provided physics 
with a methodology. I shall discuss this in chapter two, three, and four.
My argument in this thesis is that scientific knowledge is a socio-tcchnical ambition and that 
experimentation is a socio-tcchnical process. Theories are the products of inteipretive and mathematical 
inscriptions of the technological enframent of the interactions between human interventions and machine 
performances. Each theory is metaphorically connected to a natural process by social imagination, whereas 
it is technically connected to a family of machines. It is this social imagination that allows machines to act
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as interface between human beings and an invisible world of hidden natural mechanisms and laws. The 
operational metaphysics of mechanical realism allows the translation between machine performances and 
“Nature” to be made in terms of “natural mechanisms”. Quantum Electrodynamics (QED) may well have 
unprecedented predictive success. What does it predict? Its accurate predictions of the magnitude of 
magnetic dipole moments, for example, are the prediction of how a particular kind of machine should 
perform. Scientific knowledge is neither “read straight from the natural world” nor “out of the human 
mind”. This is a false dichotomy. Scientific knowledge is the objective of the processes of generalising the 
transdicted inscriptions of the contours of human-machine interactions into sets and sequences of causal 
mechanisms, fundamental mechanical entities, their effects, and mechanical interactions. I shall discuss 
how this has been done in chapter two, three, and four. The performativity of machines is neither entirely 
dependent upon nor entirely independent from human agency because it is interactional. Performativity 
arises in the technological contexts of these interactions. The centre of control and causal power lies neither 
in a “material world” nor in a “human world” but rather occurs during the processes of bringing together 
diverse agents and attempting to converge and integrate them into a single centre of control and 
transformative power. I shall discuss this in chapters four and five. It is this project of integration that 
constitutes the technological context of production. The specific forms of both human interventions and 
machine performativity are situationally dependent upon this context, and human-machine interactions are 
shaped by the technological tasks they are set-up to achieve. The significance of these interactions for the 
human understanding of Nature only occurs through social and cultural mediation, imagination, and 
consensus. The interaction between the “intransitive dimension” and the “transitive dimension” is emergent 
from the interaction between heterogeneous technological objects along a teleologically posited trajectory 
destined by previous efforts, challenges, and expectations. This insight opens up the possibility of 
interpreting experimental physics as a technological phenomenon An intelligible non-realist account of 
experimental physics needs to draw upon both anti-realist and scientific realist interpretations but is not 
reducible to either.
The Inadequacy of Empirical Adequacy:
In this thesis I shall explore and discuss how experiences are made through experimental physics. Popper 
presumed that this process of making is guided by theory but did not provide us with a clear account of how 
theory is used to make experience. Gooding has provided a clear and detailed account of how both theory 
and experience are made through the actions of the experimenter in the case of Faraday's work in 
constructing electromagnetic phenomena. However, due to the non-mathematical character of Faraday’s 
work, Gooding does not provide us with any account of how mathematics is used within modem 
experimental physics to construct theory and experience. In order to generalise the discussion of how 
theories and experiences are constructed through experimental physics we also need to address the roles 
that mathematics has in this process. I shall discuss the interactions between mathematical, material, and 
discursive practices, in the contexts of experimental physics, throughout this thesis.
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The boundary between the observational and the theoretical is not clear cut -  it may change with 
instrumentation and also with changed intellectual frameworks.11 A positivistic account of experimental 
science is restricted to, in Harre’s (1986) terms, “realm 1” and “realm 2” beings. The former are 
perceivable entities, such as mountains, trees, bananas, etc. The latter are entities that can only be perceived 
through instruments, such as bacteria, the moons of Jupiter, dust mites, etc. The shape of the boundary 
between “realm 1” and “realm 2” beings is defined by the innovation of instruments such as the microscope 
and the telescope. The innovation of new instruments led to the growth of “the observable realm”. 
Observation of entities through instruments such as the microscope or telescope is not simply a matter of 
perception. One must also interpret what one sees. Kuhn (1961) and Feyerabend (1975) argued that 
observations using such instruments are made from within theoretical frameworks.12 The interpretation of 
perception used to construct observations is made using pictures rather than theoretical frameworks. The 
indirectness of perceptual experience when using such instruments is a serious problem for a positivistic 
conception of science because the interpretive processes involved on the boundary between “realm 1” and 
“realm 2” beings using novel instrumentation is not based on empirical and logical propositions. This 
problem is made worse for the positivist if the development of a new instrument is based on unperceivable 
mechanisms, “realm 3” beings. The shift in the boundaries between “what might be perceivable using an 
instrument” and “what is perceivable using an instrument” provides a science based on theories of “realm 3 
beings” with an interpretive dimension. The construction and interpretation of instruments such as electron 
microscopes, x-ray scanners, neutrino detectors, geiger counters, etc., is at best highly problematic for the 
positivist and at worst is inconceivable. We need to make a distinction between the kinds of reference-act 
involved in making reference to “realm 1” “realm 2” and “realm 3” beings. In my view, the ontological 
status of “medium sized dry goods” or “realm 1” beings, such as mugs, tables, horses, cigarettes, etc., that 
we have a familiar perceptual acquaintance with, is not an interesting philosophical problem for the 
philosophy of science. The reference to these objects is not of the same kind as making reference to 
electrons, genes, and electromagnetic waves, etc., because we do not have a perceptual acquaintance with 
the latter kind of “objects” at any time or in any context. We infer their existence on the basis of particular 
interpretive practices. Pointing at a tree and saying “tree” is not the same type of reference-act as pointing 
at a test-tube full of gloopy liquid and saying “genes”, or pointing at a photograph of slightly curved lines 
and saying “electron”. We make a technically mediated interpretive reference to the electron and make a
11 A point made by Popper (1975), Feyerabend (1975),Kuhn (1961, 1977), Hacking (1983), Harr£ (1986), 
and Gooding (1990)
12 Popper (1975) also argued that observations are made in the tight of theories. Collins (1985) also argued 
that observations are made from within conceptual frameworks. As Hacking (1983) pointed out, if we take 
the term theory to refer to a hypothetical, formal, and abstract mathematical and conceptual representations 
of a wide body of connected phenomena (as Kuhn, Feyerabend, and Popper do) then this claim is 
overplayed. The term "construa!” is a better one. Cf. Gooding (1990) pp. 123-4 and 256.1 shall discuss this 
term in chapter three.
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socially mediated perceptual reference to the tree. These are distinct types of reference-act. The everyday 
perceptual reference-act is not of interest to scientists qua scientists whereas the technically mediated 
interpretive reference-act is. This type of reference act is distinct from technologically augmented 
perceptual reference-act. The act of looking down a microscope and seeing bacteria, or the act of looking 
through a telescope and seeing the moons of Jupiter, is not the same kind of reference act as looking at a 
microscope and seeing a microscope, or looking at a telescope and seeing a telescope. Making reference to 
“realm 1” beings is a different kind of reference-act to making reference to “realm 2” beings. The latter is 
both a technologically mediated perceptual reference-act and a technically mediated interpretive reference- 
act. The latter requires specialised interpretation and training to be able to perceive what is “there”. Even if 
one is a realist about the objects of everyday perceptual reference-acts, or even technologically augmented 
perceptual/interpretive reference-acts, it does not follow that one should be a realist about the “realm 3” 
beings of technically mediated interpretive reference-acts. “Realm 1” and “realm 2” beings are part of the 
lived-world of experience whereas “realm 3” beings are the causal-mechanisms in explanatory accounts of 
“the unexperienced world that causes the world Of experience”. I shall not discuss the ontological status of 
“realm 1” or “realm 2” beings further. The ontological status of “realm 3” beings and their role in the 
construction of experience in terms of technically mediated interpretive reference-acts will be discussed 
throughout this thesis. The argument of this thesis is that we do not need to be realists about “realm 3” 
beings even if the discourses of experimental physics are constructed using technically mediated references 
to “realm 3” beings and experimental physics is shown to technologically progress.
None of these factors are a problem for a positivism that is critical of experimental science. They 
are only problems for a positivistic foundation for experimental science. However, positivism does raise 
some very important problems for scientific realism. For example, there is always the possibility that at the 
empirical level two different theories can agree but utilise different theoretical entities; this leads the 
positivists to argue against any necessary relation between predictive success and truth. Scientific theories 
are far from accurate representations of reality -  they are idealisations and abstractions, which focus on 
particular properties of phenomena under investigation and cases of partial regularity. However, do 
working physicists operate under this kind of scepticism? It seems that the scientific realist has a case when 
s/he argues that working scientists tend to take their theories literally. The aim of theorising is not just a 
matter of achieving empirical accuracy, or predictive success. It is also a matter of explaining the 
phenomenal world. Positivists, as descendants of Hume's empiricism, reject metaphysics as either nonsense 
or unverifiable because, by positivistic definition, metaphysics is taken to lack any empirical content. 
Positivists presume that physics has a logical and empirical character that is divorced from metaphysics. 
This anti-metaphysical turn can be seen throughout the works of Hume, Mill, Mach, Carnap, Comte, 
Wittgenstein, and Bas van Fraassen.13 However, as Popper (1975, p.39 and pp. 312-2) pointed out, 
scientific laws, as universal laws, cannot be logically reduced to singular statements of experience and,
13 It can also be seen in the empiricist approaches of sociologists such as Collins (1985), Knorr-Cetina 
(1981), and Latour (1979,1987,1990).
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consequently, positivists, by rejecting all metaphysics, must reject all natural sciences that claim to 
Hdiscover” universal laws. Positivism, by rejecting metaphysics, cannot affirm the physicists' claim to 
discover or use universal laws of Nature. A positivistic interpretation of physics is a rejection of the validity 
of such claims and, as a consequence, must reject the epistemological validity of experimental physics. This 
raises serious problems for positivistic interpretations of physics that claim to be for experimental physics. 
Furthermore, as Popper conceded (1975, p.206n), various metaphysical beliefs, such as Kepler's 
neoplatonic harmonics of the geometry of the planetary orbits about the Sun, have lead to significant 
advances in theory. History provides many examples, such as seventeenth century atomism, that were 
untestable using the technologies available at the time. In Popper's terms these theories remained 
metaphysical until the innovation of technological means by which they could be tested. The demarcation 
between a metaphysical theory and a scientific theory, in these cases, is one of historical accident and yet 
the role that they played in the development of science was often significant prior to the innovation of the 
means to test them (Popper, 1975, pp. 277-8). By rejecting metaphysics, positivists have amputated a 
significant source of scientific speculation. However, metaphysics has a far more central role in 
experimental physics than Popper would allow. In this thesis, I shall argue that a metaphysics, namely the 
metaphysics of mechanical realism, has an essential role in constructing the epistemological justification 
and development of the processes of using mathematically rationalised machines to “discover” the 
fundamental mechanisms of nature and mathematical natural laws.
Instrumentalism, like positivism, fails to recognise that an important goal of physics is to produce 
explanatory theories that describe the law-like behaviour of the causal agents that lead to the phenomena of 
the experienced world. As Popper (1975, p. 6 In) pointed out, the motivation to provide causal explanations 
of the phenomena of the experienced world is irreducible to the practical technological interest in the 
deduction of predictions. The former is an attempt to satisfy a basic human desire to explain "the world of 
experience'' in terms of a "deeper" world of fundamental principles and causes. The latter is a part of the 
two-fold process of testing the deductions of theories and is a route by which hitherto unexpected novel 
phenomena could be discovered. The prediction of possible novel phenomena is an important aspect of 
theoretical work. It provides existential statements that can be verified by actually finding the predicted 
entities.14 The discovery of new phenomena is a much more important motivation for scientists than 
falsifying theories. Physicists aim to identify, explore, manipulate, describe, and explain, the elements of 
the world that would exist independently of human experience. Positivists, in their rejection of both 
metaphysics and “deep explanations”, have rejected the validity of the narrative aspect of scientific 
theorising. This narrative aspect, as a kind of story telling, is a cultural phenomenon that attempts to situate
14 Cf. Rom Harry’s (1983) policy realism. Note that existential statements cannot be falsified by experience 
until a search of the entire world has been performed. The importance of the existential aspect of discovery 
is one that was somewhat neglected by Popper. For example, physicists and astronomers are far more 
interested in discovering black-holes, instances of gravitational lensing, worm-holes, or a variety of 
phenomena predicted using the theory of General Relativity, than they are interested in falsifying it.
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human beings within a world-picture. In all cultures, human beings have told stories about how the world 
came to be. This social and psychological phenomenon is an essential part of what it is to be human. The 
active construction of narrative about identity is, in essence, a part of what it is to be human. Scientists qua 
human beings are no different in this respect. Positivists have made a crucial error by rejecting this essential 
aspect of ‘the human character’ as scientifically legitimate. Nothing could be legitimate in ongoing novel 
experiments, on the positivists' account. Although it always remains possible that a scientific explanation 
may be replaced at some future date with another explanation, this still does not discredit the claim that 
physicists seek explanations. Even though it may well be an important part of any explanation that it is 
taken to be (at least tentatively) literally true it is not actually necessary that it is true for it to qualify as an 
explanation. All that is required is that an explanation is intelligible. This is as true for a physicist as it is for 
a shaman. The fact that an explanation is intelligible says nothing about its truth. An intelligible explanation 
may be true or false and still be intelligible. For example, children may well find the Santa Claus stoiy to be 
an intelligible explanation for the appearance of Christmas presents at the foot of their bed when they wake 
up. The fact that it is a fiction does not detract from its intelligibility to children, provided it is taken 
literally. Newton found the corpuscles explanation of light to be intelligible despite the lack of evidence for 
it. It did not matter whether it fitted the facts of the behaviour of light -  its function was to make light 
intelligible. Intelligibility is also essential any intentional deception to be effective.
This importance of intelligibility for the acceptance of scientific theories cannot be as easily 
dismissed as van Fraassen (1980) would have us believe. Of course, to some extent theories must “fit the 
facts” in order to be widely acceptable, but if a theory does not explain “the facts” then it is an 
unsatisfactory theory. Although the history of physics has witnessed the establishment of numerous 
“empirical laws”, such as Newton’s Universal Law of Gravitation, Boyle’s Law for Ideal Gases, Ohm's 
Law of Electrical Resistance, and Ryberg’s Empirical Law for Spectral Lines. These laws only suggested 
that there was a simple relationship at work in complex phenomena. They did not explain why it had that 
form. Newton found his own law quite unsatisfactory in this respect. Physicists, such as Leibniz, 
Boltzmann, and Bohr, were driven to find a theory, or model, that not only matched the “empirical laws” 
but also explained that model in terms of fundamental entities and mechanisms. On this point, I am in 
agreement with Harr6 and Madden (1977), when they argued that explanation is essential to the 
development of scientific theories. Furthermore, given that the content of these explanations are in terms of 
mechanisms, or “causal powers”, then these explanations can take a functional role in scientific reasoning 
during the construction of further experiments. This gives physics an exploratory and developmental 
trajectory. This was also argued for by Peirce (1955, p. 330) when he criticised the empiricist assumption 
that accurate measurement was the central feature of science because, as he put it, “they fall behind the 
accuracy of bank accounts” and the determination of physical constants was “about on a par with an 
upholsterer’s measurements of carpets and curtains”. It can be argued that current accuracy is greater than 
the nineteenth century of which Peirce wrote, but his point was to question the assumption that accuracy is 
as important in experiment as it is often made out -  science can be done without a great deal of attention
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being made to achieve accurate measurements.
We may differ about whether an absolute conception of the world is achievable through scientific 
activity, or even whether we should aim at such a thing as a directional principle. It certainly is 
questionable whether an absolute conception of the world, even as a directional principle, is necessary for 
the practice of science. It is conceivable, as at least a possibility, that any regularities uncovered through 
scientific activity are spatially or temporally dependent and variable. Physical laws could only be valid 
from within a very small region of the universe. Alternatively, Nancy Cartwright’s (1983) suggestion that 
the laws of physics are approximations and models constructed in accordance with our interests and needs 
could well be correct. Hume’s denial of eternal and universal natural kinds may well be justifiable. We are 
not in a position to be certain one way or the other. Furthermore, we are not presently in a position to be 
certain that fundamental accounts between different sciences will be compatible with one another. One 
thing that we can be certain of is that science has provided us with technologies and some degree of 
manipulative power that exceeds pre-scientific abilities. Although the question of absolute truths remains 
controversial, the case that science is able to conform to Bacon’s dream, at least as a directional principle, 
is evidently the case. Although it may well be the case that many working scientists are scientific realists 
about their science, it is evidently the case that it is not necessary for a scientist to hold this disposition to 
follow the Baconian imperative. One can be sceptical of an absolute conception of nature but be able to 
manipulate and control objects with increasing success. One may reject the notion that science takes us to a 
deep understanding of the structures of the world, that any such understanding is provisionally and 
contingently true but constantly open to modification and radical change, but be accepting of the ability to 
provide practical and useful solutions to present problems.
It is fairly uncontentious to claim that most scientists tend to be realists in the sense that they 
accept that many of the theoretical terms that they use could correspond to real referents that exist 
independently of their theorising. In order to provide an intelligible account of experimental physics as an 
alternative to Bhaskar’s I shall assume that most physicists are scientific realists. This assumption brings 
with it an requirement for the account I shall develop in this thesis. It has to be a two-fold account of both 
the technological success and the explanatory success of physics. Bhaskar argued that empiricism can not 
sustain the idea of the independent existence and action of the things that are “investigated and discovered 
by science”. Furthermore, if experience is taken to be both definitive and primary then classical empiricism 
cannot account for how those experiences are related to discourses about unexperienced things. Empiricism 
can not account for the fact that scientific discourse, in the context of experimentation, is technically 
constructed in terms of unexperienced entities and mechanisms. Given that in the world outside the 
laboratory walls, which Bhaskar terms as an open system, is a complex place in which regularly repeated 
constant conjunctions of events (such as if A then B), required by the positivistic sciences, are uncommon, 
then a positivistic science would only operate within the circumscribed confines of the closed system. It 
would not be able to justify the production of any conjunctions of events that it was able to produce 
because, as empirical regularities, they would not be transferable from the context of production. These
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empirical regularities could not be presented as the consequences of natural laws. Thus, for Bhaskar, 
empiricism can not make the practices of experimental sciences intelligible as a pursuit
The notion of empirical adequacy was central to the scientific epistemology in the constructivist 
empiricism presented by van Fraassen. Van Fraassen rejected scientific realism and limited scientific 
ontological commitments to that given as a matter of direct observational experience. The purpose of an 
adequate scientific theory is to save empirical appearances without any need for a realist ontology or 
causal-accounts. This involves adopting the traditional empiricist scepticism regarding the existence of an 
objective Nature and causes (or entities) that are not apparent as actually observable phenomena. 
Furthermore, he claimed (1980, p. 22) that the demand for causal explanations does not play a role in “the 
scientific enterprise”. Allegedly, objective and mind-independent reality is, by definition, beyond the 
capacities of human understanding and, therefore, the task of producing a complete and correct theory of 
objective reality is an impossible one.15 Van Fraassen argued (somewhat inductively) that if past theories 
have been shown to be empirically inadequate then this provides a good reason to suppose that current 
theories will be shown to be empirically inadequate in the future. Many theoretical entities, utilised in past 
theories, have become merely of historical interest whereas the empirical knowledge those theories have 
produced have often remained. Consider the case of Newtonian absolute space and time. These theoretical 
entities have been replaced with the Einsteinian relative space-time as a theoretical entity. Yet much of the 
empirical adequacy, which Newton’s theory produced, remains and is also obtainable using Einstein’s 
theory. It is a possibility that Einstein’s theory will be in turn replaced with a theory that will use different 
theoretical entities. Even if we accept that scientific theories are progressing in their empirical accuracy, 
predictive power, explanatory success, and productivity of new phenomena, this still does not provide us 
with any certainty that the theories that are being currently used by working scientists will not be replaced 
by subsequent theories. In fact, this acceptance of the progress of scientific knowledge prohibits any such 
certainty. As a consequence of this, it follows that not only is there reasonable doubt in the theory- 
independence of unobservable entities, in their necessary existence, but also that there is no pre-requisite 
for any isomorphism between the structures of a theory and the structures of the object of that theory, for it 
to be successful at an empirical level.
Van Fraassen adopted the instrumentalist line that the best that physicists could legitimately claim 
to achieve are empirically adequate descriptions, predictive success, and manipulative control. The 
physicist should be content to adequately describe phenomenal appearances by producing abstract 
formalisms and sets of equations that successfully predict observational results. Explanatory causal- 
accounts amount to nothing more than fictions. Physicists should rest content with saving phenomenal 
appearances and reject all explanatory causal-accounts, the notion of objective Nature, and claims 
concerning the existence of unobservable entities. The best that physicists can achieve, according to van 
Fraassen, is that the evidence suggests, if the evidence is in favour of that theory, that things behave as i f
15 For now, I shall put aside the internal contradiction that we are able the make such a final statement about 
something we are supposedly unable to make any final statements about.
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unobservable theoretical entities existed. This does not support any claim that those entities exist. We 
should not be surprised at the predictive and descriptive successes of current scientific theories. Scientific 
theories arise through competitive social processes in which only the successful theories emerge. These 
theories are latched onto observed regularities in Nature (1980, pp. 19-40). Nancy Cartwright (1983) made a 
similar point when she argued that literal representation is not a criterion in theoretical modelling. 
Assumptions and approximations are accepted which, although not exactly true, are not exactly false either. 
Theories are corrected and modified in order to fit the facts. She argued that physicists need to simplify 
complex natural phenomena in order to provide the simplicity appropriate for mathematical description. 
Thus both theories and the objects to which they apply are constructed and then matched, in a piecemeal 
fashion, to the real situations. This process sometimes provides predictive accuracy but rarely do theories 
and models match all the facts at once. She argued that fundamental laws do not, in fact, describe reality 
but only describe the appearance of reality. This appearance “is far tidier and more readily regimented than 
reality itself.”(1983, p. 162) Cartwright argued that reference acts in terms of discrete and stable theoretical 
entities occur through attempts to simplify complex real phenomena. Physicists can only achieve abstract 
descriptions of “the appearance of reality” and these are insufficient to provide good reasons for a belief in 
the theoretical entities used to produce those descriptions.
My first criticism of empirical approaches to modem physics is that it is a mistake to claim that the 
theories of modem physics represent “the world of experience” or “the appearance of reality”.16 The “world 
of experience” is not “the objective world” explored by modem experimental physics.17 Although “the 
world of experience” and “the objective world” are both parts of the same world neither are reducible to the 
other. The empiricist misrepresents the object of inquiry for modem physics. The “world of our 
experience” contains phenomena such as blue skies on clear summertime days. How would a physicist 
describe such a phenomenon? How would a physicist describe the colour blue to someone who had been 
blind since birth? Let us assume that the blind person is conversant in the language of modem physics. The 
physicist could describe the eye in terms of an optical device. S/he could describe how electromagnetic 
waves of a particular wavelength radiate from the Sun, are refracted and scattered by particles in the Earth's 
atmosphere, are focussed onto the retina by the lens of the eye, stimulate the rods and the cones of the 
retina, and are transformed into electromagnetic pulses in the optic nerves. S/he could then describe how 
these electromagnetic pulses travel through the optic nerves, travel through a network of nerves leading to 
the brain, generate electrochemical process in the brain’s network of neurons, and are finally ‘processed’ by 
the brain as the colour blue. Let us assume that whatever theory, or model, that the physicist utters is 
empirically adequate to the extent that its derivative resultant would be that the sky on a clear day would
16 This is a mistake made by classical empiricists, logical positivists, van Fraassen, and Popper (Cf. 1975, 
P-39).
17 This point was made by Merleau-Ponty (1999, p. 3) in his criticisms of intellectualist and empiricist 
accounts of perception. Heidegger (1962) also made this point with regard to attempts to equate lived 
spatiality and temporality to any scientific conception of space and time.
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have the colour blue. Let us also assume that the blind person perfectly understands the physicist’s 
description of how the eye and brain processes differences in wavelength. But does the blind person know, 
on the basis of this description, what an experience of the colour blue is? There is one essential 
characteristic of the colour blue that is missing from the physicist’s description of blue. That essential 
characteristic is the blueness of the clear daytime sky. It is a quality of clear daytime sly that is 
immediately experienced by all people who are able to see it. One merely points at the sky on a clear day 
and remarks on its blueness. The blind person will, from the physicist’s description, have no idea 
whatsoever of the experience of seeing the colour blue. Nor will the blind person have any idea, from the 
physicist’s description, that there is even the possibility of the experience of blueness. The physicist could 
talk of atoms, electrons, photons, matter, ions, radiation, wavelengths, refraction, the spectrum, prisms, 
electromagnetism, oscillations, coupling-constants, or resonance, but would be unable to introduce blueness 
into her/his description. The blind person would have no more idea of the experience of looking at the sky 
and seeing its blueness, as a result of the physicist’s description, than s/he did at the onset. The physicist 
could deny the facticity of the blueness of the sky on a clear day to people who can see the colour blue. 
However, any arguments against the facticity of the blueness of the clear daytime sky require assumptions 
and premises that would be more suspect than the indubitable experience of blueness. Blueness remains 
surplus to the physicist’s descriptions of the colour blue. It lies outside the language of physics and remains 
an undeniable residua to any attempt to explain it away. The same is also true of all the qualia that are 
characteristic of “the world of experience” or “the appearance of reality”.18 The lived-world of human 
experience contains surplus and residua qualia that cannot be reduced to the language of physics. The 
language of physics is essentially reductionistic and operates upon a distinction between primary and 
secondary qualities.
The primary qualities are taken to be qualities, such a number, size, weight, volume, etc., which 
supposedly do not vary between human subjects. These are taken to be the properties of objects. The 
secondary qualities are taken to be qualities, such as colour, scent, value, orientation, meaning, etc., which 
vary between human subjects. These are taken to be the properties of the reaction of human subjects to 
objects. Primary qualities supposedly allow for an universalisation of description that the secondary 
qualities do not. If this is accepted then any description of the world that is presented as an universal 
description can only include primary qualities and all secondary qualities, no matter how remarkable they 
might be, must be excluded. Descriptions of the phenomena of “the world of experience” must be reduced 
to include only the primary qualities if those descriptions are to be universal descriptions. As these 
universal descriptions are taken to be descriptions of the properties of objects then such a description would 
be a description of “the objective world”. The language of physics is disciplined reduction all that could be 
said to include only that which could be said by all. As the descriptions of “the objective world” are not 
limited to any particular human observer then “the objective world” is taken to be independent of all human 
observers. “The world of experience” includes experiences of both “the objective world” and “the
18 This point was also made by Dunne (1948, pp. 11-7).
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subjective world”. None of these “worlds” are reducible to one another once the distinction between 
primary and secondary qualities has been made.19 Physicists aim to identify and describe the elements of 
the world that would exist independently of human experience. Physicists only study “the objective world” 
and do not study whole world. From the very onset, physics excludes all characteristics that are taken to be 
dependent upon human experience.20 Physics excludes human beings from its object of study; it also 
excludes itself. Physics is expressly the study of those elements of the world that would supposedly remain 
if there were no human beings to experience them or their effects. As such, physics is implicitly an attempt 
to obtain objective knowledge and is a realist enterprise.
Physics is not primarily the study of everyday objects. The directly observable objective behaviour 
of familiar objects, such as trees, rocks, nuts, berries, and bananas, are of little interest to the experimental 
physicist. Studies of the behaviour of familiar objects, at most, constitute starting points for experimental 
physics. The observation of the empirical regularity that hot objects, in a cooler environment, cool down, 
and cold objects, in a wanner environment, warm up, (formally universalised as the Zeroeth Law of 
Thermodynamics) constitutes an almost trivial starting point for the study of thermodynamics. The 
physicist wants to know why this empirical regularity occurs. There is a big leap from this "empirical 
regularity" and an interpretation of it in terms of flowing heat. An even greater leap is required to quantify 
heat and construct an apparatus to measure the conservation of that heat flow. On van Fraassens' account, it 
is hard to see how thermodynamics could have progressed from the Zeroeth to the First Law. The Second 
Law, with its esoteric definitions of work and entropy, could not be part of “the scientific enterprise”, 
without an appeal to theory. The majority of experimental work in experimental physics involves the 
investigation of phenomena of which we have no direct experience whatsoever. We do not have direct 
experience of the majority of the phenomena investigated by the studies of mechanics, thermodynamics, 
electromagnetism, radioactivity, solid state physics, or quantum physics. The study of these kinds of 
phenomena involves the interpretation of the performances of machines and instruments. We only have 
experience of the numerical and analogue readings on calibrated meters, oscilloscopes, graph plotters, 
gauges, computer displays, and other instruments. However, these experiences are not direct sensory 
experiences. We need the mediation of technical education before we can make sense of our direct sensory 
experiences of instruments. Each instrument is calibrated using technical entities (such as potential 
difference, time-signals, inductance, capacitance, thermal capacity, electrical resistance, phase, frequency, 
mass, magnetic field strength, force, harmonics, electric charge, power, etc.,) quantified in terms of 
arbitrary SI units ( such as kilograms, metres, candelas, seconds, amperes, moles, radians, kelvins, newtons, 
coulombs, tesla, watts, etc.) These technical entities and units are meaningless outside of the theoretical and
19 Cf. Nagel (1986) for a discussion of some of the problems this causes for realism and objectivity
20 Although it is questionable whether qualia, such as blueness, should (or could) be properly categorised as 
subjective, intersubjective, transcendental, epiphenomenal, or whatever, the claim that they are, at least in 
part, existentially dependent on the existence of a being capable of experiencing them is a relatively 
uncontentious one.
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technological frameworks in which they occur. By claiming that measurement using such instruments 
provides direct experience, the empiricist merely has passively accepted the stable results of an historical 
struggle of technological and theoretical efforts, and the current state of instrumentation, education, and 
interpretation as givens. The empiricist has neglected the role that theories and causal-accounts, involving 
theoretical and technical entities, have had in the construction of those instruments and their interpretation. 
If we were to describe the objects of investigation and theories as fictions, as does van Fraassen, that are 
instrumentally used to interpret the empirical facts of measurement, we would still require interpretive and 
theoretical training in order to ascertain what the empirical facts of measurement were (in all but the most 
trivial of experiments.)
Entities such as potential differences are no more, nor less, fictional than entities such as 
electromagnetic fields, given the fact that we have no direct experience of either and both are only 
meaningful within theoretical interpretations. The former are only considered to be more concrete than the 
latter on the basis of a passive and uncritical acceptance of past theoretical interpretations and an arbitrary 
scepticism about present theoretical interpretations. If we were to consistently adopt van Fraassen's 
empiricism then experimental physics would be a process of instrumentally using fictional entities to 
investigate other fictional entities. If a final complete description of “the objective world” is impossible 
then it would be pointless to map out the empirical variation of the fictional entities used to make 
instruments intelligible against the fictional entities used to make theories intelligible. The empirical 
adequacy of any laws that would be produced through such a process would be the pointless inter-relation 
of different kinds of fictional entities. Modem experimental physics could not be grounded on “constructive 
empiricism” and physicists would not rest content with it. Modem experimental physics is not empirical in 
the philosophical sense; a physicist does not rely upon direct experience but investigates the disclosure of 
interpreted instrumentation to direct experience.21 An intelligible account of physics must provide an 
account of how this disclosure is possible and how it is achieved. Empiricists cannot provide us with an 
account of how observations of using instruments are obtained because they cannot consider the technical 
reasoning (made in terms of theoretical entities and causal-accounts) used in the interpretation of 
measuring instruments and experimental apparatus, as scientific. Thus they either cannot provide a 
meaningful account of observation within experimental physics in terms of scientific facts, or it is only able 
to provide accounts of observation by arbitrarily, passively, and uncritically accepting particular technical 
interpretations of particular measuring devices as given. Causal-accounts, in terms of theoretical entities 
and mechanisms, are central to the interpretation of experimental apparatus and measuring instruments. 
Any causal-account is, at least in part, an explanation. Modem experimental physics could not proceed 
without them.
Experimental physics provides descriptions of entities, properties, and mechanisms, of which we 
do not have direct experience (such as mass, charge, fields, radiation, atoms, virtual particles, coupling 
constants, etc.,) in terms (such as number, rate of change, magnitude, proportion, direction, etc.,) that can
21 Feibleman (1982, p.6) also made this point.
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be related to mathematical practices, interpretations, and technological manipulations using measuring 
instruments and experimental apparatus. It is limited to descriptions of an objective world of machine 
performances in terms of laws, causes, unperceivable entities, and mechanisms. The descriptions produced 
by modem physics make reference to and utilise what Harre termed as “realm 3 beings”. Experimental 
physicists, whether or not they realise it, tend to be scientific realists. The theories of modem physics 
attempt to represent “the unexperienced world that causes the world of experience” and not “the world of 
experience”. It attempts this by interpreting “the objective world” of machine performativity in terms of 
“realm 3 beings”. Measuring instruments and experimental apparatus are the “the objective world” 
interface between “world of experience” and “the unexperienced world that causes the world of 
experience”. This interface is interpreted using technical causal-accounts in terms of “realm 3 beings”. Van 
Fraassen's a priori rejection of the role that such interpretive technical causal-accounts play in “the 
scientific enterprise” of modem experimental physics prevented him from producing an intelligible account 
of experimental physics. He also attempted to close off the character of “the objective world”, that is 
explored through physics, from philosophical analysis. It is the phenomenological character and ontological 
status of “the objective world”, explored through physics, that is the subject matter of this thesis. In order 
to question the ontological status of this world we need to examine the complex relationships that occur, 
through the interface of measuring instruments and experimental apparatus, between “world of experience” 
and “the unexperienced world that causes the world of experience”. How is “the objective world” used to 
disclose “the unexperienced world that causes the world of experience”? We need to examine experimental 
physics as a scientific realist enterprise of disclosing the “the unexperienced world that causes the world of 
experience” through kinds of human interaction with machines.
Van Fraassen assumed a robust and clear distinction between theory and observation that is not 
apparent in actual experimental work. Observations occur in the light of theories, within theoretical 
frameworks or paradigms, using concepts, visualisations and construals.22 The processes of making 
observations are socially mediated interpretive and interactive acts. They involve making choices and 
judgements that are irreducible to either empirical or logical propositions. Experimentation is based on 
planned action, selections, and decisions.23 It is not based upon a passive reading off facts from the world 
but is a process of active intervention.24 It is an interpretive, interventional, and interactive process in which 
experiences are made through deliberated interpretive and material practices rather than passively received. 
Positivism is unable to deal with the processes of constructing novel experiences of novel phenomena. It is 
unable to account for the ways that novel material, communication, and visualisation practices are 
constructed when dealing with novel phenomena.25 Positivism cannot provide an account of how theories
22 Kuhn (1961, 1977); Popper (1975); Feyerabend (1975); Collins (1983); Gooding (1990).
23 Gooding (1990); Popper (1975, p. 280)
24 Hacking (1983); Gooding (1990).
25 Gooding (1990, pp. 29-30) made this point in his discussion of the construction of novel communicable 
experiences in the early work on electromagnetism by Faraday et al.
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and their tests are to be constructed in the face of novel phenomena. Nor can it provide an account about 
how novel experiments can be constructed in the absence of an established theory. Novel experimental 
research programs could not proceed according to a rigid positivistic conception. Bhaskar (1975, p. 167) 
was right to argue that there are not any general philosophical criteria for judgements of adequacy of an 
empirical law because such judgements are intrinsic to the sciences concerned. The criteria for judgements 
in chemistry will not be the same as for psychology, nor would those for genetics be the same as for 
physics. Judgements of adequacy are also based upon aesthetic estimations of technical excellence, utility, 
simplicity, etc. Adequacy is determined in context, through use, experience, and expectations. Such 
judgements are made in relation to other people and the historically transitional standards for adequacy, 
which are used to make experiences commensurable within the same historical period. It is whiggish to 
compare the efforts of medieval mechanists with twentieth century mechanical engineers on the basis of an 
affirmation of the standards of the latter as an improvement. This respect for the efforts of the past has been 
accepted in science studies since Kuhn wrote The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions.
Furthermore, by asserting that sensory observation founds all genuine knowledge, by presuming 
that only those statements that are derived from experience are legitimate or scientific, the positivist has 
neglected to attend to the ways that experience is itself constructed. The positivist, by considering the 
problems of traditional philosophy as metaphysical pseudo-problems that are meaningless for empirical 
sciences, has neglected the fact that the central problem for traditional philosophy has always been a 
critical analysis of appeals to the authority of "experience".26 Positivism, by uncritically making its appeals 
to "the authority of scientific experience”, rests upon a reactionary and conservative appeal to already 
completed scientific results. It is unable to account for the construction of experiences in cases of neither 
novel experimental physics, nor the impact that those novel experiences have in the subsequent 
construction of novel theories, and is only able to provide a conception of experimental physics during its 
Kuhnian "normal science" phase. It fails to recognise the explorational, speculative, and constructive 
processes of experimental work. By reducing physics to the systematic ordering of our sensory 
experiences, positivism restricts "facts" to be statements of our immediate experiences made in terms of 
already given language. Thus it is impossible for us to add any fact that cannot be expressed and logically 
analysed in terms of already given language. It is impossible for positivists to explain how novel 
experiences could be constructed in terms of novel language because the restriction that they place upon 
legitimacy and intelligibility would not allow the processes involved in the construction of novel language 
to begin. Any novel experiment would be unscientific according to the positivist conception of science. 
Thus positivism cannot account for scientific change nor can it account for how experimental physics 
began in the first place.
Hacking (1983) also argued that the growth of the observable realm through instruments is an 
important feature of science. If the same entities can be observed with independent instruments then there is 
a good reason to believe that they exist independently of those instruments. This belief in the
26 A point made by Popper (1975, p.51-2)
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transcontexturality (or transfactuality) of the existence of theoretical entities, such as electrons or 
electromagnetic fields, is central to the "internal" intelligibility of experimental physics as a pursuit and 
emphasises the importance of cross checking. This point was also central to Rom Harre’s and Bhaskar's 
arguments for scientific realism. Positivism cannot justify a belief in the transcontexturality of theoretical 
entities because, by limiting knowledge to the empirical, it is unable to legitimately transcend the 
particularity of experience. Theories are nothing more than a means for the logical deduction of predictable 
events. Instrumentalism, a descendent of positivism, proposes that a theory is nothing more than a tool or 
an instrument for prediction and control. For the instrumentalist, there is no distinction between science and 
technology. Science is a technology, an instrument, to produce predictive power and control. Choice 
between theories is made on the basis of the empirical adequacy and/or instrumentality between them rather 
than their truth-status. On an instrumentalist view, it is possible for statements about a kind of entity to be 
logically consistent and useful despite the fact that the kind of entity in question does not exist. An example 
would be an ideal gas. Statements about the properties of an ideal gas can be logically consistent and useful 
despite the fact that an ideal gas is an imaginary entity. Mach, Schlick, and van Fraassen, are exponents of 
varieties of instrumentalism. There is much commonality between the interpretations of science expressed 
by the instrumentalists and that of Dewey's pragmatism. Theories, according to instrumentalists, are merely 
instruments to provide predictive success and manipulative control. Any theoretical entities, such as 
electrons or electromagnetic fields, are fictional and should not be taken to be literally real entities. Van 
Fraassen inductively assumes that because past scientific theories have been falsified and replaced there are 
good reasons to assume that current theories will, in turn, be falsified and replaced. Theories, on his 
account, should be treated as fictions and not as literally true. The central problem with instrumentalism is 
that it is unable to explain how these instrumental theories based upon fictional entities can provide 
predictive success and facilitate manipulative control at all. If electrons and photons are merely fictional 
entities then how can instrumentalism explain the incredible predictive accuracy of Quantum 
Electrodynamics? Furthermore, if the validity of any theoretical entity is restricted to its utility then such 
entity could only be said, by an instrumentalist, to operate within the context of use. Thus theoretical 
entities do not have any transcontexturality. When physicists experiment on electrons in electric circuits 
they are not operating with the same kind of electrons as the physicists at CERN. The instrumentalist is 
unable to explain how these physicists are able to use the same theories, say QED or Maxwell's equations, 
in these distinct contexts. Nor is the instrumentalist able to account for the physicists' motivation to perform 
the experiments in the first place.27 If the theories produced by experimental work do not refer to anything 
outside the contexts of the experiment then either physicists do not aim at obtaining universal laws or they 
are deluded. Given that theories such as Maxwell's equations are taken by physicists to apply to all 
electromagnetic phenomena, and QED is taken to apply to all electron-photon interactions, then, on the
27 Norris (2000) made this point in his criticisms of both the positivistic and anti-realist interpretations of 
quantum mechanics.
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instrumentalist account, physicists must be deluded. On the instrumentalist account, the apparent 
transcontexturality of Maxwell's equations and QED must be merely co-incidental. However, as I shall 
argue in this thesis, the transcontexturality of techniques, theoretical entities, mathematical practices, 
instruments, and theories, is essential to the construction of experiments, the innovation of technologies, 
and the development of physics. We do not need to deny transcontexturality in order to criticise scientific 
realism. Furthermore, instrumentalism can not provide an account of how physicists fail to successfully 
perform experiments. Given that Morpurgo's experiment to attempt to find free-quarks was a project that 
utilised fictional entities, electrons and electromagnetic fields, to attempt to find other fictional entities, 
namely free-quarks, then there does not seem to be any source of resistance to its success. If what 
constituted the proper use and identity of theoretical entities is completely determined in context then there 
is nothing to prevent a physicist, in that context, from achieving success. One need only instrumentally 
reconstruct the meaning of the performativity of the apparatus according to one's intentions within that 
context. Other physicists, in other contexts could not object to this because one could merely argue that 
they were using the terms "electron'', "electromagnetic field", and "free-quark", differently within different 
contexts, and that anyone who failed to repeat the observation merely had failed to re-construct the context 
of use. Instrumentalism does not provide an intelligible non-realist account of experimental physics. An 
intelligible non-realist account of experimental physics must provide an account of how theories can be 
predictively (un)successful and are used for manipulative control (well or badly). It must also provide an 
account of how theoretical entities achieve transcontexturality.
Empiricism can not provide an account of the 'feedback* processes between scientific theories and 
the construction of experiments, and experience. It is unable to do this because it is premised upon 
completed knowledge, reasoning, techniques, experiments, and experiences. It is unable to cope with novel 
(or revolutionary) experiments and cannot explain how and why experiments were constructed in particular 
ways. Empiricism can not explain how theoretical entities "transcend" neither the particular contexts of 
their production nor how predictive success is possible. Classical empiricism fails because the 
technological environment of the laboratory is unintelligible to primitive experience. Scientific 
instrumentation is a meaningless maelstrom of flashing lights, moving pointers, digital displays, graphs, 
and readouts, to the uninitiated. Technological discourse is required to construct a meaningful experience of 
experimental apparatus and instruments. There is nothing primitive about voltages, time signals, 
amplitudes, temperatures, and pressures. Furthermore, if we accept that the production of causal-accounts is 
an essential aim of experimental physics, then positivism, by rejecting the possibility of the knowledge of 
causes, cannot provide an intelligible account of how and why novel experiments are constructed and 
performed. A physicist uses causal-accounts to construct an apparatus that relates variables. S/he cannot 
operate experimentally by restricting the technological discourse to the level of "when substance A is 
placed near the geiger-counter the current across the tube increases by B" when designing the experiment in 
the first place. S/he utilises a discourse at the level of "if radioactive material emits energy sufficient to 
ionise a gas then this will be manifested as a current across a sealed tube with a voltage across it. Therefore
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we can build a device to measure levels of radiation.1’ The capacity of physicists to construct experiments is 
dependent upon such causal accounts. Even if we constrain ’’the world of experience" to the confines of the 
laboratory, as orthodox empirical accounts of science have done, as a means to verify or falsify theories by 
testing their predictions and deductions, this still does not provide us with an account of how those 
experiments are constructed. Empiricism tends to only account for experimentation in terms of a ready­
made procedure of measurement, without any justification of that procedure, because it has neglected to 
attend to the role of technology in experimentation. As Heidegger, Rom Harrd, Hacking, Bhaskar, and 
Gooding have pointed out, because empiricism (and positivism) can only deal with Kuhnian "normal 
science" it cannot account for novel physics.
However, scientific realism has also neglected the role that technology has in the construction of 
scientific theories. Consequently it has presumed that the causal accounts produced by the experimental 
sciences must refer to natural causes. Hence, there is a false dichotomy between positivism and realism 
presented in Bhaskar's argument: if positivism fails to provide an adequate theory of science then realism is 
the only alternative. However, if we address the constructive role of technology in the production of 
scientific theories then we can examine scientific causal accounts without committing ourselves to either a 
realist or positivist interpretation of them. If scientific causal accounts are neither fictions nor refer to 
natural entities then Bhaskar's dichotomy is a false one. We are not compelled to consider scientific causal 
accounts to be either fictions or referent to natural entities. The causal accounts utilised by physicists are 
techneic guides to the construction of machines and their associated theories. These techneic discourses are 
constructed in terms of the first causal principles, or mechanisms, that are in operation during the 
interaction between human intervention and machine performativity. Such discourses only require the 
existence of particular kinds of machine and particular modes of technological activity. They do not need to 
refer to Nature at all. Bhaskar has neglected to attend to how physicists actually test statements about 
causes. What physicists actually do is attempt to embody such statements into their practices of designing, 
constructing, operating, and interpreting, machines. They embody causal statements by transforming them 
into machinable forms. It is only by making such a process neutral and transparent, through social 
processes and metaphysical precepts, that the transformative nature of technological embodiment can be 
conveniently forgotten. I shall discuss this in chapters five and six.
However, when Bhaskar claimed (1975, pp.33-7) that the empiricists have conflated ontology and 
epistemology he has misrepresented their point. The empiricists' point is not that human experience is an 
existential condition for the existence of the world, but, rather, that what we can legitimately say about the 
world is limited by what we know about that world based on experience. The empiricist has conflated 
ontology and epistemology only in the sense that the study of being is constrained by empirical knowledge. 
It has epistemologically enframed ontology. Hume, for instance, did not claim that "what is" is itself 
constrained by "what is experienced". IBs claim was that talk about "what is" outside of "what is 
experienced" is mere speculation. The empiricist does not place any restriction upon what does exist; s/he 
places a restriction upon what we can say about what exists. For the empiricist, a statement about cause is
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an assertion of belief, or an expression of speculation, and is not an example of knowledge. The 
epistemological point made by empiricists is that knowledge should be prior to discourse about things. The 
"empirical world" is the part of the world that the empiricist claims that we can have legitimate knowledge 
about. This only places a constraint upon which part of the world we can claim knowledge about. 
Empiricism only places a constraint upon discourse. It does not place any constraint upon the world and 
Bhaskar has misrepresented empiricism by claiming that it does. However, empiricism does not provide an 
epistemology that provides a meaningful account of the spirit of experimental physics. Bhaskar was right 
about this. Hume's critique would not support experimental physics as a route to knowledge. Bhaskar is 
right about this too. However, Bhaskar (1975, p.40) misrepresented Hume’s position by claiming that Hume 
assigned impressions an ontological primacy. What Hume did was to assign impressions an epistemological 
primacy and consequently all knowledge (not being) must begin with impressions. This only constrains 
ontological discourse and does not constrain being. Hume did not conflate knowledge and being. He 
constrained knowledge claims about beings. His point was that experience should constrain knowledge 
about the world and not that it constitutes the world. Hume refused to make knowledge claims about an 
unexperienced world. Hume's point was that events are often co-joined, i.e. heat and flame, a heavy object 
falls when dropped, thunder and lightning, etc., but we cannot have certain knowledge about any causal 
connection between them. He did not deny that causal connections exist. Hume's concern was about the 
knowledge claims that we make based on the use of reason. He did not make any claim that the world was 
comprised only of events; he argued that our experience of the world was comprised of events. His point 
was that "necessary causes" were beyond our experience and that, if we base our knowledge upon 
experience instead of reason alone, we cannot claim to have any knowledge of "necessary causes". Hume 
equated knowledge with the empirical; he did not equate the real with the empirical.
Bhaskar (1975, p. 3 2) asserted that events are "categorically independent of experience" and 
rejected the empirical definition of events in terms of experience. However, in relativistic and quantum 
physics observational acts are required for an event to be determined. This does not necessarily involve 
direct perceptual experience on the part of a human being, and is certainly not subjective (an accepted 
technique of measurement is required), but it does require measurement. An event is determined from 
within technological enframent to the extent that the phenomenon in question is reconstructed in terms of a 
set of measurements. The observational experience is reduced to this set of measurements. Thus events and 
experiences are categorically brought together by technology. They can only be taken as independent by 
making the technology involved transparent. Reference to an unperceived object (e.g. radioactivity) is made 
via the connection between theoretical discourse and technical discourse, as a distinct kind of reference act 
to a perceived object (e.g. the clicks of a geiger counter). Bhaskar's realism treats these two kinds of 
reference act as if they were the same kind because he assumes a tight and competent link between 
scientific interpretation and perception. He has uncritically accepted the technical expertise of scientists. So 
did Hacking. However, this assumption is inconsistent with both of their theories of science. If one accepts 
that our knowledge of the intransitive objects of perception is itself transitive, as Bhaskar does, then we
39
cannot assume that there is a tight and competent link between any perception and any interpretation of that 
perception. If our interpretations change, which Bhaskar accepts, and our skill at making interpretations 
improves, which Bhaskar asserts, then we cannot, at any stage, assume that our current interpretations are 
correct and, therefore, we must maintain a distinction between the two types of reference act. Van Fraassen 
was quite right to maintain this distinction. Bhaskar made an argument of the kind that he rejected as illicit 
when he argued (1975, p.32) that it follows “from the current state of knowledge we can... state that there 
were events unperceived and unimagined by previous human beings, in the past, and that (1) these events 
actually occurred in the past; (2) these events were possible in the past; (3) these events occur 
independently of our current productive capacities”. The act of interpreting the past in terms of current 
interpretive and perceptual reference acts is an act of reconstructioa It reconstructs the past in terms that 
are only presently available. We need to be sensitive about the reconstructive character of our efforts to 
interpret the past. Aristotle was mistaken when he claimed that we do not deliberate about the past. It can 
be changed by political action, as Lukacs and Orwell pointed out. It is only as a result of such a 
reconstruction that we can postulate the past existence of events that were unknown and unperceived at the 
time they occurred. Events that are unknowable and unperceivable, if they occur at all, would never be a 
part of science unless there was a change between the boundaries between "unknowable" and "unknown", 
and also between "unperceivable" and "unperceived". As Harre (1983) and Don Ihde (1991) pointed out, 
the distinctions between "unknowable and unknown" and between "unperceivable and unperceived" are 
crossed by technologies, such as the telescope, the microscope, the electron-microscope, etc. The problem 
for the empiricist is not whether or not such events existed but, rather, is how can knowledge of such past 
events be constructed given that they were unexperienced in the past. Whose experiences do we use? The 
empiricist does not claim that the set of unknowable and unperceivable events is empty, as Bhaskar claimed 
(1975, p.32) they must. For the empiricist, there is nothing that can be said, based on knowledge and 
perception, about the contents of such a set. On that point, I agree with the empiricist.
Bhaskar suggested (1975, p. 34) that transfactual Laws of Nature must exist because 
experimentalists can make mistakes. I agree that mistakes can be made but disagree that the facticity of 
“Laws of Nature” follows from this. All that need follow from human fallibility is that there are 
expectations, and ends, and the possibility of satisfying them, or not. We also have changing standards of 
success between different groups of people and different periods of time. Failure says nothing about the 
ontological status of the "Laws of Nature". Nor does it follow from fallibility that the means of satisfying 
expectations are determined by any kind of law (natural or otherwise). Nature, if involved at all, may well 
have whims. My argument is that if we treat technology as heterogeneous then failures are the result of 
incompleteness, complexity, and diversity between non-linear processes, rather than a failure of 
correspondence. Bhaskar's transcendental realist ontology depends on a reified technocentricity and a 
concealed metaphysics. Bhaskar described his position as one of "nature-centricity". This is only the case if 
"nature" is taken to be that which is revealed by the technologies of experimental physics. His claim to
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maintain a "nature-centricity" is a form of anthropocircumfcrentialism28 based upon a conception of 
"technical man" as a natural being. In my view, Bhaskar (1975, p.58) misrepresented empiricism by 
claiming that "the concept of the empirical world is anlhropocentric". The concept of the empirical world 
would only be anthropocentric if it also implied that human beings were the origin and controller of 
experience. Empiricism cannot make any claim to the knowledge of the origin of experience because that 
would lie outside (prior) to experience. This is one of the crucial distinctions between Hume and Kant. 
Empiricism makes a modest claim to limited human powers to know the world that rejects die more 
grandiose claims to knowledge of the world make by practitioners of speculative reason hi this respect, 
transcendental realism represents a far more a concealed "anthropocentric" ontology that the empiricist 
would allow because it presents, as I shall argue in this thesis, a human created view of the world as the 
world itself. Bhaskar (1975, p.35) misrepresented empiricism by claiming that it commits "the epistemic 
fallacy". It is true that empiricism is primarily concerned with epistemology over ontology. However, the 
primary concern of empiricism is to find justifications for a distinction between certainty and speculation. 
For empiricists, we can be certain about constant conjunctions but only speculative about causal laws. Their 
mistake is to presume that the "we" is well defined and speculation is technically functionless. If 
empiricism mischaracterises science it does so by placing prohibitions upon the speculative reasoning that 
is central to scientific exploration. Science could not exist without speculative reasoning. However, it does 
not follow from the fact that science speculates upon causal laws that these laws exist outside of, or prior 
to, scientific reasoning. They might do but they also might not. The onus upon the scientific realist is to 
demonstrate that they must do. Realists have not done this. They have merely asserted it. In this thesis, my 
argument is that if we treat the non-human part of the world in experimental physics as the machine-half of 
the human-machine relations of modem technology then experimental physics can be made intelligible as a 
mathematically inscripted, technologically driven, metaphysics that does not necessarily need to have 
anything to do with Nature at all. My point is that, even if physicists need to be realists, then we can still, 
as outsiders, make experimental physics intelligible without committing ourselves to scientific realism. 
Bhaskar, by assuming the epistemological validity of experimental science, and, as a consequence, 
accepting the ontology revealed by experimental practices, has conflated epistemology and ontology 
himself and committed the very "epistemic fallacy" that he accuses the empiricist of making.
Both empiricists and realists neglect the productive role of knowledge in experimental physics and 
yet their arguments for the success of physics are premised upon its technological success. Knowledge does 
not necessarily follow existence, as Bhaskar claimed (1975, p. 39), but, rather, as techne, promises the 
knowledge of how to bring things into existence. In chapters two and three I shall argue, following 
Heidegger, that laying down the law of the ground-plan of Nature was prior to the development of
28 The anthropologist Tim Ingold introduced this term at a conference in Oxford on Biocentrism vs. 
Anthropocentrism in 1995. Ingold coined this term to capture the way that certain humans, namely "deep 
ecologists", have circumscribed this region of the world as "nature" and criticise any position that does not 
respect that region for being "anthropocentric". It is an apt word to describe Bhaskar's position.
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seventeenth century mechanics and nineteenth century electromagnetism. I shall argue that the existence of 
a law is a premise for laying down the form of that law as something to work towards discovering. The 
content of that form was filled by the use of the geometrical abstracts of six simple machines: the wheel, 
the balance, the inclined plane, the wedge, the lever, and the screw. The discovery of that law was then a 
matter of discovering the techne of how to construct a machine as a demonstration and disclosure of that 
law. As I shall argue in chapters three and five this does not imply that the techne discovered existed prior 
to the process of constructing those machines.
Constant Conjunctions and Nature:
The process of experimentation is to disclose the natural mechanisms in operation during the construction 
of a repeatable process. This process needs to be isolated from interfering mechanisms if the desired 
disclosure is to be beyond criticisms. Experiments occur in closed systems. Both the CERN and Lancaster 
physicists have spent considerable efforts in attempting to shield their experiments from unwanted 
interference from outside elements. Bhaskar argued (1975, p.33) that constant conjunctions of events (if 
event A then event B) outside the artificial and closed systems of the laboratory are rare. Astronomy is a 
special case. However, even the predictive successes of astronomy have proved to be limited. Thunder and 
lightning are an example of a natural constant conjunction of events. Physics has been notoriously 
unsuccessful at accurately modelling these phenomena. The primary context of success in physics is largely 
restricted to the production of mathematical laws and causal explanations regarding the production of the 
constant conjunction of events in the performance of certain kinds of machines. Bhaskar argued that 
experimental physicists seek to isolate mechanisms and do not stop at noting the existence of constant 
conjunctions. I agree with Bhaskar on this point but 1 do not accept that it immediately follows that 
physicists must discover natural mechanisms. Mechanistic accounts were central to the task of building 
these machines in the first instance; they are also required for the physicists to have a complete account of 
the consequences of their own interventions. Without such an account, physicists can only hope to 
disentangle those consequences from the subtleties of Nature. The challenge for the physicist is to acquire 
the techne of the hows and whys of building, operating, and interpreting the experimental apparatus in 
order to acquire the episteme of natural laws. How do physicists attempt to rise to this challenge?, and, 
have they succeeded?
Bhaskar (1975, p.73) defined an open system as a system in which constant conjunctions do not 
occur. He stated (1975, p. 134) that M[t]he judgement that the system is closed can only be made ex post 
after we have observed (and theoretically assessed) the observable situation." In other words, the 
determination of whether a system is open or closed is one that can only be made in hindsight in the tight of 
our estimations of whether we have observed constant conjunctions (or not) and related it to our 
mechanistic models of the natural phenomena at our disposal. I agree with Bhaskar (1975, p.69) that 
"[regularity determinism is a mistake, which has been disastrous for our understanding of science." He 
defined regularity determinism to be the view that holds that constant conjunctions, of the form "when X
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then Y", are the limit of certainty for scientific investigation. Causal accounts are essential when 
developing machines. The identification of constant conjunctions is necessary but insufficient for an 
adequate understanding of how any machine works. However, regularity determinism is an essential part of 
the process of developing causal accounts of machine behaviour. One must be able to state that "whenever 
X then Y" as a starting point in the description and design of machine performances. But this is insufficient. 
One must also state the mechanism(s) that occur between X and Y before one can claim to have an 
understanding of how machines work. A complete understanding of such causal mechanisms is 
characteristic of techne. The understanding of classical mechanics takes this form. Bhaskar also argued 
that:
(1) even if the world is treated as if it is a complex of machines then we still can not reduce this complex 
to the principles of classical mechanics;
(2) the principles of classical mechanics cannot be themselves understood in terms of constant 
conjunctions;
(3) even if the world was a single machine then constant conjunctions would not provide an explanation of 
the world.
I agree with Bhaskar on these points. It is my view that the reason why the scientific understanding of the 
world should not be reduced to an interconnected complex of classical mechanisms is because the world is 
not comprised of such a complex. This complex, the machines used by experimental physicists, are only a 
part of the world. Furthermore, there is more than one kind of machine and its associated set of 
mechanisms. In terms of the experimental sciences, such as physics, chemistry, biochemistry, and genetics, 
etc., there are several distinct kinds of machines in operation, such as electromagnetic machines, quantum 
mechanical machines, bioassay machines, etc., with their own distinct technological objects, techniques, 
and operational practices. These machine-kinds can be interconnected but they cannot be reduced to one 
another. They are not the simple machines of classical mechanics. As I shall argue below, the ontological 
stratification of the experimental sciences is delimited by the distinction between these machine-kinds. For 
example, physics is itself comprised of historical strata of distinct machine-kinds. These are the 
mechanical, thermodynamic, optical, electromagnetic, quantum machine-families. None of these are 
reducible to the others. Most machines are hybrids of other machines and are transcontextural, when they 
share technological objects, because techniques and general models link them. However, though I agree 
with Bhaskar that limiting an account of the experimental sciences to the identification of constant 
conjunctions is a mistake, he missed a crucial point about the relation between such sciences and the 
machines that they use. The physical boundaries of these sciences are identical with the physical limits of 
the machines that these sciences use and their dissemination into the wider world. These sciences can only 
extend their ontology by innovating new machines. They overlap in so far as they use each other’s 
machines. The objects of scientific thought, in these experimental sciences, are technological objects. I 
agree with Bhaskar that regularity determinism is disasterous for our understanding of the sciences but, in 
my view, mechanical realism may well prove disasterous for our understanding of Nature.
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Bhaskar’s Transcendental Argument for Scientific Realism:
Bhaskar claimed that a scientific realist interpretation of experimental science is necessary because only a 
scientific realist interpretation can make experimental science intelligible as an activity. Bhaskar’s 
argument is based on the following premises:
(i)Scientific experimentation exists;
(ii)Experiments are physical and not just mental;
(iii)Experiments involve causal interactions with the material world;
(iv)Causal interaction is only possible because we are embodied beings;
(v)As embodied beings, we are subject to the same laws that govern the material world;
He presupposed that there are laws that govern the material world His conclusion was that the same laws 
that govern the material world govern experiments. That conclusion presupposed conceptions of what 
human beings are, and what the world is comprised of. It is a statement of a realist interpretation of science 
and not an argument for one. It is an expression of the spirit of the enterprise.
Bhaskar described his argument as a transcendental argument because it is based on the question 
“what must be true in order for ‘x’ to be possible?” where ‘x’ is taken to be some self-evident fact about 
existence. Such arguments are based on premises of what is evident (or actual) and conclude that there is a 
‘more fundamental something’ that is a condition for the possibility of these evidences (or actualities). Such 
arguments move from the phenomenal to the identification of enduring structures. Bhaskar started from the 
premise that experimentation occurs in science and asked what must the world be like in order for this 
practice to be intelligible. His question was: what makes scientific experiments possible? The function of a 
transcendental argument is to account for the possibility of some phenomenon. However, as Bhaskar 
pointed out, there may well be alternative transcendental arguments that explain the same thing differently 
and possibly better.29 One transcendental argument may be better but there are no reasons to believe that 
any transcendental argument is a final one that is unsusceptible to revision and improvement. Bhaskar 
offered us an alternative as an example. His alternative transcendental realist argument for a realist 
interpretation of science ran along the lines:
(1) science exists;
(2) science discovers underlying mechanisms;
(3) if there were no underlying mechanisms then science would not be possible;
therefore there are underlying mechanisms. Even if we accept premises (1) and (2) it does not follow that
29 Kant was aware of the difficulties inherent in applying transcendental arguments to the experimental 
sciences. Kant too appreciated the difficulties in applying transcendental principles to the particularity of 
experiments in physics (and chemistry). The questions "How is physics possible?" and "How is the 
transition to physics possible?" were both central to his later work. These efforts were unpublished during 
his lifetime but have recently become available. Cf. Notes 22:282 to 22:452 in Kant, I., Opus postumum, 
Forster (ed.) Rosen & Forster (trans ), Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 100-199.
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the “underlying mechanisms” discovered by science are in fact “natural mechanisms”. Bhaskar's argument 
presupposed the metaphysics of mechanical realism from the onset and, yet, it is a metaphysics that he does 
not address. Bhaskar’s argument is based on a presumption of mechanical realism and, in my terms, is not 
a metaphysical argument at all. It is a statement of allegiance. His assumption of the necessity of a realist 
interpretation of experimentation for the intelligibility of science is based upon an appeal to the 
indubitability of the "internal rationale" of experimental physicists. By taking the "internal rationale" of 
experimental science as the only intelligible rationale, Bhaskar has conflated intentionality with actuality. 
This is a fatal move for a realist argument. It must be a criterion for any realist position that, in any practice, 
the intentions of the practitioners could be at odds with the actuality of those practices. It must be possible 
for someone to think that they are doing one thing when, in truth, they are doing something else. Otherwise 
no one could ever be fallible. Furthermore, given a plurality of available interpretations of any set of 
practices, there is a sufficient degree of ambiguity for those practices to be taken as successful by the 
practitioners. It is possible that experimental scientists could intend to reveal natural mechanisms but only 
produce artificial mechanisms; they would be internally successful and externally deluded. It is only 
necessary, for the continuance of the practice of experimental science to be internally intelligible, that the 
practitioners interpret the artificial mechanisms that they produce to be natural mechanisms. We only need 
to show the process by which this interpretation is made and it is externally intelligible as well. We do not 
need to accept that the "internal rationale" is justified by the continuance of the practices. For example, 
religions have been practised for thousands of years. Is it the only intelligible explanation of the existence 
and continuance of any particularly long lived religion that it must be based upon truth? If we were to adopt 
Bhaskar's style of argumentation then we would have to accept that it was. After all, the devotee, no doubt, 
would claim that their material practices were based upon the truth of their beliefs regarding the 
significance of those practices. Rituals for the dead would be a good example of material practices 
combined with beliefs about the worldly (as well as otherworldly) significance of these practices. Many 
religious beliefs are embodied in theories that appeal to some kind of intransitive cosmic order. However, 
non-believers would readily claim that those practices were based upon culturally sedimented beliefs, 
authorities, social power structures, and traditions, etc. We could argue that religion has maintained its 
existence through the maintenance of certain social structures, powers, and beliefs, and find it intelligible 
despite the "false consciousness" we have ascribed to its practitioners. We could equally argue this way 
about the conditions for the existence of experimental physics and make it intelligible. It depends upon the 
maintenance of certain social structures, powers, and beliefs. We do not need to accept the authority of 
either set of social structures, powers, and beliefs, to make either religion or physics intelligible. A similar 
argument could be made against Hacking's (1983) famous confession to be a realist about electrons because 
physicists claimed to spray them on mobidium spheres in their search for free quarks. It seems to me that 
Hacking should also be a realist about spirits because witch doctors claim to use them to heal the sick. After 
all, forms of shamanism have existed for much longer than experimental physics and, by both Bhaskar and 
Hacking's standards, the endurance of practice is a criterion for its truth. One can imagine an analogous
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argument for a realist theory of shamanism:
(i) shamanism exists;
(ii) it aims to achieve knowledge of, and access to, a spirit world for purposes of healing the sick, 
exorcising evil spirits, etc.;
(iii) it would not be intelligible as an existent set of practices, if it persists and does not actually 
achieve what its practitioners claimed that it did;
therefore, given (i) to (iii) above, shamanism must necessarily achieve knowledge of, and access to, the 
spirit world, and the spirit world exists. However, this argument, like Bhaskar’s "transcendental argument", 
is a petitio principii because it presumes its conclusion: that the practitioners actually achieve what they 
intend to achieve.
Bhaskar presented a third form of transcendental argument:
(1) science exists;
(2) science is only intelligible if real causal mechanisms exist independently of science;
(3) science is intelligible; and, therefore: real causal mechanisms exist independently of science.
There are three main problems with this argument:
(1) It is circular. It begs the question;
(2) Bhaskar’s argument rests upon the meaning of "intelligibility" but he does not define, qualify, nor 
discuss it;
(3) even if real causal mechanisms exist, we still need additional work to determine whether they are 
natural or not. It does not follow from the fact that a generative mechanism exists that it is a natural 
mechanism. It requires a presumption of mechanical realism to make this leap.
My argument in chapters five and six is that it is equally intelligible that such mechanisms are created by 
experimentation. My argument is that this process is analysable as a non-linear technological process. Any 
independence of the mechanisms discovered by experimentation is a consequence of the fact that it, as a 
process, is not completely under human control either. Nor would such a process be possible without 
human participation and partial control. This does not support scientific realism and yet makes 
experimental physics as a "policy realism" intelligible. However, given the power of the technological 
objects produced by experimental physics (i.e. nuclear power, radio communications, and lasers) the lack of 
control is something of considerable concern from a humanist and naturalist point of view. I shall return to 
this point in chapter six.
Bhaskar (1975, p.21) claimed that any adequate philosophy of science must grapple with "the 
central paradox of science". This "paradox" is that science is a social product that is concerned with a 
"knowledge of things that are not produced by men at all". It is my intention to cut through the Gordian 
knot of this "paradox". My argument is straightforward. Production is not purely a human activity. Human 
beings, on our own, have no productive capacities whatsoever. We must engage in disciplined practices 
with tools, machines, materials, and other people, in order to have any productive capacities at all. In order 
to become productively empowered human beings we must relinquish any possibility of absolute control. A
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carpenter does not have absolute control of the processes by which s/he makes a chair. S/he must learn how 
to make a chair and her/his body must be disciplined to be able to perform the technological practices 
required of it by her/his instructor. This is technological enframent and the motility of her/his body is 
inscribed and directed in the mimicry process of learning how to make a chair. Nor is there a singular 
process by which chairs can be made. The challenge for experimentation is to explore the productive 
possibilities of innovation. In chapters four and five I shall discuss the complex craft of experimental 
physics in detail but my basic argument is straightforward. In order to be able to build, use, and interpret, 
experimental apparatus and measuring instruments, a  human agent needs to be trained in the technological 
practices involved. This training involves relinquishing absolute control over his/her body whilst 
transforming that body into a technological agent. The centre of control is the centre of the technological 
enframent and not the human agent as the human subject is both empowered and decentred by technique. It 
is this divergence of a centre from the human agent, and the dependence of technological enframent upon 
human participation, which presents "the paradox" that the objects of production are a social product and 
yet not completely controlled by human beings. There is, in fact, no paradox at all if we do not assume that 
the technological simply means "man made". Technological objects are made by the art. Experimental 
sciences are artificial processes and, therefore, any adequate philosophy of experimental science must 
grapple with the question: what is the artificial? Bhaskar has presumed that the answer to this question is 
simply "man made" and, consequently, he is confronted by a paradox which he can only resolve by 
assuming mechanical realism or considering experimental physics to be impossible.
However, it is not my intention to criticise Bhaskar, or any other scientific realist, for their 
position. They are as entitled to their opinion as anyone else is. I shall only criticise them for their uncritical 
acceptance of the metaphysics that their position presupposes. I agree that the spirit of the scientific 
enterprise, scientific progress, and scientific intention, is to achieve objectivity and rationality in scientific 
endeavours, and is also essentially a realist endeavour. However, I am of the opinion that we are fallible 
and we can misunderstand what we are doing and what is true. Scientific realism may well be mistaken and 
false; it might even be rewarded with the truth. That is not the question. Is it the only intelligible 
explanation of predictive success of physics, and the innovation of new machines in experimentation, that it 
is a natural science? My answer is no. It is not my intention to discredit or debunk experimental physics; I 
am trying to understand how it is possible. To this aim, the positivistic claim that science should be free 
from metaphysical speculation should be rejected because all truly novel theories require metaphysical 
interpretations.301 aim to unmask the metaphysical precepts that are implicit in the history and trajectory of 
the theoretical and experimental practices of working scientists because there is frequently a gap between 
the practitioner's perception of their own practices and the practices themselves.31 Heidegger also dismissed
30 For examples of these from contemporary experimental quantum physics see Cohen (ed.) (1997).
31 Gooding was also aware of this "gap" (1990: p. 113, pp. 254-5) and noted the difficulties in attempts to 
reconstruct the original experiments from the physicists' own accounts. Latour, Collins, and Knorr-Cetina 
have also emphasised this.
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the positivistic demand that all metaphysics is purged from science. New experiences require new concepts 
and, if we are to understand those experiences, we need to understand the metaphysics that made those 
experiences possible. In the next chapter I shall discuss the origins of this metaphysics.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE MATHEMATICAL PROJECTION OF THE SIX SIMPLE MACHINES
“Philosophy is written in this grand book, the universe, which stands continually open to our gaze. But 
the book cannot be understood unless one first learns to comprehend the language and read the letters 
in which it is composed. It is written in the language of mathematics, and its characters are triangles, 
circles, and other geometrical figures without which it is humanly impossible to understand a single 
world of it; without these, one wanders about in a dark labyrinth.”
(Galileo Galilei, TheAssayer, pp. 237-8.)
“There remains one hope of salvation, one way to good health: that the entire work of the mind be 
started over again; and from the very start the mind should not be left to itself, but be constantly 
controlled; and the business done (if I may put it this way) by machines.” (Francis Bacon, The New 
Organon, p.28)
“...not to know what it is but to know out of what it arises is most precious.”
(Aristotle, EE, 1.5.1216b2)
A great deal has been written on the change in the conception of Nature that occurred during the 
“scientific revolution” of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In the “traditional view” of the 
“scientific revolution” the rise of modem technology is taken to be derivative from the mathematical 
sciences; modem technology is taken to be “applied science”. 1 However, the proponents of this view 
have not provided us with a satisfactory account of how this “application” occurred. Alfred North 
Whitehead (1925, p.32) considered the way that highly abstract mathematically formulated theories 
have been “effectively applied to practical affairs” to be die “paradox” of modem science. How did the 
mathematical natural sciences lead to modem technology? How were mathematical practices and 
technological practices connected? How was this connection possible? How was it justified? Ernst 
Nagel (1961) argued that the relations between modem science and modem technology are not as 
obvious and clear as the “traditional philosophy of science” has assumed. He maintained the view that 
modem technology is applied science but was aware that the character of “application” is an 
ambiguous one. J.K. Feibleman (1982) criticised philosophy in general, and the philosophy of science 
in particular, for its “traditional” neglect of technology.
In contemporary science studies considerable attention has been paid to technology to the 
extent that an “alternative tradition” has become fashionable. On this view, the experimental “natural”
1 Whitehead (1925), Disjksterhuis (1961), Strong (1966), Westfall (1983), Koyr6 (1992), and Wolpert 
(1992), for example, all considered this derivative relationship between modem science and technology 
to be self-evident.
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sciences, such as physics, chemistry, and genetics, are forms of “applied technology”.2 However, the 
characterisation of physics as “applied technology” only reverses the problem of how the “application” 
occurred. How was technology “applied” in such a way as to become the “natural science” of physics? 
How was this “application” justified? How was it conceptually possible? In order to understand 
experimental physics as “applied technology” we need to address how mathematics, machines, and 
natural phenomena were related. What understanding of technology do we need in order to understand 
the technological basis of the experimental natural sciences? What was the nature of the “application”? 
It is my view that we need to analyse physics at a “deeper” level than merely pointing out that the use 
of mathematics and technologies has been central to the experimental natural sciences since their origin 
in the sixteenth century. What presuppositions about both natural phenomena and technology permitted 
the use of technologies to understand natural phenomena? This is a question of the metaphysics that 
underlies the whole legitimacy of the technological disclosure of natural mechanisms. We need to 
understand how the reification of mathematics, as something objectively, eternally, and universally 
true, in the context of the Renaissance developments of the Medieval science of mechanics, allowed 
experimental physics to be metaphysically operational as a technological mode of disclosure. My 
argument in this chapter is that the precepts of mechanical realism provided the operational 
metaphysics of experimental physics.3 Thus the mathematical description of the motions of the six 
simple machines (the wedge, the lever, the balance, the inclined plane, the screw, and the wheel) could 
be taken to be descriptions of the fundamental natural motions. This provided the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries with both a methodological and an ontological foundation for the mechanical and 
experimental natural philosophies of Galileo, Descartes, Bacon, Gassendi, Newton, Boyle, Hobbes et 
al.
Experimental physics emerged as a continuation of the ancient and medieval mathematical 
treatments of mechanics. It was situated, from its onset, within a cultural desire for organised 
technological powers combined with a reification of Euclidean geometry. Some contemporary 
historians of the science of mechanics also have this understanding.4 The possibility of experimental
2 Jonas (1974), Kuhn (1977), Feibleman (1982), Heelan (1983), Ihde (1991, 1983), Mitcham (1994). 
Many contemporary historians of science and technology also share the view that technology preceded 
the sixteenth century “scientific revolution” and that, to a lesser or greater degree, physics is “applied 
technology”. For examples see Hill (1984); White (1962, 1984); Landels (1978); Hodges (1974); 
Dugas (1955); Forbes (1955); Chatly (1942); Rostovtzeveff (1941); Brett (1939).
3 As I stated in the last chapter, an operational metaphysics is distinct from an interpretive metaphysics. 
The latter is required to interpret disclosures whereas the former is required for the existence of 
disclosures in the first place.
4 Long (1997) argued that there were close ties between the patronage of political elites and sixteenth 
century mechanics. This point was also made by White (1962 pp.21-9). Kaufman (1993) argued that 
art, science, technology, and humanism were inter-related across disciplines in the circles of the 
Imperial court of Rudolf II (c.1577) in Vienna of the sixteenth century. Bennet (1986) argued that
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physics did not primarily occur because of the success of Copernicus and Kepler's mathematical 
treatments of planetary motions. There is not any possibility of experimenting upon planetary motions 
(at least not yet). Experimental physics emerged due to the successful mathematical treatment of 
mechanical devices within societies that valued the economic, political, and military advantages of 
technological innovations. Appeals to the successes of mathematical astronomers were rhetorically 
connected to the successes of mechanists, as part of the movement towards a unitary conception of 
natural science. This occurred within the cultural context of patrons; mechanists were providers of 
technological innovations for economic, political, and military goals. The precepts of the mechanical 
realist metaphysics were required (at least implicitly) to conceptually connect, via the mathematical 
science of mechanics, the astronomical phenomenon of planetary motion with terrestrial mechanical 
devices, and present both as aspects of a unitary natural science. The mechanical science of Galileo was 
the culmination of Medieval and Renaissance developments of geometrical mechanics and 
technological innovations; it was not the radical break from his predecessors that it has been 
presupposed to be. However, his physics presumed and attempted to justify the precepts of mechanical 
realism, and it was this presumption and attempt that was novel, heralded the “mechanical world view” 
of seventeenth century mechanical and experimental philosophies, and was a pre-requisite for 
conceptions of modem scientific technology and modem experimental physics. In order to understand 
the metaphysical origin of experimental physics we need to historically trace back its enduring essence 
through its current manifestation as a modem technoscience.
Modern Technology; The Technical Imperative:
In this section I shall introduce Martin Heidegger's and Jacque Ellul's characterisations of the essence 
of modem technology and its relation to modem mathematical science. Although both Heidegger and 
Ellul offered us clear and insightful analyses of modem technology neither was particularly clear on the 
relationship between mathematical physics and modem technology. In order to understand their 
characterisations we need to examine their distinction between premodem and modem technologies. 
My starting point is Marx's definition that premodem technologies were based on local needs and craft 
practices whereas modem technology is based on the industrial and mechanised organisation o f labour 
based on capital and science (1967). I take this definition to be clearly influential upon many 
contemporary analysts of modem technology. Many twentieth century writers, following Marx, have 
taken the nineteenth century “industrial revolution” to be the historical period in which a radical
practical mathematics grew in England during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries through the work 
of Dee, Hood, Davis, Recorde, Diggs, the Gresham College, Norman, Gilbert, Gellibrand, Briggs, et. 
a l, in developing techniques to attempt to solve problems of national import. See Johnson (1940) for a 
discussion of the close ties between Gresham College, the English navy, and the development of 
English mathematics in the early seventeenth century. Also see Bedini (1994), McMullin (1967), 
Scholfield (1970), and Rossi (1970).
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transformation between premodem and modem technology occurred.5 They distinguished between 
premodem and modem technology broadly on the basis that premodem technology was local, 
pluralistic, unscientific, and largely based on craft technologies, whereas modem technology is global, 
unitary, based on mass production, and is scientific. For these writers, premodem crafts were based on 
disorganised processes, pluralistic techniques, and skills whereas modem technology is based on the 
theoretical organisation o f technology into science as a unitary phenomenon. This distinction is clear 
but it raises several questions. How was this transformation from premodem to modem technology 
possible? Why did it occur during the nineteenth century? What relation did it have with modem 
science? My position is that this transformation occurred earlier than the nineteenth century and, in 
feet, made both the “scientific revolution” and “the industrial revolution” conceptually possible. The 
transformation from premodem arts and crafts to modem technology arose primarily from a 
transformation in the conception of the origin of technological powers that occurred at the same time as 
the mechanical-world view of the mathematical natural philosophies. It was this conceptual 
transformation that made both experimental physics and modem technology conceptually possible. 
Mechanical realism underpinned the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries' conception of technological 
powers and natural phenomena as having the same unitary origin and manifest according to the same 
principles or laws. The possibility of modem technology occurred simultaneously with the possibility 
of modem experimental sciences because of the emergence of this conceptual synthesis of the origins 
of both natural phenomena and technological powers. Once this metaphysical conceptual synthesis had 
been made then the conception of modem technology as a unitary phenomenon, manifest according to 
universal natural laws, was possible. Technology could then be invented as a process of unlocking and 
utilising natural forces, causes, and powers. It could be treated as a unitary kind of relationship between 
“Man” and “Nature” in which “Nature” could provide the means for its own domination by “Man”. 
Technology could then taken to be a neutral process that was accessible to “universal rationality”, 
defined in terms of “technical rationality” on the basis of a concept of “efficiency”; Nature was 
conceptualised in terms of universal mathematical laws, materials, mechanisms, “necessity”, and 
“efficient causes”.
Mechanical realism emerged within the contexts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries' 
expansion of technological powers (literally around the globe) and the continuation of pre-sixteenth 
century attempts to mathematically describe the six simple machines in terms of fundamental 
mechanical principles. The precepts of mechanical realism emerged from the mathematical science of 
mechanics. The novelty of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries' mathematical science of mechanics 
was the emergence of an important symmetry, both natural phenomena and technological powers were 
taken to be explicable and manipulable according to the same kind of principles or laws. This was 
simultaneously a naturalisation of mechanisms and a mechanisation of Nature. It was this naturalisation
5 For example, Cohen (1955), Mumford (1963), Ellul (1964), Marcuse (1966), Horkheimer (1974), 
Heidegger (1977), Habermas (1987), Adorno (1994), Mitcham (1994), and Steigjer (1994).
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of mechanisms that was the crucial novelty. This was situated within the Archimedean-Aristotelian 
framework but was a metaphysical synthesis of natural philosophy and mathematical mechanics that 
conceptually allowed a reduction of Nature to the mechanical: that which permitted description in 
terms of mathematical mechanics. It was the subsequent interpretive metaphysics of the seventeenth 
century, such as the Newtonian mechanical system of the world, Gassendi's atomism, or Descartes' 
metaphysics, that constituted the epistemological rupture by introducing interpretations that would have 
been nonsensical to previous natural philosophers. However, those interpretive metaphysics presumed 
the validity of the transformation of the Medieval and Renaissance mathematical treatments of 
mechanics from a means of disclosing the mathematical principles of simple machines (and all other 
mechanical devices by derivation) to a means of obtaining knowledge of the mechanical laws of 
Nature. This premise allowed technological innovation (bringing novel technological powers into the 
world) to be taken as nothing more than taking advantage of those laws. Thus technological innovation 
(the expansion of technological powers) could be treated as human participation in the natural order of 
things disclosed by the mathematical mechanical sciences. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
the confidence in the human ability to construct and use machines to produce new technological 
powers grew to such proportions that machines were reified. The presupposition of mechanical realism 
allowed these reified machines to become transparent means of disclosure at the service of “Man”. 
Machines could be used to disclose the mechanical principles of the Grand Machine, the Universe and 
everything contained therein, and conceived as a self-evidently rational exploration of Nature. The 
scientific realist notion of progress was henceforth implicitly premised upon appeals to technological 
innovation and power.
Heidegger presented a phenomenological analysis and Ellul presented a socio-political 
analysis of modem technology and the mathematical sciences. Both of these thinkers were influential 
upon subsequent thinkers, their insightful analyses complement each other, and they raised crucial 
questions for any intelligible analysis of modem technology and science.6 Both Ellul and Heidegger 
approached technology from a post-Hegelian perspective of dialectically interpreting experience in the 
light of an interpretation of history and, consequently, have many points of similarity with Marx and 
Lukacs.7 They were also both concerned with the question of how we can attain a free relation with 
technology. In order to elucidate both of these writers characterisations of technology, I shall compare
6 Heidegger was clearly influential (as well as Marx) upon Arendt, Horkheimer, Habermas, and (at 
least indirectly via Habermas) Marcuse. Both Ellul and Heidegger were central starting-points for 
Steigler (1994) and many “postmodern” analyses of technology. See Winner (1977) for a discussion of 
the influence of the above thinkers (as well as Marx) upon the notions of “autonomous technology” and 
“efficiency”. See Mitcham (1994) for a discussion of the influence of both Heidegger and Ellul on “the 
humanist tradition”. To my knowledge neither Heidegger nor Ellul discussed, or made reference to 
each other’s work, despite the fact that they were contemporaries.
7 Although Lukacs (1976, p.xxiv) criticised Heidegger for his sublimation of a critique of society into a 
purely philosophical problem.
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Ellul's The Technological Society (1964) with Heidegger's The Question Concerning Technology 
(1977a).
Ellul's questioned the meaning of the dominance of technique for the human present and 
future. Heidegger was concerned with preparing a way in which we could question the essence of 
technology and develop a free relationship with it. The Technological Society is a narration of the 
tragedy of a civilization increasingly dominated by technique. The Question Concerning Technology 
was an attempt to unconceal the essence of technology and relate it to truth. Ellul placed an emphasis 
upon the erosion of moral values brought about by technicism, an examination of the role of technique 
in modem society, and a historical disclosure of the forces that have shaped the development of 
technical civilization. Heidegger examined how the instrumentalist and anthropological definitions of 
modem technology, whilst being correct, have made us blind to the essence of technology. The 
anthropological definition is that technology is a human activity and the instrumentalist definition is 
that technology is a means to an end For Heidegger, the essence of technology was not to be 
considered as something technological and he considered the claim that technology is “something 
neutral” to be the worst misconception of technology possible because it immediately delivers us over 
to an unthinking relation with it Heidegger agreed (1977a, pp.3-6) that technology is a human activity 
in the sense of positing ends and procuring the means to them. He accepted that it is also an instrument 
in the sense that the manufacture and utilisation of equipment tools, and machines, as well as the needs 
and ends that they satisfy, all belong to what it is. However, his starting point was that if we are to 
understand the essence of technology, we need to ask: “what is the instrument itself? Within what do 
means and ends belong?”
For Heidegger, modem technology was a mode of disclosure in which beings are set in place, 
ordered, in such a way as to “put to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be 
extracted or stored as such.”(1977a, p. 14) Heidegger termed this mode of disclosure as Herausforden 
(challenging).8 To use Heidegger's examples, modem technology challenges a tract of land to yield coal 
and ore. The earth is disclosed as a coal-mining district and the soil as a mineral deposit. Air is set upon 
to yield nitrogen for the mechanised agricultural industry and the earth is set upon to yield uranium for 
the atomic weapons and power industries.9 Modem technology sets upon and challenges Nature to 
disclose itself, unlock and expose itself, as energy or resources for future use. It is
“always itself directed from the beginning toward furthering something else, i.e. toward driving on to 
the maximum yield at the minimum expense. The coal that has been hauled out in some mining district
8 Lovitt noted (Heidegger, 1977a, p. 14 f ii. 13) that the verb herausforden could be translated as: to 
challenge, to call forth, to summon to action, to demand positively, or to provoke. A literal translation 
would be “to demand out hither”.
9 Lovitt noted (Heidegger, 1977a, p. 15 fin 14) that the verb stellen (to place or to set) has a variety of 
uses. It can be translated: to put in place, to order, to arrange, to furnish, or to supply. It can also be 
translated, in a military context, to challenge or to engage.
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has not been supplied in order that it may simply be present somewhere or other. It is stockpiled; that is 
on call, ready to deliver the sun's warmth that is stored in it. The sun's warmth is challenged forth as 
heat, which in turn is ordered to deliver steam whose pressure turns the wheels that keep a factory 
running.” (1977a, p. 15)
It is this availability for use in the future (without any consideration of the particularity of that future 
use) that Heidegger termed Bestand (standing-reserve).10 He used this term to characterise the way in 
which everything is commanded into place and ordered according to the challenging essence of modem 
technology as it comes into presence as a mode of disclosure. Objects lose their character as objects 
when they are disclosed as standing-reserve. It was for this reason that Heidegger considered the 
instrumental definition as something that was both correct and concealed the truth. Modem technology 
can only disclose Nature as standing-reserve because it challenges human beings to exploit Nature in 
this way. This challenging is an imperative in which the participation of human beings in the ordering 
disclosure is essential if it is to happen at all. However, what is disclosed by this ordering is not 
controlled by human beings. By responding to the challenging, human beings are ordered into modes of 
disclosure and it is the way of disclosure that discloses objects as the objectlessness of standing- 
reserve. Thus, for Heidegger, the anthropological definition is correct and conceals the essence of 
modem technology. Technology sets-upon, challenges, and gathers human beings together “to order 
the real as standing-reserve in accordance with the way that it shows itself’ as a mode of disclosure. 
(1977a, p. 19) Heidegger termed this as Ge-stell (Enframing). This imperative is not something 
technological (in the same way that pistons, rods, and chassis are technological) and the assembling of 
the technological, the ordering of the stockpile of components falls within technological activity. 
Technological activity is merely a response to the imperative, the challenging of Ge-stell, and it neither 
comprises Ge-stell nor brings it about.
Like Heidegger, Ellul considered technique to have its own reality, substance, and particular 
mode of being. Modem technology, or the technical phenomenon, was ontologically identical with the 
technical society. He characterised the technical phenomenon as a perpetual state of social 
inequilibrium and defined “technique” as “the totality of methods rationally arrived at and having 
absolute efficiency (for a given stage of development) in every field of human activity” and proposed 
that it should be studied as a sociological phenomenon.11 He used the term “technique” to refer to any 
complex of standardised means for attaining a predetermined result. This term was used to refer to any 
deliberate, stable, and rationalised productive behaviour. He considered a means to be stable if it was 
repeated to realise stable intentions. Technique is the means and the ensemble of means employed to 
attain results. Technical operations include “every operation carried out in accordance with a certain
10 Lovitt noted (p. 17 fh. 16) that Bestand is ordinarily translated as “standing by” with its connotation 
of the verb bestehen (“to last” or “to undergo”). Lovitt also noted that Bestand contrasts with 
Gegenstand (object).
11 Ellul, (1964) “Note to the Reader” p.xxxv
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method to attain a particular end” in which the method employed characterises the operation. (1964, 
p. 19) For Ellul, (1964, pp. 11-9, p.79) technique was objective in the sense that “it is transmitted like a 
physical thing” through the organisation of productive performances. Technique is the organised 
ensemble of all techniques that are used to secure any end whatsoever. It can in principle only provide 
technical and quantitative solutions to technical problems. Ellul did not intend to convey any 
metaphysical notion of “technological determinism” in his characterisation of technique because, for 
Ellul, things could always differ from the contingent actuality of the present. If technique is a “blind 
force” it is so because human beings have closed their eyes to the alternatives. Technique has the 
character of an imperative that only achieves its power because human beings respond to its demand. It 
is this conception of technique, in terms of a unitary imperative to order the world, which has a 
considerable parallel with Heidegger's conception of Ge-stell.
Ellul characterised the modem conception of “rationality” in terms of a “technical rationality” 
which brings mechanics to bear on all that is spontaneous. It operates through systematisation, division 
of labour, creation of standards, production of norms, and the reduction of method.12 Any intelligible 
critical analysis of any productive technology, technical decision, or process, must be placed into a 
socio-economic context of political interests and organisation Every technology is a social ordering 
and organisation of production processes directed to the satisfaction of socially (politically and 
economically) emergent goods (or ends). A technological order is a social order and vice versa; non- 
human artifacts are participants in the shape and direction of society. Technological choices affect the 
social and political landscape. Although “technical rationality” is socially, economically, and politically 
situated it is also situated within a technological background It can then, in turn, reiteratively shape 
and limit the social, economic, and political landscapes. ‘Technical rationality” is a bounded and 
evolving rationality.13 It is a context-dependent rationality that is related to technology through context- 
dependent information. Within any particular bounds, particular choices are “technically rational” and 
others are not. Context-dependence gives technology a dynamic and evolutionary agency. As Mueller 
put it
“ ... the form taken by a technological system is not a design but an evolutionary trajectory. The 
trajectory is defined as its operations adjust to the specific social, geographical, economic and political 
characteristics of its environment, and overcome the technical problems posed by its growth and its 
competition with other technologies. Anyone familiar with the history of a large-scale technological 
system knows that an attempt to implement the simplest idea can create vast numbers of unforeseen 
problems. It is the process of solving these problems -  not of preconceived design -  that gives 
technology its shape.” (1987, p.32)
12 The notion of scientific rationality was heavily criticised by the so-called neo-Marxist-Frankfurt 
school, Horkheimer (1974), Adorno (1994), Marcuse (1966), and Habermas (1987).
13 See Simon (1981) and Mueller (1987) for detailed discussions of this definition.
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Thus “technical rationality” is situated within social, economic, and political contexts of problem 
solving. The horizon of possibilities and the ways to reach it are shaped by the social, political, and 
economic choices and problems, for which technology has been constructed to solve. It is no more 
neutral than the contexts in which it arises. The evolution of any technology is shaped by social, 
political, and economic trajectories because the uses to which any technology is put to are the content 
of that evolution. In turn, the “technically rational” also has shaped political, economic, and social 
possibilities.14 Technical knowledge, as an active form of knowledge directed towards efficiency, has 
to be context-dependent, if it is to be able to provide the functionality required for “technical 
rationality”. Bounded and evolving technological rationality, or context-dependent rationality, has a 
bounded and evolving concept of efficient functionality as its basis for informed choice. Efficient 
functionality is also context-dependent trajectory of human-technique relationships in a changing 
political, economic, social, and technological environment. By bringing new things into the world, such 
as hydrogen bombs, antibiotics, contraceptives, radio, motor cars, etc., technology transforms the 
world. New political, economic, and social possibilities arise because new modes of social organisation 
become possible. These possibilities, when realised, shape the directions of technology. Technological 
objects are non-linear complex objects that are emergent through interconnected socio-technical 
feedback relations and an evolving socio-technological background.
For Ellul, every intervention of technique is, in effect, a reduction of facts, forces, phenomena, 
means, and instruments to the schema of mechanistic logic. The human agent becomes transformed 
into an agent that is defined in terms of her/his performance and function, as an integrated and 
articulated component, in an ensemble of functioning agents. Technique sets upon and organises 
human agency. This conception of technology has a considerable parallel with Heidegger's conception 
of technology in terms of enframing and challenging The project of “the technical man” is a perpetual 
search for the “one best way” to achieve any designated objective and the perpetually expanding and 
irreversible role of technique is extended to all domains of life. The choice of method/technique is 
made in reference to the satisfactory stabilisation of measurements, calculations, and productive 
practices, in relation to an intelligible causal account. Such a choice can not be divorced from the 
socio-technical backgrounds against which it is made and emergent from. It is a matter of paradigmatic 
socio-technical consensus. Once this choice has been made then the method/technique becomes a 
technological object available for future work. In Heidegger's terms, this method/technique is placed as 
available standing-reserve within the public realm. There it is placed in competition with other 
technological objects for ordering within the technical imperative towards “efficiency”. The socio- 
technical winner is taken to be “the most efficient” and “the one best way”. Until it is replaced by 
another technique, “the one best way” achieves a technical autonomy in practice because technical 
practitioners, also under the sway of the technical imperative, are obliged to use it. Its results are
14 Wajcman (1991) made this point about domestic “labour saving” devices; Wallis & Baran (1990) 
made this point about television news broadcasting; Walsh (1980) made this point about contraception.
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indisputable until a “better” technique takes its place. Once a technique has become established as “the 
one best way” then it is no longer an object for technical deliberation. The technical practitioner is 
committed, whilst under the sway of the technical imperative, to perform her/his operations in “the 
most efficient” manner which, of course, requires using “the one best way”. It is this conception of 
technique that has a parallel with conception of Ge-stell as Geschick (destining).15 Challenging sets 
human beings on a way of disclosure of the real as standing-reserve. It simultaneously sends and 
gathers human beings upon this way of disclosure. It is modem technology itself (as Ge-stell) which 
gathers together and sets-up human beings into this mode of ordering and disclosure. Like Ellul, 
Heidegger rejected the idea that this involves “a fate that compels... where 'fate' means the 
inevitableness of an unalterable course” (1977a, p.25). For both Heidegger and Ellul, Western 
Civilization is a progressively technical one committed to the quest for continually improved means to 
carelessly examined ends. Technique transforms ends into means (and vice versa). Human agents are 
compelled to adapt to a technical substratum of human existence that has become so overwhelmingly 
immense that we are unable to cope with it as a means and, consequently, treat it as an end. In 
Heidegger's terms, modem technology conceals itself and yet is everywhere. “Know-how” is treated as 
the ultimate virtue.16 Heidegger based his distinction between Ge-stell and techne upon the change in 
the destining of disclosure. The ancient handicrafts were a different mode of disclosure. They 
participated in “bringing-forth” beings into the world (poiesis) as ends-in-themselves. They were 
intimately bound-up with alethia (truth) as a mode of disclosure and presenting of the real. This truth 
was bound up with modes of completion and perfection and did not correlate with the definition of 
truth as “correctness” (yeritas)}1 What was once prized as a good in itself, for its own sake, is 
transformed into something that is only of instrumental value, for the achievement of something else. 
Under the sway of technique everything (including technique) is transformed into standing-reserve. 
Technique and Ge-stell capture the same essence of modem technology.
The dominance of technique upon state controlled capitalist economies in which planning 
becomes “the order of the day” for the economy as a whole. Technique imposes an impersonal 
centralism upon the economy. For Ellul, this impersonalised centralism does not result “from the 
machinations of evil statesmen” and it can not be controlled by public opinion (if we accept Ellul's 
claim that public opinion is primarily orientated towards performance and satisfaction of socio- 
technical ends.) “The conflict of propaganda takes the place of the debate of ideas”, as R.K. Merton put
15 Heidegger (1977a, pp. 24-6.)
16 Cf. Aristotle (N.E. Bk. 6) for his distinctions between the intellectual virtues of episteme, techne, 
sophia, nous, and phronesis. The criticism of the dominance of the intellectual virtue of techne in 
modem society was central to the critical analyses of modem society presented by Arendt (1958), 
Habermas (1987,1983), and Dunne (1993).
17 Heidegger (1977a, pp. 6-13). I shall discuss the significance of this mode of disclosure for an 
understanding of the relationship between the art of experimental physics and truth in chapters four and 
six.
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it, when every part of a technical civilization responds to the socio-technical needs generated by 
technique itself, as if they were responding to immutable “laws of development”, and “technology 
becomes more like the new god.” 18
For Ellul, the machine has created our world and without the machine the world of technique 
would not exist. However, the history of technique is not the history of the machine. Technology and 
the machine are not identical (1964, p.5). This point was also made by Heidegger (1977a, p.23). 
Technique does transform everything into machine processes but it has taken over all human activities 
and not just those that involve machines. Technique inventoried everything according to its utility and 
ordered everything in line with the machine. Thus it is technique itself which makes the machine 
possible. Machines did not integrate themselves into nineteenth century European society; technique 
integrated machines into society. Like Heidegger, Ellul warned us against considering the essence of 
technology as something technological. The “[a]ll embracing technique is in fact the consciousness of 
the mechanised world” and it is this “consciousness” which manifests itself as the imperative to 
integrate everything into the mechanised world and “will assimilate everything to the machine; the 
ideal for which technique strives is the mechanisation of everything it encounters.” (1964, pp.6-12) 
Technique has become the substance of human agency and is integrated with it. Technique is distinct 
from the machine and has become autonomous within society. It leads to mechanisation, via the action 
of the machine, by applying the “know how” of mechanisation to domains which were previously 
“lacking” machines. Whereas “primitive” productive activities “spontaneously imitate nature” it is the 
processes of refining abstract requirements, which lead to criteria of selectivity that lead from “the 
imitation of nature” to “the ways of technique”. (1964, p.20) The intervention of “technical 
judgements” provided an awareness of a plurality of novel means, methods, and tools. It allowed a 
“more extensive and less rigid experimentation” and “multiplie[dj technical operation to a high degree 
of diversity”. Craft practices became possible through the intervention of “technical judgement”. 
However, once “technical judgement” was directed towards “efficiency” its operation was transformed 
into “technical rationality”. Instead of multiplying the technical operations available for “technical 
judgement” it performed the opposite. It reduced the multiplicity of means to “the most efficient one”
18 Merton's introduction to The Technological Society, pp.viii -  xiii. Fournier D’Albe (1926) also made 
a similar point He considered this “new god” to be the ancient Greek god of fire and making: 
Hephaestus. He made many of the points raised by Heidegger and Ellul but affirmed modem 
technology. It is quite ironic that, with hindsight, Fournier D’Albe’s affirmations were situated in the 
context of the post “Great War” relief. He condemned the insanity of that war and affirmed the “golden 
age” of technology and science that he believed was on the horizon. He was unable to foresee that the 
insanity was about to reach unprecedented levels. Ellul and Heidegger’s critiques of modem 
technology should be situated in the context of post WWII and Cold War reactions against the 
juggemaught and tragedy that modem technology had become. See also Winner (1977) for discussions 
of the autonomy of technology in the actuality of the World Wars, the Cold War, and Vietnam.
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(1964, p. 20-1).19 The “technical phenomenon” is the drive to find this “most efficient” means. This is a 
technical imperative, which pervades all human activity, and “it ranges from the act of shaving to the 
act of organising the landing in Normandy, or to cremating thousands of deportees.” (1964, p.21) Every 
material technique is subordinate to its immediate result and “efficiency” is determined by choosing the 
technique that produces the most satisfactory result. Satisfaction and its achievement is a social and 
psychophysical phenomenon and, hence, the mechanical realist characterisation of “efficiency” as the 
consequence of the “correct” application of “natural law” is supportive of inevitability and necessity of 
technique. For Ellul, the technical phenomenon is artificial. Technique is opposed to Nature. Art, 
artifice, and technique are attempts to create an artificial system. It is this attempt that Ellul termed as 
“the societal gamble”: a gamble on the superiority of an artificial world over the natural world. The 
mechanical realist presupposes the facticity of the premise that only those acts of creation permitted by 
“natural law” are possible. Thus the creation of an artificial closed system can disclose “natural law”. 
The means at our disposal may well be artificial means, as Ellul pointed out, but this, in itself, in my 
view, does not undermine the deterministic presuppositions of mechanical realism. The mechanical 
realist presupposes that only those artificial means that function according to “natural law” are capable 
of functioning at all. Human agents may well have only artificial means at our disposal but, for the 
mechanical realist, these means are only capable of being means in virtue of their utilisation of “natural 
mechanisms”. For Ellul, the artificiality of the world created through technique implied that it is 
radically different from the natural world. However, for the mechanical realist, the only artificial 
worlds that are possible are the ones that are constructed in accordance with “natural law”. Hence, once 
mechanical realism has been presupposed any artificial world is not radically different in kind from the 
natural world. It is merely a counterfactual. Both artificial and natural worlds are manifest according to 
the same “natural laws”. The only difference between the two, on the mechanical realist account, is that 
the former requires human intervention to occur whereas the latter is the result of a lack of human 
intervention. For the mechanical realist, such as Bhaskar, this is a requirement for the intelligibility of 
experimentatioa However, for Ellul, the artificial world destroys and replaces the natural world. It does 
not even allow the natural world to restore itself or enter into a symbolic relationship with it. 
Accordingly, these two worlds have nothing in common. Just as hydroelectric installations take 
waterfalls and lead them into conduits so the technical milieu absorbs the natural. Heidegger (1977a, 
p. 16) also used the example of the hydroelectric plant to describe the way that the Rhine is disclosed as 
hydraulic pressure for an interlocking complex of turbines, electromagnets, power stations, and a 
network of cables, set-up to provide electricity as standing-reserve. The river is damned up into the 
power plant and is transformed into a water power supply. Even to the extent that it is still a river in the 
landscape, it only remains so as an object for the tourist industry. We are rapidly approaching a time 
when there will no longer be any natural environment at all.
How did Ellul and Heidegger relate science and technology? Ellul used the example of 
Archimedes to claim that mathematics and technique had been bound together as far back as ancient
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Greece. However, noted Ellul (1964, p.28), for Archimedes (as well as Plato), the goal of mathematics 
was contemplation and not application. Ellul posited distinctions between art, science, and technology. 
Art was concrete and subjective, science was abstract and objective, and technology was concrete and 
objective. Technique creates the reality it describes. Ellul was critical of the view that modem science 
is pure theory and modem technology is applied science. He was also critical of the view that 
technology figures at the point of contact between material reality and the scientific formula He 
considered these views to be “radically false” because they are “only true of the nineteenth century 
physical sciences and [are] not true of science and technique in general.” (1964, p.7) In Ellul's view, 
technique preceded science (“even primitive man was acquainted with certain techniques”) but only 
began to develop and extend itself when science appeared. Technique required science to progress 
because it had to wait for science to provide the solutions to the problems posed by the repeated 
experiments of technique. How did science provide the solutions? What were the problems? Ellul did 
not address these questions. He merely maintained that the border between technological and scientific 
activities is not sharply defined and that technique provides preparatory work for scientific synthesis. 
Ellul provided the example of the steam engine to illustrate this point (1964, p.8). In his view, the 
steam engine was the product of technical trial and error sequences of invention and improvements and 
scientific explanations came much later. However, he did not provide us with an account of how those 
explanations were forthcoming. Nor did he show us how they were related to invention. How did 
precision and explanation solve the problems of technique? Ellul (1964, pp.8-9) did not explain this to 
any greater depth than arguing that there is an increasing interaction between scientific research and 
technical preparation to such an extent that science can not progress without the technical means to do 
so. According to Ellul, Faraday was unable to precisely formulate his theories about the constitution of 
matter because of a lack of high-vacuum techniques. Did Ellul mean to imply that somehow high- 
vacuum techniques were necessary for the precise formulation of Faraday's theories? Surely, if 
technique does not have anything at all to do with Nature then there would be not any necessity for any 
particular technique for the scientific synthesis to proceed. What was the “matter” that Faraday wished 
to explain? Ellul did not address these questions either. Of course the work of large scientific research 
is increasingly technical work and “pure science” is becoming increasingly “applied science”. Science 
has become the instrument of technique because scientific discoveries are increasingly implemented in 
every day life before the consequences of that implementation have been considered. Modem scientific 
research increasingly requires large teams of researchers, enormous amounts of money, and the aid of 
machines. It requires technique as a necessary condition of its existence. Ellul argued (1964, pp. 17-8) 
that science without technique is merely hypothesis and theory. But why? If technique and Nature are 
independent, as Ellul maintained, then why is technique necessary for natural science? For Ellul, 
mathematical techniques were central to his definition of science. In his view, only that which can be 
expressed numerically can be said to be scientific and, hence, the scientific use of technique is that of 
reducing the possibilities of investigation to the calculation of numbers. However, for Ellul, (1964, 
p. 27) it is also the creation of general explanatory theories which makes science distinct from
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technique.
Ellul assumed that the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were lacking in technique “in all 
areas but the mechanical” and the ideals of universality and humanism of that period resisted reducing 
the idea of human progress to that of technical progress (1964, pp.38-42). For Ellul, (1964, p.45) the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries' “scientific progress” prepared the way for nineteenth century's 
technical progress; scientific discoveries provided the necessary conditions but not the imperative. 
However, Ellul maintained that the natural philosophies of the eighteenth century were concrete, bound 
up with material results, naturalistic, and, sought to know and exploit Nature. But, for Ellul, these ideas 
were restricted to an intellectual elite and could not motivate the population of Europe to value the 
excellence of technical progress, and, consequently, the eighteenth century was only a preliminary 
phase of technical application. In my view, it was this historical interpretation that prevented Ellul from 
being able to identify how the origin of modem science was bound up with technique from its onset. 
For Ellul, modem science became bound up with technique during the nineteenth century's “industrial 
revolution” development of the machine and the application of technique to all spheres of life. The 
work of technique, the mechanisation of all human spheres of action, was a systematisation, 
unification, and clarification of everything (1964, pp.43-3). Ellul observed (1964, p.86) that science has 
been becoming increasingly governed by technique since the nineteenth century to such an extent that 
the smashing of the atom and the smashing of Hiroshima (and Nagasaki) are manifestations of the same 
imperative.20 Technique is globalised through the educational and technical dissemination of European 
values, projects, techniques, and technicians. It is a global unification of a monolithic Western mode of 
social organisation and can not be anything other than totalitarian because the imperative towards 
“efficient” intrinsically requires the absorption of any plurality of function into a “scientific” 
unification in order to maximise “data”, co-ordination, and exploitation (1964, p. 125). This involves 
the total organisation of the human population to achieve “efficiency” and “maximise results” in every 
area of human endeavour. It is this totalitarianism that generates the monopoly of technical 
phenomenon and makes it an autonomous method of action that achieves its autonomy by being 
available as “the best technique”. This is the meaning of use and, to the extent that use in experiment is 
underdetermined (otherwise there would be no experiment), it is the task of experimentation to stabilise 
technique. In this sense, it is the whole technical phenomenon, technological society, which is itself the 
experiment. This is why it is characteristic of a gamble. For Ellul, the technical phenomenon arose 
from the entire post eighteenth century technical Western Civilization. As a technical civilization, the 
West is entirely constructed in terms of technique to such an extent that only that which is technical is 
considered to be part of civilization. Everything in a technical civilization must serve a technical end 
and anything non-technical is either excluded as “inefficient”, “subjective”, or it is reduced to a 
technical form Ellul accepted that this imperative somehow developed out of the science of mechanics
20 Cf. Chaloupka (1992) and Easlea (1983) for discussions of the political and socio-technical 
trajectories implicit in the construction of the technosciences of atomic physics and nuclear power 
technologies.
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but, for Ellul, its origin was “mysterious and enigmatic” (1964, p.5 andp.21). This acceptance reveals a 
considerable parallel with Heidegger.
For Heidegger, it was precisely the monolithic character of Ge-stell which “threatens to sweep 
man away into ordering as the supposed single way of revealing, and so thrust man into the danger of 
the surrender of his free essence” (1977a, p.32). Heidegger criticised the view “modern technology is 
something incomparably different from all earlier technologies because it is based on modem physics 
as an exact science” because modem physics “as experimental, is dependent upon technical apparatus 
and progress in the building of apparatus. The establishing of this mutual relationship between 
technology and physics is correct... ...The decisive question still remains: Of what essence is modem 
technology that it happens to think of putting exact science to use?” (1977a, p. 14) For Heidegger, 
human beings are challenged by Ge-stell to disclose Nature as the standing-reserve of energy, and this 
attitude, on the part of human beings, was first displayed in the rise of modem physics as an exact 
science. Physics was a “way of representing [that] pursues and entraps nature as a calculable coherence 
of forces” and even as pure theory “sets nature up to exhibit itself as a coherence of forces calculable in 
advance, it therefore orders its experiments precisely for the purpose of asking whether and how nature 
reports itself when set up in this way.” (1977a, p.21). Heidegger maintained his view that 
“mathematical physics arose almost two centuries before technology” but claimed that because 
“physical theory prepares the way first not simply for technology but for the essence of modem 
technology” then modem physics “is the herald of Enframing, a herald whose origin is still unknown.” 
(1977a, pp.21-2) Heidegger argued (1977a, p.22-3) that, despite the fact that “chronologically 
speaking” modem physics began in the seventeenth century and machine-powered technology began in 
the latter part of the eighteenth century, the essence of modem technology was “the historically 
earlier”. Modem physics, according to Heidegger, was itself challenged forth by the essence of modem 
technology. It was the technological imperative of Ge-stell, the demand that Nature is orderable as 
standing-reserve, that set-up physics as a means by which Nature was disclosed “in some way or other 
that is identifiable through calculation and that it remains orderable as a system of information.” Thus 
for Heidegger, the essence of both modem physics and modem technology is Ge-stell and it is for that 
reason that “modem technology must employ exact physical science”. Both Ellul and Heidegger 
accepted the mysteriousness of the origin of this essence.
My argument is that if we take a closer look at the transformation in the status of mechanics 
and its internal construction in the sixteenth century then we can locate the origin of the synthesis 
between science and technology as the acceptance and dissemination o f the precepts o f mechanical 
realism. In my view, the historical situation was the reverse of Ellul's interpretation. The universalist 
and humanist movement was restricted to an intellectual and religious elite but the confidence in and 
the value of the practical advances of the experimental philosophies were widely recognised. The 
Baconian dream was more deeply and widely entrenched than the philosophies of Descartes, Leibniz, 
Voltaire and Diderot. Ellul identified five factors leading to the transformation of seventeenth century 
civilization into the technical civilization of the nineteenth century. These were social plasticity,
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economic plasticity, population growth, the accumulation of diverse technical experiences, and the 
appearance of “a clear technical intention”. Ellul defined “a clear technical intention” to be “a precise 
view of the technical possibilities, the will to attain certain ends, application in all areas, and adherence 
of the whole of society to a conspicuous technical objective.”(1964, pp.52) I agree with Ellul that the 
above factors were essential for the development of the nineteenth century technological base and the 
technosciences. However, the technical imperative was present in European thinking from at least the 
sixteenth century onwards. In fact, we can see a “clear technical intention” in the writings of Francis 
Bacon, the practical interests of the Royal Society, and the efforts of the sixteenth century Italian 
mechanists and engineers. As Kuhn (1962,1977) pointed out, the practical values of the new sciences 
were central to the whole enterprise from its onset. Craft practices and the innovation of novel tools and 
instruments were central to the work of Galileo, Descartes, and Newton. The technical imperative was 
present in the sixteenth century drive for the achievement of commercial, political, and military 
advantage in the competitive contexts of European ambitions. It may well have been a dream but the 
intention was there. The destining of modem technology had begun. We can readily reverse the order 
of rank in Ellul's argument (1964, pp.47-9) that the decisive condition for technique was the systematic 
disintegration of social groups and their replacement with atomistic individualism. The identification of 
“Man” as an isolated and rational individual is apparent in the writings of Descartes, Bacon, Bentham, 
Hobbes, and Rousseau. The focus upon material practices and social relations based upon their 
satisfaction of individual interests preceded the nineteenth century. This atomistic individualism was 
itself a consequence of the beliefs in the primacy of the techniques of rational and reasoned discourse 
and the unitary material relation between “Man” and “Nature” as disclosed by the mechanical 
philosophies.21 It was itself premised upon an universalist conception of “Man” and the precepts of 
mechanical realism. The atomistic, state-governed, malleable, flexible, and individualistic society, that 
Ellul considered as a condition of technique, was itself a consequence of the conceptions of “Man” and 
“Nature” forged between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. These conceptions were a 
consequence of the technical imperative rather than its conditions. They were conditions for the mass 
transformation of society termed as “the Industrial Revolution” and the mass participation in the 
technical imperative to be presented as progress, social evolution, and human destiny. Ellul located the 
search for “efficiency”, the demand for the “one best way to do work”, in the nineteenth century. 
However, it was the mechanical realist metaphysics of the sixteenth and seventeenth century that 
proposed that there is one single most efficient mechanism in operation between any particular cause 
and its effect(s). That “most efficient mechanism” was termed as “the natural mechanism” and it was 
the allotted task of the natural experimental philosophies to find it for any particular cause-effect 
sequence. Thus mechanical realism provided the metaphysical foundation for the possibility of 
technique and provided the link between the natural mathematical sciences and the practical sciences.
21 Lukacs termed this atomistic individualism of the post Renaissance as “an individual consciousness & 
la Robinson Crusoe”. (1967, p. 135).
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The distinction between “pure” and “applied” science is merely the distinction between finding the 
“most efficient mechanism” and implementing it in productive practices. Once we address the extent 
that experimental physics interactively and reiteratively involves both the discovery and 
implementation of “the most efficient mechanism” in on-going research and technological practices, as 
I shall argue in the next two chapters, we can characterise experimental physics as internally both 
“pure” and “applied”. In my view, this characterisation is as appropriate for the mechanical 
philosophies of the seventeenth century as it is for the physical sciences of the nineteenth century (and 
for the twentieth century as well) because both shared the same metaphysical precepts. It is merely the 
case that it is more obviously characteristic of the nineteenth century physical sciences and, as Ellul 
correctly pointed out, the nineteenth century required certain economic, social, and technological 
conditions before it could technoscientifically “flourish”.
However, there was considerable equivocation, on Ellul's part, in his description of the 
relations between science and technology. He maintained (1964, p.88) the view that mechanical 
progress “is limited by the physical world”. In his view, (1964, p. 103) the drive for efficiency is the 
mobilisation of “the forces of nature” and the exploration of the atom was an “intervention into the 
inorganic world.” He also insisted upon the feet that “The only thing that matters technically is yield, 
production. This is the law of technique; this yield can only be obtained by the total mobilisation of 
human beings, body and soul, and this implies the exploitation of all human psychic forces.” (1964, 
p.324) and, yet, “The new milieu has its own specific laws which are not the laws of organic or 
inorganic matter... Man is still ignorant of these laws.” (1964, p.429) Does this equivocation reveal an 
inherent contradiction in Ellul's thesis? How could science and technology be related in this way and 
have nothing in common with the natural world? Did Ellul take “the physical world” and “the inorganic 
world” to be distinct from “the natural world”? Unfortunately, Ellul did not discuss the relations 
between these “worlds” further. In my view, the equivocation in Ellul's thesis was a consequence of his 
rationalist account of mathematics and the character of science as mathematical, on one side, and the 
absence of any account of the technique(s) which provided a clear link between mathematics and 
technology, on the other. What was the scientific synthesis? How did science produce explanations? 
Ellul argued that the precision of any machine is only possible because of the elaboration of its design 
with mathematical rigor in accordance with its use but he did not provide any account of how this 
elaboration of its design could be performed. For Ellul, (1964, p.73) this meant that practical activity 
rejected “gratuitous aesthetic preoccupations” in favour of “the idea that the line best adapted to use is 
the most beautiful”. It was necessity that characterised the technical universe because “everything must 
accommodate itself to its mathematical certainty” (1964, p. 116) but he did not provide any account of 
how mathematics became bound up with the technical imperative and conceptions of “efficiency”. This 
omission lead to the considerable equivocation on his part which can be seen in his stance that modem 
science depends upon technique whilst maintaining the “traditional view” that somehow technology is 
“applied science” because it is mathematical. For example, Ellul wrote, “technique is universal in its 
manifestations. It is devoted, by nature and by necessity, to the universal. It could not be otherwise. It
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depends upon a science itself devoted to the universal and becoming the universal language understood 
by all men. We need not belabour the fact, which everyone recognises, that science is universal. And 
this fact in turn leads of necessity to the technical universalisation which stems from it.” (1964, p. 131)
However, I wish to criticise “the fact” that science is universal. I accept that the reification of 
mathematics, as something referent to objective, universal, and eternal truths, has been inherent to 
human thinking (in both occidental and oriental cultures) since antiquity. The mathematical character 
of post-sixteenth century physics is evidently dependent upon the recognition that mathematics is 
universal. However, this raises central questions for my argument. What is the object of the 
mathematical descriptions of mathematical physics? Which technique(s) linked mathematics and 
technology? I shall argue below that the object of mathematical physics has been, since the sixteenth 
century, the mechanical motion of machine performances. It was the technique of applying Euclidean- 
Archimedean geometry to the problems of mathematically describing the six simple machines that 
linked mathematics and mechanics. The metaphysical precepts of mechanical realism allowed these 
mathematical descriptions to be presented as representations of “natural laws” and opened the way for 
the possibility of using mathematically described mechanisms to explain the occurrence of natural 
phenomena. This metaphysics is the root of both modem physics and modem technology. Technique is 
limited by “the physical world” and intervenes in “the inorganic world” by mobilising “the forces of 
Nature”. These “worlds” are nothing more that the whole complex of technical ensembles of machines, 
in which any mobilisation of “forces of Nature” is the non-linear interactions that occur during the 
attempts to integrate novel machines into this complex. It does not necessarily have anything to do with 
the natural world at all! This complex is itself only a small part of the real world (which I take to 
contain both natural and artificial entities). If we are to understand the origins of physics as a 
technoscience, we must inquire into how the massive reduction of the ontology of the real world to an 
innovated collection and ensemble of machines was metaphysically founded. This involves an inquiry 
into the sixteenth century use of mathematics and the science of mechanics.
Mathematical Projection:
Unfortunately Ellul did not provide us with any details about his understanding of the mathematical 
sciences. However, for Heidegger, the mathematical aspect was central to his understanding of physics 
and the metaphysics upon which it was founded. Heidegger analysed the essence of modem science as 
the transformation of fundamental concepts that constituted the “scientific revolution” of the fifteenth 
to seventeenth centuries. What was the transformation of fundamental concepts that occurred during 
this period? How do modem sciences differ from ancient episteme and medieval sciential How was 
this transformation possible?
In What Is Metaphysics? Heidegger (1999c, p.83) considered modem science, as distinct from 
ancient episteme or medieval sdentia, to have an essence because “in a way peculiar to it, it gives the 
matter itself explicitly and solely the first and last word.”22 What is the way peculiar to it? What is “the
22 First published in 1929.
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matter itself’? How does this way give “the matter itself’ words at all? These questions were central to 
all of Heidegger's efforts to understand the essence of modern science and its “special relation” to the 
world. Heidegger examined this special relation, and the human stance that guides and sustains it, by 
attending to how modem science relates to the world and what happened in order to attain that relation. 
The human stance that guides and sustains science is one of pursuing science. In this pursuit, the 
human being, as one being among others, “irrupts” into the whole of beings in such a way that, in and 
through this “irruption”, beings show themselves as what and how they are. What is the character of 
this “irruption”? How does it help beings “show themselves as what and how they are”? It was 
essential to Heidegger's approach that human beings are only able to pursue science by anticipating the 
nature o f the being that they pursue. Human beings could not begin (or end) the pursuit without 
anticipating the conditions under which it could be considered to have been successful or have failed. 
How and what do human beings “anticipate” when they pursue science?
Heidegger (1999b, p.272) took it for granted that measurement, experimentation, the use of 
mathematics, and relating conceptual and material practices, are characteristics of modem science, but 
argued that these characteristics should not be taken to be the essence of modem science.23 Heidegger 
considered experimentation, as a means of acquiring information and testing cognitions, via a definite 
ordering of things and events, to be a basic kind of experience and activity involved in all craft work, 
tool use, and material practices. This was familiar to ancients and medievals alike. Heidegger did not 
give any supporting examples to support this claim. However, contemporary historians of science and 
technology have provided historical examples of measurement, experimentation, the use of 
mathematics to analyse natural phenomena, and conceptualised material practices, from ancient and 
medieval periods that discredit the “traditional view” that these facets began during the “scientific 
revolution”.24 Ancient, medieval, and modem sciences involved working with mathematics and 
measurements. The use of facts, experiments, measurements, and mathematics, was not the 
fundamental novelty of the emergence of the modem sciences. These were not the fundamental 
characteristics of the novelty of the “scientific revolution”. Modem science is different from its 
predecessors because of the way that it measures, experiments, uses mathematics, and conceptualises. 
The fundamental novelty of the modem sciences consisted in how facts, experiments, measurements, 
and mathematics were used. Heidegger's analysis of modem experimental sciences raised crucial 
questions. How were the experiments set up? What was the intent with which they were undertaken 
and in which they were grounded? How was the manner of experimentation connected with the 
conceptual determination of the facts? How were the concepts applied? What preconceptions were 
made about the phenomena in the setting up of the experiment? How were the practices of calculation 
and measurement applied and carried out? How were these mathematical and measuring practices used 
to determine the objects of investigation?
23 Original edition: Die Frage nach dem Ding, Tublingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1962, pp. 50-83
24 For examples, see Clagett (1959a,b), Laird (1986, pp.44-5), Lindberg (1982), Murdoch and Sylla 
(1978), and Torrance (1999, p.577).
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Heidegger (1999b, pp.273-8) characterised one fundamental event in the pursuit of modem 
mathematical science, in the work of Galileo, Descartes, and Newton, to be mathematical projection,25 
Heidegger analysed this in two related ways by describing (1) what mathematical projection consisted 
of and how it unfolded its essence; and, (2) how it became established in a certain direction. The 
meaning of “mathematical projection” was not to be taken from mathematics itself because 
mathematics is only a particular formulation of the mathematical. The word “mathematical” referred to 
the way that something is learnt, rather than merely using mathematics, and the word “projection” 
referred to the fundamental presuppositions and expectations that anticipated the phenomenon. Galileo 
conceived the motion of each and every body as having one “basic blueprint” according to which 
motion was nothing more than the determination of geometrical points in uniform space and time. This 
“basic blueprint” circumscribed its realm of application as both universal and uniform. Heidegger noted 
(1999b, p.289) that the conception of a body moving under uniform rectilinear motion, as posited by 
Galileo and Newton, was one that did not correspond to any experienced motion of a body and there is 
not any conceivable experiment w hich would bring such a body into direct perception. Heidegger noted 
the irony in die positivistic rejection of medieval scholasticism and scientia, as merely dialectical and 
poetic, in favour of a science concerned with an imaginary and unexperienced thing such as uniform 
rectilinear motion. How could a science, supposedly based upon experience, be founded upon a law 
that describes something that does not exist and demands a fundamental representation of things in 
contradiction to experience?26 Heidegger presented (1999b, pp.291-3) the essence of mathematical 
projection as a conceptual project of conceiving the essence of phenomena that skips over the 
phenomena and opens a domain where facts can show themselves. He used the term “skip over” to 
focus on the way that modem mathematical physics does not actually attend to the phenomena. In my 
view, Heidegger intended a double meaning to this term. On one hand he intended the connotation of 
“brushing the phenomena aside” and on the other hand intended the connotation of rapidly (and lightly) 
stepping over appearances to reach “their essential reality”. For both connotations the notion of the 
phenomena as being an obstacle or a hindrance, which was all too easily avoided by modem 
mathematical physics, should be read into “skips over the phenomena”. According to Heidegger, 
Galileo and Newton could not observe uniform rectilinear motion because such a motion does not 
occur. They started with an attendance to the phenomenon of motion but “skipped over” it in order to 
conceive of natural motion as uniform rectilinear motion. This project posited that phenomena were to 
be conceived of in certain ways, and what, and how, they were to be evaluated was brought to the
25 Heidegger characterised modem science in terms of two other fundamental events: research and on­
going activity. I shall discuss these in the next chapter.
26 It could be argued that we could travel into the vacuum of space and put Newton's First Law to direct 
experiential test There are two problems with this argument. Firstly, Newton's First Law was widely 
accepted 250 years, or thereabouts, prior to our technological ability to perform this experiment and we 
can not claim that experience was a criterion for its acceptance. Secondly, even if we were to perform 
this experiment, how we could prove that the body was in fact moving in a straight line?
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phenomena. It was axiomatic and, by expressing physics and cognition in terms of fundamental 
propositions, the cognition that was taken and posited in the mathematical project was of such a kind as 
to set things upon their foundation in advance. As axiomatic, mathematical projection anticipated the 
essence of things and sketched the “basic blueprint” of the structure of everything, and its relation to 
every other thing, in advance. This basic plan provided the measure for laying out the circumscribed 
realm of Nature, as the context for uniform and universal motion in space and time, as outlined in the 
axiomatic project, which would in the future determine which bodies could be a part of it and anchored 
in it. Henceforth, natural bodies could only be what they were shown to be within this projected realm. 
This realm of Nature also required a mode of access appropriate to its axiomatic predetermination. 
How things were to be shown was prefigured in the project and, therefore, the project also determined 
the mode of experiencing and studying the phenomena. Things could only be shown in the relations of 
positions in space, and time, and as measures of mass and force. The project established a uniformity of 
all bodies according to relations of space, time, and motion; it also required, and made possible, a 
uniform measure as an essential determinant of things, i.e. numerical measurement. Inquiry was 
predetermined by the outline of the project in order to allow a line of questioning to be instituted in 
such a way that it posed conditions in advance to which Nature could answer one way or another. Upon 
the basis of the mathematical, the experientia became the modem experiment, and modem science is 
experimental because of mathematical projection. The mathematical projection of Newtonian bodies 
lead to the development of mathematics (in the narrow sense). The new form of modem science did not 
arise because mathematics became an essential determinant but, on the contrary, the use of 
mathematics was a consequence of mathematical projection. The founding (and application) of 
analytical geometry by Descartes, infinitesimal calculus by Newton, and differential calculus by 
Leibniz, were only possible because of the projection implicit from the onset.
Heidegger argued this project was metaphysically established, as the definition of modem 
metaphysics, in the work of Descartes. Descartes posited that clear and insightful intuition, or certain 
deductions, are the routes to knowledge, and also posited that method is necessary for us to have truths 
at all. This method was to consist in the order and arrangement upon that which “the sharp vision of the 
mind” is to be directed if truth is to be discovered If mathematics, in the sense of mathesis universalis, 
was to ground and form the whole of knowledge then special axioms were required These were to be 
intuitively self-evident and established in advance what constitutes being and from where, and how, the 
essence of being is to be determined The basic mathematical projection was to be based upon its own 
foundation, as a fundamental principle, and be indubitable. Heidegger defined the essence of the 
mathematical according to the following general characteristic: it takes and gives to itself cognisance of 
something as a cognisance that it already had and brought to the experience of learning. The 
mathematical had the original meaning of learning what one already knows. How is mathematics and 
the mathematical connected? Heidegger’s definition of "the mathematical" began with its etymological 
stem in ancient Greek. He translated ta mathemata to be "what can be learnt and, at the same time, 
what can be taught", mathanein as "to learn", and mathesis as "the learning and the teaching". The two­
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fold meaning of ta mathemata was to teach and to learn in a broad and essential sense (and not the 
narrow and trite sense of schools and scholars). Heidegger understood ta mathemata in terms of his 
understanding of what is involved in truly learning something or truly teaching something. True 
learning does not occur by merely being instructed that something is the case. It occurs when the 
student learns for him or herself, in terms o f his or her own experiences, what the teacher is offering. 
Learning is a form of taking, self-giving, and is experienced as taking what one already has. It involves 
realising for oneself what is being taught. Teaching involves letting the students learn for themselves 
by bringing them to the point of learning by bringing to the fore what the students are already capable 
of learning for themselves. This way of learning is determined by what is brought to bear by the learner 
upon the phenomenon in question. For Heidegger, number was the most familiar form of the 
mathematical because numbers are "the closest to that which we recognise in things without deriving it 
from them" (1999b, p.227). Heidegger used the number "3" as an example. One cannot teach children 
the number "3" merely by showing them three chairs, or three apples, or three cats, and instructing 
them to see the unifying cognition of three things. Children must recognise that for themselves. 
Number is the most familiar example of the mathematical because it is the most readily learnt and 
taught. Other things are simply more difficult for children to learn for themselves, and, consequently, 
more difficult to teach. Recognition of one's own reflection in a mirror, one's own mother, that other 
people have feelings, acceptance of one's own mortality, how to read and write, and many other things 
that are not related to mathematics, would also be examples of the mathematical.
"[0]ne must grasp that the fundamental condition for the proper possibility of knowing is the 
knowledge of the fundamental presuppositions of all knowledge and the position we take based on such 
knowledge. A knowledge which does not build its foundation knowledgeably, and thereby notes its 
limits, is not knowledge but mere opinion." (p.278)
For Heidegger, the numerical was something mathematical in this sense. Citing Galileo's famous (and 
perhaps mythical) experiment of dropping weights from the tower of Pisa, Heidegger argued that 
onlookers disagreed with Galileo's interpretation of the same phenomenon (p.290). They saw the 
weights hit the ground at slightly different times whilst Galileo triumphantly upheld his view that they 
hit the ground at the same time. Kuhn (1962) and Feyerabend (1975) gave a similar interpretation of 
Galileo's experiment in terms of the "theory ladeness" of observation. Galileo conceived the motion of 
all bodies as rectilinear and uniform (once ever obstacle was excluded) but that it also changed 
uniformly when an equal force affected it. This was how Galileo could conceive of the motion of a 
body thrown onto a horizontal and smooth plane as being uniform and perpetual if the plane was 
extended infinitely. Heidegger pointed out that Galileo used this thought experiment to present his 
conception of the motion of a body in such a way as to allow the reader to cognate it for him or herself. 
Heidegger compared this to Plato's characterisation of mathesis in Meno (85d) as "taking the 
knowledge from out of himself'. Galileo had provided an a priori conception of what should be
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universally conceived about each and every body: no bodies are special, every place is like every other, 
no motion is special, and every force is to be understood only in terms of the change in motion it 
caused. Galileo had conceived the determination of each and every body as having one "basic 
blueprint" according to which the natural process was nothing more that the space-time determination 
of the motion of geometrical points. Furthermore, this "basic blueprint" circumscribed its realm of 
application as both universal and uniform.
What are the limits and justification of mathematical formalism in contrast to a demand for an 
immediate return to intuitively given Nature? The particular discipline of mathematics is a special form 
developing from the mathematical, but, argued Heidegger, we need to grasp the mathematical at a 
deeper level. For Heidegger, every kind of thinking was a consequence of "a mode of historical 
Dasein" and, as such, was a consequence of fundamental positions taken towards Being and towards 
the way in which beings are manifest as such, i.e. towards truth. What new fundamental position of 
Dasein showed itself in the rise of the dominance of the mathematical? For Heidegger, this new 
fundamental position was a spirit and formulation of freedom (against the Church, faith, and 
Aristotelian dogma) to have new experiences. In the mathematical project an obligation to the 
principles, demanded by the mathematical project itself, was developed and self imposed. How did the 
mathematical project, according to its inner direction, drive towards an ascent to a metaphysical 
determination of Dasein? Modem natural science, mathematics, and metaphysics sprang from the same 
root of the mathematical (in the wider sense). 27 In my view, it is this characteristic of modem 
mathematical science that has led some philosophers of science to argue that the metaphysical
27 The historian W.P.D. Wightman (1962) presented a similar (but broader) view of the whole 
Renaissance. He argued that it was, in fact, the whole conception of "the scientific revolution" as a 
revolution that was the novelty of the late sixteenth century. He was also aware that many of the ideas 
of "the so-called scientific revolution" were, in fact, rediscoveries of the ideas of the Medievals and 
Ancients. He argued (p. 4) that William Whewell's oft quoted idea that the mechanical sciences and arts 
"had lain in Stygian darkness for roughly a millennium and had been revived in the second half of the 
sixteenth century " was itself an invention of the late sixteenth century. Contrary to this myth, 
Wightman argued that there was considerable continuity between the development of the arts 
(including literature, fine arts, and sciences) throughout the pre- and post fifteenth century periods. For 
Wightman, "the Renaissance" was invented during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries through a 
critical reflection upon the past that, after using the efforts of its predecessors and pronouncing their 
rejection, presented itself as "coming out of itself". In many respects, the novelty of this period was the 
presentation of itself as something novel.
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foundations of modem physics are platonic.28 It has been argued that Galileo was a Platonist because 
his new science was based upon an interrogation of Nature that was formulated in terms of geometrical 
language rather than observations and experiences based on ordinary language. As Heidegger, Kuhn, 
and Feyerabend argued, this new science was not based on common sense, observation, and 
experience. Galileo's theory of motion was based on a geometrization of Nature and the concrete, 
qualitatively differentiated, lived-world experience of distances was replaced with the homogeneous 
and isotropic abstract space of Euclidean geometry. Galileo de-inscribed ordinary perception from 
experience and, in its place, inscribed Euclidean geometry upon it It is supposedly this “Platonism” 
that placed Galileo's physics in direct opposition to the physics of Aristotle.29 For the Aristotelian, this 
mathematical approach to the presence of phenomena, replacing real bodies moving in real space by 
mathematical bodies moving in mathematical space, was something that was fundamentally 
unacceptable and has been taken to the central point of incommensurability between the two physics.30 
The question about the role and nature of mathematics is supposedly the central point of opposition 
between the new and the old physics. However, Galileo’s attempts at mathematical inscription of 
experience involved more than a platonic istoria at the indubitability of geometry. For Galileo, these 
deductions had to be proved by experimentation -  by mathematically describing mechanisms -  and it is 
this methodological demand that makes his natural philosophy more indebted to Archimedes than it 
was to Plato.31 In my view, Galileo’s affirmation of geometry as being “the language of Nature” is 
insufficient to qualify him as a Platonist. Nowhere in Galileo’s works can we find an inquiry into
28 Cf. KoyrS (1992, pp. 16-43), Burtt (1954, pp.40-7), and Whitehead (1925, ch. 1-3). Burtt and 
Whitehead argued that the mathematical essentialism of Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and Newton, was 
the result of an emergence of neoplatonism in Renaissance Europe. Koyrd, following Burtt, argued that 
Galileo was a Platonist because Galileo held a priori that “the book of Nature” is written in 
mathematics.
29 See Koyre (1992: pp. 28-43) for his discussion of Aristotelian objections to the geometrization of 
space.
30 Aristotle did permit mathematics a role in technai such as astronomy, optics, and music. See Physics 
II.2.194a7-ll; Post. Anal. I.7.75M4-20; andMeteo. DI.3-5. See also Heath (1949).
31 Koyre was aware of Galileo’s Archimedean inspirations. I agree with Koyre’s view that “The true 
forerunner of modem physics is... Archimedes.” (p.22), for reasons that shall become apparent. 
However, I disagree with his view (p.22.fn.2) that “the sixteenth century, at least its latter half, is the 
period of the reception of the study and of the gradual understanding of Archimedes.” The reception 
and gradual understanding of Archimedes had been occurring since, at least, the thirteenth. 
Furthermore, Koyrg described Archimedes as a Platonist without evidence to support this claim apart 
from Archimedes’ passion for geometry. It seems that, by Koyrd's criteria anyone who considers 
geometrical proofs to be universal, eternal, and complete is a Platonist. My view is that this is not good 
enough.
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knowledge, wisdom, virtue, justice, and the immaterial and unchanging form of the Good.32 A 
commitment to the utility of mathematics in describing specific natural phenomena, such as moving 
bodies, is not sufficient, in itself, to quality as a Pythagorean, Platonic, or neoplatonic metaphysics.33 
Metaphysics in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was not defined in terms of a positivistic 
definition as being a collection of unconscious presuppositions and dispositions (or a paradigm, in one 
of Kuhn’s sense of the word.) This would take the meaning of “metaphysics” out of historical 
context.34 In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the aim of metaphysics was to argue for, or assert, 
fundamental a priori principles, that were reflectively explicated and put forward with conviction in 
order to invoke conviction. Metaphysics constituted a formal philosophical position, not a set of 
unarticulated values and beliefs, regarding the nature of Nature.35 Arguably, the reason for the view 
that modem physics was based upon a Platonic metaphysics was probably based upon a positivistic 
interpretation of Plato's Timaeus Dialogue. In this dialogue, Plato used the analogy of the craftsman in 
the story of the origin and form of the Kosmos through the work of a divine craftsman (the Demiurge). 
Plato also used the metaphors of "a shaking machine" to describe the ordering and mixing of the 
elements (53a4), and "natural mechanism" in the description of the digestion of food (80dl-81al). The 
character Timaeus also proposed that an understanding of the Kosmos required an understanding of 
mathematics. It is this proposition that taken to be the opinion of Plato. However, there is no evidence 
that Plato intended this dialogue to be a vehicle for his own cosmological opinions and, in my view, we 
cannot know to what extent, if any, the speech given by Timaeus represented the opinions of Plato. 
Especially given that even the character Timaeus distances himself from the literal truth of his speech 
by emphasising that it is only a likely story (29dl). One may equally speculate that it is more likely that 
Plato situated this dialogue within the larger project of conveying general points about the nature of 
philosophical discourse. In this context it should be read as the middle dialogue on the nature of 
philosophical speeches between The Republic and Critias. Timaeus closely related phusis and techne in 
his description of the Kosmos. Phusis was without any internal power to produce its own order, form, 
or being, and required input from the techne of the Demiurge in the cosmic order in which phusis was
32 In my view, this is a necessary (but not sufficient) criterion for a philosophical position to be 
identified as platonic.
33 Cf. Hatfield (1990) for his argument in support of this point.
341 agree with Hatfield’s argument on this point I would also like to add that on Hatfield’s criterion 
for classifying a position as metaphysical, we would be using the term anachronistically if we 
characterised Plato’s position as metaphysical for two reasons. Firstly, the first use of the term 
“metaphysics” was to entitle the book of Aristotle that followed the Physics. Secondly, Plato’s own use 
of mathematics in discussions and arguments were (arguably) designed to elucidate and clarify 
Socrates’ arguments about the nature of the forms and how we could come to know them.
35 That is not to say that metaphysical positions were not based on unconscious presuppositions but it 
does mean that these presuppositions were not themselves metaphysical positions.
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immanent. It was this view of the Kosmos that had considerable commonality with the metaphysical 
arguments of Descartes and Gassendi, for instance. This was the opposite of Aristotle's argument in the 
Physics that the function fulfilled by the Demiurge was immanent in phusis, as an intrinsically divine 
principle of ordered change, and hence it did not require any input from an external Deity.
Hatfield (1990) argued for an important distinction between the metaphysical arguments of 
Descartes and Leibniz, for instance, and the geometrical arguments of Galileo and Copernicus. He 
considered the former as metaphysical, in terms of their own period, the latter as an extension of 
already established mathematical practices, and argued for the importance of recognising that there 
were both metaphysical and non-metaphysical styles of argumentation in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. This recognition is important. If all the styles of argumentation are anachronistically treated 
as metaphysical then the influence of the practicality of mathematical practices upon the development 
of modem science tends to be overlooked. The fact that an author used mathematical arguments is not 
sufficient grounds for attributing platonic metaphysics to him/her, there are many non-platonic 
European traditions that used mathematical arguments (including the Ptolemaic astronomers, 
presocratic geometers, cabalists, alchemists, and members of the Hermetic tradition.) Galileo was more 
indebted to Euclid and Archimedes than Plato. In addition, Hatfield argued that there is scant textural 
evidence for the view that Galileo’s (and Copernicus’) arguments were based on Platonist or 
neoplatonist metaphysics. He cites this scant textural evidence for the Platonic Galileo as the numerous 
allusions to Plato in Galileo’s dialogues, reference to the theory of recollection expounded by Socrates 
in The Republic, the choice of dialogue style for his major works, allusions to the socratic method, and 
the emphasis on geometry as a route to knowledge. Galileo’s allusions to Plato and his choice of the 
dialogue as the style for his major works could be read as a commitment to Platonism, but they could 
also be read as simply the use of allusion and style for rhetorical and elucidatory purposes. Hatfield 
noted (1990, p. 124-5) that “the characterization of Plato as a supporter of geometry or mathematics is 
thrice put in the mouth of Simplicio, and once in the mouth of Sagredo, but never in the mouth of 
Salviati, who simply defends the importance of geometry and geometrical demonstration, saving his 
praise for Euclid, Archimedes, and Copernicus.” When Salviati discusses quoddam reminisci 
(reminiscence) he refers to previous experience of everyday objects or events, appealing to Simplicio 
or Sagredo’s ability to imagine and think about these objects or events geometrically. He does not 
appeal to a recollection of a direct apprehension of the eternal Forms that occurs during the period 
between death and rebirth.36 Salviati argues for “common sense” to be guided by geometrical 
reasoning, images, figures, and diagrams. Geometry was used to order the imagination of the reader 
with the purpose of demonstrating the applicability of geometry to everyday experience of certain 
objects or events. As Hatfield remarked: “Salviati’s remarks on geometry appear as the remarks of one 
who is teaching the value of the mathematical approach to nature through instances of the practice,
36 For example, see Two World Systems (Drake trans.) pp. 190-1. Hatfield (1990, p. 122) interpreted 
Salviati’s responses to Simplicio’s allusions to Plato’s reminiscence as being openly ironic.
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rather than the remarks of one who has a Platonic appreciation of pure geometrical intuition.”37 
Hatfield argued that Galileo’s project involved the development and extension of mathematical 
practices. He offered examples of a method to solve specific kinds of problem. In Hatfield's view, 
Galileo’s approach was that of presenting a series of innovative mathematical exemplars that could be 
used to solve specified problems. Galileo’s dialogues were those of a practitioner teaching his practice 
by reference to a specified set of problems and the demonstration of their solutioa As Hatfield 
remarked,
“Although [Galileo] looked to mathematics as a model of knowledge, he neither sought an a priori 
insight into the plan of a geometrizing deity nor extended this model into a rational, intellectualist 
account of knowledge in general... his mathematical approach was taught through the examination of 
instances of its application, not through the presentation of a codified set of precepts.” (1990, p. 138)
It is on this point that I disagree with Hatfield and agree with Heidegger. I accept that Galileo extended 
mathematical practices but he also presented a codified set of precepts as well. By focussing on the 
mathematical practices to the exclusion any substantive metaphysical and ontological commitments on 
Galileo’s part, Hatfield has overlooked the realism inherent to Galileo’s physics. Galileo was neither an 
instrumentalist nor a pragmatist. Galileo did more than draw a distinction between qualities that 
afforded mathematical description and qualities that did not. For Galileo, length, weight, and number, 
the measurable qualities were real, whereas qualities such as taste, odour, and colour, were to be 
explained away as illusionary 38 This distinction -  later termed by Locke to be one between ‘primary’ 
and ‘secondary’ qualities -  shows that Galileo was doing more than argue for the extendibility of 
mathematical practices to observation. Galileo was constructing experience in terms of features that 
were supposedly real, or natural, and features that were the responses of sense organs to real features.39 
Of course, this construction had a primary methodological value because it allowed a problem to be 
broken down into simple parts, but it signified more than this in Galileo’s physics. For Galileo, taste, 
odour, colour, and touch, were “no more than mere names”, whereas size, shape, weight, and motion, 
were quantities that were properties of external bodies that would remain even “if ears, tongues, and
37 Hatfield (1990, p. 125). Hatfield was aware that Galileo was more an Archimedean that a Platonist It 
is also worth noting that Socrates was dismissive of astronomy as a worthwhile pursuit (as well as the 
phusicoi in general). In my opinion, the application of geometry to mechanical problems as providing 
essential knowledge about the world would have received short shrift from Plato as the activity of a 
foolish technite and not a road to wisdom.
38 For Galileo’s argument for the distinction between real and nominal qualities see The Assayer pp. 
308-13.
39 For examples, see Galileo’s treatment of music in Two New Sciences pp. 98-104 and his treatment of 
heat in The Assayer pp.308-13.
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noses were taken away”.40 Galileo overtly argued for a realist interpretation of such quantities and, by 
Hatfield's criterion, offered a substantive metaphysical position as a starting point for his physics. He 
articulated assumptions about Nature and presented a method by which Nature could be investigated; 
his physics involved metaphysically directed practices. It was as a form of mathematical projection that 
Galileo extended mathematical practices. The style of Galileo's arguments, throughout his works, was 
that of using mathematical arguments to show how “knowing for oneself’ was central to the project of 
reading the book of Nature. This involved the assumption, as a starting point, that Nature is comprised 
of mathematical properties that can be isolated and treated as interacting components in a dynamic 
system that could be explored by geometrically describing phenomena in terms of mechanisms. 
Furthermore, for Galileo, if one truly understood any phenomenon then one should be able to construct 
a machine to reproduce that phenomenon. The mechanisms at work in the construction of the 
mechanical model are literally those of Nature. The mechanical was to be taken literally as an 
embodiment of mathematics in the world This is evident from Galileo’s use of a pendulum to 
demonstrate his theory of motion, his use of an astronomical sphere to demonstrate his theory about the 
Sun’s rotation, and steelyards and balances to demonstrate his theory of free fall.41 In the metaphysics 
of Galileo, mechanical realism had emerged into seventeenth century as a substantive metaphysical 
position and constituted a set of precepts.42 The transition between the Euclidean mathematical 
Aristotelian-Archimedean tradition of mathematical mechanics and the development of mathematical 
natural science required a set of precepts in order to appeal to a generalised principle of operation in 
Nature in order to correlate the motion of bodies, and their properties, with measurements.43 
Furthermore, by restricting the classification of the real to that of the mechanical Galileo’s mechanical 
realism was a reductive mechanical realism. This was a precursor to the mechanical philosophies of the 
seventeenth century that Hatfield considered as metaphysical.
In Galileo's work, the “mathematical” element was used to reflect what Galileo wanted to 
learn from phenomena and, consequently, reflected his anticipations. Galileo's science was as abstract 
as the scholastic natural philosophies that he criticised for their abstractness. Ancient, medieval, and 
modem sciences all involved the utilisation of mathematics, facts, and concepts. What differed was the 
way that these facts were conceived and how mathematics and concepts were used and established. The 
positivistic attempt to distinguish modem from pre-modem sciences, by describing the former as based 
on facts, is inadequate. Positivistic science is only capable of performing “average and supplementary
40 Assayer. p.313
41 Galileo (1960) on pendula pp. 152-3; on the astronomical sphere pp.348-9; on steelyards and balances 
pp.213-4.
421 hasten to add that although the content of mechanical realism is explicit in Galileo’s work it was 
not named as ‘mechanical realism’. Galileo’s term for this metaphysics was ‘science’.
43 On this point I agree with Strong (1966, p.3). However, Strong did not account for the use of 
machines or mechanical devices in the rise of mathematical natural science and, consequently, this 
generalised principle of operation remained explained.
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work” (in Heidegger's words, 1999b, p. 271) and “normal science” (to use Kuhn's term). Novel 
research involves the fundamental creation and extension of new concepts rather than collecting mere 
facts because a fact is only what it is in the light of the fundamental conception. For Galileo, this 
fundamental conception was encapsulated in the precepts of his metaphysical mechanical realism. 
However, this raises the question of how he managed to conceive those precepts. From what resources 
did he draw upon? From where did his anticipations arise? How did he draw up his “blue print” which 
he mathematically projected over his experiences of natural phenomena? What was the content of his 
“mathematical projection”?
The Science of Mechanics
Archaeologists have provided considerable artifactural evidence of ingenious innovations in ancient 
civilisations.44 Several ancient texts dealing with the geometrical and general principles of craft 
practices and mechanics were available, translated, and studied during the medieval period. For 
example, Vitruvius' (c. 1BC) De Architectura (on the theory and practice of architecture and the large 
scale management of craftsmen and labourers); Heron of Alexandria's (c. 1 AD) detailed works on pure 
mathematics, physics, mechanics, surveying instruments, and practical engineering.45 Frontinus' (c. 
1AD) De Aquis (on the engineering and distribution of water supplies); Plindy's (c. 1AD) Naturalis 
Historia (which includes sections on artifice and the mathematical treatment of mechanisms); and, 
Pappus (c. 4AD) wrote on several problems of mechanics.46 All of these works contained systematic 
collections of Euclidean geometrical treatments, inventions, designs, experiences, and accounts of 
established practices. If we consider technology to be the logos (rationale, accounts, principles) of 
techne then all of these works are technological. They do not merely constitute collections of accounts 
of trial and error tinkering.47 The cultural dissemination of mechanics was accelerated by the invention 
and dissemination of the printing press as the mechanical arts were explicated in writing, including 
mathematical and illustrative diagrams, as well as rationalised and associated with the ancients through
44 Cf. De Santillana (1961: pp. 276-79) for discussion of Hellenistic and Roman engineering and 
mechanics; Rostovtzeveff (1941) for details about Egyptian (c,18BC) automatic irrigation systems; 
Winton (1962) for details about ancient Babylonian (c.250BC) batteries used for copper and silver 
plating techniques; Temple (2000) for details about ancient Egyptian, Hindu, Cathaginian, African, and 
Greek optics; Price (1959) for details about an ancient Greek (c.82BC) mechanical planetary cycle and 
retrograde motion calculator.
45 His mathematical work was Euclidean, used Archimedes' proofs and mechanical method, and 
included Pneumatics, Mechanica, Catopica (theory of mirrors), Metrica, Dispotra (theory and practice 
of surveying), Automatopoietike (the making of automata), Definitions, Geometrica, and Stereometrica 
(solid geometry).
46 Cf. Dugas (1955, pp. 33-5) for Pappus' treatment of the problem of the inclined plane.
47 As Wolpert (1992) would have us believe about almost every productive practices prior to die 
sixteenth centuiy.
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geometry in order to give them status of being “sciences”.48 This involved the innovation and 
dissemination of new inscriptive techniques that, in turn, required the modification of printing 
technology to cope with these new forms of technical and mathematical writing. Once the know-how of 
craftsmen and practitioners was presented in terms of mathematical and rational principles it was 
transformed into “true knowledge”. When coupled with the patronage of political and military powers 
this elevated the social status of the mechanical arts and prepared the way for the experimental and 
mechanical “natural” philosophies of the sixteenth century to achieve mechanical leverage into the 
workings of Nature. The experimental and mechanical sciences of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries grew out of the contemporary mechanical arts and mathematical sciences of the fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries. The artisan had a central role in the emergence of experimental philosophy 
because, as Bennett put it, the “experimental philosophy, given its methodology of testing hypotheses 
by manipulating mechanical devices, must be said to have appropriated both values and specific 
knowledge from the mechanical arts.” (1986, p.2) Once the status of mechanical invention had been 
transformed from a craft to a science, via mathematics and the patronage of elites, the conditions were 
ripe for the formal construction of the science of mechanics.
White argued that during the thirteenth century there emerged both generalised concepts of 
mechanical power and the view that Nature was “a vast reservoir of energies to be tapped and used 
according to human intentions.”(1962, p. 134) If White was correct then the conception of Nature as a 
resource, a conception that Heidegger considered to be the essence of modem technology that 
distinguished it from ancient handicrafts, emerged 300 years before the “scientific revolution” and over 
500 years before the nineteenth century “industrial revolution”. White argued between the thirteenth 
and sixteenth centuries there were widespread innovations in civic, military, and economic 
technologies, as Europe began its expansion of political, economic, and military powers. This 
expansion required more resources and the continuing innovation of machines and techniques to 
enhance productive, explorational, military, and civic power. In his view, the sixteenth century 
development of technologies was a continuation of the post thirteenth century “period of decisive 
development in the effort to use the forces of nature mechanically for human purposes. ”(1962, p. 79) 
Clagett argued that it was the continuing medieval innovation of technologies and the fascination with 
mechanism that contained the seeds of the sixteenth century development of mechanics and the new 
physics.49 He argued that the physical concepts used by Galileo, Descartes, and Newton, had significant 
continuity with those used in ancient and medieval studies of mechanics. Medieval mechanics -  largely 
based on Pseudo-Aristotle’s Mechanica, Heron’s Mechanics, and Archimedes’ demonstrations -  were 
continually modified and developed in such a way that the points of criticism raised in the fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries became the points of departure for the mechanics of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. (1959a, p.41)
On Clagget and White's accounts, the mechanics of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
48 Long (1997, p. 29). Also see Eisenstein (1979, pp. 520-74.)
49 Clagett (1959a). See also Clagett & Moody (1952).
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was the culmination of medieval efforts rather than the radical break that the advocates of the 
“traditional view” have assumed. The sixteenth century science of mechanics had its origins in the 
mathematical treatments of mechanical devices and the culture of technological innovation that 
occurred from, at least, the thirteenth century onwards. From the mid-thirteenth century many treatises 
appeared that focussed on the problems of kinematics and dynamics for mathematical and 
philosophical treatment. By the fourteenth century there were many books on the subject of the 
application of geometry to the problems of motion.50 The thirteenth century mathematician Jordanus de 
Nemore, in his book De rationale ponderibus, used both Archimedean static proofs and Arabic 
derivatives to tackle the problems of the balance, weights, levers, and the problem of geometrically 
dealing with the problems of motion. John Buridan’s fourteenth century book Questiones super libris 
quattuor de caelo included discussions of impetus theory, the possible rotation and motion of the Earth, 
the general law of leverage, the solution to the problem of the inclined plane, and the equilibrium of 
connected weights.51 Both Nemore and Buridan tacked problems that were to become central to 
Galileo’s work during sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Of course the objection may be raised that 
these early efforts were based upon completely different conceptions of motion and matter. Indeed they 
were. Buridan’s notion of “impetus”, for example, has no correlate in Galileo’s mechanics and, in 
terms of modem mechanics, the early efforts made significant errors in their treatments of even simple 
mechanical devices. However, this is irrelevant for the question of whether Galileo’s mechanics was a 
culmination of earlier efforts. What we see in the pre-sixteenth century efforts was the attempt to 
describe the motions of simple mechanical devices in terms of Euclidean geometry. This set down the 
template for subsequent efforts.
The most influential ancient sources for the template for the sixteenth century science of 
mechanics were the works of Euclid, Archimedes, and Pseudo-Aristotle. Pseudo-Aristotle’s 
Mechanical Problems was possibly written in the 4th century BC by a student of Aristotle called 
Strato. The only certainty regarding the authorship of this work is that it was not Aristotle. In the 
Mechanical Problems the geometrical treatment of all the simple machines were reduced to a single 
problem: the properties of the balance were related to those of the circle and the properties of the lever 
to those of the balance. All the motions in mechanics were reduced to consequences of the properties of 
a lever and the circle. Archimedes’ works had a profound influence on Medieval and Renaissance 
mechanics, as they became available to medieval scholars from predominantly tenth century Arabic 
sources and were translated into Latin from the thirteenth century onwards.52 Roger Bacon, in the 
thirteenth century, invoked Archimedes against those who did not “dare to know” and Commanding, in 
sixteenth century, wrote, “with respect to geometry no one of sound mind could deny that Archimedes 
was some God.”53 Leonardo da Vinci studied both Archimedes’ mathematics and Psuedo-Aristotle’s
50 Laird (1986, pp. 44-5); Murdoch andSylla (1978); Clagett (1959b).
51 Cf. Clagett & Moody (1952: pp. 213-9).
52 Clagget (1978). See also Laird (1991) and Simms (1987).
53 Clagget (1978). vol. iii. p. 1225.
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mechanics.54 His works included mathematical analyses of machines, in terms of mathematical 
mechanics, which were reduced, primarily, to the elements of force, impact, weight, and motion. This 
analysis integrated geometry and mechanical arts -  an integration of Archimedean theories of 
geometrical mechanics with fifteenth century technological practices -  and postulated that the 
principles of mechanics and the principles of Nature had an analogous explanatory connection. 
Leonado was akin to Roger Bacon and regarded those who did not read Nature “by the light of 
experience” with contempt. However, unlike Bacon, he regarded “experience” not in terms of mystical 
insight, nor just observation, but in terms of an interventional exploration of “the processes of Nature” 
through chemistry, mechanics, and dissection. These “processes” were treated in his experiments, 
models, and art, as mechanisms. Leonardo's writings suggest that he was formulating die precepts of 
mechanical realism in his studies of Nature and mechanics. It is in the work of Leonado da Vinci, 
inspired by his readings of Archimedes, with his interest in Nature, proficiency in mathematics and 
mechanics, that reveals a trace of the emergence of mechanical realism prior to the “scientific 
revolution”.55 However, Leonardo's approach of exploring natural phenomena in terms of “natural 
mechanisms” experimentally, applying geometry to solve problems in natural philosophy, was a 
continuation of medieval efforts in these directions rather than a radical or novel break from them. This 
approach was characteristic of both Medieval and Renaissance natural philosophers and mathematical 
practitioners.
Archimedes’ fame as an inventor of fantastic machines was widespread in the fifteenth 
century, largely through the account of Plutarch’s Life o/Marcellus.56 It is ironical that it is in this text 
that Archimedes is claimed to have destroyed all his designs for machines because of the ignobility and
54 Clagget (1978, p.490-1). See also Simms (1988) for a description of Leonardo’s design of the 
Architronito (a steam cannon) based upon the drawings of cannon in De Re Militari by Valturius, who 
stated that the cannon had been invented by Archimedes. There is a lack of any supporting evidence for 
this claim. A physicist, Ioannis Sakas, used Leonardo’s sketches to build this device in the mid-1980s. 
Simms reported that it projected a missile (a 10 oz. tennis ball filled with hardened cement) to a 
distance of 150 to 200 ft. within seconds. See Galluzi (1987, pp.91-5) for a discussion of Leonardo’s 
use of Aristotelian notions of motion (as presented in Pseudo-Aristotle’s Mechanica) and the 
Archimedean principles of geometrical mechanics. See Kemp (1981) for a discussion of Leonardo’s 
designs for machines and devices (including hydraulic devices, fortifications, weaponry, flying 
machines, submarines, the parachute, and the helicopter.)
55 Dampier (1938: pp. 32-3) argued that modem science would have begun with Leonardo da Vinci if 
he had published his work. Hart (1961: pp. 347-8) noted that the works and notebooks of Leonardo da 
Vinci, after his death, were primarily of interest to sixteenth century wealthy collectors and patrons of 
art. He claimed that there is little evidence of any specific attempts to recover his notebooks for the 
sake of their scientific content.
56 Plutarch, 1961, Lives, Perrin (trans.), Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
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danger of such records.S7 Although famous for his mechanical inventions there are no surviving texts, 
directly attributed to Archimedes, which contain his reputed devices; only second and third-hand 
accounts remain. His surviving works include the geometrical solutions to the sphere and cylinder, 
conoids and spheroids, the equilibrium of planes, spirals, buoyancy, quadrature of the parabola, the 
diameter of the Earth, numbers, square roots, irrational numbers, arithmetic, a method of integral 
calculus, the diameter of the Universe, probablity, solids, centre of gravity, and measurements.58 There 
are references to lost works on polyhedra, numbers, balances and levers, gravity, optics, the mechanical 
motions of heavenly bodies, parallel lines, circles, triangles, and machines. His only remaining 
description of a mechanical device is his orrey to model the mechanical motion of the heavens. In the 
Method (addressed to Eratostheses) Archimedes described “a certain method, by which it is possible 
for you to get a start to enable you to investigate some of the problems in mathematics by means of 
mechanics” and wrote “for certain things first became clear to me by a mechanical method, although 
they had to be demonstrated by geometry afterwards because their investigation by the said method did 
not furnish an actual demonstration.”59 It is this mechanical method that had wide appeal to the 
Medieval and Renaissance mechanists and mathematicians.60
It is beyond doubt that the works of Archimedes had a profound influence on Galileo. This 
profound influence can be read from Galileo’s own words: “I cover myself with the protecting wings of 
the superhuman Archimedes, whose name I never mention without a feeling of awe.”61 In 1586 Galileo 
constructed a hydrostatic balance, following Archimedes’ geometrical arguments, to determine 
accurately the relative amounts of two metals in an alloy mixture, which he described (in Italian) in a 
paper published in 1644.62 In the same year, 1586, Galileo also studied the Archimedean concept of 
“the centre of gravity”, and wrote a paper (in Latin) on “Theorems about the Centre of Gravity in 
Solids”.63 Galileo wrote On Motion (Du Motu) applying Archimedes’ principle of motion in a medium 
whilst retaining Aristotle’s notion of natural places and the medieval notion of impetus in 1590-1.64 He 
argued that a falling body should be treated as a body rising, falling, or floating in a medium and,
57 Plutarch xviii, pp. 4-5. Cf. Authier (1995) and Latour (1990) for discussions of the narrative 
construction and use of Plutarch's legend of Archimedes.
58 c.f. Heath (ed.) The Works o f Archimedes with the Method o f Archimedes (N.Y.: Dover, n.d.).
59 Ibid. p. 13 of the supplement The Method o f Archimedes. According to Heath, Heiberg discovered 
this work by Archimedes in 1906. The MS was written in Greek, on tenth century parchment, and the 
final leaves were written on sixteenth century paper.
60 See Keller (1971) for a description of how salvage operations in Venice put Archimedes' principles 
into practice during the sixteenth century.
61 Galileo On Motion and On Mechanics (trans. Drabkin & Drake, 1960) p. 67
62 A translated version of this paper, “The Little Balance”, can be found in Fermi & Benadini (1961).
63 This paper was not published until 1638 as an appendix to the Two New Sciences (trans. Crew & de 
Salvio, 1914).
64 This was unpublished until 1883.
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consequently, it could be treated in Archimedean terms as a body “reduced to weights of a balance.”65 
He wrote On Mechanics (Le Meccaniche) in 1593-4 giving Archimedean geometrical treatments of the 
simple machines: the wheel and axle, the wedge, the balance, the lever, the inclined plane, and the 
screw.66 He started from his premise that all simple machines could be reduced to a problem of an 
Archimedean balance. This argument was based on the Archimedean principle that all machines 
operate on the same physical principles so a complete understanding of any one of them is adequate for 
the deduction of the mechanical properties of all the others. Having chosen the balance as fundamental 
and used it to derive the laws for an inclined plane, the lever, the windlass, the capstan, the pulley, and 
the screw, Galileo constructed a ‘dynamic equilibrium’ method as the basis of his physics. He used this 
method in his treatment of hydrostatic phenomena in Discourse on Floating Bodies (1612) and in his 
Dialogue on the Two Chief World Systems (1632). He used this method to describe motion as 
separated into two independent horizontal and vertical axes to describe the fall of a body from a 
moving point as that of a parabola. He rhetorically argued that the Earth could revolve around the Sun 
(without the breath being snatched from our mouths nor birds being flung from out of the sky). In his 
last work, Two New Sciences (1638), he concentrated on explaining natural motion using the inclined 
plane 67 This involved using the pendulum experiment and the balance as exemplars for the description 
of all natural motion.
According to Seegler (1966, p. 4), Galileo probably first became acquainted with the works of 
Archimedes in 1583 through the Tuscan court tutor, Ostilio Ricci, a pupil of Nicold Tartaglia (1500- 
57), who, in 1543, had translated the works of Archimedes into Latin. Tartaglia taught perspective, 
architecture, and in 1537 published his mathematical science of ballistics68 He also taught 
mathematics, surveyed land, designed fortifications, made maps, and invented mathematical 
instruments. His studies included arithmetic, geometry, music, astronomy, perspective, and 
architecture. He had translated Euclid’s works into Italian in 1543. In 1551 he published his Italian 
translation of Archimedes’ On Floating Bodies and, using Archimedes’ hydrostatics, Tartaglia derived 
and proposed a method of re-floating wrecks.69 He had also studied and translated into Italian Pseudo- 
Aristotle’s Mechanica and declared that mechanics based on the principles of weight was “the cause of
65 Galileo (1960) p.38. In this work he presented his “physical analogy” of the balance for naturally 
moving bodies and for the motion of a body on an inclined plane and pendula.
66 Published in French in 1634 and in Italian in 1649.
61 See Naylor (1989) and Cantor (1989) for discussions of Galileo’s rhetorical use of his “experiments”. 
Both Naylor and Cantor argued that Galileo anticipated the results of his experiments and question 
whether those “experiments” had ever been performed at all.
68 Keller (1975: p. 19). Tartaglia’s famous books are Nova scienta (1537) and Questi et inventioni 
diverse (1546). Parts of Questi Bk.VH and all of Bk.VIII are translated and reproduced in Drake and 
Drabkin (1969: pp. 104-43).
69 Laird (1986, p.52), Clagget (1978, pp.508-607). In his book Travagliata Invenione, there is a 
translation and commentary on Archimedes’ On Floating Bodies BK.I. Cf. Keller (1975, p.21).
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every ingenious mechanical invention”.70 He argued that arguments about Nature could only be based 
on experience whereas abstract arguments about mechanics should be based on mathematics. This lead 
him to assert that arguments based on mechanics were superior to those based on mere observation 
because reasoning based on mathematics was more rigorous than reasoning based on experience. When 
observation and mechanics did not agree then the notions of “error” or “material hindrances” could be 
used to explain the discrepancy.71 By adopting this tactic Tartaglia had pre-empted the seventeenth 
century method of transdiction.72 It was this method that was central to the use of mechanics as an 
explanatory tactic. The discrepancies between the fall of a body and a parabola, for example, could be 
transdicted as the mechanical consequence of the invisible force of friction. A subsequent mechanical 
experiment could be constructed to demonstrate friction and, due to the presumed universality of such a 
demonstration, it could be taken to have disclosed the reason for the initial failure of mathematical 
description to match experience. Tartaglia accepted the Aristotelian classification of mechanics as an 
“subaltemated science” because its method was abstract mathematical demonstration but its subject 
was physical and consequently both mathematics and experience were required in the development of 
mechanics. He argued that mechanics provides knowledge of how to calculate the strength (virtu) and 
power (potentia) of any machine to augment the strength and power of men by any degree.73 According 
to Laird (1986, p. 53), Tartaglia attempted to inscribe a formal mathematical treatment of mechanics by 
combining the statics of Archimedes with the dynamics and kinematics of Psuedo-Aristotle but was 
unsuccessful because he could not combine the Archimedean proofs based on equilibrium and the 
Aristotelian arguments based on velocities. However, Tartaglia had laid down die challenge to his 
sixteenth century Italian contemporaries.
Laird claimed (1986, p.54) that Francesco Maurolico was the first of Tartaglia’s 
contemporaries to take up this challenge. He already had established his reputation in astronomy, 
optics, and by translating and commenting on the works of Euclid, Archimedes and Pseudo-Aristode. 
In Problemata mechanica cum appendice he discussed the scope and classification of mechanics within 
the sciences.74 He listed mechanics (along with music, astronomy, perspective, geography, architecture, 
painting, sculpture, stereometry, and cosmography) as an intermediate science between the 
mathematical and the physical that was distinct from the secular arts. He considered mechanics to be a
70 Questi. Bk. VII. Keller (1975, p.20). For discussions of the Psuedo-Aristotelian basis of Tartaglia’s 
mechanics see Laird (1986, pp.52-3) and Wallace (1984, pp. 203-5).
71 Questii, fols., 78r-v, quoted and translated in Drake and Drabkin (1969, pp. 105-7)
72 Osier (1994, p. 117), following Mandelbaum (1964), termed this as the methodological problem of 
transdiction. This is a form of inference by which an explanation is constructed in terms of an, as of 
yet, unobserved mechanism in order to explain the deviation of an observation from theoretical 
expectations.
73 Questii, fol., 82v, Drake and Drabkin (1969, p. 111)
74 This book was published in 1613 well after Maurolico’s death in 1575. The preface to this book and 
several of the problems can be found in Clagett (1978, pp.784-7).
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part of “contemplative philosophy” due to its mathematical part. He argued that the dynamics and 
kinematics of Pseudo-Aristotle’s mechanics had to be based on “the doctrine of equal static moments” 
and consequently mechanics had to be based on Archimedean principles. It is this notion of the 
primacy of Archimedean statics that was shared by many subsequent sixteenth century Italian 
mechanists.75 Guidobaldo used Archimedean techniques, in On the Equilibrium of Planes, as 
exemplars to solve the problems set by Psuedo-Aristotle starting from the lever and then on to the rest 
of the six simple machines (the lever, the wheel and axle, the inclined plane, the wedge, the screw, the 
balance).76 Guidobaldo aimed to establish mechanics as a branch of rigorous axiomatic geometry and 
claimed that any machine based on such a mechanics would work in the real world. Another sixteenth 
century Italian military engineer called Giulio Savorgan, also inspired by Archimedes, innovated Italian 
town fortifications, developed mechanics and invented ‘Archimedean instruments’ to aid the lilting and 
transportation of heavy cannons.77 He invented light, robust, and powerful liiling-gear based on spur- 
gears, worm-gears, rack-and-pinion, block-and-tackle, winch and pulley, screw-jacks and ratchet-jacks. 
Bernardino Baldi considered mechanics to be a “subaltemated science” due to its physical subject 
matter described in terms of geometrical proofs. In his view, mechanics was consequently of an equal 
status to optics, music, and astronomy. In his treatment of mechanics he followed Maurolico and 
argued that the solutions to the problems raised by Pseudo-Aristotle should be based on Archimedean 
proofs. However, he argued that mechanics should not be based purely on static principles but must 
also be based on motion, power, and impetus.78
The Aristotelian and mathematical science of mechanics was established in Italy through the 
influence of the university at Padua.79 Since the fourteenth century Padua had been a centre for 
mathematical subjects (including astronomy, astrology, geometry, optics, and geography) and was the 
first Italian university in the sixteenth century to offer lectures in mechanics from the chair of 
mathematics. According to Laird (1986, p.48), mechanics was first introduced into the university 
ciriculum at Padua in the 1560s in the form of lectures on Pseudo-Aristotle’s work. The elevation of 
mechanics from the banausic to the academic was established through the influence of mathematically 
educated Aristotelian scholars such as Niccolo Lenico Tomeo and Alessandro Piccolomini.80
75 Cf. Laird (1986, p. 55)
76 Guidobaldo was an aristocrat and a military engineer. Guidobaldo’s famous books are Le 
mechaniche 1581, see Drake and Drabkin (1966, pp.239-328), and Liber mechanicorium, published in 
Latin 1577 and Italian 1588, see Wallace (1984, p.206). These books described the simple machines as 
described by Heron. Federico Commandino translated Heron’s works into Latin in 1573. Heron 
reduced the problem of the mathematical description of the six simple machines to the properties of the 
circle. His treatment implicitly utilised a principle of moment. Cf. Laird (1986, p. 55).
77 Keller (1975, pp. 21-32.)
78 Cf. Laird (1986, p.56-7) and Rose (1975, pp.248-51).
79 Cf. Schmitt (1976: pp. 35-56).
80 Tomeo was a professor of philosophy at Padua from 1497 to 1509. Cf. Laird (1986: pp. 48-9); Rose
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Guidobaldo studied there in 1564 and Baldi from 1573 to 1575.81 Pietro Catena was the first lecturer in 
mechanics at Padua and gave lectures between 1564-1573.82 His successor was Guiseppe Moletti.83 
Moletti classified mechanics as “contemplative philosophy” of mathematical principles of statics, 
dynamics, and kinematics. According to Moletti, the task of mechanics was to demonstrate the most 
efficient means of performing the maximum amount of work with the minimum of effort. For Moletti, 
mechanics was a science and not an art because the geometrical first principles of mechanics were 
“necessary and eternal” whereas the arts were contingent upon human ends. The end of science was the 
knowledge of causes and truth whereas the end of arts was productive work. He argued that the first 
principles of mechanics were natural means, that mechanics was to be found in all the works of Nature, 
and the first principles were “Natural Laws”. Moletti transformed the traditional classification of 
mechanics as a “subalternate science”; whilst he still considered it to be “intermediate” between the 
geometrical and the physical it was based on both mathematical and natural truths.84 Moletti formally 
reclassified the subject of mechanics to be that of natural principles. In the work of Moletti, mechanics 
was presented as a natural science. By declaring that the science of mechanics was based on “Natural 
Laws”, Moletti had paved the way for Galileo's mechanical realist physics.
A similar view can be found in the writings of Francis Bacon. In The New Organon he was 
critical of sixteenth century arts, intellectual sciences, and philosophy.85 He considered Greek science 
to be childish, due to their basis on “bland and specious generalities” that lead only to “disputes and 
scrappy controversies” and “almost stopped in their tracks”, and praised the mechanical arts for 
progressing.86 He proposed
“the production of a Natural History by making a history not only of Nature free and unconstrained 
(when nature goes its own way and does its own work), such as a history of the bodies of heaven and
and Drake (1971: p.79). He translated Pseudo-Aristotle into Latin and published a commentary in 
1525. Piccolomini taught moral philosophy at Padua in 1539. Cf. Laird (1986: p. 49); Rose and Drake 
(1971: p. 82). On his scientific work cf. Suter (1969).
81 Cf. Laird (1986, p.59)
82 Op cit. pp.59-60; Rose and Drake (1971: p. 93). Catena was professor of mathematics from 1547 to 
1576.
83 ibid. pp.60-2. Moletti was professor of mathematics at Padua between 1577 and 1588.
84 Moletti’s arguments can be found in In librium mechanicorum Aristotelis expositio tumultaria et ex 
tempore. Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana MS. S 100.1 have relied on Laird’s commentary, translation, 
and selections.
85 Published in 1620. Quotations and references taken from the Jardine and Silverthom edition (2000).
86 New Organon, pp. 6-7. Bacon did not give any examples of the arts, intellectual sciences, 
philosophy, or childish Greek sciences to which he referred. He only gave a single reference to Plato’s 
reference to Atlantis in Timaeus (24D ff.) and the description of Scylla in Ovid (Metamorphoses, x.IH. 
732-3).
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the sky, of land and sea, of minerals, plants and animals; but much more of nature constrained and 
harassed when it is forced from its own condition by art and human agency, and pressured and 
moulded. And therefore we give a full description of all the experiments of the applied part of the 
liberal arts, and all the experiments of several practical arts which have not yet formed a specific art of 
their own.” (2000, pp.20-1, my italics.)
He argued (2000, pp.69-70) that the mechanical arts were founded on natural axioms induced from 
experience and were capable of growth and flourishing provided that they were directed according to 
utility. He praised the mechanical arts for providing a “variety of objects and splendid equipment”, 
having “contributed to human civilisation”, and being based on “axioms of nature” discovered by 
observation and subtle, patient, ordered movement of hands and tools. He cited the clock as an example 
of “a subtle and precise thing that seems to imitate the celestial bodies in its wheels, and the heartbeat 
of animals in its constant, ordered motion; and yet it depends on just one or two axioms of nature.” He 
considered (2000, p. 100) the Arts to be praiseworthy as die source of civilisation and political 
advantage in general and the discovery of the art of printing, gunpowder, and the nautical compass in 
particular. The mechanical arts were the noblest human pursuit and “right reason and sound religion 
would govern its use.”
However, Bacon (2000, pp.53-5) was critical of natural philosophies that reduced Nature to 
mechanisms because mechanics was based on only “a few axioms of Nature” and measurement was 
insufficient to reveal “the ultimate causes of Nature”. Bacon was not a reductive mechanical realist 
because he considered mechanics, although based on a few “axioms of Nature”, to be artificial and that 
Nature, when left to its own ways, was not mechanical. Bacon’s mechanical realism was a modest 
mechanical realism in as much as he considered the fundamental principles of mechanics to be natural 
principles but he did not consider all natural principles to be mechanical. Furthermore, he considered 
(2000, p. 109) mechanics to be subordinate to physics because the latter, through observation of Nature 
going its own way, could discover latent processes, efficient and material causes, and latent structures, 
that occur through the common and ordinary course of Nature. In many respects, Bacon maintained an 
Aristotelian physics. Experimentation, in the form of interventional material practices, could only 
provide us with a limited kind of knowledge. As Bacon put it (2000, p.33): “All man can do to achieve 
results is to bring natural bodies together and take them apart; Nature does the rest internally.”87
Another proponent of this interpretation of machine performances at the turn of the 
seventeenth century was Giovanni di Guevara.88 Guevara analysed mechanics using both Archimedean
87 Note that the word “results” is a translation of the Latin opera. This word has a variety of meanings. 
It can be taken to mean “results”, “effects”, and “work”. It is derivative from operatio, which is 
translated as “operation” or “practice”.
88 Cf. Laird (1986) pp. 65-7 and Wallace (1984) pp. 208-16. Guevara was a Spanish noble from Naples, 
praepositus generalis of the Clerics Regular Minor, the Bishop of Teano in 1627, and a papal legate to 
Philip IV of Spain. His In AristotelisMechanicas commentarii was published in Rome in 1627.
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principles and Pseudo-Aristotelian mechanics. He dealt with the principles of mechanics, centres of 
gravity, the simple machines, Psueda-Aristotle’s thirty-five mechanical problems, the scope of 
mechanics, and its relation with the other sciences. He defined mechanics as the ait or science of 
applying geometrical principles to heavy and light things that must be moved or brought to rest 
artificially. Mechanics was based on the weight of the moved body and the strength of the mover 
(which could be an impetus or a machine) and it consisted in discovering the appropriate powers 
needed to move loads and to supplement Nature. He distinguished two subjects of mechanics: (i) its 
material subject; and, (ii) its formal subject. The material subject of mechanics was defined in terms of 
die quantity of weight of a body and the powers required for it to move or stop. The formal subject was 
defined as the mathematical treatment of the material subject. Guevara’s formal treatment of mechanics 
was in terms of marvellous and artificial motion and rest (each, in turn, was treated in the Aristotelian 
terms of violent and natural motion and rest).89 These distinctions allowed Guevara to describe how 
mechanics and natural philosophy dealt with the same subject differently. Guevara argued that natural 
philosophy was concerned with marvellous motions and rest whereas mechanics was concerned with 
artificial motions and rest; both natural philosophy and mechanics could analyse their distinct kinds of 
motion and rest in terms of natural and violent motion. He argued that natural motion was apparent in 
any motion that was produced by machines. Although a machine operated upon violent motions, from 
an external source, the behaviour of that motion could be analysed in terms of natural motions. In the 
operation of any machine there were both violent and natural motions at work. In other words, human 
intervention was required to produce and activate any machine but once that machine had been 
produced and activated then Nature played its part in how that machine operated.90 Consequently, the 
operation of mechanical devices was based on both human interventions and natural principles.
In 1592 Galileo Galilei succeeded Moletti as professor of mathematics a Padua. He was 
trained as an artisan and an engineer rather than a philosopher or mathematician.91 As Seegler pointed 
out (1966, p.7), Galileo’s natural philosophy was that all conclusions had to be checked “directly with 
nature to ascertain if they agreed with actual observations”. However, the key to understanding his
89 In the Aristotelian terms, violent motion arose from an external source whereas natural motion arose 
from the body in question.
90 A similar view of material practices is given by Gooding (1990) and Hacking (1983). I have also 
heard experimental physicists talk in similar ways about the participation of Nature in their work It 
seems that many experimentalists are all too aware of the artificiality of the experimental apparatus, 
they accept that human intervention has a fundamental role in an experiment, but claim that the object 
of their investigation is how Nature responds to their interventions. I shall discuss this further in 
chapter six.
91 Cf. Drake (1957), Seegler (1966), Settle (1967), Shea (1972), andRedondi (1987), for biographies of 
Galileo’s life and works. Also see Bedini (1994, pp.89-95) and McMullin (1967, pp.256-92) for 
discussions of Galileo’s close relationship with mechanicians, instrument makers, and craftsmen of 
Venice, Padua, and Florence.
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“natural” philosophy is to understand the “Nature” that his conclusions were to be checked against. For 
Galileo, following Moletti, Nature was both a source and a resource for physical theories. However, 
geometrical methods did not allow any investigation into quality. It is for this reason that the notion of 
quality, as an object of natural philosophy, was discarded, demarked as subjective, and removed from 
“the realm of Nature”. It was a direct consequence of this reduction that mere experience did not 
qualify as a legitimate source of knowledge. Checking directly with Nature involved an intellectual a 
priori knowledge of mathematics as being the only means of apprehending the truth of what was being 
experienced. Physics became a priori science in the hands of Galileo -  and by Descartes later -  and 
consequently the Euclidean-Archimedean geometry became the necessary language to understand 
Nature. He argued that the efficient causes of mechanics were the necessary causes and fundamental 
mechanisms of Nature. Galileo was not an empiricist and experience had to be mathematical in order to 
qualify as an observation. Experience had to be described in the form of Euclidean-Archimedean 
geometry if one was to read “the book of Nature”. Galileo was able to develop the Archimedean statics 
into the dynamics of the new physics that aimed to describe everything in terms of number, figure, 
motion, and causal mechanism. He did this by disregarding the primacy of perception and affirming the 
technical exemplars of Euclidean geometry, inscribing motion solely in terms of the translation of a 
body from one geometrical point to another. For Galileo, mechanical realism was implicit to his 
scientific method. The natural philosopher to understand the true cause of natural phenomena s/he must 
be able to replicate or reproduce the natural phenomena by constructing an artificial device.92 It was 
this move that was essential for the development of Galileo's new physics and was to provide the 
template for all subsequent physics. The mathematical motions that were to be projected upon the 
natural phenomena were the motions of the six simple machines. Circular motion and the coupling of 
anti-parallel linear motions could be described in toms of the geometrical solution to the wheel (and 
consequently the pulley). Orthogonal changes in motion, the transference between horizontal motion 
and vertical motion, could be described in terms of the geometrical solution to the wedge (the 
transference between vertical and horizontal described in terms of the inclined plane). Transference 
between circular motion and motions orthogonal to the plane of the circle could be described in terms 
of the screw. Galileo had reduced all these machines to the operation of the lever and then the 
balance.93 This provided him with a complete set of uniform mechanical motions, with which to 
mathematically project on to all natural movements, and be reduced to a single unitary mechanical 
motion. It was the balance that, as a metaphor and a model, that was to become central to all physical
92 Galileo On Motion and Mechanics, p. 421.
93 In Two New Sciences (p. 124) Galileo defined his notion of force (forza) in terms of the lever as 
“mechanical advantage”. He also, after making reference to Archimedes' treatment of Equilibrium (cf. 
Heath The Works o f Archimedes pp. 189-220), proposed the derivation of “most other mechanical 
devices” in terms of “the Law of the Lever” (TNS p. 110-2).
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explanation and law.94 The laws of conservation (mass, charge, energy), Newton's Laws of Motion, the 
First Law of Thermodynamics, and the applicability of mathematical equations to natural processes, 
were all premised upon the metaphor of the balance as a fundamental mechanical principle of Nature. 
Furthermore, by utilising the method of transdiction whenever the mathematical projection of the 
balance failed to match experience, the projected invisible counter-mechanisms used to correct the 
discrepancy could themselves be projected as balances.95 Each natural process could be described in 
terms of the interaction between balances and balances within balances. Any external force could itself 
be simply described by mathematically projecting the lever. The mathematical projection of balances 
and levers made the mechanical world-view and the idea of the clockwork universe possible. All that 
was required to solve the problem of transdiction was to devise a further experiment to show the 
mechanical action of the correcting mechanism. This could then be mathematically projected over the 
original phenomenon. This projection embodied the precepts of mechanical realism and made the 
experimental use of mechanical devices to ascertain the fundamental mechanisms of Nature possible.
Galileo made essential two contributions to mechanics that made modem experimental 
physics possible. The first contribution was technical. Galileo innovated geometrical techniques to 
reduce all motion to a single unitary mechanical motion: the motion of the balance. As a consequence 
of this innovation he was able to inscribe simple time-reversible mechanisms, such as pendula, in terms 
of Euclidean-Archimedean geometry and provide a mechanical determination of time. The second was 
metaphysical. He was able to establish his mechanical realism as a basis for using mechanical devices, 
experimental apparatus, rhetorically to “discover” mechanical principles of Nature. Galileo went 
further than had any of his Paduan predecessors. Not only were the motions of simple mechanical 
devices treated as natural, as Moletti had proposed, but they were also to be used to determine the 
mathematical “Laws of Nature”. It was the geometrical treatments of simple mechanisms that were to 
be classified as “the Laws of Nature” and all natural movements were to be treated as simple 
mechanisms. Galileo’s reductive mechanical realism was both the precursor to the “mechanical world 
view” of the seventeenth century mechanical philosophers and also provided a method to investigate 
Nature mechanically.
The development of mechanics as both a mathematical and a natural science could only be 
described as platonic in terms of a conflation of platonic uses of techne and episteme. The causal logos 
of the (platonic) techne of mathematical mechanics was presented as the unchanging and eternal 
episteme of Nature. Thus, from its onset, mathematical physics was an epistemic logos of techne; it was 
techne-logical. This move was facilitated by the ambiguity between mathematical reasoning as techne
94 Machammer (1998) argued that Galileo should be situated in the Archimedean heritage and that the 
mathematical treatment of the balance was central to Galileo’s physics.
95 An example of this in Galileo's work is the solution to the discrepancy of the motion of a body from 
the mathematically projected quadrature of a parabola. (Cf. Two New Sciences pp. 252-6). Galileo 
explained this discrepancy in terms of air resistance. This transdiction was demonstrated by the 
dropping of two cannon balls and the pendulum thought experiments.
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and episteme within the texts of both Aristotle and Plato, but it was also novel. This novelty allowed 
both the reification of the products of Euclidean-Archimedean geometry and the transformation of the 
status of the mechanical arts to mechanical science to become a means of writing the book of Nature. 
However, this transformation occurred within the context of the European desire for novel 
technological powers. It is this desire that provided the condition for naturalness of the conceptual 
synthesis of the precepts of mechanical realism and the possibility of both mathematical natural science 
and modem scientific technology. Once this metaphysical foundation was secured then the episteme of 
Euclidean-Archimedean geometry was foregrounded and the techne was backgrounded. The technical 
acts of writing the book of Nature could be ignored (as mere means) and it could be read as if written 
by God. The history of the dissemination of Euclidean-Archimedean geometry is one of the 
presentations of its practice as the discovery of truths. This remained the case in European mathematics 
until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries’ construction of non-Euclidean geometries. It was 
Euclidean-Aristotelian-Archimedean science of mechanics that provided the template for the 
mathematical projection of the lever and the balance as the blue print for the physics of the seventeenth 
century. Once the precepts of mechanical realism had been embodied in mathematical projection then 




THE "MAKING” OF THE GROUND-PLAN OF NATURE:
“[TJhere are absolutely no judgements in Mechanics which do not also pertain to Physics, of which 
Mechanics is a part or type: and it is as natural for a clock, composed of wheels of a certain kind, to 
indicate the hours, as for a tree, grown from a certain kind of seed, to produce a certain kind of fruit. 
Accordingly, just as when those who are accustomed to considering automata know the use of some 
machine and see some of its parts, they easily conjecture from this how the other parts which they do not 
see are made: so, from the perceptible effects and parts of natural bodies, I have attempted to investigate the 
nature of their causes and of their imperceptible parts.”
(Rene Descartes, Principles o f Philosophy, p. 285)
“Nothing is more dangerous for a theologian than to know the Elements of Euclid.”
Pierre Gassendi (Disquisitio metaphysica)
Mechanical Realism and The Mechanical World-View:
In order to reveal the root of modem metaphysics, Heidegger began an analysis of Descartes. The usual 
interpretation of Descartes’ cogito sum is that of the thinking-being as "I", as the human subject, as the self- 
declared centre of thought that placed doubting at the beginning of philosophy in order to provide reflection 
upon knowledge itself and its possibility, placing epistemology prior to ontology. For Heidegger (1999b, 
p.298), this was a story that "at best [is] only a bad novel" because it neglected the questioning of substance 
that was central to Descartes' philosophical enterprise in the Meditationes de prima philosophia (1641). 
Heidegger criticised the usual interpretation that Descartes' philosophical project was a form of scepticism, 
subjectivism, or egoism. Heidegger placed Descartes within the context of an historical period in which a 
new assault upon reality had been embarked upon. Descartes' enterprise reflected the passion for this new 
assault and an inquiry to bring clarification to the essence of the new enterprise. In Descartes' work, it is the 
mathematical itself that is the centre, and his philosophical efforts were directed towards grounding the 
mathematical in terms of its won inner requirements by explicating it as the standard of all thought and 
establishing its rules. Descartes' self-appointed task was a work of reflection upon the fundamental meaning 
of the mathematical. This reflection was concerned with the totality of beings and the knowledge of that 
totality, and, therefore, was a reflection upon metaphysics. Heidegger referred to Regulae ad directionem 
ingenii, a posthumously published unfinished work by Descartes, in his discussion of Descartes' 
mathematical and metaphysical work.1 In this work, Descartes emphasised that clear and insightful 
intuition, or certain deductions, are the routes to knowledge. He also argued that method is necessary for us
1 For an English translation of this text see Rene Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Lafleur 
translation, Indianapolis: Library of the Liberal Arts, 1961.
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to have truths at all. This method was to consist in the order and arrangement upon that which "the sharp 
vision of the mind" is to be directed if truth is to be discovered. If mathematics, in the sense of mathesis 
universalis, was to ground and form the whole of knowledge, then special axioms were required. These 
axioms needed to be intuitively self-evident and establish in advance what constitutes being and from 
where, and how, the essence of being is to be determined. The basic mathematical projection had to be 
based upon its own ground, as a basic principle, and be indubitable. Descartes did not start his discourse 
with doubt because he was a sceptic, but in order to clear the way for the mathematical as posited as the 
absolute ground and foundatioa Hence Descartes' cogito was something mathematical when in thinking 
itself it takes cognisance of itself as something we realise for ourselves as something we already have. As 
Heidegger argued (p.302), Descartes' formula, cogito ergo sum, was not an inference because the sum was 
not the consequence of thinking, it was the jundamentum. Descartes' project was founded upon the "I posit" 
proposition because it allowed his work to be presented as something independent from that which is given 
before hand and as that which already lies within. The mathematical "I" was presented as the special 
subject, against which all remaining things first present themselves as what they are, that mathematically 
provided the fundamental relation from which all things receive their thingness. In relation to the "subject" 
things could then stand as something else, as objectum, and became "objects".
Descartes established a mechanical philosophy of Nature upon the foundation that all natural 
phenomena could be explained in terms of innate matter and motion in geometrical space. He argued that 
the Universe is a plenum and that the matter filling it is infinitely divisible, identical with geometrical 
space, and has only the property of extension. He argued that extension could be understood in terms of a 
prior knowledge, there is no need for any appeal to experience or observation, and consequently, the first 
principles of natural philosophy could be known a priori and lead to the discovery of essences. Experiences 
and observations were only required to determine the contingent actuality of phenomena. Descartes was 
committed to the Galilean mechanical physics and mechanical philosophy. IBs 1641 Meditationes de prima 
philosophia contained his demonstrations of the metaphysical foundations of the epistemological basis of 
his mechanical philosophy. His aim was to provide metaphysical foundations for the epistemology of 
mechanical philosophy that would replace the Aristotelian natural philosophy without appealing to an 
alternative ancient philosophy.2 His method was to use sceptical arguments instrumentally in order to clear 
the way for his arguments in favour for mathematics as a foundation of indubitably certain and 
demonstrative knowledge. Furthermore, he also used arguments for God choosing to be bound by the 
necessity that God had freely created in the physical world and consequently the a priori arguments for the 
etemality, universality, and necessity of mathematical first principles were the metaphysical basis of his 
epistemology of physics.3 Furthermore, his points of departure were continuous with the theorlogical 
presuppositions of Medieval theology because his metaphysical arguments about God's creation of eternal,
2 See Osier (1994, ch.5) and Shea (1991) for further discussions of this point.
3 See Brdhier (1968), Curley (1984), Hatfield (1989), and Garber (1992) for further discussions and 
arguments.
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necessary, and universal truths was tempered by, and drawn from, the Medieval traditional discussions 
about the absolute and ordained powers of God.4 The theological tradition played a formative role in the 
development and interpretation of Descartes' natural mechanical philosophy. Furthermore, as discussed in 
the last chapter, philosophical discourses for the eternal necessity of mathematical truths occurred 
throughout the Medieval. Descartes, Galileo, and Kepler identified mathematical truths as eternal truths that 
were central to the natural order of the physical world and all shared a concern with the relationship 
between God and mathematical truths.5 Descartes' arguments for God's creation of mathematical truths 
provided the metaphysical foundation of his epistemology because if certain fundamental mathematical 
truths are necessarily true then we could have a prior knowledge of them. These a priori indubitable truths 
provided Descartes with a foundation for his deductive methodology. From this "standard of certainty", 
Descartes was able to provide arguments in the Discourse on Method for his method of systematic 
doubting, the cogito, the existence of God, the existence of the soul, and the essence of matter. He was able 
to instrumentally start from his conception of the cogito based on the components of doubting, thinking, 
and being, to argue the cogito was indubitable as a transferable standard by which the reliability of any 
knowledge claim could be made. In the Discourse on Method (p.54) this standard provided "a general rule 
that the things we conceive very clearly and very distinctly are all true, but that there is nevertheless some 
difficulty in being able to recognise for certain which are the things we see distinctly." It was this general 
rule that Descartes used to argue that if this general rule were true, and it must be, then there is a necessary 
connection between that which is clear and distinct in our minds and the natural order of the physical world 
created by God. If the rule were false the God would be a deceiver and this would be in contradiction with 
the conception of God in terms of perfection. Given that mathematical truths are clear and distinct then they 
must provide truths of the physical world. Descartes used this reasoning to establish his characterisation of 
matter in terms of geometrical extension, infinite divisibility, and primary and secondary qualities. These 
characterisations constituted the fundamental elements of the physical world within Descartes' natural 
philosophy.
On the basis of these elements, Descartes asserted laws of Nature as the first principles of his 
natural philosophy. These laws were given in the Principia philosophiae (1644) to be: (1) God was the first 
cause of motion and He always conserved an equal quantity of it in the Universe; (2) the principle of 
inertia; (3) the fundamental law of impact. Descartes appealed to the perfection of God in order to justify 
these laws of Nature and consequently a priori knowledge of Nature and, given that the existence and 
content of these laws are derived from God's attributes, required knowledge of God's attributes. As a 
consequence of the perfection of God, the same laws of Nature would govern any world created by God, 
and therefore in order to obtain knowledge of this particular world more than just the a priori laws of 
Nature are required. For Descartes, knowledge of the laws of Nature was necessary but not sufficient to
4 Osier (1994, ch.l and 5), Garber (1992, pp. 148-55), Rubidge (1990, pp.27-9), and Funkenstein (1986, pp. 
179-92).
5 See Osier (1994, p. 127) for further discussion of this point.
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explain particular phenomena. Observation and experiment were also needed to explain the phenomena of 
Nature we needed both to know which possible phenomena are actually existent in this world, and which of 
the several possible mechanisms, compatible with the same general law, were involved in the production of 
the phenomena in question. Even though the laws of Nature were eternal and necessary, the actuality of the 
phenomenal world was contingent because the particular implementation of the laws of Nature was 
contingent.6 To know which mechanisms God had used to make the phenomenon in question, as well as 
which phenomena God had made, one needed to observe and experiment. In Descartes’ discourse, the 
actual was the made and God was the maker. The laws of Nature present the possibilities of God's choices 
when making. In terms of the possibility of human knowledge, observation and experiment were 
constrained in terms of what could be made or manipulated mechanically either in practice or in thought 
Descartes' scientific method was to produce mechanical analogies (or models) that could be derived from 
first principles and would produce the same phenomena that were observed to exist in the world 
Observations and experiments could then be used to eliminate deduced mechanical models from the 
potentially infinite set and provide criteria by which judgements regarding which mechanisms were the 
actual mechanisms involved in the production of the phenomenon in question. By using "empirical 
evidence" to eliminate deduced possibilities, except one, Descartes hoped that the demonstrative character 
of his natural philosophy would be secured Experiments and observations were not designed to validate 
laws of Nature but rather to select from a set of possibilities and to show how the general laws applied to 
particular phenomena. Descartes' scientific method was to deduce possible mechanisms from a priori laws 
of Nature as proposed explanatory mechanisms that could be eliminated via observation and experiment.7 
Thus Descartes was a mechanical realist due to the fact that he limited explanations of natural phenomena 
to mechanisms, proposed that a single mechanism (or set of mechanisms) were at work in producing the 
phenomena, and that machines could be used to determine the truth of any explanation by attempting to 
produce phenomena artificially. The implicit mechanical realism in his philosophy was accompanied by a 
transformation of the status of craft knowledge from techncd to epistemoi. An understanding of the 
mathematically rationalised arts, itself transformed into sciences, constituted the basis for an understanding 
of the productive capabilities of God. Furthermore, for Descartes, once we understood these productive 
capabilities then we too could become more God-like in our capacity to change and produce things in the
6 Principles pp. xxvi-xxvii and p. 85. See Garber (1978) and Clarke (1982) for further discussion of this 
point
7 The purpose of experiments and observation were not to provide data for the induction of general laws. 
Rather the general laws were deduced from assumptions regarding the nature of God and logic. These laws 
were used to deduce the possible explanatory mechanisms. In many respects, Popper and Bhaskar's 
philosophies of the scientific method owe and great debt to Descartes. They are modem re-workings (de- 
theologised) versions of Descartes' scientific method, in that the aim of experiment and observation was to 
deduce explanatory mechanisms from general laws and trying to falsify these by attempting to actualise all 
the possible explanatory mechanisms until only one was left.
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physical world. For example, Descartes wrote,
"we can have useful knowledge by which, cognisant of the force and actions of fire, water, air, the stars, the 
heavens and all the other bodies which surround us - knowing them as distinctly as we know the various 
crafts of the artisan - we may be able to apply them in the same fashion to every use to which they are 
suited, and thus make ourselves masters and possessors of Nature." (Discourse on Method, p.78)
Furthermore, by securing epistemological validity to productive success, Descartes was able to secure 
knowledge of natural principles to productive skills. Hence he argued
"id artisans are unable immediately to execute the invention which is explained in the Dioptrics, I do not 
believe cone can say on that account that it is bad; for, inasmuch as skill and practice are needed to make 
and to adjust the machines that I have described, so that no detail is overlooked, 1 would be no less 
astonished if they succeed at the first attempt than if someone were to learn in one day to play the lute with 
accomplishment simply because he had been given a good score." (Discourse on Method, p.91)
Consequently Descartes' natural philosophy was intimately bound up with the human capacity to make.8 He 
was not alone.
In the early seventeenth century an influential group of self-professed mechanical philosophers 
emerged. These people established a community of writers dedicated to the establishment of the 
metaphysical foundations of mechanical philosophy, the promotion of the growth of the new mechanical 
sciences, and the opposition to Aristotelians and the occult. The members of this community included 
Beekman, Cavendish, Charleton, Descartes, Digby, Gassendi, Hobbes, and Mersenne.9 These men
8 Schaffer (1988) made a similar point about Newton's use of similar arguments regarding his prisms. If a 
prism failed to resolve the seven-coloured spectrum then Newton would argue that it had been made badly. 
Newton's definition of a good prism was that it showed a seven-coloured spectrum. Collins (1985) also 
makes a similar point about replication in general to the extent that it is always open to question and 
controversy whether an experiment has been repeated correctly or not.
9 For a discussion of Beekman's contribution to the mechanical natural philosophy see Hooykaas (1972) 
vol. I, p. 566. Beekman did not publish any major works but wrote philosophical letters to his 
contemporaries. For discussions of Gassendi's contribution see Dijksterhuis (1961), Lennon (1993), and 
Osier (1994). Gassendi published Syntagma philosophicum in 1658. For discussion of Descartes' 
contribution see Dijksterhuis (1961), Gaiber (1992), Lennon (1993), and Osier (1994). Descartes published 
Principiaphilosophae in 1644. For discussions of Hobbes' contribution see Molesworth (ed.) (1962) vol. I., 
Mintz (1969), and Spragens (1973). Hobbes published De corpore, Part I of The Elements o f Philosophy in 
1655. For discussions of Cavendish's contribution see Mintz (1969) pp. 3-5 and Kargon (1966) ch. 7. For a 
discussion of Charleton's contribution see Sharp (1973). Charleton published Physiologia Epicuro-
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corresponded with each other, reacted to each others’ work, and formed an international intellectual 
community.10 This community had a formative influence on the next generation of mechanical 
philosophers, such as Newton, Boyle, Leibniz, Pascal, Huygens, and Hooke.11 However, all of these natural 
philosophies were premised upon the operational precepts of mechanical realism. Their disagreements were 
primarily based upon concerns with which interpretive metaphysics provided the most intelligible account 
of mechanical Nature and squared with their theological commitments. Mechanical realism had allowed the 
seventeenth century experimental and mechanical philosophies to be possible. It was then the task of the 
natural philosophers to build their interpretive metaphysics upon those precepts. The mechanical world­
view was both an interpretive and operational metaphysical world-view in the sense that it was premised 
upon explicit assumptions about the constitution of the world in order to allow physical inquiry based on 
mechanics to be possible and intelligible. These assumptions involved explicit interpretations of reality in 
terms of contingency and necessity, the nature of matter, cause, and the ontology of the world, that reduced
Gassedo-Charltonicma, or a Fabrick of Science Natural Upon the Hypothesis o f Atoms in 1654. For a 
discussion of Digby's contribution see Foster (1988). Digby published Two Treatises. In the One o f Which, 
The Nature o f Bodies; in the Other, the Nature o f Man’s Soule; is Looked Into: In Way o f Discovery, o f the 
Immortality o f Reasonable Soules in 1644. For discussions of Mersenne's contribution see Dear (1988) and 
Rouse-Ball (1960). Mersenne published Quaestiones celebrimae in Genesim in 1623, L 'impiitd des deistes 
in 1624, La verite des sciences in 1625, and Traits de harmonie universelle in 1627. Descartes had met 
Mersenne at La Fleche during their education by Jesuits between 1604 to 1609 (see Dear(1998, pp. 12-3; 
Garber (1992, pp.5-9) for further details.) Descartes also frequently communicated with Beeckmann, 
Constantijn Huygens (farther of Christiaan), William Cavendish, Jacques and Pierre DuPuy, Morin, Hnery 
More, and Gassendi (see Osier (1994, pp. 118-9) for further details.)
10 See Osier (1994) pp. 6-12, Mintz (1969) ch. 1, and Kargon (1966) ch. 6-8.
11 For discussions of Boyle's contribution see Sargent (1995) and Shapin & Schaffer (1985). For 
discussions of Huygens’ contribution see Westfall (1971) chap. 4 and Yoder (1988). Lennon and Osier 
argued that Gassendi and Descartes were the primary influences on the natural philosophies of Newton and 
Boyle; Kargon also included Hobbes. Osier (1994) pp. 9-10, Lennon (1993), and Kargon (1966) p. 54. 
Newton attempted to construct thought experiments to decide between Gassendi and Descartes in his early 
work and Boyle tried to accommodate both philosophies. See Westfall (1962) for Newton’s early thought 
experiments; see also Boyle ( ed. Birch, 1965) vol. 3, p.7. Newton was a committed mechanical realist but 
could not square his theological commitments with Cartesian mechanics. Newton tended to side with 
Gassendi regarding God’s freedom and his corpuscular theory of matter. See Dobbs (1991) pp. 33-5. 
Elizinga (1972) argued that Huygens was greatly influenced by Descartes. Huygens accepted the precepts 
of mechanical realism in his methodology of physics and based his kinematics on Descartes’ mechanics. 
For Huygens, any physical system could be reduced to a mathematical system of mechanics that could be 
understood with absolute clarity.
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the conceptualisations of the physical to that of the mechanical motions of the six simple machines.12 These 
assumptions were emergent during the developing understanding of, fascination with, and confidence in the 
possibilities and potentials of machines. The metaphysics of mechanical philosophy was reduced, in 
accordance with the limits of the mechanisation of processes, in such a way as to allow machines to have 
the power of disclosing natural mechanisms at work. This was possible because the conceptions of Nature 
had themselves been reduced to that of mechanical processes. In other words, the fundamental principles of 
Nature were reduced to be the fundamental principles of mechanics and consequently mechanics could be 
presented as the means by which the fundamental principles of Nature could be discovered. The circle was 
completed. It is this transformation, the emergence of mechanical philosophy, as expressed in the natural 
philosophies of Galileo, Beekman, Bacon, Gassendi, Descartes, Harvey, Newton, Hooke, Hobbes, and 
others, that was essentially premised on mechanical realism.
It was this new philosophical movement that began through the studies of mechanics, anatomy, 
and astronomy, during antiquity and the Medieval, and finally emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries as “new sciences”. The (albeit limited) successes of the two mathematical sciences of astronomy 
and mechanics inspired the mechanical philosophers to propose that the motions of the entire physical 
world, the Heavens and the Earth, could be completely described in terms of laws, mechanisms, and 
inanimate matter. The physical world was to be described as nothing more than inanimate matter in motion 
in geometrical space -  exactly the same components that comprised the conceptual basis of the 
rationalisation of mechanical devices. Newtonian natural philosophy became possible and Newton was able 
to assert that mechanics should not be limited to the manual aits, but, instead, be used to investigate “the 
forces of Nature” and to deduce the motions of the planets, the comets, the moon, and the sea.13 In 
Newton’s Principia we can find a statement of his precepts of presented as the “Rules of Reasoning in 
Philosophy.”14 Rule I is a statement of the natural economy of causes: “We are to admit no more causes of 
natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances.” Newton presumed that 
“Nature does nothing in vain... for Nature is pleased with simplicity”. Rule n  is a statement the invariance 
and universality of cause-effect sequences: “Therefore to the same natural effects we must, as far as 
possible, assign the same causes.” Newton assumed that Nature is both isotropic and homogeneous. This is 
an essential assumption for all experimental physics because without it the experimenter could not extend 
the particularities of any local experiment to the universal level of a law. Rule HI is a statement of 
methodological reductionism: “The qualities of bodies, which admit neither intensification nor remission of
12 Descartes seems to have been particularly aware of this reduction. He wrote in a letter to Florimond de 
Beaune (dated April, 1639) that all his physics was “merely mechanics”. This reference was provided 
Miller and Miller (Descartes, Principles p. 52 fn 14) and was taken from the revised Adam and Tannery 
edition of Oeuvres de Descartes (Paris: Vrin/C.RN.S., 1966-76, n, pp. 541-44).
13 see Newton's Preface to the 1st Edition of Principia (pp. xvii-xviii). Motte's translation (revised by 
Cajori)
14 Principia pp. 398-99.
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degrees, and which are found to belong to all bodies within the reach of our experiments, are esteemed the 
universal qualities of all bodies whatsoever.” This assumption was necessary for Newton to assert that “the 
qualities of bodies are only known to us by experiment” whilst simultaneously allowing the qualities 
determined through experimentation to be informative about bodies upon which an experiment has not been 
performed. Newton’s own example was that of the Earth’s gravitational attraction. If an experiment showed 
that a body attracted other bodies then Newton could use this demonstration to assert that all bodies attract 
each other. These precepts display considerable continuity with Newton’s predecessors. In order to 
understand their connection with mechanical realism we need to examine their context of application. 
Newton founded geometry upon mechanics and told us (Principia, Preface to 1st. ed., p.xvii) that it “is 
nothing but that part of universal mechanics which accurately proposes and demonstrates the art of 
measuring. But since the manual arts are chiefly employed in the moving of bodies, it happens that 
geometry is commonly referred to their magnitude, and mechanics their motion In this sense rational 
mechanics will be the science of motions resulting from any force whatsoever, and of the forces required to 
produce any motions, accurately proposed and demonstrated.” For Newton, all causes of motion were 
mechanical causes and, consequently, his rules of reasoning are a statement of the precepts of mechanical 
realism. Hence the mechanisms disclosed through the mathematical projection of machines could be taken 
to be both the universal mechanisms of Nature and as methodologically available as solutions to the 
problem of transdiction.
Similar views can also be found in the works of Boyle and Hooke. Boyle, in Mechanical Qualities 
(1675), sought to explain cold, heat, magnetism, and all other natural phenomena in terms of mechanical 
principles. For example, Boyle wrote
“That which I chiefly aim at, is to make probable to you by experiments, that almost all sorts of qualities... 
may be produced mechanically; I mean by such corporeal agents as do not appear either to work otherwise 
than by virtue of the motion, size, figure, and contrivance of their own parts (which attributes I call the 
mechanical affections of matter).”15
This is also evident in the case of his development of the air pump as a means to disclose the fundamental 
nature of (already presumed) homogeneous and isotropic space as a vacuum (or void).16 Once the 
technological innovation of this device was established (transformed into a reliable technological means of 
disclosure) then subsequent innovations and modifications could be woven into the social fabric of material 
science. This weaving was rhetorically secured to Boyle’s natural philosophy on the basis of the social 
success in establishing the air-pump as a repeatable technological device. In fact, for Boyle, the knowledge 
that could be obtained from constructing and performing experiments was itself provisional on its use in the
15 The Works o f the Honourable Robert Boyle, 1672, Birch (ed.), vol. HI, p. 13.
16 Cf. Grant (1981) and Shapin & Schaffer (1985).
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construction and operation of future experiments.17 For Boyle, the epistemological criterion for any 
knowledge claim was that it could be instrumentally transdicdve and functional in the subsequent 
innovation of further machines. It was this epistemological criterion that was to become central to the 
whole methodological enterprise of experimental physics.18 Hooke described an experimentally based 
mechanical philosophy of Nature as “the real, the mechanical, the experimental philosophy”.19 This 
“natural” philosophy had transformed from the observational, experiential, and categorical, into an 
interventionist interference with natural entities using instruments and machines to produce explanations of 
the sensible phenomena of experience in terms of fundamental mechanical interactions. Hooke’s 
experimental mechanical philosophy was premised upon an intimate relationship between mathematics, 
natural philosophy, and machines. Hooke frequently used machines to present illustrations of “the common 
rules of mechanical motions” that he assumed were the mechanical principles of Nature. Newton, Boyle, 
and Hooke’s work, in which machines were presented as having explanatory power about Nature, were all 
premised on the precepts of mechanical realist metaphysics. Newton, Boyle, and Hooke were able to assert 
the dream of deriving the rest of the phenomena of Nature from the same kind of reasoning from 
mechanical principles. This dream was only possible once Galileo and the sixteenth century mechanists had 
assumed the metaphysics of mechanical realism. However, in the seventeenth century mechanical 
philosophies, mechanical realism was itself transformed Once secured, there was not any further need of 
the metaphysical arguments of the sixteenth century mechanists. Once the status of mechanics had been 
transformed from a banausic art to a natural science, by the mathematical projection of the six simple 
machines as geometrical demonstrations, then those first principles could be presented as “eternal and 
necessary truths”. In combination with the mechanical realist metaphysical premise that “natural causes” 
were efficient, this transformation allowed mechanics to be naturalised. The distinction between the 
artificial and the natural was dissolved for particular aspects of technology: the fundamental principles of 
mechanical motion. That was subsequently taken as self-evidently true and there was not need of any 
further metaphysical argument. Once this had been achieved then the ontology of experimental physics, 
based on mechanical apparatus, could achieve an epistemological legitimacy as a means of disclosing truth. 
Mechanical realism had become techno-ontological: it was a means of disclosing the truth and nature of 
beings. The “scientific revolution” of the sixteenth century was the mechanists’ revolution that was 
founded upon the establishment of mechanics as a mathematical science and was directed towards the 
establishment of the epistemological legitimacy of mechanics as a natural science. The establishment of 
this legitimacy involved a transformation of the conceptions of matter, cause, natural necessity, and the 
dissemination of the mechanical world-view, in parallel with rhetorical appeals to the practical successes of
17 Shapin & Shaffer (1985) chap. 2
18 A view that was central to Ian Hacking’s (1983) instrumental realism and Bhaskar's (1975) 
transcendental realism.
19 Hooke, Micrographia (London, 1665), preface, quoted in Bennett (1986) p.l.
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mechanics. It was also premised upon novel conceptions of “Man” and “rationality”.20 Furthermore, the 
reduction of the lived-world to the mechanical world required a distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities. The former were taken to be those properties possessed by material bodies whereas the latter were 
taken to be the effects due to the interaction between material bodies with human sense organs and minds. 
This distinction was required to account for the fact that human experience is not of a mechanical world (an 
accounting that was itself a transdiction) and also provided the possibility of a mechanical account of 
human perception. It required a fundamental transformation in the conception of the human body.21 With 
the increasing interest in the development of the mechanical sciences in seventeenth century Europe, for the 
purposes of enhancing technological powers, the discourses of mechanical natural philosophers become 
dominant. Once this occurred then the path was cleared for the notion of “mechanism” to become the 
dominant explanative trope. This monolithic explanatory strategy was symptomatic of the accelerated 
mechanisation of European social organisation towards the monolithic goal of achieving technological 
advantages for the competing European social elites. This transformation was a profound shift from the 
contemplative scholarly logic and poetics of Aristotelian (and to some extent neoplatonic) natural 
philosophy towards the construction of mathematically rationalised machines and transformative 
technological powers. As I argued in the last chapter, Aristotelianism had become obsolete and irrelevant.
Osier (1994, ch. 10), following Kuhn (1977), argued that two distinct traditions, or “styles”, 
emerged from the mechanical philosophies of the seventeenth century.22 She argued that these two
20 Cf. Steigler (1998) ch. 3 for a discussion of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries conceptions of 
"Man" in relation to both Heidegger and Ellul's conception of technology.
211 shall return to this point in chapter six.
22 Osier’s argument was that these two traditions emerged from two distinct theological traditions, 
exemplified by in Gassendi and Descartes’ natural philosophies, and these lead to the two distinct 
approaches, empirical and mathematical, in the latter part of the seventeenth century. She considered the 
development of mathematical and practical trajectories of science to be a consequence of the Descartes vs. 
Gassendi arguments on God's relation to natural laws and necessity. Gassendi argued that all natural 
phenomena could be explained in terms of atoms of inanimate matter and their motion in geometrical 
space. His atomism was based upon the ancient atomic theories of Epicurus and Lucretius and he argued 
that the Universe is composed of atoms and the void. He argued that atoms possessed the qualities of size, 
shape, and heaviness, and consequently cannot be described in terms of a priori knowledge. His theory of 
science was based on appeals to experience and also the assumption that essences were knowable only to 
an absolutely free God. On the other hand, for Descartes, size, shape, and location, were the primary 
qualities and, since these were all geometrical properties, then the essence of a material object could be 
known through mathematical reasoning. God, being perfect, was unchanging and therefore, the 
mathematical laws of the Universe, created by God, were themselves perfect and unchanging. It was not a 
question of whether God could change these perfect laws. Once God had created the laws of Nature then 
God would not change them Osier was aware that Hacking (1982,1992) has raised considerable objections
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“traditions” exemplified and manifested themselves in terms of two distinct sets of scientific practices 
governed by distinct metaphysical and epistemological assumptions. These two sets of scientific practices 
were termed by Osier to be “conceptual frameworks” which differed in the emphasis that they placed on 
empirical evidence and mathematics in their interpretations of natural phenomena. However, in my view, 
this distinction conceals an essential unity in the development of scientific practices since the seventeenth 
century. These two “conceptual frameworks” were primarily derivative from the same mechanical realist 
metaphysical precepts and, as such, were the two dimensions of the same “technological framework”. The 
mathematical dimension was more apparent in the grandiose mechanical realists, such as Descartes, 
Galileo, and Newton. Their problems involved developing a mathematical description of the entire 
Universe, whereas the practical dimension was more apparent in the modest mechanical realists, such as 
Boyle, Pascal, and Newcommen, whose efforts were directed towards developing particular machines in 
order to solve particular problems. These two dimensions were derivative from the establishment and 
acceptance of mechanical realism as different sides of ‘the same coin’ and did not constitute distinct 
“conceptual frameworks”, paradigms, or metaphysical positions. They merely constituted a degree of 
difference in attitudes regarding the “new science” and its possibilities. As such, this difference is 
indicative of a spectrum of dispositions regarding the question of what could be achieved with the “new 
physics” rather than necessarily constituting formally assumed metaphysical positions.
Without a formal metaphysics, dispositions do not form “conceptual frameworks” about the 
world, even though they may well be formally transformed into them, but, rather, constitute different 
tendencies towards acting within the world. I agree with both Kuhn and Osier that the “empiricists” tended 
towards practical problem solving and the “rationalists” tended towards the development of interpretive 
metaphysics. However, a form of mechanical realism was presupposed by both approaches and, in my 
view, both Osier and Kuhn have missed the unitary essence that connected these two dimensions.23 In my
to the utility and meaningfulness of the word “style” to characterise endeavours in scientific reasoning. In 
my view, “priority” constitutes a clearer term for discussions of the distinction between practical problem 
solving and grand cosmological theorising. Perhaps the term “style” should be reserved for the forms of 
writing and presentation, which have been developed to convey scientific narratives. Cf. Derrida (1967).
23 Of course it is possible to find particular cases, such as Boyle’s arguments with Hobbes concerning the 
interpretation of air-pump experiments, in which the dispute can be stretched between Gassendi vs. 
Descartes poles. Cf. Osier (1994) p.225. However, this dispute was not a rationalist vs. empiricist dispute, 
nor mathematics vs. experiment dispute, but was specifically a plenum vs. void dispute, and, as such, was 
not necessarily a typical dispute. A commitment to mechanical realism was premised in both Hobbes and 
Boyle’s arguments. 1 accept that the content of these arguments involved, as Osier argued, theological 
commitments, such as More’s commitment to “the Spirit of Nature” and Boyle’s rejection of it. Osier 
(1994) p. 226. See also Shapin & Shaffer (1985) pp. 207-12. These may well have been prior to the 
interpretations of the air-pump experiments, and conceptualisations about Nature, but it does not follow that 
either of the arguments should be construed as clearly empirical or rational. Hobbes, and More, tended
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view, once mechanical realism had become established (which it certainly had become by the latter part of 
seventeenth century) then, in experiments, both mathematics and technology had become integrated into 
physics. The content of both mathematics and experience had been transformed by the mechanical realist 
precepts and the techniques utilised to disclose “natural mechanisms”. Mechanical realism had been used to 
justify the reduction of the experienced world into mechanically accessible properties that could be 
mathematically projected over parts of the world and presented as the whole world Empirical evidence was 
restricted to variables and quantities that in principle could be measured using mathematically rationalised 
and calibrated technological devices (scientific instruments) even though it was not necessary that they 
were actually measured in practice. Mathematical treatments were limited to forms that could be both 
abstracted from mechanical devices and used instrumentally in the design, building, operation, and 
interpretation of such devices. Experimental apparatus, as means of disclosure, were based on the 
interaction between mathematics and machines and both ‘‘traditions” were based on the same assumptions. 
Furthermore, due to the mathematico-technological structure of the new physics, neither “tradition” could 
be placed under experimental test in terms of the other. Any experiments devised to facilitate such a 
decision would require the very assumptions that were being “tested”. Both “traditions” were based on 
mechanics, assumed mechanical realism, and consequently there was not any mechanical means, either in 
deed or thought, by which a decision could be made as to the superiority of the one approach over the other. 
Both the so-called empirical and the mathematical traditions were dimensions of the same “technological 
framework” in such a way as to centre the distinction between the priority of the usefulness of mathematics 
to experiment or of experiment to mathematics. Either way, the central constraint was that of the 
mechanisation of any hypothesis or proposition. These two dimensions are evident in Newton’s approach in 
Principia,24 It is this two-fold dimensionality that is central to experimental physics. It is evident in the
towards grandiose (reductive) mechanical realism and, as such, held a metaphysical commitment that was 
not empirical, but Boyle’s interpretation of the air pump was no more empirical than Hobbes’ a priori 
assertion that the Universe was a plenum Even if one accepts that a vacuum existed in Boyle’s experiment, 
and it is questionable whether it did, it does not immediately follow from the localised production of a 
vacuum in a glass bulb using a pump that the entire Universe is comprised solely of atoms and void. Even 
Boyle was not prepared to go as far as even claiming that the space in his apparatus was really devoid of all 
matter, let alone use that experiment as providing any purchase on a universal truth claim Boyle was 
possessed with a more modest form of mechanical realism than Hobbes and, as such, the dispute was not so 
much as whether mathematics or experiment was the correct path but rather that of how far one could go 
with either.
24 Newton was an inductive empiricist in so far as he argued that all facts should be induced from 
experiment and re-evaluated in the light of further experiments. He was also a mathematical deductionist in 
so far as he argued that the demonstration of any truth should be deduced from mathematical first 
principles. It is also evident in his Opticks where the lens is itself reduced to an optical lever that
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eighteenth and nineteenth century studies of mechanics, optics, thermodynamics, and electromagnetism. 
These distinct areas of physics all operated by reducing the motions of their respective objects to that of 
circles, anti-parallels, orthogonal reflections, levers, screws, and push-pulls. These were the motions 
abstracted from the six simple machines. However, these distinct areas of physics can not be reduced to one 
another because they involve distinct sets of stabilised mechanical processes using distinct kinds of 
materials. They are strata of distinct machine-kinds: mechanical machines, optical machines, 
thermodynamic machines, and electromagnetic machines. I term these strata as machine-families. How can 
these machine-families be characterised in such a way as to reveal a general principle by which practical 
experiments and mathematical theories can be linked and shown to be manifestations of the same 
“technological framework”? It is my argument that this general principle was the methodological principle 
of mathematically projecting the abstracted motions of the six simple machines (the first machine-family) 
over all subsequent machines-families. This is done during the innovation of those machine-families as 
stable and repeatable disclosures of mechanisms whilst maintaining their distinction in relation to the kinds 
of materials from which those machines were built. In order to make this argument I need to return to 
Heidegger's characterisation of modem science as mathematical projection.
Heidegger (1977b) argued that Nature is transformed by modem science into the object of 
explanatory representation and only that which can be objectified is considered to be real within scientific 
research. The objectification of Nature is accomplished, according to Heidegger, by setting in {dace, 
representing, each particular being that can be objectified in such a way that calculation provides certainty 
of the reality of that being. Modem scientific research was only possible when and only when truth had 
been transformed into the certainty of calculable representation. Heidegger located the transformation of 
this conception of truth in the metaphysics of Descartes (as articulated in Meditationes de prima 
philosophia). For Heidegger, (1977b, p. 127) the essence of the modem age was to be “seen in [the] fact that 
man frees himself from the bonds of the Middle Ages in freeing himself to himself.” Heidegger's analysis 
of the characteristics of the essential foundation of the modem age held "the modem world picture" 
(Weltbild) to be central.25 In this context, Heidegger used the word "world" to refer to "what is, in its 
entirety" and did not limit it to "the Kosmos", or "Nature", or "History", or "Matter". He used the word 
"picture", not in the sense of a copy or imitation, but, rather, in the sense of the colloquial expression "get 
the picture", to capture the way that we grasp the matter in question. "The world" in this case, in place 
before us, as a representation, and all that belongs to it and stands together in it, is a system, in such a way 
that we are acquainted with it as something that we are equipped and prepared to deal with. Thus "the
mechanically operates upon (otherwise) rectilinear rays of light. This is also evident in treatments of the 
phenomenon of polarisation, which is treated in terms of the wheel and the lever template.
25 1977b, pp. 128-34. Lovitt noted (p. 128 fh 12) that Weltbild is conventionally translated as "conception of 
the world" or "philosophy of life" but the literal translation as "world picture" was more appropriate in the 
context of Heidegger's discussion. However, in this context, "conception of the world" also bears a close 
relation to the theme of Heidegger's discussion.
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world picture" was presented as that which we are prepared for and which we intend to bring and set in 
place before us as something conceivable (graspable). This setting in place, representing, of the world as 
picture involves an essential decision regarding what is, in its entirety. It is an anticipatory act of 
mathematical projection. It was this setting in place, as something objectively before us and at our disposal, 
that was, for Heidegger, characteristic of the modem age. There was not an ancient or medieval "world 
picture" that was transformed into the modem; having a "world picture" at all is characteristic of the 
modem age. Heidegger argued (1977b, p. 134) that this "picture" was produced in such a way that it 
represents to us, gathers and orders, an image of the world that affords us the position of articulating, 
securing and organising a "world-view". This allows us to measure and draw up the guidelines for 
everything that is in accordance with our "unlimited power" for the planned calculation and manipulation of 
all things.26 For Heidegger, (1977b, p. 135) scientific research is an “absolutely necessary form of this 
establishing of self in the world", because it provides a graspable picture of the world in which the self can 
be situated as the one who grasps. It was this picturing which participated in the set-up of the modem age, 
and science "is one of the pathways upon which the modem age races towards fulfilment of its essence, 
with a velocity unknown to its participants.” As such, the mechanical realist metaphysics of modem science 
and modem technology was foundational for the modem age and is a central participant in the development 
of modem culture.
However, this still leaves us with the question of how a "world-picture", a "mechanical world­
view", connected theoretical and experimental practices. How was the "world-picture" mathematically 
projected over phenomena, in such a way as to make them graspable and calculable in advance, in terms of 
mechanical principles? How are theories and experiences connected within the "technological framework" 
of experimentation?
Setting-Up The Ground-Plan:
Modem experiments, such as those performed at CERN and by the ULT physics group, are technologically 
sophisticated projects involving a wide range of techniques, practices, machines, tools, tacit skills, and 
knowledge. The objects experimented upon, such as "electromagnetic fields", "paraelectric materials", 
"photons", "nuclei", "quasi-particles", "electrons", "quark-antiquaik events", "superfluids", etc., require 
techniques and machines for their production, observation, and manipulation. Without those techniques and 
machines we would not be "aware" of these objects at all. The relationship between scientific experience 
and these "invisible" objects occurs by transforming the macroscopic objects of everyday experience into a 
means of disclosure. Physicists are concerned with macroscopic objects, such as machines, because these 
technological objects disclose the underlying causal mechanisms in operation in those machines. The object 
of scientific inquiry is not the machines themselves but, rather, the techno-phenomena that are produced by
26 Obviously it is possible for the mechanical realist to object to Heidegger's characterisation on the premise 
that "our power" is, in fact, limited. Is it? If so, then why? The mechanist will pronounce "Natural Law" as 
if that, in itself, explained anything. I shall discuss this in chapter six.
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those machines.27 Many of the phenomena studied by contemporary physicists are techno-phenomena28 
The properties of superfluid He-3, the dynamics of phonons in crystals, the thermal capacities of metals, the 
properties of lasers, superconducting materials, solar neutrinos, the polarisation of the tau-lepton, etc., are 
all complex objects which are only disclosed through the mediation of machines, theories, and techniques. 
The establishment of scientific facts and theories about such objects requires putting techniques to work. 
Furthermore, these objects are only objects for study because machines, theories, and techniques have been 
put to work. Without putting machines, theories, and techniques to work these objects would not be 
apparent at all, and, would not be available for scientific study nor philosophical discourse. Theories are 
bound up with both the objects of study and the techniques by which they are investigated. Otherwise there 
would be no possibility of putting them to "the test". The observational aspect of experimental work 
involves the active technical use (and modification) of theories, methods, and techniques. It is complex and 
there is not any possibility of being able to disentangle theories, techniques, and observations, except in
27 The term phenomeno-technique has been attributed to Gaston Bachelard, and there seems to be a 
considerable parallel between this idea and that of techno-phenomena. I have two reservations about a 
parallel here: (i) Bachelard seems to have been a scientific enthusiast; (ii) I have not read his books. 
Unfortunately, English translations of Bachclarcfs books on science are unavailable until, at the earliest, the 
end of this year (2001) when Clinamen Press plans to publish Formation o f the Scientific Spirit. I have 
consulted Gaukroger (1976); Lecourt (1977); Tiles (1984), and have noted several promising parallels 
between Heidgger, Bachelard, Gooding, and my own approach. Unfortunately, I am not in a position to 
discuss them yet. His works on science (in French) are: L'Activite rationaliste de la physique 
contemporaine, Generale dEditions, 1977 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1951); Le Nouvel 
Espirit sdentifique (14th ed) Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1978 (Paris: Alcan, 1934); Le 
materialisme rationnel (3rd ed.), Paris: P.U.F., 1972, (Paris: P.U.F. 1953); La Formation de Vespirit 
scientific: Contrabution a une psychoanalyse de la connaissance objective (11 ed.), Paris: J. Vrin, 1980, 
(Paris: J.Vrin, 1938); La Philosophic du non: Essai d'une philosophie du nouvel espirit scientific (7 ed.), 
Paris: P.U.F., 1975, (Paris: P.U.F., 1940); Le Rationalisme applique (5th ed.), Paris: P.U.F., 1975, (Paris: 
P.U.F., 1949)
28 Examples of technophenomena explored by the Lancaster ULT physics group are: Magnetization of 
absorbed He-3 films: BSuerle etal., (1995); Shaw et al., (1998b); Absorption of He-3 on graphite: Bguerle 
et al., (1996b), 3He/Graphite Antiferromagnetic Regimes: BSuerle et al., (1996d); Nuclear Magnetization 
of He-3: B&uerle et al., (1996e); Heat Capacity: B£uerle et al., (1997), Resonance of Landau Field: Bunkov 
et al, (1992a, b); Spin precessions: Bunkov et al, (1992c, 1994); Quasi-particles: Bunkov et al., (1992c); 
Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (NMR): Bunkov et al, (1995b, 1996); Temperature Dependencies: Cousins 
et al., (1994); Andreev Scattering/Reflection of Quasi-Particles: Fisher et al., (1990a, 1992b, c, d); Enrico 
et al, (1993); Cousins et al, (1995b, 1996b); A-B superfluid phase boundary: Fisher et al., (1991c); 
Cousins eta l, (1996c); Nuclear spins: Enrico etal., (1994a); Cousins etal, (1999); Vibrating wires: Fisher 
eta l, (1991d).
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hindsight through reconstruction.29 Take He-3 for example. This isotope of the element helium is itself a 
product of technological processes. It is the by-product of the nuclear weapons industry and (to a lesser 
extent) the oil production industry. I am not claiming that helium does not exist naturally but "natural 
helium" is not what is being experimented upon. A physicist would explain that there is an absence of 
helium in the atmosphere.30 He-3 is only available as a result of the above mentioned industrial processes. 
Furthermore, the Lancaster ULT physicists do not directly experiment upon that He-3. What they 
experiment upon is a purified sample of that He-3. By what standard is "purity" defined here? "Purity" is 
defined in terms of an established technique of purification and, in order to know whether a sample is pure 
or not, the experimenters must do so in relation to that technique. This anticipates what He-3 is to be and 
that which passes through the template will be He-3. Thus helium is transformed from a "natural substance" 
to a technological product, via techniques and machines, and it is the latter that is experimented upon. 
Mechanical realism cannot secure itself on a theory of natural kinds because the objects of experimentation 
are modified according to kinds of technique. Furthermore, the properties of He-3 disclosed by the 
experiments of the ULT group are only those that can be disclosed using the techniques of dilution 
refrigeration and voltage resonance. Anything else will remain unobserved and not be part of "their" He-3. 
Thus the He-3 explored is not He-3 in its entirety, as a "natural substance", but is, in fact, the techno­
phenomena of the theoretically interpreted interactions between machinery and the technological product
29 Examples of the use of techno-phenomena, innovated and stabilised as techniques by Lancaster ULT 
group, to explore other techno-phenomena are: magnetic field dependencies: Fisher et al., (1991b, 1992a); 
Bauerle, et al., (1995, 1996e); nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR): Bunkov et al., (1992a, b, 1995b); 
Bauerle, et al, (1996a); Cousins et al., (1999); nuclear recoil: Bradley et al, (1995b) thermal boundary 
resistances: Cousins eta l, (1994, 1995a, 1996a); A-B phase boundary movements: Cousins et al., (1995b, 
1996b); Andreev reflection of quasi-particle beams: Enrico et al., (I994d, e); Cousins et al, (1996c, 1997); 
Shaw et al, (1996, 1998a); vibrating wire resonances: Fisher et al, (1990b, 1991a, 1992c). Examples of 
modelling techno-phenomena and techniques in terms of other techno-phenomena: Cosmic string 
formation: Bradley et al., (1995a); Bauerle et al, (1996a, b, 1998); Quantum gases: Fisher et al., (1992e, 
1994); Pickett et al., (1994); Cousins et al., (1997); Damping forces: Enrico et al, (1994c, g); Superfluids: 
Morchard eta l, (1995,1996); Fisher et al, (1989).
30 This absence is explained by the transdiction that helium is lighter than air and would escape into space. 
A physicist would construct a device to demonstrate this transdiction by establishing a technique by which 
it could be shown that there was helium and air present in the experiment and that the helium was, in fact, 
lighter than the air. This device could then be presented as a model for the Earth's atmosphere on the basis 
of the mechanical realist precepts that Nature operates by mechanical cause-effect sequences; that there is a 
single mechanism between each cause and each effect, and that these mechanisms are in operation in both 
the device and the atmosphere. A deviation in the performance of the experiment from the model can be 
explained by further transdiction. A further interfering mechanism can be sought and the model can be 
modified.
106
He-3. Furthermore, He-3 is studied by the ULT group, not for its own sake, but for the sake of 
understanding the quantum properties o f superfluidity at ultra-low temperatures. The techno-phenomena of 
the technological product He-3, within the "technological framework" of the experiment, are a means of 
disclosing these properties. They are taken (again invoking the precepts of mechanical realism) to be 
realisations of the transfactual quantum mechanisms that are independent from He-3 and are otherwise 
swamped by impurities and higher energy interactions. He-3 is used as a technological object to disclose 
these subtle mechanisms because it is taken to be the bounded technically rational choice on basis of its 
functionality within the technologies at the physicists’ disposal.
Techno-phenomena are phenomena that have been brought into the world by machines and 
techniques; the scientific experience of these objects is circumscribed by their responses to technical 
interventions and interpretations of how they have been disclosed. They are disclosed by the theoretical 
interpretation of machine performances and their availability for theorising is dependent upon those 
machines. Each techno-phenomena is existentially dependent upon the machine-family within which it 
occurs and, as such, the history of its becoming an object for scientific investigation is a part of the history 
of the construction of that machine-family. For example, an “electromagnetic field” is a techno­
phenomenon that is dependent upon the existence of electromagnets and "electric current" production 
machines (these, in turn, are dependent upon metal production techniques and chemistry, and so on). It is 
disclosed by integrating those machines together, into a single unified technological object, by utilising 
specific techniques and interpretations of how those machines work. The “electromagnet” is a technological 
object available to produce an “electromagnetic field” only as the result of considerable efforts by 
experimentalists such as Oersted, Davy, Faraday, et al. However, contra Hacking, we cannot base a realism 
upon this stable instrumentality. The performance of any technological object, as a productive object, is 
itself dependent upon explanatory accounts of that performance and what it has been taken to produce. 
Thus “spraying electrons on mobidium spheres” is an act of interpretive reference to a manipulative 
technique made in relation to a machine built in order to disclose “fractional charge”. “Fractional charge” is 
itself an index for a set of particular machine performances that would achieve their theoretical 
significance, as instances of "free-quarks", through the embodiment of theoretical significance in the 
selection of techniques and technological objects collected together to construct the machine in the first 
place. It does not follow from the stability of those machine performances that the interpretations of them 
are correct. That is the very question at stake. There is an interpretive dimension to machine performance 
and a technical account and technological object should not be divorced from one another. Objects, such as 
the "electromagnetic field", are defined in terms of what they do, their functions and interactions in 
specified contexts, and, as such, the concrete character of their performance is inextricably bound-together 
with technical interpretations of that performance. The “electromagnetic field” is neither purely abstract nor 
purely concrete. It is both. The performance and accounts are made “hand in hand” through their concrete 
implementation in the particularities of practice. Each techno-phenomena is a set of complex machine 
performances (voltages, time-signals, frequency resonance, etc.) unified under a single index (i.e. electron,
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charge, repulsion, energy gap, field change, etc.) in such a way as to link theoretical interpretations with 
technical interpretations of those machine performances. Of course the scientific realists and positivists will 
object at this point. Does not lightning produce an electromagnetic field? That is the question. Without 
wanting to conflate epistemology with ontology, I would like to ask another. How do we know that 
lightning produces an electromagnetic field? “Physicists have measured it!” reply the scientific realist and 
the positivist in unison. Therein lies the rub. How have physicists measured it? This question is central to 
the understanding of experimental science presented by Heidegger and Gooding.
Heidegger characterised the essence of modem science as in terms of three “fundamental events”: 
mathematical projection, research, and on-going activity. I discussed mathematical projection in the last 
chapter. In this chapter I shall discuss the other two “fundamental events” and their relation with 
mathematical projection. Heidegger (1977b, pp. 118-21) discussed research in his essay The Age o f the 
World Picture.31 What is scientific research? For Heidegger, (1977b, p. 118) the first essential characteristic 
of research is the opening up of a sphere of research, in which procedure can operate and provide 
knowledge. This is done by projecting a “fixed ground plan of natural events” over Nature in such a way as 
to sketch out, in advance, the connection between procedure and the opening of the sphere. How is this 
done? Heidegger did not give any account of this. How is the opening of a sphere of research and procedure 
connected by the advance sketching of a fixed ground plan of natural events? David Gooding in Experiment 
and the Making o f Meaning (1990) described how Michael Faraday, et al., did exactly this. Gooding’s 
analysis of the development of the stable communicable results of the work by Faraday et. al. is a history of 
the considerable effort involved in the development of stable craft practices and representational 
techniques. Gooding argued that experimenters, such as Faraday, were engaged in a process of developing 
communicable and stable representations that enabled reasoning and skills by conferring meaning upon 
actions, materials, instruments, and procedures. He deconstructed the orderly reconstruction of the post­
experiment narratives of the nineteenth century physicists, which are presented in publications of results 
and notebooks, in order to recover the processes involved in generating order in the face of the phenomenal 
chaos of novelty. His analysis showed that these narratives and representations emerged as a result of 
nonverbal material practices directed towards the construction of cognitive representations through the 
refinement of those practices. He argued that the theory of electromagnetism was made, rather than 
discovered, and it has no fixed, independent, essential nature that can be accessed independently of the 
manipulations that are involved in the development of stable practices and representations. He also argued 
that the phenomena disclosed by Faraday et al., and the effects that these physicists encountered on the way 
to producing those means of disclosure, are not “mere fictions” either. He proposed a convergence theory 
of agency, which he termed “asymptotic realism”, in which experimental practices (manipulation) and 
theoretical practices (representation) converge when both types of practice acieve practical success in
31 In this essay, Heidegger maintained the position given in Modern Science, Mathematics and Metaphysics 
(1999b), as a starting point. The Age of the World Picture should be read as a development of the analysis 
given mMSMMin order to provide a "deeper" and clearer understanding of the essence of modem science.
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making models that enable experimentation and communication. He used the analogy with the 
mathematical asymptote to convey the point that at no time is an independent Nature touched (1990, 
pp. 186-8) This convergence is directed towards the innovation of stable, reasoned, material practices and 
experiences of producing novel phenomena. To put this point into my terms, Gooding seems to have 
characterised experimental physics as directed towards the acquisition of a techne.
On Gooding's account of experimentation, intervention is central. Experimentation occurs through 
planned interventions upon objects in the world This intervention is itself guided by the experimenter's 
conception of the object and the world Through progressive actions, the object, the conception of the 
object (and the world), and the experimenter's conceptions of how to intervene are transformed 
Experimentation dynamically creates new phenomena and conceptions of the projected plan of action. 
Through experimentation, objects and the dynamic process are brought into being. It was this view of the 
dynamic, creative, and technically rational process of experimental science that seems to have put Gooding 
in opposition to scientific realism. In my view, Gooding's use of the term "asymptotic realism" to describe 
the psychologism that results from the achievement of stable processes of refinement, seems to belong with 
the realist notion of "approximation". However, what Gooding has done is to highlight the extent that the 
notion of "approximation" is itself only meaningful within the context of both a history of refinement and 
also a projected future to an unattainable limit. In my terms, this reveals the extent that scientific realism is 
itself bound-up with its metaphysical faith in the challenge of the becoming of the "bringing-forth" of a 
perfection that is never achieved in practice.32 For Gooding, objective knowledge is open to change and is 
made. The idea of experimental physics exploring a reality independent of it is only possible from a 
removed and abstract level after the real work has been done. Scientific realism is an obstacle to us 
developing a deeper understanding of the processes by which experimenters realise their reasoning and 
manipulative possibilities. Experimentation aims at objective knowledge, but what constitutes such 
knowledge, and rationality itself, must be learnt along the way. A change in experimental practice may 
involve a change in understanding as to the nature of knowledge and its method of acquisitioa 
Furthermore, any understanding of any measurement can only be developed, through experimentation, in 
relation to an understanding of the techniques by which that measurement was made. It is for this reason 
that statements of the degree of precision (and confidence in those statements) are linked to evaluations of 
the sensitivity and "cognitive value" of the techniques used
For Gooding, progress was both a technical, functional, pragmatic, revisable, and creative goal of 
all scientific activity: a perpetually emergent (and idealised) trajectory towards objectivity. Claims to 
increased accuracy in measurement can be considered to be justifiable despite the facts that they are (1) 
based upon theory-dependent techniques, and (2) they cannot be compared to any absolute standard The 
justification of such claims is based upon the convergence between theoretical and experimental practices
321 shall discuss this further in chapter six.
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in which the measured quantity is involved33 It seems that Gooding's characterisation of the basis for 
scientific judgements of convergence was a conception of rationality in terms of a bounded and evolving 
technical rationality that was directed towards an unobtainable complete causal account of the activities of 
experimental and theoretical practices as an ideal. It is in this context that the goal of experimental practices 
can be taken to be the achievement of its own techne. Consequently, the standard by which scientific 
practitioners are to judge their own objectivity is to be in reference to “the cognitive value” of their own 
judgements within a context of "making". This objectivity requires a social agreement between all 
(similarly placed) experimental practitioners. It is made through the innovation of novel modes of 
reflection, discourse, representation, and material practice (and not through immediate intuition, nor 
experience). Gooding did not deny that experience has a qualitative uniqueness, but he did not consider this 
to be objective, because this uniqueness cannot be shared. He consequently maintained that such 
experiences have nothing to do with “the material world” where that “world” was circumscribed as being 
that which is disclosed through publicly accepted techniques of manipulation and representation. 
“Objectivity”, as a socio-technical pursuit, stands in opposition to the “self-evidence of experience” 
because it must be demonstrated to another by using a mutually understood technique. Experimental 
physics, as a historical phenomenon, is itself constantly undergoing change, in its theories, objects, and 
techniques, and, for Gooding change is an essential part of the rational process of scientific inquiry. 
“Subjective experience” may well have a role in instigating change but that change could not become part 
of science until it had been publicly justified via accepted techniques. Thus, for Gooding, an observation 
made by an experimenter could only become part of science once it had been justified to the experimenter 
and others in terms of repeatable observational techniques. It seems to have been for this reason that 
Gooding rejected the positivists' appeal to perception, because what was required for “objectivity” and 
rational discourse was a justification of any perception made in relation to technique. Even at the level of 
measurement there is always the possibility of future refinement and the development of new techniques 
and instruments. There is no such thing as “fixed data” because “data” is acquired through the use of 
techniques and there is no such thing as a technique that cannot be refined. Empirical inductive reasoning 
requires the applicability of concepts to objects and, thus, if empiricism is to be successful, it requires the 
successful and complete refinement of those concepts in relation to the objective world. However, on 
Gooding's account, such a process of refinement is never complete and the empiricist is dependent upon the 
work of others. Gooding's argument against positivism (and classical empiricism) was that they have 
misunderstood the practicality of theorising neglected the relevance of knowing-how to knowing-that, and 
that the interdependence of know-how and know-that is just as necessary to defending empirical claims as 
it is to explaining their origin. At the point of the asymptotic (unreachable) point of perfection the object 
under investigation will be considered to be completely understood, absolutely stable, and functionally
33 Examples of the ULT physics groups' papers on the technological innovation of nuclear cooling 
techniques are: Enrico et a l, (1994b, f); Fisher et a l, (1995); Bunkov et al., (1995a); Bauerle et a l, (1996f, 
1997).
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repeatable. It will be a robust technological object available for future use and will no longer be an object 
for experimental investigation (except as an object used to investigate other objects). Experimenter’s are not 
engaged in simply (and passively) registering what is objectively the case because they are actively using 
techniques, and making judgements about which technique to use, when performing experiments and 
making observations. It is for this reason that experimenters write down accounts of which techniques they 
have used. Scientific journals would not accept a paper that merely recorded “observations” without 
reference to techniques. Experimental observation requires the development of observational skills and if 
others are not able to acquire these skills then it is unlikely that the experimental observations will be 
widely accepted.34
Even when a novel experimental phenomenon is not theoretically understood it still can be known 
under publicly available technical descriptions. Both the intentions and the techniques implicated in the 
experimental set-up (the construction of the experiment, its operation, and its theoretical significance) can 
be known without a complete theoretical description of the phenomenon. Otherwise there would not be any 
point in performing the experiment. Nor would the experimenters be able to anticipate the phenomenon and 
devise a plan of action. For Gooding, experimentation is founded on a projected plan of action, which 
anticipates the phenomenon. However, one of Gooding's main points was that when physicists attempt to 
experiment upon novel phenomena they need to be able to understand one another and so agree about the 
object of their investigation. This involves coming to an agreement about what phenomenon is under 
investigation, what they want to learn about it, and how to proceed to learn that. These decisions are made 
as the investigation proceeds and are not completely fixed in advance. Experimenters learn how to 
articulate their experiences of novel phenomena along the way of experimenting upon them. Experimental 
investigation involves the progressive organisation of the research, the techniques, the resources, and the 
descriptions of experiences. Novel phenomena require novel forms of communication and representation in 
order to reassure the experimenters that they are experimenting upon the same thing. This involves 
producing agreement about the methods of experimentation and also about what was experienced when 
those techniques were implemented. For Gooding, if we are to grasp what a scientific object is (i.e. an 
"electromagnetic field"), as an object o f knowledge, then we need to know how that object has been 
cognitively engaged with and how cognition was achieved. In the case of Faraday's experiments, this 
involves paying attention to the social and material practices that were developed as the work progressed, 
and the way that theory is created rather than discovered. At each stage of experimental research the 
experimenters publicly tie together techniques (both manipulative and representational) and techno­
phenomena that are brought into the public realm through those techniques. This involves a progressively
34 Consider the case of “cold fusion”. Fleischmann and Pons were unable to publically provide a repeatable 
technique of how to observe “cold fusion” and, consequently, the validity of their work was brought into 
question. Collins (1985) also made this point about experimental efforts to observe gravitons (and also 
emotional responses in plants). The experimenters' inability to publicly provide a reliable observational 
technique undermined the scientific confidence in their observations.
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developing refinement of "the ground-plan of Nature" as part of the reiterative process of drawing up a plan 
of action for how the research is to proceed.
For Heidegger, the rigor of research is the obligation to remain within the opened sphere and, by 
projecting the ground plan and prescribing rigor, the procedure is provided with a sphere of objects (an 
object-sphere) appropriate to that procedure. Heidegger did not provide an example of an object-sphere. I 
take it that an object-sphere is the collection of objects upon which procedure (a connected set of 
techniques) operates. An example of this would be the phenomena under investigation during an 
experiment on electromagnets, such as coils, wires, batteries, and magnetic needles, as well as the 
deviations in magnetic needles when they are moved adjacent to the connected coils and batteries. The 
procedures would be the techniques for connecting these objects and investigating the contours of the 
deviations. Mathematical physics anticipated in advance the plan (projection) required for the procedural 
knowledge of Nature as material corporeality in its motion. The rigor of modem physics is defined in terms 
of its exactitude because it must restrict itself to calculative research performed in this way, in order to 
remain connected to its object-sphere, and not merely because it calculates with precision. Heidegger was 
being more general than Gooding He was referring to all of physics rather than the early experiments on 
electromagnetism. Nature, as the projected ground plan, became the “self-contained system of motions of 
units of mass related spatiotemporally” (1977b, p. 119). He was referring to the whole Newtonian 
schematics that had been established as the exemplar of physics, in which motion was defined as the 
homogeneous and isotropic change of position in a projected grid of space and time, and force was defined 
in terms of the magnitude of change of position in this grid. Every event in Nature was defined in advance 
as an event only in terms of how it could be made visible within the projected ground plan. The projected 
plan is guaranteed by restricting research to the projected plan in every one of its questioning steps. All 
events had to be defined as spatiotemporal magnitudes of motion and changes of motion that were 
quantifiable through measurement and calculation. In this respect the experiments in electromagnetism 
were no exception. However, what Heidegger failed to appreciate was the fundamental novelty of those 
experiments. The Newtonian system was the product of the Euclidean-Archimedean-Aristotelian 
abstraction of the six simple machines and Galileo's reduction. The grid that it projected over phenomena 
was the projection of the abstracted motions of the balance, the wheel, the lever, the wedge, the inclined 
plane, and the scew: the first machine-family. It projected the balance as the corrective principle of Nature 
and defined force in terms of the lever. The electromagnetic machines of Oersted, Davy, and Faraday were 
a novel machine-family. Did they require a novel ground-plan? Was Heidegger too much in the sway of 
Newton (and Heisenberg, for that matter) and the view that physics is a mathematical science? After all, 
Faraday is famous for not being trained in the use of mathematics and for being an exemplar of a modem 
experimental physicist. Was Faraday an exception? Or does Faraday show that physics is not actually 
mathematical but only uses mathematics as a technique? How did Faraday project his ground plans? In 
order to answer these questions we need to take a closer look at how Faraday developed representational 
techniques. Gooding analysed the processes by which Faraday was able to visualise “invisible” phenomena
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in terms of construals?5
Construals:
Gooding's argument was that experimenters intervene in "the natural world" and construe their experiences 
to create the correspondence of representations to experience. Observers with different theoretical 
predilections can agree about salient aspects of the phenomena whilst disagreeing about their theoretical 
significance. How? Agreement is negotiated by exchanging tentative visual constructs about “the observed” 
- construals - of personal experiences. Observers publicly construe and re-construe their experiences in 
relation to the construals of other peoples' experiences. Construals are pre-theoretical, practical, situated, 
and concrete, visually representative means of interpreting novel experience and communicating trial 
interpretations. For example, when we picture "light" as either "rays" or "waves" we are using construals. 
They are a tentative and public means of visualising an otherwise "invisible" phenomenon (i.e. the motion 
of light). Construals permit observers to have common (commensurable) experiences of phenomena. As 
Gooding noted (1990, p.63), the acts of making novel experiences of novel interventions intelligible, such 
as Biot, Davy, and Faraday's experiences of the motion of a magnetic needle around an electric wire, need 
to be ordered in either "real space and time, by moving a real needle around a real disc" or in an imaginary 
geometrical space. The visual record, in drawings, sketches, and geometrical diagrams, provided the means 
by which personal experiences could be construed in a form available to public experience. As a form of 
making spatio-temporal order, construals provided the content of the ground-plan projected over the 
phenomena during the setting-up of further experiments. In the case of the early experiments, this ground- 
plan was not the motion of points of mass upon a space-time grid but, rather, the construed motion of the 
tips of magnetic needles, iron filings, and electric wires upon a space-time grid This was the projection of a 
new machine-family. It involved the space-time mapping of the interactions between moving a needle 
around a wire and the movement of that needle in response. In my terms, it involved mapping-out the 
contours of human interventions and machine performances. The construals that were used to map out 
those contours were circles, tangents, arrows, push-pulls, rectilinear motion, anti-parallel motion, and skew 
motion. This projected ground-plan was essential for the transformation of a magnetic needle into a 
technological object. It could become a probe (or a sensor) and its construed motions could be re-described 
in terms of "sets", "tendencies", "pointing", "dipping", etc.
Gooding observed (1990, p.78-80), in reference to Faraday's notebooks, that Faraday was aware of 
the problem of recollecting how he had construed previous experiences. Faraday devised a tactic to deal 
with this problem. He invented instructions, techniques, on how to construe his previous construals in such 
a way as to make those experiences stable and repeatable. For Faraday, construals were the interpretive 
possibilities of motion. These developed against a background of the regularities that he learned to produce. 
The construals of motion - as provisional and flexible interpretive possibilities - can be compatible with
35 Gooding (1990) esp. ch. 5 described how Faraday made circular motion by inventing construals of the 
performance of the novel needle-wire-magnet machines.
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several theories or with none. They enable the earliest (pre-theoretical) stages in the interpretation of novel 
phenomena and have a heuristic function as a technique for exploring an emergent phenomenal process. As 
Gooding pointed out (1990, p. 116), construals are selected on the basis of their heuristic, communicable, 
and instrumental value. Construing involves a complex process of relating actions and imagination. It links 
concrete and abstract space in which both are distinguished, through the construal, in relation to the other. 
Construals make motion a techno-phenomenon. Attention to the use of construals in communicating 
techniques and experiences highlights the pictorial (rather than linguistic) aspect of scientific imagination. 
The judgements regarding how phenomena should be represented are socio-technical judgements (made in 
relation to both other people and material practices) regarding the intelligibility of any techno-phenomena 
and how to produce them. As Gooding pointed out (1990, pp.66-7), consensus between experimenters 
depended upon the successful exchange of observational and manipulative techniques. This involved the 
dissemination of qualitative and pictorial representations of the phenomenon-as-a-process. In my terms, this 
involved the dissemination of techno-phenomena: it involved the social organisation of a mode of 
disclosure through technique.
Gooding argued that construals are central to the processes of experimentation and they do not 
permit either a monolithic fit with articulated theories or a metaphysical commitment to determinism (a.ka. 
realism, materialism). I agree with Gooding. However, this raises an important question that Gooding, 
given the peculiarity of Faraday's lack of mathematical training, did not address: how do construals link 
with mathematical practices and models?
Technogranhe and Mathematical Practices:
I use the term technographe as a modification of Derrida’s term graphe. Graphe was used by Derrida to 
denote styles of writing; that specific styles of writing, or inscription, were required for science to be 
possible.36 However, Derrida neglects mathematical forms of inscription and these are essential in 
experimental physics. I shall argue, following Heidegger, that modem physics is inherently mathematical.37 
I term these mathematical forms of inscription as technographe because they are a form of physical marks, 
graphey that are used technologically in the design, interpretation, and inscription of machine 
performativity. Technographe are used for writing down mathematical techniques and inscriptions. They 
are the parts of mathematical writing used in constructing solutions, demonstrating proofs, calibrating 
mechanisms, modelling the performance of machines, and for designing machines. Geometrical proofs, 
algebra, analytical differential calculus, vectors, matrices, statistics, etc., are all written down, recorded,
36 Cf. Derrida (1967) especially pp. 81-7. Latour & Woolgar (1979) used Derrida’s idea of inscription to 
characterise graph plotting machines used in scientific work as inscription devices. Like Derrida, Latour & 
Woolgar treated science as a form of writing for which the aim was to produce text. They neglected to 
attend to the way that scientific inscriptions are fed-back into the processes of experimentation, as part of 
technique, in order to produce the inscription devices in the first place.
37 In both Heidegger’s sense of the term and in the common sense of involving mathematics.
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printed, and disseminated, through the use of technographe. Technographe are not the mathematical 
techniques themselves, in the same way that graphe do not tell us how to write or how to read. They obtain 
their meaning as part of the inscription and interpretation practices used in those mathematical techniques. 
They are situated within the hermeneutic system of the ordering technologies of those techniques and they 
require mathematical artifice to be effective. Examples of technographe would be a drawn circle, arabic 
numerals, an equal sign, a differential operator, vector notation, matrix notion, etc. Feynman diagrams, 
electric circuit diagrams, and design schematics, are all examples of inscriptions constructed using 
technographe.
Euclid's first proposition, to construct an equilateral triangle by intersecting two circles, in The 
Elements is not a logical proof at all.38 Formally, in terms of modem logic, Euclidean geometry is 
incomplete because it lacks a continuity axiom in either the Postulates or the Common Notions.39 The first 
proposition remains unproven because it has not been demonstrated that the two circles actually intersect. 
From the perspective of modem logic, the Euclidean geometry available from antiquity to the nineteenth 
century was not a complete logical system. It was an art rather than a science. The basic postulates of 
Euclid’s geometry, such as to describe a circle with any centre and distance, draw a straight line from any 
point to any point, etc., are distinct technographe that can only acquire their meaning through repetitive 
practice. These practices are comprised of the inscription acts involved in the mathematical inscription of 
geometrical figures. In turn, each geometrical figure, once inscribed, becomes a distinct technographe that 
is used to inscribe further geometrical figures. The first proposition is inscribed by performing the 
technographic acts of drawing straight lines and circles. A straight line and a circle are defined by Euclid in 
terms of acts of drawing and, consequently, we can only learn how to perform these practices by following 
instructions, performing the inscriptive act, and being informed that the resultant is correct. Each figure is a 
socially mediated artifact, a technological object available for further use, and only achieves its truth within 
the artifice of Euclidean geometry as a set of tacitly embodied practices and their products. We are only 
able to intuit the indubitability of these products once we have acquired the artifice of Euclidean geometry 
and have become mathematical practitioners. Once this artifice is acquired, through education, then 
practices, reasoning, and intuitions are ordered within its framework.
Euclid’s geometry is a form of writing in which a set of primitive inscriptive practices constitute 
the basis of the whole corpus. Proposition 1 provided the technographe to inscribe an equilateral triangle. 
This was used to construct further technographe. For example, Proposition 1 was used as a technique in the
38 This has been widely accepted by mathematicians and logicians since Frege published Begriffsschift in 
1879.
39 Aristotle seems to have been aware of this. In Phys VI, 1, 231a24ff, he argued that a line does not arise 
out of points, nor a surface out of lines, nor a volume out of surfaces, because in each case there is 
something lying in between that cannot be constituted out of the elements in terms of the preceding 
elements. A determinate kind of connection, a determinate kind of unity in the manifold, is required. 
Aristotle rejected the applicability of mathematics to the complete description of movement.
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construction of Proposition 2 which, in turn, was used in the construction of Proposition 3, and so on. Each 
use of technographe is an exemplar, in Kuhn’s sense of the word, because it constitutes a set of problem 
solving tactics that are learned, or constructed, by using them to solve problems.40 They are technai in the 
pre-socratic sense of the word. These technai, as exemplars, were technographically used in The Elements 
to construct geometrical treatments of angles, straight lines, ratios, circles, curves, areas, and solids. It is as 
exemplars that their self-evident correctness is established by being able to use them. Each proposition is 
proved by the act of inscribing it Its self-evidence is a resultant of its practice and, consequently, Euclidean 
geometry is as eternal and universal as the inscription practices upon which it is based. Each axiom is an 
encodification, abstraction, and reification of a set of inscription practices. Its status as an episteme is 
achieved by its acceptance amongst its practitioners (and anyone else that they can convince) on the basis 
of claims for its completeness. These epistemoi are collected together and integrated within a technical 
system as a fixed "technological framework" with a specified object-sphere (the geometrical figures, 
proofs, and theorems) and a well defined set of interpretations as to how to combine and relate them. 
Euclidean geometry is characteristic of a techne, from the platonic usage, and an episteme, in a Foucaultean 
sense of the word, as being a total set of related inscriptive practices that is socially presented as eternally, 
universally, and necessarily true scientific knowledge.41 They are discursively and technographically 
related via their embodiment in practice during education. In this sense, Euclidean geometry is an enduring 
techne that has been discursively presented as an eternal episteme. The Elements provided the 
technographic exemplar for the works of Archimedes, Apollonius of Perga, Nicomachus of Gerasa, and 
many others. This can be seen in the geometrical proofs of Archimedes and Apollonius, and Nicomachus' 
study of arithmetic based upon Euclidean ratios.42 These works, as well as The Elements, were preserved 
and disseminated from antiquity, through the medieval period, and into the present day. The structures of 
these geometrical treatments were organised within the Euclidean template of axioms, postulates, 
propositions, corollaries, theorems, and proofs; they provided the exemplars for all subsequent geometry to 
emulate. Archimedes, Apollonius and Nicomachus innovated new technographe and extended the 
Euclidean techne to include irrational numbers, projections, powers, series, and the geometry of ellipses, 
hyperbola, and parabolas.43 The role these technographe had in the construction of mechanics cannot be 
overstated. The science of mechanics and the techneic use of technographe to inscribe the motion of the
40 Cf. “Postscript” in the second edition (1970) of Kuhn (1962).
41 Foucault (1961/1994) used the word episteme, in his analysis of the mutation of organised knowledge 
from the Medieval to the present day, to characterise distinct strata of the ordering of discursive practices 
within texts of given eras.
42 Cf. Heath (1949)
43 Both Archimedes and Apollonius developed and used their mechanical methods to begin developments 
of infinitesimal calculus. However, Euclidean technai and technographe proved cumbersome for this task. 
This had to wait until the seventeenth century construction of new technographe that analytical geometry 
and calculus, for example, could be constructed as a set of exemplars to solve a wider range of problems.
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simple machines were one and the same thing. As I argued in the last chapter, it was the conflation of 
Euclidean geometry as a techne and episteme (in the context of the construction of the mathematical 
science of mechanics and the European desire for novel technological powers) that lead to the emergence of 
mechanical realist metaphysics, the possibility of experimental physics, and the conception of modem 
scientific technology.
The axioms of geometry have application in our world of experience because, through artifice, we 
have mathematically projected that application onto parts of the world. It is through the embodied 
praktognosia44 of pre-conscious habitual familiarity with the techniques of geometry that we are able to 
"intuit'' the applicability of this projection. These axioms encodify the structure that we impose upon parts 
of the world This is not a structure of our untrained consciousness; it is the structure of the imposition 
itself. It is the structure of the mathematical inscriptive practices of the artifice of geometry. If techne 
resides "in the soul of the craftsman" it has been inscribed upon that "soul" through training, mimicry, and 
practice. The "soul of the craftsman" is not something that we are bom with. It is something that we learn 
and embody through the social acquisition of technique to the extent that we become so familiar with its 
practices that we are no longer aware of them. Our educated bodies have become situated within the 
"technological framework" of geometrical inscriptive practices; that framework, once embodied becomes 
part of us. The art and the artist reside in the same place. Projecting the trained imagination performs the 
"outer sense" of mathematical projection. Our ability to have a priori knowledge of the truth of the axioms 
of geometry is dependent upon the invisibility of technique itself. Our capacity to ground geometrical 
imagination in self-reflective knowledge is itself a manifestation of the pre-consciousness of technique to a 
being that is already well versed in the application of that technique. If the technique is invisible then all we 
see is the projection. It was for that reason that Kant located the origin of that projection in the structures of 
pure intuition rather than in the art of geometry itself. He was sufficiently skilled in the art of geometry to 
the point where the art became invisible and its practice became innate.
The mathematicians' demand for formal rigor is always the demand for the formal rigorisation of 
non-formal practice. It is the demand for the logical encodification of abstracted and reified skilled human 
labour. However, the formal axioms, the logically abstracted and encoded system, will be both 
unintelligible and useless without the skilled practices from which it was reified. A logical proof for the 
constancy of the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter is meaningless if we are unable to draw and 
recognise a circle. It will not do to appeal to pure conceptualisations of a circle either because without the 
skilled practices from which those conceptualisations were abstracted there would be absolutely no 
possibility of applying them in the world. Application requires practice. The technographic practices of 
geometry (drawing using a straight edge and a compass) were reified in response to the degree of
44 Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1999) to capture the primacy of tacit and practical knowledge used the term 
praktognosia. It has parallels with Michel Polanyi's (1958) tacit knowledge except that, for Polanyi, tacit 
knowledge was situated in the educated intellect whereas, for Merleau-Ponty, this knowledge was 
embodied in the situated and habitual motility of the existential body-subject.
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unreflective application of those practices. This reification was itself the product of the challenge of 
imposing "rational order" upon practices which were both informal (lacking in rigor) and disordered 
(inconsistent). The abstraction of those practices was an encodified simplification of what was already 
taken for granted as being technically correct, in such a way as to induce a universal techne under which 
those practices would be integrated under a single theory of practice, which paid no attention to the 
particularities of practice. The move towards abstraction is an attempt to detach the technique from its 
application in order to generalise it from the particularities of use. This involves a synthesis of a diverse and 
divergent set of particularities into a general encodification that can be applied equally to all those 
particularities. Under the techne of geometry the objects produced by the application of that techne would 
be abstract, idealised reconstructions of technographe that were conceptualised in terms of definitions 
generalised as axiomatic principles. This reification allowed the axioms of geometry to be divorced from 
their practical origins and contexts of use. However, this abstraction itself required the techniques (and 
practices) of logical encodification into general rules which, in turn, also requires abstraction if the formal 
system is to be a complete techne. That process will also require technique. And so on....
All mathematical abstractions, as encoded reifications of techniques, are incomplete. This is the 
source of all error and problems for the application of a formal system to experience. It is not the case that 
the formal system does not correspond to reality (as the realist would argue) and hence the error. It is more 
the case that the system is itself incomplete and we are not in possession of a full and complete techne. In 
short, we do not know what it is that we have done, nor do we fully know how to apply the general system 
to particular experiences. We are forced to keep experimenting or give up. Furthermore, without 
completeness we are unable to unify the whole abstraction into a formal techne and, consequently, we 
cannot consider the particular practices from which the system is abstracted to be homogeneous. They are a 
heterogeneous collection of exemplars and tactics. It is this heterogeneity which is the source of all "error" 
and "resistance". This is a matter of coherence rather than correspondence. The challenge of system 
building is to collect together and integrate heterogeneous objects into an homogeneous whole. The 
inconsistencies that arise during that process are the results of the interference between heterogeneous 
objects, which were not designed to be integrated in those particular ways. The "failure" of any system is a 
consequence of its incompleteness, complexity, and disunity.
The invention of non-Euclidean geometries brought with it a novel awareness. Not only were 
geometrical objects the products of our mathematical practices but they were also arbitrary. There is 
nothing unique about any particular set of technographic practices; dimensionality can be projected in any 
number of different ways. Any numbers of new technographic practices were possible (as Boltzmann, 
Lorentz, Minkowski, Gauss, and Einstein have shown). We are free to construct any topology from any 
arbitrary set of axioms. That topology is considered rigorous, in the disciplinarian sense of the word, 
providing that our axioms and definitions do not contradict one another when we attempt to combine them. 
There is not any "objective" space to which mathematical geometries must "correspond"; topology can only 
provide us with an encodified system of consistently mapping arbitrarily imposed axioms and definitions.
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The problem is how to relate these arbitrary spaces to the practices of experimentation and measurement. 
Once again, this raises the question: How is the "empirical" practical dimension of experimentation 
connected with the "rational" mathematical dimension? The case of Faraday's work provides an 
illuminating answer to this question. If we accept Gooding's argument that the use of construals was central 
to Faraday's public reasoning process then we can readily see that this process was a technographic 
process. Socio-technical judgements are premised upon technographic cognitions and it is for this reason 
that I agree with both Gooding and Heidegger. Such cognitions are made within the context of a socio- 
technical learning process and realised "for ourselves" as something brought by us to the learning 
experience. This is not an innate cognition but is a socio-technical cognition that is made "ours" through the 
embodiment of artifice through innovative practices. It is premised upon an open and praktognosic 
orientation towards objects from within the invisible "technological framework" of embodied artifice. Thus 
Faraday's work was not mathematical in the common sense of using mathematics, but it was mathematical 
in Heidegger’s sense of mathesis. As Gooding pointed out (1990, p. 87), “ [successful construing creates 
'giveness' of experience... [it is] a relatively stable but plastic interpretation of experience which guides 
further exploration and interpretation” It is this 'givenness' that is characteristic of mathesis and 
mathematical projection. It is the “laying down of the ground-plan of Nature” in retrospect whilst leaving it 
open for future refinement.
Ampere's key experiments, as Gooding noted (1990, p.46-7), involved preventing movement. His 
experiments were designed to reduce complex interactions to just one of the possible configurations: stable 
equilibrium. Why did he choose this particular configuration? There are two possible reasons that I would 
like to discuss. The first possibility was that Ampere had adopted a mathematical tactic, in the common 
sense. This tactic was set-up to avoid the practically unachievable task of finding solutions to the 
mathematical expressions for the complex phenomena produced by the "process-structuring" techniques of 
Oersted, Davy, and Faraday. In my view, this tactic was the attempted extension of the Galilean reductive 
method of reducing all mechanical motion to that of the lever and the balance. This would have allowed 
Ampere to treat the problem as if it were one of ratios and simple differentials. The second possibility was 
that Ampere had adopted a mathematical tactic, in Heidegger's sense. He projected the Galilean template. 
Faraday, on the other hand, was destined to non-mathematical work, in the common sense.45 And yet, in 
Heidegger's sense, Faraday was an exemplar of mathematical projection. How did Faraday know how to 
begin? From Newton? According to Gooding, Faraday's plans of action began in October 1820 with 
attempting to reproduce and map out the contours of Oersted's famous needle-wire motion observation. 
After eleven months of experimenting with sideways motion, circular motion, and push-pulls, he managed 
to stabilise his configuration of the 1821 compact rotation apparatus. This produced revolutions. It was the 
stable predecessor of the electric motor. It was a hybrid electrical and magnetic machine that produced 
stable rotations when it was connected to a chemical battery by metal wires. It both enabled and constrained 
the spontaneous circular motion of a needle pendulum around a magnet. Yet this kind of motion had been
45 This would put him in the "empirical tradition", according to Kuhn and Osier.
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seen before. These are the primary motions of Newton's mechanics and the totality of Galileo's. I shall put 
aside the question of what enabled such motion until chapter six. For now, what constrained that motion? 
As Gooding observed, the motion of a suspended magnetic needle around an electric wire is far from stable 
and well defined. It takes considerable patience, practice, and skill to manoeuvre a needle around the wire 
(without it touching the wire) and map out its motions. One must control one's interventions carefully. How 
did Faraday plan the control of his interventions? He did so by exploring the possible motions of sideways 
motion, circular motion, and push-pulls, and with meticulous attention to those possibilities, Faraday 
mapped out the contours. The 1821 machine was designed to demonstrate circular motion and an otherwise 
quite unpredictable movement was constrained to a circular path. It is in this sense that Faraday 
mathematically projected, in Heidegger's sense, the six simple machines as the possibly stabile motions to 
try. Faraday's experiments on the motion of magnetic needles and electric wires were constructed to capture 
the circularity of that motion. By doing so, Faraday projected the ground-plan of circular motion. However, 
as Gooding pointed out, Faraday's "rotations" - his screw-construals - were a non-newtonian construal of 
force.46 He deconstructed (via Ampere) the applicability of Galilean reduction to the novel electromagnetic 
machines. The screw was a non-reductive exemplar of "electromagnetic motion". And it was still one of the 
simple machines. He managed to resolve his difficulties in construing that motion by using the screw as his 
construal. Maxwell's field theory utilised Faraday's construals of the tangential, or skew, motions of 
"electromagnetic lines of force" in terms of the screw. Faraday's construal of his experiences in terms of 
screw motion of the "invisible" lines of force is a breaking free from the Galilean reduction. The 
mechanical circular and rectilinear motion would not suffice for the novel machines. Faraday's screw- 
construal was a non-reducible primitive.47 Once the grad and curl operators of differential calculus had 
been invented by Maxwell (and specifically invented for this task) then such motion could be described in 
terms of differential calculus. How? So far, I have only discussed the pictorial and geometrical 
technographic inscription of machine performances. One of the crucial mathematical innovations of the 
seventeenth century was analytical geometry and differential calculus. These allow machines to be 
analytically inscribed. How are machines and analytical differential calculus connected? Furthermore, how 
do technographic inscriptive practices connect with modelling? How do technographe represent techno- 
phenomenal In order to answer these questions, I need to introduce Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's idea 
offiinctives and exoframing.
Functives and Exoframing:
Functive was a term used by Deleuze and Guattari in their analysis of science and its distinction from art
46 It is also arguable that his field-lines pre-empted the non-euclidean spaces of Einstein et al.
41 Gooding noted (1990, p. 117) that "Faraday took up the possibility that the skew-aspect was not to be 
reduced." For an example of Faraday's construal of "skew" motion see Thomas Martin's transcription of the 
first part of Faraday's experimental record for 3rd. September 1821 (reproduced in Gooding 1990, pp. 122- 
3). Here we can see Faraday construing such motions as a screw.
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and philosophy.48 A functive is an element of a function. Limits and variables are examples of functives. A 
function defines the relationship between its functives and may, in turn, be used as a functive within 
another function. In physics, a function has to refer to a co-ordinate system in which the axes represent 
physical quantities. In Deleuze’s terms, physics proceeds in the face of the infinite chaos of existence by 
constructing a plane of reference from co-ordinate systems in order to slow down the disorder of chaos by 
external framing (or exoframing). Exoframing involves extrinsic determination of the meaning of the frame 
of reference. Physics is distinct from mathematics due to this extrinsic determination. The latter finds its 
meaning in the intrinsic and interpreted relationships between functives whereas the former has to 
extrinsically give those functives physical meaning. Exoframing allows functives to participate in 
modelling. It is exoframing that provides a co-ordinate system composed of a least two independent 
functives, whose relationship is the function, with meaning as a state of affairs or informed matter. 
Exoframing is necessary for the frame of reference to form a proposition that relates a state of affairs 
meaningfully to the system in question For example, it is the act of exoframing that is required for the 
differential functive dy/dx to refer to the rate of change of pressure with respect to temperature and to have 
meaning as a state of affairs between pressure and temperature in a system that is extrinsically determined 
as a sphere of gas at constant volume. The function allows each dimension (axis, variable) to be fixed 
whilst the others are varied Exoframing allows mathematics to participate in modelling machine 
performances.
Functives and technographe are meaningless without the enframent of inscriptive practices and 
hermeneutic relations in which they are situated. This enframent, itself a part of artifice, is a mathematical 
method (a procedural collection of mathematical techniques). It will utilise techniques and ordering 
technologies as part of that method(s). This method is associated with its applicatioa For example, Fourier 
analysis involves a collection of different technographe, functions, functives, techniques, and inscriptive 
practices. It is technique for analysing complex "wave patterns" in terms of series of sine and cosine 
functions. In order to be effective it must be embodied in inscriptive and hermeneutic practices, as a part of 
artifice, in the context of solving a range of particular problems. By applying Fourier analysis to the 
solution of an inscribed physical problem, say the solution to the Schroedinger Equation for electrons 
within a metal wire under a potential difference V, the solutions of this technique can be exoframed as 
expressions of physical states. The sine and cosine functions of the Fourier series can be taken to be the 
wavefunctions that are superimposed to probabilistically describe the measurable behaviour of the 
electrons.
By inscribing the contours of the interactions between human interventions and machine 
performances, in terms of functives by using technographe, the contours can be mapped out in terms of 
operational and responsive variations. The physicist can slowly turn up the pressure acting on an 
experimental cell and read the variations in temperature from a calibrated thermometer. This can be 
recorded graphically and written down in the form of a differential equation. Differentials are particularly
48 Deleuze and Guattari (1994) esp. chap. 5.
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suited for inscribing machines and mechanisms. The differential relates variables in terms of a ratio of a 
rate of change, of one with respect to another. These variables can be used as dimensions to construct an 
analytical "space" in which the differential equation can provide the "contours" of the physical process 
under investigation in terms of an exoframe that can be projected over the machine performativity in terms 
of fundamental variations and dimensions. It will already be apparent how the process of exoframing, the 
construction of an external frame of reference between variables, already facilitates the process of writing 
out, de-inscribing, both human interventions and machine performativity from the final products of 
experimental work. The technographic inscriptions can then be taken to be representations of the physical 
processes involved in the experiment. Both human interventions and machine performances are de­
inscribed (written out) from the final accounts. The book of Nature can then be read However, before 
discussing how this process of de-inscription is achieved we need to examine how exoframing relates to the 
ongoing activity of "making" the ground-plan of Nature.
"Making" the Ground-Plan of Nature:
The work of Faraday was an example of mathematical projection, in Heidegger's sense. He projected the 
six simple machines over the novel phenomena. Faraday also modified the ground-plan to allow himself 
more freedom to construe the screw motion without the restriction of the Galilean reduction Faraday et al 
had invented a novel machine-family and confirmed the methodology of mathematical projection. His work 
is an example of how the so-called "rationalist" and "empiricist" traditions were both aspects of the same 
"technological framework". It was this "technological framework" that Heidegger (1977b) termed as 
methodology. He characterised methodology as the second essential characteristic after mathematical 
projection. According to Heidegger, methodology sets in place an object-sphere and procedure in which 
rules and laws of change can be determined and questioned In my view, Faraday was an exemplar of this. 
He projected his ground-plan of action in order to establish a series of interventions by which he could map 
out the phenomena by building machines. He did this by projecting the ground-plan of the six simple 
machines and constructed ensembles that could produce the motions for the template. This provided 
Faraday with a general methodology by which he could set in place his object-sphere (his magnets, wires, 
needles, etc.), his set of possible construals (rotations, screws, antiparallels, etc.), and his procedure (build a 
machine and map out its motions). The rules and laws could then be abstracted from the technographic 
maps of the motion of the machine. According to Heidegger, procedure must set in place the changeable 
and allow it to change, as its object, in order to allow facts to become objective, fixed, and, hence, 
determinations of the constantness of the changing of the changeable can be made into rules. Again 
Faraday did this. By building these novel machines, Faraday transformed the movements of magnets and 
needles into the changeable motions of the six simple machines. He did this by constructing the apparatus 
in such a way as to prevent it from making any movement that was not a simple machine motion. I am not 
claiming that Faraday was a stage magician who built a trick. What I am claiming is that he reduced the 
possible movements to that of one of the six simples. His procedure, building a machine according to the
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template, set in place and restricted the changeable movement to one of the six projected mechanical 
motions, in such a way as to make it repeatable within the projected plan. This allowed the technographic 
construals and representations of that motion to be used map out the contours of that motion in terms of 
constants and variables. These can be used to construct an exoframe and, eventually, a mathematical law.49
What is this “changing of the changeable”? It is machine performance. Methodology sets down 
the set of techniques and technological objects that will be used by the research to disclose the "natural 
mechanisms" to be realised by that experimental research. The process of research is then one of mapping 
out the contours of the interaction between human interventions and machine performances by using those 
techniques and technological objects as transformative agents. It is the task of the experimenter to 
determine, in relation to the contours, which aspects of machine performance change in response to 
particular human interventions. These aspects are “the changeable”. The process of research is 
subsequently one of mapping out, as a result of the interactions between human interventions and machine 
performativity, the changes of the changeable in response to those interventions. For example, we could 
map out the change in volume of a gas in relation to changes in pressure and temperature. This would 
involve collecting together the technological objects, say a piston, a bunsen burner, a thermometer, and a 
pressure gauge, and then by varying each of the variables (temperature, pressure, volume) in relation to one 
of the others (whilst the third is fixed) we could map out the contours of human interventions and machine 
performances. Those contours could then be presented as the manifestation (resultant, consequence) of the 
realisation of the rules by which those variables are related "in Nature" via a mechanism. By inscribing 
those contours in terms of an exofiame we could then write down the differential equation for those rules. 
What we have done (or so the mechanical realist would claim) is to create an artificial space (free of the 
chaos of competing mechanisms) by which those rules could be disclosed. Furthermore, or so the 
mechanical realist would claim, the differential equations that we have written down are, in fact, a 
representation of the 'Taws of Nature" that govern such a process. It is for this reason, on my reading, that 
Heidegger maintained that, by fixing these rules as the necessary consequences of natural laws, 
methodology is able to determine the laws of Nature in terms of the rules governing the changing of the 
changeable that has been set in place by procedure. By projecting the ground-plan of Nature, physics has 
made this so. Facts can only be made clear, as the facts, within the purview of rules and laws, and, 
therefore, research into the facts is intrinsically the establishing, verifying or falsifying, rules and laws. In 
my terms, physics is thus able to perform the “sleight of hand” that has been premised by the pursuit since 
its origins. Through methodology it engages in a process of making that is directed towards the techneic 
realisation of unchanging principles of change. It has presumed, on the basis of mechanical realism, that 
these principles are epistemic principles, whilst simultaneously de-inscribing the participation of human 
interventions and machine performances from that process. It is then able to remove its own methodology 
(using machines, etc.) from the final account and present its techne as “Natural Law”.
49 The empircist will then claim that the law is a good fit to the phenomenon, and the rationalist will then 
claim that it is a necessary consequence of that law.
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For Heidegger (1977b, p. 120), the projected object-sphere is made objective by encountering it in 
“the complete diversity of its levels and interweavings” in order that procedure is freely directed to view 
the changeableness in its object-sphere that provides "the horizon of incessant-othemess of change” 
required for facts, as concrete particularities, to become present. This is crucial. For Heidegger, human 
beings do not control the outcome of experimentation. The disclosed would not have been disclosed 
without human intervention but the disclosed is not controlled by that intervention. What is controlled is the 
template of the experiment, how it is performed, and this template constrains what can be learnt. This 
provides methodology with an explanatory character because it can present itself as a mode of disclosure. 
Methodology accounts for an unknown by means of a known and, at the same time, verifies that known by 
means of that unknown. Both knowns and unknowns are used to explain each other. Heidegger did not 
provide an example of this. A good example is the case of gravitation. Newton's Law of Universal 
Gravitation explained already established facts (objects fall to the ground when dropped, the Moon orbits 
the Earth, and the planets orbit the Sun in elliptical paths) in terms of an unknown (the unitary force of 
gravitation) via a procedure (the calculation of paths using the inverse square law). Hence the unknown 
could be accounted for in terms of the known facts and these facts were verified as necessary consequences 
of the unknown. This can also be seen in Faraday's experiments. The known possible motions of 
electromagnetic machines would be explained in terms of “an unknown force” via a procedure of mapping 
out “the lines of force”.
In modem physics research takes place by means of experiment. The ways in which 
experimentation is performed is dependent upon the particularities of what is being investigated and which 
type of explanation is required. However, it is only through the transformation in general conceptions of 
knowledge and Nature that research through experiments became possible. What was this transformation? 
Firstly, mathematical projection, as discussed in the last chapter, is a condition for research through 
experimentatioa It is this condition that distinguished modem science from medieval scientia and ancient 
episteme. Aristotle's understanding of emperia as the attendance to the phenomena, their qualities and 
movements under changing conditions, in order to achieve knowledge of the tendencies of things, was 
essentially different from the modem scientific observations made through experimental research. Even 
when ancient and medieval studies worked with number and measure, using instruments and apparatus, the 
character of observation was essentially different because they lacked the decisive characteristic of modem 
experimentation which, according to Heidegger (1977b, pp. 121-3), begins with laying down a law as a 
basis. This may, at first glance seem a surprisingly Kantian move. However, Heidegger was concerned with 
the metaphysical projection implicit to modem physics. An experiment does not begin with a complete 
physical law, which it then tests (as if often presumed) but it does presuppose the existence of a law, which 
it aims to disclose. Thus, as Bhaskar argued, the presumption of the existence of a law is the basis for an 
experiment. As Gooding argued, the "discovery'' of this law, in the form of an empirical regularity or a 
form mathematical abstraction, requires considerable effort on the part of experimenters and may take 
decades of work before it has been formulated However, on my reading, Heidegger was setting-up the
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methodology by which experimental physics operates. This does involve the presumption that there is a 
law, which can be disclosed by the proposed experiment (or series of experiments). It also presupposes the 
forms of possible motions that would qualify as regular motions. As I have argued above, these motion 
were the motions of the six simple machines for both mechanics and electromagnetism. For Heidegger, to 
set up an experiment requires representations and conceptions of the conditions under which a specific 
series of motions can be made susceptible to being “controlled in advance by calculation” and followed in 
its “necessary progression”. On my reading, Heidegger was directing us to the way that physics has pre­
empted what could be possibly learnt, to such an extent that it has pre-empted the conceptual and 
representational conditions under which an empirical regularity would be produced and recognised, and 
accepted as such, and these representational and conceptual conditions also pre-empt how the experiment 
could be built in such a way as to be a controlled experiment. In other words, it has pre-empted what 
qualifies as a constant conjunction and the conditions under which an experimentalist could claim to have 
produced constant conjunctions. It is because a constant conjunction is a repeatable conjunction of events, 
and each event is construed, in advance, as one of the projected six simple mechanical motions, then 
performing an experiment inherently and necessarily involves constructing machine performance. The 
experiment is controlled to the extent that some kind of machine performance will be its consequent but 
which combination of simples will be disclosed is not controlled This allows physics to participate in 
discovery. It discovers the particularities of the machine performance of the machines it has built according 
to the preconception of how a machine should perform. It is for this reason that I agree with Heidegger's 
claim that Natural law is established with reference to the ground plan of the object-sphere that provides 
criteria and constraints upon the anticipatory representation of the conditions under which the experiment 
can be performed This set up is required to prevent the representations necessary for experiments from 
being based upon "random imaginings". The set up is based upon the ground plan projected onto Nature 
and the representations are sketched into that ground plan. The planning and execution of experimentation, 
as a methodology, is supported and guided on the basis of the fundamental law that allows the facts, that 
either verify or falsify the law, to be adduced. In my terms, the character of this fundamental law was 
presumed to be techneic from the onset, the possibilities of experience were constrained by the projected 
template of the six simple motions, the required combination of simples were mechanised The experiences 
acquired during that process of assembly were induced into a general techneic form. Due to the operational 
precepts of mechanical realism this techne was conceivable as the holy grail of “Natural Law”. Heidegger 
maintained that modem experimental research provides observations that are more precise (in degree and 
scope) and is methodologically essentially different in kind than medieval scientia and ancient episteme. It 
is the way that modem experimental research is related to, and at the service of, the verification and 
falsification of law in the framework of an exact plan projected onto Nature, as the ground-plan, that 
provides the essential characteristic of modem experimental science.
The next stage in Heidegger's analysis was to examine specialisation as an essential characteristic 
of the ongoing activity of modem science (1977b, p-p. 123-5). For Heidegger, every science, as research, is
125
grounded upon the projection of a circumscribed object-sphere and is itself circumscribed as a distinct 
science on the basis of the distinctness of its object-sphere. In my view, it is technique that binds together 
an object with procedure and methodology; hence the "technological framework" of techniques and objects 
upon which it projects its template defines the methodology of any experimental science. Distinct sciences 
are defined in terms of distinct sets of techniques and technological objects. The objects of all experimental 
sciences are technological objects because they are constrained to be disclosed, and to disclose other 
technological objects, only to the extent that they are disclosed by technique. This is as true for rats in 
biological experiments as it is for the motion of needles around wires. Rats are disclosed by technique to be 
a set of machine performances (repeatable responses to interventions) just as much as the needle and wire 
were when Faraday assembled them into a rotation device. Each machine is associated cluster of 
techniques, technographe, exoframes, and technological objects, is a distinct object-sphere. The exploration 
of that object-sphere in “the complete diversity of its levels and interweavings”, by mapping out the 
possible interactions between human interventions and machine performances, is an experimental research 
project. For Heidegger, each science, in the development of its projected plan by means of its methodology, 
is particularised into specific fields of investigation For Heidegger, the particularisation (specialisation) of 
each science into specific fields of investigation was not a "necessary evil", due to the increasing 
unsurveyability of the results of research, but was an essential characteristic of science as research. 
Specialisation was the foundational condition for the progress of all research. Why? For Heidegger, 
specialisation is a necessary consequence of the third fundamental event of modem science. Heidegger 
identified this third fundamental event as “ongoing activity5’.50
Heidegger highlighted that practical activity was an essential characteristic of modem research. 
Any attempts to disown it (by characterising science solely as "serene erudition") could not sustain a notion 
of modem science as an ongoing activity, nor its performativity, nor its capacity for enduring, nor the "self­
evidence" of its results (1977b, p.138). Ongoing activity, in order for a science to be respected as a science, 
provides modem science with the capacity for institutionalisation. Each institution is defined in terms of its
50 Lovitt noted a translation difficulty in rendering Betrieb as "ongoing activity" (1977b, p. 124 fit 10). He 
noted that Betrieb means the act of driving on, or industry, activity, as well as undertaking, pursuit, 
business, and can also mean management, or workshop, or factory. Heidegger qualified his use of Betrieb ( 
Cf. 1977b Appendix 2, pp. 138-9) as not intending any pejorative sense. He stated that he intended this 
word to convey and highlight that the industriousness of research only degenerates into "mere busyness" 
when, in the pursuing of its methodology, it closes itself from accomplishing novel projections of the 
ground-plan and, instead, takes that plan as given and simply accumulates results and calculations. (There 
is a parallel between Heidegger’s use of Betrieb and Kuhn's use of the term "normal science".) Heidegger 
argued that "mere busyness" in scientific research was a consequence of the tendency of research to 
become completely dominated by industriousness rather than remain open to the ground-plan that "gives 
the impression of a higher reality behind which the burrowing activity proper to research work is 
accomplished".
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self-appointed task: To investigate a particular field of investigation. The methodology through which 
individual object-spheres are "conquered" does not simply amass results, but, uses those results to adapt 
itself to a new procedure. It is the adaptation of research to its own results that, as an ongoing activity, 
provides modem sciences with advancing methodologies and an intrinsic basis for the necessity of the 
institutionalisation of research. Heidegger's position, that adaptation to new procedures circumscribes the 
methodology of science by means of its results, is correct, but he left the questions of how this is done, and 
how methodology opens up new possibilities, unaddressed. How does methodology use results to adapt 
itself to new procedures? How do new procedures arise? These questions suggest that Heidegger left a 
"gap" in his analysis of research. I shall discuss the reasons for this "gap" in Heidegger's analysis below and 
these questions will be addressed in the next two chapters. For Heidegger, the sciences are able to create 
"the solidarity and unity appropriate to them" upon the foundation of their character as ongoing activity. 
According to Heidegger (1977b, p. 126), planning provides the basis for solidarity of procedure and attitude, 
with respect to the objectification of Nature that constitutes "the real system of science". The ongoing 
activity of research builds the plan of an object-sphere into all adjustments that facilitate any plannable 
conjoining of types of methodology, that further the reciprocal checking and communication of results, and 
that regulate the exchange of talents and skills.51 Extending and consolidating the institutional character of 
the sciences, as an ongoing activity, secures the precedence of methodology over Nature and determines, at 
any given time, what is taken to be objective in research.52 The researcher is directed according to research 
projects that are legitimated by the institution appropriate to the object-sphere in question. The negotiations 
at meetings, the information collected at conferences, the books and papers contracted by publishers, are all *
directed and organised through the institutionalisation of modem sciences. The research worker is, 
consequently, forced to operate within “the sphere characteristic of the technologist” in order to be “capable 
of acting effectively”.53
It is techne that provides an asymptotic link between practice, theory, and scientific rationality (as 
ideals). Thus the process of scientific progress is one of aspirations towards technical excellence which is to 
be achieved via a techneic process of questioning and correcting both the content of theories, experimental 
and theoretical practices, and standards of justification. Gooding termed this process to be one of 
convergence. This open ended process is one which is perpetually directed towards the future and, as such, 
is one for which there are not any rules to guide it because we cannot foresee the course of innovative 
development. It is one of bounded and evolving technical rationality. Controversies regarding the 
artificiality of the results of techniques and preparations (what is a property of the object and what is a 
product of the preparation process) could only be achieved by reaching theoretical agreement as a
51 Hacking (1983); Gooding (1990); Knorr-Cetina (1981); and Collins (1985) made this point.
52 Cf. Kuhn (1977), Latour & Woolgar (1979), Knorr-Cetina (1981) for discussions of the institutional 
character of scientific research and the paradigmatic consensus of judgements of what is to be researched 
and how it is to be researched.
53 A parallel with Ellul (1965).
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consequence of further technical exploration. This requires both theoretical accounts of the techniques 
utilised and of the object under investigation. The establishment of a techne of investigation is the 
technically rational conclusion of any controversy. Knowledge becomes objective upon the creative 
establishment of a techne of how that knowledge was produced. This involves the abstraction and 
reification of labour. In this respect experimental physics is something of a conundrum for a Marxist 
analysis because it is both an exemplar of free-creative labour and the ultimate in alienation from the 
products of labour.
Prior to publication, any experimenter needs to reflect upon the experiment (its purpose and 
execution) and anticipate any criticisms to her/his work. Every experiment is situated within the 
background of a wider scientific community's standards and expectations in which it will achieve its 
significance and meaning. The working scientist will base her/his conception of what makes a reliable 
observation and/or technique upon recognition of the level and content of any possible criticisms that 
her/his work may be subjected to. For Gooding, it was this ability of the experimenter to view for 
her/himself how her/his actions and reasoning will be viewed by others which was a necessary condition 
for the critical self-reflection required for “objectivity”. In proposing any novel theory or experimental 
technique it is necessary for the experimenters to break the accepted norms and standards of the current 
scientific community by engaging in a critically motivated reflection upon the correctness (or legitimacy) 
of those accepted norms and standards. This requires that the framework that the experimenters are working 
within is open and capable of being developed and changed If the framework were fixed, final, and closed 
there would not be any potential for novel research because there would not be any possibility of 
establishing new techniques, theories, and objects for investigation. Experimental work is an unending 
process of producing a series of refinements for which successive refinements correct and reveal the errors 
of previous efforts. This process is perpetually one in which the experimenters must make judgements 
between technical frameworks from which to proceed against a background of past efforts and frameworks. 
Thus experimental science must be an on-going activity that is constantly open to change.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE ART OF EXPERIMENTAL PHYSICS
“Man is a shrewd inventor, and is ever taking the hint of a new machine from his own structure, adapting 
some secret of his own anatomy in iron, wood, and leather, to some required function of the work of the 
world.” Emerson (1860, p. 169)
“For to make use of his hands, no longer to have paws, is to manipulate — and what hands manipulate are 
tools and instruments. The hand is that hand only insofar as it allows access to art, to artifice, and to 
tekhne.” (Steigler, 1998, p. 113)
In the previous two chapters I have discussed how the ground-plan of Nature is made and projected. In this 
chapter I shall describe how physics is perpetuated and extended. I shall discuss how technological objects 
for the purpose of investigating Nature are made and used to produce two things: (i) intelligible models of 
natural phenomena, and (ii) the ongoing development and extension of physics towards its own perfection 
as a techne. Implicit in the concept of experimental investigation is the mechanical realist underpinning of 
the reality of those technological objects based upon their instrumentality in material practice. Thus 
Hacking (1983) was a realist about electrons when physicists claimed to spray them on mobidium spheres 
as part of the process of investigating the existence or inexistence of free quarks. The presumption of 
mechanical realism allows the production of technological objects to be presented as a fundamental relation 
between human intervention and natural processes that discloses natural laws by designing, constructing, 
inscribing, and interpreting machine performances. In this chapter I shall address the question of how 
Natural Laws and models are connected. I will also address the question of how mechanisms and machines 
are connected. Mechanisms perform a central function in Bhaskar's (1975) realist interpretation of 
experimental physics; he required the notion of a mechanism to connect events in closed and open systems 
by the same laws. The innovation of novel machine-families is taken by scientific realists such as Bhaskar 
to be a "deeper" exploration, disclosure, and discovery of natural mechanisms, causes, and laws. Later 
innovations are used to demonstrate (rhetorically and poetically) the existence of a mechanism transdicted 
to correct the deviation of the performance of a previous generation machine from the on-going 
expectations of experimentalists. It is for this reason that Bhaskar considers the explanations, the causal- 
accounts, of the fundamental mechanisms discovered by such an exploration to be an example of 
“ontological depth”. However, in this chapter I shall begin an alternative interpretation of the phenomenon 
of technological innovation in experimental physics. I will describe how Ge-stell (as discussed in chapter 
two) operates in experimental physics. I shall then compare this operation with Heidegger’s definition of 
techne and argue that modem experimental physics satisfies both aspects of Heidegger's analysis of 
making: craft and modem technology. The convergence operation of Ge-stell upon machines provides
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technological objects with transfactuality by gathering and ordering them into strata of machine-kinds; the 
innovative extension of technological objects into novel machine-families provides experimental physics 
with stratification. These provide both of Bhaskar’s ontological dimensions. The transfactuality and 
stratification of the technological objects utilised in experiments provides physicists with senses of 
ontological "depth" and discovery through the process of making innovation intelligible in terms of models. 
The labour processes involved in the construction of stability and the convergence of practices towards 
objectivity, in the artificial contexts of experimentation within closed systems, are nothing more nor less 
than the construction of repetitions that can be described technographically and presented as empirical 
regularities. The physicist is discovering how to make making intelligible in terms of die interconnected 
strata of machines and transfactual technological objects upon which the experiment has set upon. Once 
mechanical realism has been presumed then techneic causal accounts, operating with technographic 
functives and visual representations, can be metaphorically used as mechanical models of the natural 
phenomena under investigatioa This is essentially a process of “reverse engineering” in which the 
physicists construct a mechanistic model of the machine performances in order to imagine the “natural 
machine”, in operation behind appearances, that generates the artificial machine performance. The 
physicists then compare the expected performance with the actual performance. By invoking the natural 
economy of mechanisms, when similarity increases, the physicists become increasingly confident that the 
precepts of mechanical realism underwrite the removal of technological processes from the final accounts. 
This permits machine performance to be treated as a transparent mode of disclosure, and, the techneic 
account of the causal series stabilised during the production of empirical regularities can then be presented 
as the ontological law that was disclosed by the experiment. This metaphysical foundation allows techne to 
be presented as episteme, provides experimental physics with an ontological dimension, and the 
achievement of stability facilitates the abstraction and reification of techne as natural law. This chapter will 
present a further discussion of the social and technological processes involved in the production of techneic 
accounts. Experimental physics is a labour process that uses models and metaphors in order to produce 
intelligible accounts of natural phenomena in terms of mechanisms and laws. It uses technological objects 
to produce further technological objects to satisfy the "internal" challenges of scientific research and the 
"external" challenges of the wider world of economic, political, and military ambitions. I shall argue that 
the craft practices and technological trajectories of experimental physics are directed towards the 
production of intelligible mechanistic models and prototype technologies, and, that the pursuit of modem 
experimental physics is a mode of both Ge-stell and poiesis that participates in "world-making".
The On-going Experimental Labour Process:
Any new PhD. student entering a modem experimental physics laboratory for the first time enters a highly 
complicated technological environment populated by already established practitioners.1 S/he is a novice
1 This view is based partly on my own experience as a physics student entering the High Energy Physics 
Data Analysis Laboratory at Lancaster University Physics Dept., and the DELPHI detector site at CERN,
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despite her/his (in all but exceptional cases) at least 21 years of familiarity with technology use. Her/his 
experiences as an undergraduate, an acquired knowledge of basic techniques and theories, are insufficient 
for the purpose of making this new environment intelligible. S/he requires further training. Many students 
and researchers anecdotally recall being told “to forget everything they learned at degree level” as they are 
initiated into “the world of research”. Novice students frequently spend the first year “familiarising 
themselves” with the experimental apparatus, techniques, procedures, theoretical models, computer 
simulations, and “the way things are done” within the laboratory. They learn the techniques and tactics. 
They are also expected to familiarise themselves with “the current literature” and “who’s who in the field” 
as the definition of “the field” and “the state of the art”. They also learn what the laboratory group’s 
projects and aims are, who are the group’s allies, and who are the group’s competitors. In short, the novice 
student is socialised as a competent group member by being orientated within this specialised technological 
and social environment A novice student’s prior familiarity with using technologies and her/his 
undergraduate degree knowledge can only help as a starting point For the purpose of participating in the 
specialist character of all scientific research, the idiosyncratic character of particular laboratories’ working 
practices, and the novelty and complexity of the experimental research, degree level knowledge is too 
general, too basic, and also often obsolete. For example, a third year B.Sc. course in Quantum Mechanics 
or in Low Temperature Physics would be insufficient for either an understanding of the mathematical 
models used by an Ultra-Low Temperature Physics research group. The students' education would not 
provide the level of refinement of skills and technological familiarity required when working upon the 
experimental apparatus.2
Although postgraduate physics students attend general theoretical courses, learning both general
Geneva. It is also based on experiences I have had with Ph.D. students working in The Ultra-Low 
Temperature Laboratory at Lancaster University School of Physics and Materials, as well as in other 
physics laboratories at Bath and Bristol. I have also had discussions with Ph.D. students from other fields of 
research, including genetics, computational mathematics, chemical engineering, behavioural microbiology, 
physiological biochemistry, astrophysics, and mechanical engineering from Bath, Bristol, Plymouth, 
London, Birmingham, and Liverpool universities. In my experience, I have yet to encounter an 
experimental scientist who is not, to a greater or lesser extent, sympathetic with scientific realism. Most 
affirm realism about their techno-phenomena, although they do tend towards scepticism about their 
theories. Physicists, often in reference to the arrogance of nineteenth century classical physicists, tend to 
acknowledge that their current theories and models are likely to be replaced in the future.
2 The reader may care to compare Fisher et. al. (1989) and McClintock et. al. (1992). The former is a 
published research paper by the ULT physics group in Lancaster and the latter is the course textbook for the 
Lancaster University third year ULT physics optional course. The former is far more specialised in its 
inscriptions than the latter. Also, the 1989 paper discusses the insufficiencies of the two-fluid model of 
superfluidity and proposes an alternative model. The 1992 textbook models superfluidity in terms of the 
two-fluid model.
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mathematical and theoretical techniques, most of the training will be in the context of the specific 
laboratory work.3 The novice student needs to rapidly make the highly complicated technological 
environment intelligible through the mediation of the already established group. S/he learns the 
methodology. The first stage of this process of orientation requires a great deal of “black-box” abstraction 
of the group’s activities and the experimental apparatus into sequences and series of functions, operations, 
and procedures. These range from the operations of devices and instruments in specified circumstances to 
the procedures for recording operations in laboratory notebooks. The novice is taught specific bodily acts 
and technical operations; this orientates the novice as an experimental practitioner. This form of learning is 
entirely one of attendance on the part of the student, and instruction (both formal and informal) on the part 
of the already established group members.4 It is through this habituation and familiarisation, in terms of 
“when this gauge reads A then turn that dial to B because this performs function C” instructions, that the 
technological environment is embodied in practices as a set of techniques. This socialises the student into 
“how things are done” in terms of operational cause-effect sequences that represent “proper procedures”. In 
this way, the novice learns “how to operate the experimental apparatus” and begins the transition from 
“novice” student to “competent” student. The novice student also learns, as an equally important part of 
learning “how things are done”, the social dynamics of group relations. The student has to learn behaviour 
within the social organisation of the laboraioiy; this orientates her/himself within the “working day” of the 
laboratory. This involves learning “who is best at what”, “how to approach so-and-so” in order to obtain 
their help, how work tasks are organised, how meetings are organised and resolved, and even how to join in 
with the group members’ “sense of humour”. In short, the novice must learn how to negotiate within the 
group’s social organisation. This overtly social side of the laboratory is as equally important as the 
technical operation of the apparatus for the student’s transition from “novice” to “competent”. In order to 
achieve “competence” the student must be orientated in a socio-technological organisation in such a way as 
to become a negotiator rather than merely instructed. The novice student must survive a process of 
socialisation through which the student’s relationships within the laboratory are both dialectical and 
didactical. The didactical aspects of the student’s relationships are those in which the student learns 
established practices through following instructions and mimicry. The dialectical aspects are those in which
3 For example, a first year Ph.D. student at Lancaster’s Ultra-low Temperature Physics Laboratory will 
attend Quantum Physics and Statistical Physics for Low Temperature Physics courses at Manchester 
University along with first year Ph.D. students from other labs. During such classes the student learns 
general models and mathematical techniques.
4 I have used the term “attendance” to denote certain attitudes on the part of the student This term means 
more than simply being present It denotes an attitude of listening, attentiveness, and care. It is used in the 
same sense as when someone attends to their duties or attends to someone else’s needs. This term implies 
that the student is engaged in more than a passive learning relationship with the other group members. The 
student is actively orientating him/herself through making his/her working environment and the project(s), 
in which s/he is a participant, both intelligible and her/his own.
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the student negotiates her/his own orientation in the laboratory in relation to other group members and the 
experimental apparatus through questioning, negotiation, and participation.
However, the praktognosic processes of the embodiment of socio-technical techniques between 
technological objects and the human body, are necessary but insufficient to make the laboratory 
environment intelligible and workable. The empirical cause-effect relationships between machine 
performances and the interventional techniques are exoframed, from the onset, with theoretical descriptions 
of “invisible physical processes”. For example, the Lancaster ULT physics student learns that “adjusting 
the yellow valve marked B changes the pressure of the helium-3 flow” and that “switching on circuit A 
turns on the magnetic field which initialises an entropic hysteresis loop”. S/he learns that when digital 
display C reads "D" then “the phonon absorption rate has reached a significant level”. In the attendance of 
the student to the “way things are done” s/he both explicitly and tacitly learns connections between 
techniques and the manipulation of “physical variables”. S/he begins to embody the apparatus and it, in 
turn, becomes an increasingly transparent means of disclosure. The student learns the established 
interpretation of techniques in terms of “physical processes” as an essential part of making the process of 
experimentation intelligible. The student is taught how to make the “output”, or performance, of the 
experiment intelligible in terms of interpretive models, mathematical models, theoretical 
conceptualisations, and visual representations of invisible “physical processes” that are claimed to be 
occurring within the experimental closed system. The student learns “how to see” and the apparatus 
becomes a means of disclosure. This part of the learning process occurs simultaneously with all the other 
parts. The student gradually learns how to perform the socio-technical procedures and how to make sense 
of this performance in toms of experimenting upon “a physical process”. This learning process occurs 
throughout the whole process of education as a research student This tacit connectivity between socio- 
technical procedures and the remote manipulation of theoretical entities is an interpretive, technical, and 
cognitive orientation within the process of making the laboratory intelligible. Embodying this tacit 
connectivity in practice allows the novice student to participate in “doing physics”. It is this embodiment 
which makes the abstract level of theoretical physics manifest in, and linked to, the manipulative practices 
of the operation of the apparatus. The “physical properties” then can be “actualised” by pressing switches, 
or turning knobs, which tacitly relate techniques to “adjusting energies”, or “quantum states”, or 
“temperature”, or “magnetic polarisation”, etc. At all stages of the learning process the student is taught by 
the other group members how to make sense of her/his experiences for her/himself in terms of intelligible 
practices. It is by orientation of her/himself to the social processes involved in interpreting the 
performances of the apparatus that the student learns how to conduct scientific negotiation, and reasoning, 
and becomes a scientific negotiator and reasoner. The extent to which the student will be perceived by the 
already established group members to have become “competent” will be dependent upon the student’s 
success in orientating her/himself within the context of the group’s practices in such a way as to cohere 
with the group. It is by doing this that the student will be perceived by the other group members as having 
acquired the skills necessary to do the work. The student will become competent by embodying the
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methodology of physics and mathematical projection; by learning how to embody that methodology for 
her/himself.
A research group is not comprised of homogeneous individuals. A research group does not 
constitute a simple social agency. Research scientists, like people from all walks of life, are idiosyncratic 
and have divergent interests, and constitute social agents in their own right, which may, or may not, cohere 
with the group in which they are situated. The student often receives quite a diversity of opinion from the 
group members about “how to do physics”, “how to solve this particular problem”, or even if “there is a 
problem here”. Of course, the diversity of opinion will remain within the template of the methodology that 
they all share. Hence, they are performing the same experiment and their experiences are commensurable. 
From within the boundaries and constraints of these opinions the student has considerable space for 
negotiation and selection. The student has to work out for her/himself which member of the group provides 
“the best advice” in any given situation because the group may not provide a unified answer to this 
question. This will depend on perceptions of competence, credibility, and the potential outcome of 
interpersonal interactions. The student may find that, although the other group members consider “Dr. A” 
to be the most proficient at a particular technique, or explanatory tactic, s/he is able to communicate with, 
and consequently understand, “Dr. B” better. The group members may also be divided on the question of 
who is most competent and the student has to learn how to navigate these divisions. The course of 
navigation will vary from circumstance to circumstance and depends on the dynamic interchange between 
group members and the student during the periods of negotiation. Often the student will encounter diverse 
opinions on interpretations, visualisations, or appropriate techniques, in either group discussion, or 
interpersonal discussion between the student and another individual, and the student is very much left to 
make judgements for her/himself as to the best way to proceed.5 The student is very much a negotiator in 
her/his own learning process. The group may well share a commitment to make the experiments they 
perform work well, and to publish excellent results, but they may not necessarily agree about what 
constitutes “working well” and “excellent results”. In the process of experimental work there is a dynamic 
social process of social agents engaged in the negotiation of “how to proceed”. This dynamic social process 
is directed to transform a collection of diverse social agents into a unified convergent social agency. The 
establishment of convergent and stable group practices is the establishment of coherent social ageny within 
a wider social context. This give the laboratory "one voice" in interaction with other laboratories, 
conferences, funding bodies, etc. The student also has to learn that many of the choices that the group 
makes are not always made on “scientific” criteria. Economic and political factors are involved in the 
group’s choices of projects in order to gain prestige for the group, attract funding, attract media attention, 
undermine a rival group, etc.6 I agree with Karin Knorr-Cetina's argument that laboratory work exists in
5 Often postgraduate students find themselves being told to do something a certain way by one established 
member of the group only to find, that later, another established member of the group tells the student that 
s/he is doing it all wrong and should do it another way.
6 For example, the ULT physics group chose to channel many of their efforts into building a larger dilution
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trans-scientific fields.7 Choices are trans-scientific selections because they are made in contexts of resource 
relationships, interests, and social connections that transcend the laboratory. As Woolgar & Latour have 
argued, scientists make choices on the basis of credibility, perceptions of risk, and career investment 
criteria.8 The point that these authors are making is that scientists’ choices are not made solely in terms of 
internal logic, or scientific rationality, but are based on opportunism within a wider social context. The 
student learns, as a social agent, that being a scientific negotiator involves being a negotiator in a wider 
context than the laboratory.
Experimental physics is a highly complicated and “messy” affair. The novice student has to learn, 
from the other members of the group, how to make skilled judgements about how to proceed with the work. 
Experimental apparatus do not always work in accordance with the expectations of scientists. In fact, many 
experimentalists often joke that experiments rarely work in accordance with expectations. The novice 
student learns the intentions and expectations of the group in the context of frequent instability and 
complexity. S/he learns what constitutes “working well” as well as “what to do”, “how to do it”, and “when 
to do it”, from the other group members' experiences of dealing with the instabilities and complexities in 
their work as they attempt to stabilise successful working practices. In this way s/he acquires the received 
wisdom of “how to perform experimental physics” and “what the results should look like” if the experiment 
is “working properly”. The embodiment of “the best way to proceed” to “achieve realistic goals” is passed 
on to the student through this orientation of the student’s expectations and practices in line with the group’s 
established and stable expectations and practices. The student also learns, in parallel to “working well”, 
what constitutes a “breakdown”. S/he learns “likely causes” of "breakdown”, the “whys”, and “the best way 
to fix it”, as part of the process of familiarisation with the groups tacitly embodied history of trial and error 
experiences, modifications, interpretations, and transdictions. The “best way to fix this” is often a particular 
solution to a “failure” which is pragmatically taken to be the solution provided it remains stable. For 
example, the student may well learn that if a particular characteristic signal appears on a spectrograph and 
is considered by the already established group members to be “noise”, and consequently “undesirable”,
refrigerator in order to achieve lower temperatures and break their own low temperature record. Two 
members of the group expressed reservations about this because they claimed that this effort was about 
technological innovation, purely to gain prestige, and that their efforts would be better spent doing physics 
at the temperatures that they had already reached. Also, when a member of a visiting group from 
Nottingham came to present that group’s work on using polarised He-3 as part of a new lung imaging 
technique, a few of the Lancaster group tried to convince the visitor that Xenon could be an equally viable 
gas for the task. This was not based on any commitment to find the best gas for lung imaging, nor any 
knowledge of the appropriateness of xenon for this new technique. It was an expression of the Lancaster 
members’ concern that if medical research used He-3 then the price of the gas would be raised and reduce 
the group’s available resources.
7 Knorr-Cetina (1981).
8 Latour & Woolgar (1979).
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then it should be “fixed”, or “removed”, by “changing a connecting cable”, “adjusting the signal 
amplification”, or whatever. Much of experimental physics involves the acquisition of a collection of 
experiences of “jury-rigging”, tinkering with the technological configuration in order to maintain a stable 
output in line with expectations.9 It is only when such “jury-rigging” attempts persistently “fail” and that 
the output persistently “fails” to meet expectations that the experimental practitioners will look “deeper”. 
This “deeper” look involves the determination of stark closure: either there is a serious problem with the 
construction of the experimental apparatus, the performance of particular procedures, or there is “new 
physics”. Either way “something is misunderstood”. This closure occurs when stability is achieved. This 
closure is performed by running through a list of possible tiansdictions and then either removing possible 
sources (until it vanishes) or exploring it through subsequent innovation (making it instrumental in the 
performance of its own disclosure). If the expected output can be achieved and stabilised by re-building 
part, or all, of the experimental apparatus then the problem is determined to be one of apparatus design or 
construction: “The experimental apparatus was flawed.” If the expected output can be achieved and 
stabilised by using a different technique, or simply by someone else performing it, then the problem is 
determined to be simply a matter of practice: “The experiment was performed badly.” If the expected 
results cannot be achieved through changing the apparatus design or operation then (typically only then) 
“new physics” will be suspected. Only if the anomaly remains stable and an impediment to the research 
project will it be considered worthy of further investigation. Otherwise it will be avoided and the work will 
continue as before.10 However, anomalies are considered when an alternative hypothesis is abductively11 
presented to account for the anomaly and suggest a new direction for experimental research. Without this 
“explanation” the experimental result rarely is considered “publishable” and is often considered to be a
9 It is this tinkering which Pickering (1995) terms “a dialectic of accommodations and resistances” and the 
collection of experiences constitutes “the emergent contours” of material and human agency. I shall discuss 
Pickering’s thesis in the next chapter.
10 During one of my visits to the ULT laboratory at Lancaster the group observed an anomalous “cooling 
spike” on the readout of one of their dilution refrigerators. This did not make any sense to the group 
members in terms of their theoretical expectations. It was immediately rejected, transdicted, as not a real 
cooling effect and treated as artificial. The last change that the group had made to that particular component 
of the experimental cell was to coat its walls with a plastic called Capton. The group removed the 
substance, the spike did not reappear, and it was paid no more attention. To date the group has not used 
Capton again in the construction of their cell walls. No work has been done on “the Capton effect” 
transdiction.
11 Peirce defined abduction to mean the general process of inference whereby a conjecture is made of the 
form (1) Observe an anomaly, (2) Abduct a hypothesis from which the anomaly deductively follows, (3) 
test other derivative predictions from the hypothesis by experiment This is essentially the method of 
implementing transdictions. Gooding (1996) discusses the potential role of abduction in contemporary 
science.
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“dead end”. The extent to which Popper’s “falsification principle” is a principle in scientific work is that, in 
principle, any scientific theoiy or hypothesis should be falsifiable, but working physicists rarely spend any 
time falsifying hypotheses or theories.12 Most scientific endeavours are attempts to make things work and a 
theory or hypothesis will only be rejected if it consistently fails to work and there is an alternative which 
seems workable. If a practice, technique, interpretation, theoiy, or tactic, is working well within the 
coherent social agency of the group, then it will be pragmatically continued to be used whilst the group 
members deal with more interesting or problematical matters. It is this pragmatic acceptance of practices 
within coherent group agency that establishes stable technological objects. The stable technological object 
is made pragmatically meaningful through training and demonstration in such a way as to “explain” the 
meaning of the practices by showing its intended effect in the context of the work. The purposes of 
practices are given a pragmatic basis of meaning in terms of their usefulness, which the student learns 
through mimetic attendance towards the uses, the intentions, and the expectations, implicit in the group’s 
practices.
Through the above processes the student, in transition from “novice” to “competent” student, is 
orientated within die developing stable labour processes of the group in such a way as to become a 
negotiator within the group. A stable labour process constitutes simultaneously both a stable social order 
and a stable technological order. It is a socio-technical organisation of technological objects and bodily 
motility. When it is directed towards efficiency it is characteristic of Ellul's technique. In the context of 
production, “order” is determined pragmatically in terms of “stability” and “reproduction”. Any change of 
the group labour processes will occur in response to “disorder” and “instability” and will become 
established if it is deemed to promote ‘‘order” and “stability”. This moment of establishment occurs as the 
group moves from being an incoherent collection of divergent and heterogeneous socio-technical agents to 
becoming an integrated, convergent, and coherent socio-technical agent In this way the “way of doing 
physics” develops in accordance with ongoing socio-technological process of the stabilisation of labour 
processes in response to periods of instability and disorder. Stability and order form an established 
convention of “the way of doing things” into which future novice students will be socialised and orientated. 
This established convention is open to re-evaluation as the group dynamic moves between periods of 
incoherence and coherence regarding “the best way to do this” as they encounter disorder and instability. 
Whilst the group is in a period of coherence a socio-technological convention is stabilised and whilst the 
group is in a period of incoherence conventions are open for negotiation. These periods of incoherence
12 Due to the problem of ancillary hypotheses being required as well as the primary hypothesis, the 
hypothesis under investigation cannot be straightforwardly falsified. We cannot know whether one of the 
assumptions used to deduce a particular observable from a general law, one of the assumptions used to 
construct the test, or if the hypothesis itself was false. This requires further testing and also further 
assumptions. Although, in principle, Popper’s falsification method seems straightforward, in practice, it is 
unworkable. Even Popper was aware of this. Working physicists, if they are aware of it, tend to pay 
Popper’s falsification method “lip service” and then get on with their work.
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occur as the group encounters new problems and the periods of coherence occur as the group completes a 
period of negotiation as to what the solution of these new problems are. These new problems arise because 
in innovative and complicated work, such as experimental physics, the socio-technological order is 
underdetermined and heterogeneous. It is fragile and fragmentary. It is experimental.
What does the term “experimental” mean? In experimental work, technologies are used for 
purposes other than the use for which they were developed. The tools, components, and instruments, are 
often used for tasks other than those for which they were originally designed, and, consequently, their use, 
in terms of what can be done with them, is not fully determined from the onset. It remains to be determined 
through use from within a template of possibilities. It is underdetermined. Underdeterminacy is distinct 
from indeterminacy. The former means that a particular tool has not been completely determined in its 
usage yet whereas the latter means that its usage is ambiguous. Furthermore, the interaction between 
changes in the technological configurations of the apparatus and its responses to those changes are also 
underdetermined (otherwise there would be nothing to experiment upon). It is the underdetermined 
character of the socio-technological order that opens a space for choice in the selections and directions 
which are available to physicists. It is this space for choice that allows considerable free-play in scientific 
work in which incoherence between social agents is possible due to the availability of divergent selections 
and directions. This space allows an experiment to begin. The determination of the labour processes of the 
group and the technological configuration of the laboratory and experiment removes this free-space; die 
establishment of coherence fills that space. It is impossible to determine the content of a final socio- 
technological order from the onset This has to be developed experimentally through periods of disorder 
and ordering. In other words, the development of a stable social and technological ordering is incomplete, 
experimental, and no one is able to determine, in advance, exactly what form it will finally take when it is 
complete.13 The working physicists may well have expectations, as to what the final form might be, but 
these expectations are re-evaluated and transformed during the process of ordering the social and 
technological dimensions of the work. Provided that they remain within the template of the methodology of 
their institutionalised field of research, they have considerable free-play in the construction of their plan of 
action. Furthermore, the technological objects used in experimental work were constructed in 
heterogeneous contexts. Each object is a centre of transformative power when in a context in which it has 
been stabilised as a technological object. An innovative process is one of converging heterogeneous objects 
and integrating these diverse centres of transformative powers into a single convergent, stable, and coherent 
centre of transformative power in the novel context This creates a novel prototype available as a 
technological object for fixture experiments. This is how novel machine-families are created: as hybrids of 
others. It is also how physics progresses and specialisation occurs.
Experimentation is an inherently innovative development of both social and technological orders 
in terms of the achievement of stable labour processes. It is a highly developed form of social activity that, 
for all but the most trivial experiments, requires co-operation, resources, and complex machinery. The co­
13 On this point I agree with Pickering's argument See next chapter for further discussion.
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operation involved has two primary spheres of operatioa It has an "external" sphere in which the co­
operation of non-physicists is required to provide the resources and facilities for the construction of a space 
in which an experiment can occur. It also has an "internal" sphere in which the co-operation between 
physicists is required for the successful design, construction, operation, inscription, and interpretation of the 
experiment. Thus the rhetorical task of setting-up an experiment is two-fold: the experiment must be 
presented as having an external value (i.e. value for economic, military, or political purposes) and as having 
an internal value for the ongoing activities of research (Le. value for scientific purposes). Each experiment 
must be set-up as instrumental for the satisfaction of purposes, which are built into the set-up (unless the 
physicists involved are being deceptive). It is due to this two-fold task that experimental physics is both 
transcientific and teleological (internally directed towards the achievement of its goals). Every experiment, 
from its set-up to its completion, is a two-fold technological object within two spheres of purposes; within 
tbe "internal" world of ongoing scientific research and the "external" world of economical, political, and 
military ambitions. Each physicist, when positing the value of the experiment, is positing purposes and 
goals to other people that the experiment has, at least in part, the potential to satisfy. Physicists, in order to 
persuade themselves and others of the experiment's potential, must do so in relation to the conventional 
background of expectations, estimations, and acceptance of what is possible, probable, or even necessary. 
Thus every experiment is set-up in relation to paradigmatic technological backgrounds, against which it is 
foregrounded as an exemplar, within the "internal" trajectory of ongoing research and the "external" 
trajectories of the wider world's desires for further technological innovation and power. From within these 
trajectories particular exemplary experiments are publicly presented as necessary (or crucial) for the further 
progression of those trajectories. In this sense, experiments are suggested by paradigmatic backgrounds of 
ongoing scientific research and technological innovation. The physicists are challenged by these 
suggestions to set-up and perform the experiments that publicly emerge as necessary, crucial, probable, or 
even merely possible. From within complex experiments a further series of related experiments emerge as 
necessary, crucial, probable, and possible, and the participants will be challenged to construct and perform 
them next. It is in this sense that an historical understanding of the ground-plan of the set-up and trajectory 
of experiments is necessary for us to have an understanding of contemporary experimental physics. The 
trajectories of ongoing research and technological innovation are Ge-stell for which the background efforts 
are standing-reserve for the destining of experimental physics. Furthermore, due to the need for their co­
operation, the physicist is also positing purposes and goals for other people. The highly complex machines 
and infrastructure required by modem physics (i.e. ULT physics at Lancaster or HE physics at CERN) 
require division of labour in order to function successfully as research. The individual participants are 
defined in terms of their roles (i.e. physicists, engineers, technicians, mathematicians, students, 
theoreticians, and computer scientists) as they are ordered according to their techniques, under the 
challenging and destining of Ge-stell. Each one of these techniques is defined according to the postulation 
of a purpose within the complex of purposes ordered towards the purpose of the whole. The work of 
individual participants is two-fold: each participant attempts to elicit performances from their part of the
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machine interface and from other human participants. The object of their labour is not just the 
performances of the machine but is also the performances of the whole, interconnected complex of 
participants upon which the performativity of the machine depends. Thus the means to achieve machine 
performativity are orientated towards both the machine and the group of human participants. This is 
enframing. The means are not simply those required to achieve performances from machines but also to 
achieve performances from other people. The purposes and goals postulated in such complex experiments 
are socio-technical and are not simply rational orientations towards theoretical derivations. Machine 
performativity emerges from the Ge-stell of socio-technical labour upon materials, inscriptions, and other 
people, and is not a simple test of theory. The teleological positings of labour14 are the challenges of Ge- 
stell and where "theory testing" plays a role in an experiment it is as a challenge within the complex of 
interconnected challenges set-up by Ge-stell. If complex experiments can be said to be a test then it is a test 
of the socio-technical agency that is gathered and challenged to construct and perform the experiment It 
does not immediately follow from the success of agency that any theory utilised in the experiment was 
correct (or even approximately correct). All that immediately follows is that yet another challenge has been 
undertaken and completed.
The stabilisation of socio-technical practice result in the concrete realisation of a techno­
phenomenon that is produced through the contingent activities and choices made during the efforts to 
stabilise those practices. It does not follow that techno-phenomena realised in this way were waiting to be 
discovered, or were actualised in accordance with natural law. What is discovered is how to stabilise those 
practices. In my view, J.J. Thompson did not discover the electron as something waiting to be discovered 
but, rather, discovered how to make the electron a stable part of the ongoing extension of the 
electromagnetic machine-family. Given that the electron only exercises its powers within the contexts of 
this machine-family, then it is irrelevant whether it is a "real and out there" fundamental corpuscle of matter 
because what an electron is is enframed by what it does within the ongoing researches of experimental 
physics. Its reality is inextricably bound up with the character of these researches and it is that electron 
which is the object of scientific discourse. The electron is a technological object Thus its reality should not 
be divorced from the socio-technical processes in which it is stabilised and utilised as a technological 
object The technique of spraying electrons is available as standing-reserve for challenges by Ge-stell and 
its disclosure is identical with its responses to those challenges. The electron of scientific discourse does 
not have any scientific reality outside of the ongoing Ge-stell of research because if it were to have 
ontological independence from Ge-stell then these facets of its being will not be utilisable and, 
consequently, be inaccessible to scientific research. It would be outside the ground-plan The labour 
processes involved in the stabilisation of technological objects; this requires bringing together and ordering 
diverse and heterogeneous technological objects across the borders between machine-families. These 
objects can be skills, practices, machines, exoframes, models, metaphors, representations, mechanisms, 
tools, materials, techniques, or inscriptions. The innovative processes of stabilisation involve the
14 see Lukacs (1978)
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convergence of divergent and incoherent centres of transformative power into a single convergent and 
coherent centre of transformative power. This is a process of producing a stable technological object from 
many technological objects. Thus all technological objects are complex manifestations of a historical labour 
process. This manifestation emerges from a straggle with contradictions, incoherence, divergence, 
heterogeneity, and plurality that are implicit in, and emergent from, the extension and synthesis of distinct 
machine-kinds into a novel machine-kind. Once this is stabilised it is presented as a defined and self- 
contained technological object utilisable for the exploration of a “deeper and more unified strata of reality”. 
Thus the extension and synthesis of a compass (a magnetic machine) and a chemical battery and wire 
combine (an electrical machine) into Oersted’s apparatus (an electromagnetic machine) could, once 
stabilised, be presented and utilised as a technological object for the disclosure of the deeper and more 
unified strata of forces. Mechanical realist metaphysics allows the extension and synthesis of machine- 
kinds to be presented as the disclosure of “ontological depth”. The frontiers of new experimental physics, at 
any time, are the new challenges of Ge-stell and the already stabilised technological objects of prior efforts 
achieve their reality to the extent that they are available as standing-reserve. In this way, the destining of 
Ge-stell, as the destining of physics, promises novel technological complexes of objects that will challenge 
the labour processes of physicists to disclose deeper ontological strata. The frontier of physics attains an 
ontological "superiority" over the past efforts that its destining is entirely dependent upon This order of 
rank is entirely one of the "superiority" of challenges over standing-reserve. It is an expression of the desire 
for novelty. The new strata of machine-kinds, the novel machine-family, is the "cutting-edge" or "state of 
flie art" of novel physics that is manifest as a research programme through its subsequent innovation into 
further differentiated machines. The ontology of experimental High Energy Physics is circumscribed by the 
permutations of particle detectors and accelerators. These permutations are innovated by the extension and 
synthesis of the same component machine-kinds. It is this process of differentiation from a shared set of 
technological objects that unifies High Energy Physics as a research programme and provides its 
technological objects with transfactuality. It is only due to the fact that the LEP accelerator at CERN and 
the SLAC in the United States are constructed from the same component machine-kinds that the "particles” 
that they both produce are describable using the same models and theories. This fact is a consequence of 
the fact that the same models and theories were built into both machines through the processes of 
stabilising the convergence of the same machine-kinds during the design and construction of those 
machines. It does not follow from the fact that these machines are different that they are independent There 
are merely different ensembles, different configurations, of the same component technological objects and, 
as such, are members of the same machine-family. The extent that these machines are taken to be 
independent, or autonomous, is a consequence of the extent that their shared component machine-kinds 
have become transparent as standing-reserve.
The modelling of these machines, in relation to the labour processes of the research programmes 
that circumscribe them, is a process of positing causal relations and mechanisms that are relevant to the 
particular goals of that research programme. The transference of these models between members of the
142
same machine-family, as a process of cross-checking and modifying both the models and the performativity 
of the machines, transforms the posited causal relations into a more codified and abstract form and leads to 
their generalisation. The experiences of the research workers on one particular machine can be related to 
the experiences of the research workers on another particular machine, through these generalised models, 
providing that the machines are members of the same machine-family. The physicists working on DESY in 
Hamburg, the DELPHI detector at CERN, and the SLAC machine in the United States, can relate their 
experiences through the abstract and codified Standard Model of Elementary Particle Interactions. This 
occurs despite the fact that this general model needs to be extensively expanded and modified to be of any 
use in exofiaming their particular projects. By relating their experiences in terms of a shared general model 
the physicists are able to generalise and unify their experiences as experiences of the same kind of events, 
and, as a consequence, transcend the particularity of the specific machine performances. It is only in 
relation to a shared general model that these physicists are able to translate their particular experiences of 
the particular performances of particular machines into general observations of the same processes. This 
endows those events with autonomy and transfactuality. This transfactuality should not be of any surprise 
given that it was built into the machines from the onset and has been continually maintained by the 
experimenters in their interpretations of their experiences. The use of general models also allows the 
physicist to de-personalise their experiences and present them as the experiences that anyone would have 
(providing that they were familiar with the general model). It is this de-personalisation that is presented as 
objectivity and facilitates the removal of the particular labour processes that were necessary for the 
physicist to have those experiences, from the final accounts. This is an example of reification (Lukacs, 
1967, pp.83-109). Hie transfactuality of those experiences are merely a consequence of the exchange of 
experiences in terms of a shared general model that is both built into the design of the particular machines 
and is used to interpret their performances. Without a general model those experiences would be 
incommensurable because they would lack any common frame of reference, and, therefore, the use of a 
general model is a precondition for any division of labour within ongoing experimental research 
programmes. The use of a general model is also a precondition for the subdivision of any research 
programme into particular experiments and further specialisatioa The experiments and theories of modem 
physics, presented as autonomous and transfactual in terms of a general model, can only be divorced from 
the challenges of Ge-stell and the teleological positings of the labour process by presuming the validity of 
the precepts of mechanical realist metaphysics. This is an expression of the public conflation of techne and 
episteme that has been central to experimental physics since its onset in the work of Galileo. The general 
causal accounts of the stable products of the socio-technical processes of labour can be presented as 
universal knowledge of the eternal and fixed efficient causes of Nature in terms of the general mathematical 
laws that describe them. It is at that point that both human agency and machine performativity have been 
written out of the account completely. This conceals the teleological positing that is inherent in the 
destining of experimental physics because, by presenting the directions and products of physics as the 
disclosure of natural processes, it has hidden both the "internal" and "external" spheres of purposes and
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challenges for which the experiments were set-up to satisfy. This concealment hides the beings for which 
the disclosures of physics are truths and powers, and, as a consequence, not only hides the choices that have 
been made regarding the human inquiiy into Nature but also hides the fundamental relation to Being that 
provides the precondition for those choices. It is as a result of this concealment that Ge-stell became the 
natural mode for being-in-the-world, and, simultaneously, became concealed from presence as Ge-stell.
Models and Intelligibility;
As Nick Maxwell pointed out (1984), we must not forget what sort of being scientific theories and models 
are intelligible for. Once we address intelligibility as a central criterion for theory and model choice then 
we can not remove the living bodily being, namely scientifically persuaded human beings, for whom those 
theories and models are intelligible, without removing their intelligibility. Furthermore, as the choice of 
theory or model is bound up with the choice of research programme, then we can not detach the question of 
which theories and models are to be explored from the teleological positings in the "external" world of 
commercial, political, and military ambitions, that the direction of research has promised to satisfy in 
exchange for resources, equipment, and space. Modem experimental physics is situated between two 
dimensions of productive activity: the "internal" dimension of the production of intelligible explanations of 
machine performativity in terms of natural laws and mechanisms, and the "external” dimension of the 
production of innovative transformative powers and machine prototypes. In contemporary science studies 
there has been a great deal of emphasis of the roles of models in the construction and establishment of 
scientific knowledge. Leatherdale (1974) provided an extensive summary of available literature on the 
subject of models in science in the mid-70s, and Rom Harre (1961) considered explanatory models to be 
central to a realist interpretation of physics in the early 60s. The volumes have swollen considerably since. 
Models have been considered to be central in scientific reasoning by an extorsive collection of analysts of 
science from diverse academic disciplines. Many scientists have also emphasised the central role of models 
in constructing and articulating scientific theories and explanations. The processes of scientific description 
and reasoning are essentially that of modelling and exoframing.
A model of any real process is inherently a simplification, abstraction, and an approximation of 
that process. In experimental physics, the labour processes of making a model involve abstracting the 
mechanisms and functions of the apparatus in order to make manipulation of the model as simple as is 
pragmatically acceptable whilst simultaneously making selections as to which features of the apparatus’ 
configuration are essential. The purpose of a model is two-fold: it is made to both represent reality and to 
simplify i t  Physicists, when constructing models, have to make a choice between making the model 
simpler (easier to work with) or making it more complex (realistic). As Gleick pointed out (1987, pp.278- 
9), the purpose of a model is to abstract, picture, and generalise a real process, or the world, and only the 
most naive empiricist would claim that a perfect model is one which perfectly represents reality. If a model 
were to mimic reality in every detail then we would not have any need of the model at all. Models relate 
“inner” (or “hidden”) structures, mechanisms, functions, or properties, to objects, phenomena, or systems,
144
in order to explain the various properties that they have. Models are taken to be “approximations” or 
“simplifications” of “the actual phenomenon”. Models allow the processes of experimentation to continue 
through selecting “the essential features” of phenomena and the interactive relationship between 
experimental procedures and “physical variables”. As such, models have both instrumental value and make 
ontological claims; a model both is a tentative, and re-evaluative, pragmatic tool, and a “description” 
evaluated according to its truth. A model is an essential link between a mathematical theory and experiment 
without which the mathematics is not scientific at all because it lacks an exoframe by which it is connected 
to the machine performances of the interconnected apparatus and calibrated instrumentatioa Models have 
an explanatory function and are essential for the heuristic of scientific discovery to occur at all. Models 
allow mathematical expressions to be used as functives within exoframes. These relate the calibrated 
instruments and machine performativity of apparatus with the "physical processes" that are being 
experimented upon by providing a visual, descriptive, manipulable, and intelligible representation of both 
mathematical formulation and the varying instrumental displays of physical apparatus. Models are 
transferable across contexts in which a common abstract feature between those contexts allows the 
implementation of the same abstract model. For example, Laplace’s equations serve as a mathematical 
model for quantifiable change in diverse fields such as gravitation, electrostatics, electricity, elasticity, and 
liquid flow. Models combine abstractions and simplifications of dynamic and functional aspects of 
phenomena and how they inter-relate. They are used to design and construct instruments, experiments, 
computer simulations, calibrate measuring devices, and interpret experiences. Models have numerous roles 
in scientific work. A model can have an explanative role if it provides a description in terms of a narrative 
and/or imagery. Through verbalisation and/or visualisation the “novel” can be related to the familiar. In this 
way a model can be used to “make sense” out of a phenomenon by relating it to things that are already 
“well understood”. An example of using a model in this way would be the wave theory of light, which can 
be demonstrated using ripples in water to explain phenomena such as refraction and diffraction. A model 
can have a semantic role if it is used to relate technical and “common” language in such a way as to 
broaden the context of any scientific work from specific contexts to more public ones. Such a model trades 
off precision for generality at the cost of introducing ambiguity. It is often necessary to do this in order to 
make a technical model intelligible in ordinary language. An example would be the re-description of matrix 
operations in Heisenberg’s matrix quantum mechanics in terms of observational events in order to be able 
to make sense out of the mathematics in a physical context Another example would be the relation of the 
technical definition of “wave” in mathematical theory to the more broader, and ambiguous, meanings in 
“everyday” public language. A model can have an ontological role if it is used as the phenomenon, which it 
is supposed to represent. Such a model is said to possess verisimilitude; it approximates the truth, and 
maintains its “ontological realism” through the commitment of its adherents and allies. If one believed that 
light was really comprised of waves then the wave theory of light would be superimposed upon the 
phenomenon of light. The model is a metaphor and replaces the phenomenon under investigation. The 
physicists skip over the phenomenon and interact with the model as if it were the phenomenon. A model
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can have a heuristic role if it acts as an aid to insight, innovation, and/or discoveiy. Such a model is not 
necessarily considered to be ontologically realistic but rather inspirational. The wave theoiy of matter 
would be an example of this. Although very few people publicly admitted to believing that matter was 
propagated in waves in published discussions at the beginning of the twentieth century, it was readily 
apparent that such a model opened up interesting new physics in terms of new experiments and theories. A 
model can have a logical role if it aids logical, mathematical, and computational analysis of a problem. The 
wave theoiy of probabilities applied to “sub-atomic” behaviour is an example of this, as it provides both a 
framework in which calculations can be made and also a logical structure through which “thought- 
experiments” can be constructed. A model can have a predictive role if it is used not only to calculate 
numerical values in relation to any variation of factors but also if it can be used to derive new hypotheses, 
theoretical conceptions, and possible observations. An example of this would be the derivation of 
astronomical topological events from General Relativity. The General Theory of Relativity offered such a 
large number of exciting new predictions and it was adopted as an interesting model long before any 
possible techniques for observing these predictions were even imaginable. Even today, although this theory 
is well established within modem physics, there are no incontestable “observations” of entities such as 
black holes, worm holes, white holes, etc. A model can have an instrumental role if it is used because it 
works within the context of the project without ontological commitment. Many physicists use quantum 
mechanics in this way. It facilitates calculations and predictions but the physicists do not necessarily 
commit themselves to its reality. Such models are used instrumentally as a technique. These roles are 
interconnected, any model may be performing two or more roles simultaneously in practice, and often the 
role that a model is performing is ambiguous. Models are also used both techneically to explain the 
performance of the apparatus and also epistemeically to explain the behaviour of phenomena. In an ongoing 
physics experiment, the apparatus is itself constructed according models of the performativity, how those 
components will relate to one another, and how they will interact with the phenomenon under investigation. 
The apparatus embodies marry such models which can be used both epistemeically and techneically. These 
models were built into the apparatus in its set-up.
By using models to simplicity, or clarify, complicated phenomena, physicists are able to use a 
model to provide intelligibility, cognition, and articulation. This allows for the selection and summary of 
experience in terms of essential features. Models are also modifiable and manipulable, and have capacities 
to accommodate development and change. In physics this is an essential feature of experimental models. 
Much of the work of physicists involves modifying the models used to accommodate discrepancies and 
problems that arise in their use, as the model needs to accommodate changes in the configuration of the 
apparatus. It is also an essential part of a model that it is exoframed to allow for the quantification of 
properties (an essential factor for measurement) and represents the phenomenon as a set of mathematical 
relations between functions, variables and constants. This involves “slicing” the phenomenon into 
mathematical functions, which relate independent variables. This is necessary for mathematics to 
participate in exoframing. It is also essential to be able to model the apparatus in terms of functional
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sequences and relations, which are connectable to operations and procedures. Epistemeic and techneic uses 
of models are inter-connected in order to model the complete physical experiment. This connects the 
manipulative procedures of experimentation with "physical variables" through exoframing the phenomenon 
as a set of functives. Both the configurations of the exoframed apparatus and the exoframed model are 
modified together as the techno-phenomena are disclosed. The technophenomenon is, of course, eventually 
predictable using the latest model-exoframe. Then the physicists publish.
How are models constructed? A model, as a simplification and generalisation of a phenomenon or 
process, is a robust and manipulable likeness of the phenomenon or process in question. In virtue of being a 
likeness, models are analogies (often on many different levels of likeness). An analogy allows description 
of novel phenomena in familiar terms and suggests further inquiry in exploring the fullness of the analogy. 
By using analogies scientists are able to explore a whole complex of analysis of implication and association 
which facilitates a further exploration of relations suggested by the analogy. With continued work this 
process of analogical reasoning and visualisation leads to the construction of a model. This process is one 
that begins with the inspiration of a tentative analogy, a simple likeness or simile, and finishes with the 
construction of a robust analogy in the form of a model. For example, the kinetic theory of gases was based 
upon an analogy with the mechanical properties of common material objects.15 Bacon regarded the use of 
analogy as essential to scientific thinking because the investigation and observation of resemblance and 
analogies provides us with a sense of the unity of Nature and a foundation for scientific inquiry.16 The view 
that analogy is an indispensable instrument for scientific exploration, was expressed by Oppenheimer 
(1956, p. 130). Hooke, Kepler, Mach, Maxwell, and Poincare, also who recognised the important role of 
analogy in scientific discovery and work. Analogy is a fundamental technique for mathematical abstraction 
and aids intelligibility. It allows mathematics to participate in exoframing and the phenomenon to be 
compared to something familiar. It also allows phenomena to be drawn in terms of visual representations. 
Gooding (1990, ch.4) described “curves of force” -  one of the central visualisations in electromagnetic 
theory -a s  an analogy which featured prominently in the process of constructing stable and communicable 
experiences within the context of Faraday’s, and others’, experimental work. It is via using analogies such 
as “curves of force” that Faraday et. al. were able to visualise the phenomena under investigation and 
construct mechanical models. Gooding shows how Faraday continually oscillated between the development 
of experimental techniques and the construction of his models in order to inform each other. As such his 
experimental work was actively constructive in the development of stable theoretical models and vice 
versa. There are many other examples of analogical reasoning and modelling in the history of science. 
Galileo used the Jovian satellite system as an analogical support for Copernicus’ heliocentric solar system. 
Kepler used an analogy between musical harmonics and planetary orbital geometry. Newton used a 
terrestrial projectile as an analogy for the Moon. Bohr used the heliocentric solar system as an analogy for 
the hydrogen atom. The use of analogies as both a model and support for a hypothesis, or theory, can be
15 A point made by Hane (1961) p.22
16 Novum Organum. p.47, pp. 144-7, pp. 180-1
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found throughout modem physics. The free electron theory of metals, the kinetic theory of ideal gases, the 
Ising theory of ferromagnetism, the Standard Model of Elementary Particle Interactions, the Big Bang 
theory, etc., are all examples of models based on approximations and likeness, and hence analogies.
Analogy also plays a synthetic role in bringing together heterogeneous domains of experience and 
gives science interdisciplinary means to cross over boundaries between distinct specialisations. Throughout 
the history of physics new models are often emergent when two previously distinct disciplines, or 
specialisms, are brought together. For example, cosmologists trying to understand “dark matter” have 
sought a mechanism by which it can be detected. In ULT physics “superfluidity” (itself an analogy) can be 
taken to be an analogy for “a vacuum” in which changes in “the AB-boundary position”, between “the A- 
phase of superfluid He-3” and “the B-phase of superfluid He-3”, are taken to be analogous to “the 
symmetry breaking” that “occurs because of certain cosmological strings of dark matter” that are 
“predicted” by “the Inflationary Phase of the Big Bang” model (itself an analogy). It is because of 
analogical reasoning like this that a ULT physics “dilution refrigerator” can be used as a possible “dark 
matter detector” and the two previously distinct specialisations of ULT physics and Theoretical Cosmology 
can be brought together.17 Also, by bringing together previously heterogeneous experiences the physicist 
can transfer her/his experiences from one experimental project to another. In this way both experience and 
practices can be transferred between projects. It is through analogy that experimenters can find starting 
points in new projects and build novel experiments. New experiments can be analogously modelled on old 
experiments. Morpurgo’s experiment to find free-quarks using an analogous construction to Millikan’s oil- 
drop experiment is a good example of the way that analogous reasoning provides physicists with a guide 
for how to begin an experiment Analogical reasoning allows one machine to be used as an analogy of a 
potential innovation in another context It allows techniques, tactics, labour processes, skills, expertise, 
models, exoframes, technographics, and machines, to be moved through the intersections between 
connected machine-families by noting the analogies between the machine performances in different 
productive and theoretical contexts.
There are two common uses of analogy in scientific reasoning. One signifies a likeness of form 
and the other signifies a likeness of function. The analogy between the solar system and the atom is of the 
former usage whereas the analogy between the heart and a pump is of the latter usage. Many models in 
physics, such as Schrbdinger’s probability wave quantum mechanics, offer both function and form 
modelling. This combination of visual modelling and behaviour modelling, achieved through the 
connection of visual representations and mathematical functions, allows a model to act both techneically 
and epistemeically by simultaneously modelling how something works and what something is. This is 
evident in the experimental work of the ULT physics group at Lancaster in whom the functioning of the 
apparatus is construed in terms of the mechanisms of theoretical entities such as “entropy”, “AB boundary 
phase changes”, “thermal coupling constants”, “specific heat capacities”, etc. The technological
17 See Bradley et at. (1995) and Bauerler et at. (1996a,b, 1998) for the Lancaster ULT physics published 
work on these models.
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configuration of the apparatus is modelled in terms of theoretical constants and variables, which are 
reciprocally reconfigured in the adjustments made the mechanistic configurations of the apparatus. For 
example, “the heat switches” that separate the “upper” and “lower” sections of a dilution refrigerator are 
chosen because of their property of “superconductivity at specific temperatures”.18 The apparatus has had 
working models embodied into it through the choices of components made by the physicists at every stage 
of its construction and operation. This is even more evident in the work done by experimenters at DELPHI, 
CERN, where the 10m x 10m barrel of electronics, wires, magnets, detectors, tubes, and iron, is intricately 
made meaningful in terms of models of its responsiveness to different models of particle physics (itself an 
analogy). At every stage of its design and construction the choices made by the physicists were taken on the 
basis of their models of elementary particle interactions and material responsiveness. The construction of 
the experiment is an embodiment of those models. These models are then algorithmically abstracted into a 
computer simulator of the experiment called DELANA which is used both interpretively to construct “the 
physics” and diagnostically to determine the functionality of individual detectors within DELPHI in terms 
of the models used to construct the machine is the first place. This is then used to construct a computer 
simulator of “track reconstructions”, “particle momentum”, “particle energy”, “particle polarisation”, 
“particle type”, etc., on the basis of a “raw data” output which consists of voltage peaks, time signals, and 
detector cell identification numbers. Novel experimental physics is not simply hypothesis testing or theory 
falsification; it is a technological and theoretical ongoing process in which observations, models, 
expectations, and techniques are developed simultaneously in the context of making the experiment work 
as an experiment. Thus the process of modelling is one which is a two-fold process within the context of 
developing stable experiences and stable technical procedures, with the aim of constructing stable 
communicable objects. Pickering, like Gooding, emphasised the interplay of models, observations, and 
instrumentation that occurs in real experimental work (as opposed to the imaginary experiments of certain 
philosophers of science). They both highlighted the pragmatic character of this process and identified the 
technical practices, instrumental modelling, and phenomenal modelling, which interact with each other as 
the working experimenters attempt to construct stable scientific solutions which are perceptible and 
intelligible to both the experimenters and the wider public. Gooding observed (1990, p.254) that “[Faraday] 
did not respect a neat distinction between contemplative, theoretical aspects of practice on one hand, and 
instrumental and material practice on the other.” This is also evident in the experimental work at Lancaster 
and CERN.
Models allow for human imagination, reasoning argumentation, negotiation, visualisation, and 
intuition, to be active in bringing “the invisible world of causes” into the public realm, by making “if’ 
manipulable, perceivable, and conceivable, in terms of the familiar objects and relations already within the 
public realm. Experimentation using models allows “the novel” visualisable, intelligible, and
18 Such a device is called a Josephson Junction. Its function is to trap heat, described in terms of contained 
electronic energy levels, within a loop at specific temperatures. The choice of this device is based on a 
model of how it works. Such devices are also the subjects of research projects in their own right
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communicable, in terms of what already exists in the public realm. This use of modelling connects 
perception, imagination, and intuition, with the “the invisible world of cause” via technical manipulations 
and comparisons. Such a model is constructed through processes of induction and deductions based on die 
continually developed interconnections between unfamiliar and the familiar. This process even also uses 
abduction to act as analogical reasoning tactic in the proposal of new “working hypotheses”. The inductive 
aspect of modelling allows the development of increased generalisation and abstraction moving towards the 
imagined and templated achievement of the ideal knowledge of techne. The deductive aspect allows the 
generalised and abstracted model to operate at the level of the particular in terms of possibilities. The 
abductive aspect allows the model to be analogously modified and re-directed by tactical guesswork. It is 
these inductively, deductively, and abductively, directed move between the general and the particular which 
allows analogy to operate between mathematical abstraction (in terms of a set of formal equations through 
which a more complex series of equations can be derived by setting parameters and utilising mathemtical 
techniques) and the particularity of the experiences of the physicists. It allows the experiences of physicists 
to be translated into different contexts.
Models have an intelligibility requirement that limits the form of a model to be meaningful and 
articulated. This means that models have to be constructed in familiar terms, which can be expressed in 
public language. This requirement constrains the model in terms of the model users’ social conventions of 
language, and also opens up considerable interpretive ambiguity and freedom within those conventions. It 
is this interpretive ambiguity which opens up a space in between the abstract generalisations and the 
particular experiences which are continually fedback into one another in innovative ways. It is this space 
which both requires and allows negotiation and speculation to operate in experimental physics. From any 
experiences there are inductive pluralities that can be made depending on which essential features are 
selected. From any deduction there is considerable space for disagreement on whether or not it has been 
deduced correctly, on the premises involved, and on the applicability of that general model to this particular 
situation. There are always alternative abductions that can be made. At all stages of the modelling process, 
whether in construction or application, context-sensitive interpretations are involved. The success of an 
analogy in scientific work is rhetorically supported by reference to its usefulness rather than its truth, on the 
basis that “it is a model which works”, and it is valued according to its pragmatic, or instrumental, value in 
the process of ongoing scientific work. It remains techneic, situated in the context of developing and 
tentatively evolving practices, apparatus configurations, and skills, but by virtue of its instrumental success 
is treated as if it has some epistemic correspondence. How does this happen?
Models, being based on analogies, are based on similarities, likeness, and are considered to be 
approximations of the phenomenon in question This approximation allows a model to be treated as if it is 
approximately true in terms of having a likelihood, or probability, of being true. When a model is used in 
an argument for its truth based on it being probably true, or close to the truth, then such an argument is a
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probabilistic argument}9 Probabilistic arguments require attendance to the already established beliefs, 
assumptions, prejudices, and opinions, if the arguer is to be successful in establishing the analogy as 
probably true, because they are attempts to establish a similarity, a likeness, in terms of the familiar and 
already accepted. In order to secure a model as an approximation of the truth it must be connected with the 
already established conventions of a community. This involves using imagery, metaphors, assumptions, 
predispositions, and values, which the community already has in order to present the enthymeme as 
convergent and coherent with the community’s conventions. In Kuhn’s terms, such an argument must be 
made within a shared paradigm and there would be a set of exemplar arguments that would have a high 
chance of working. By cohering with already established conventions, the argument has the character of a 
“naturalistic” argument; the community is more likely to accept what is possibly true as probably true, and 
what is probably true as true. The success at achieving this depends on the credibility of the scientific group 
making the argument, the perceived appropriateness of the analogy, the inspirational quality of the analogy 
used, the perceived utility of the model, the perceived difficulty (and risk) of refuting the analogy, and the 
intelligibility of the model. These dependencies all are established in relation with social agents. To 
establish a model requires integrating it within fixe conventions of these social agents; it involves bringing 
together these agents into coherent acceptance. This requires widespread distribution through credible 
media and also the skillful refutation and avoidance of any criticism20
Measurement is an essential constraint placed upon models in physics. A model can be 
constructed out of visual, verbal, and mathematical analogies but in order to qualify as a legitimate model 
in experimental physics it has to facilitate the derivation o f measurable quantities. This constraint means 
that the possibilities available for any particular model are limited by the physicists’ expectations of 
measurability. This expectation is constructed according to expectations of cost, in terms of credibility risk 
and available resources, and perceptions of the limitations of available technology. The expectation of what 
is measurable is decided in reference to the already established labour processes, the economic support 
available to the group, and the conventions of measurement This expectation of measurability enframes the 
available choices of models to be consensually commensurable with already established practices, 
techniques, and technologies. It is in relation to this axis of commensurabilty that the perception of
19 Aristotle termed arguments of this type as enthymemic arguments. See Aristotle’s The Art o f Rhetoric. 
These are similar to syllogistic arguments, from which episteme could be reasoned, but instead of deducing 
the necessarily true these arguments construct the probably true. This construction involves the rhetorical 
skill of knowing how to persuasively manipulate one's audience and discourse. It was a techne. 
Contemporary writers have dealt with the subject of rhetoric in science. For examples see Gooding, et al., 
(1989); Fuller (1993); Bffiig (1987).
20 As Latour and Knorr-Cetina, as well as Heidegger and Gooding, have pointed out, when making choices 
regarding what to put into a publication, and what not to, scientists already pre-empt possible criticisms to 
their results. This means that scientists are engaged in the public acceptability of their work when making 
their choices about the direction of that work.
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measurability and manipulability is constructed as a perceived functionality of the available machines. It is 
this perceived functionality which acts as a constraint upon theory and practice.
“Natural phenomena” in experimental investigation are reduced to exoframed performances and, 
therefore, the object of experimental investigation is itself an analogy, a model, of the “natural phenomena” 
under investigation. Empirical experience is defined within experimentation; there is a technological 
constraint upon the form of any models used and what the possibilities of use could be. Furthermore, this 
technological constraint reduces what the form of a scientifically demonstrable ontology could be. 
Physicists will not consider any ontological description to be empirical unless that description has been 
produced within and validated by the technological context of experimentation. The ontology is 
technologically enframed and episteme is disclosed, in advance, by techne as an ideal. This technological 
enffament extends to visualisations, interpretations, conceptualisation, and mathematical abstractions. A 
model is invalidated if it cannot be subjected to experiment and it must remain within the boundaries of the 
technologically manipulable and demonstrable context Thus the natural properties associated with 
“copper” are those, and only those, properties that can be mechanised and repeated within a technologically 
enframed model. When these properties are taken to be the “natural phenomena” the experiment replaces 
them with model constituted in terms of a set of machinable mathematical functions, stable interpretations, 
and related visualisations. By doing this, the physicists are taking the model to be the phenomena and are 
using the model metaphorically by treating the technologically constituted model as the natural phenomena. 
The model has replaced the phenomena through mathematical projection, in Heidegger’s sense. The 
situation in ULT physics, or HE physics, is even more ambiguous because we are in a situation where our 
only experience of the phenomena occurs in the laboratory. There are no experiences of entities such as 
“AB-boundaries” or “tau-leptons” that occur outside the highly technological environments of the 
production, detection, and modelling context. As such these machines do not straightforwardly constitute 
metaphors because they do not replace the phenomena but, constitute the phenomena. This physics has the 
reverse situation where the “natural phenomena” are metaphors for the machine. The machine is replaced 
by “natural phenomena” and as such the latter is a metaphor for the former.
A metaphor is usually defined as a “deviation from normal meaning” and consequently is defined 
in relation to conventional usage. However, a notion of “normal meaning” is extremely difficult to define 
and maintain. There is a considerable ambiguity involved in the use of words like “normal”, “deviation”, 
and “convention”. Especially when it is pointed out that the usual definitions of metaphor in terms of a 
deviation, a substitution, a transposition, a movement, or a replacement, of the proper usage of a word with 
another word, is itself a metaphor.21 Not only do we have difficulty in establishing a stable definition of the 
words “proper”, “normal”, or “literal”, but we also do not have a clear literal definition of the word 
“metaphor” either. This results in ambiguity when dealing with metaphors and literalness to the extent that
21 This was pointed out by Paul Ricoeur in The Rule o f Metaphor. Trans. Czerny et al., Routledge & 
Keegan-Paul, 1987, chap. 2. The term "metaphor" and its definition was coined by Aristotle. See The 
Poetics 1457b6-9.
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we cannot be certain whether we are using any word, model, or image, metaphorically or literally. We can 
only appeal to conventions and habits. So how can we analyse the metaphorical substitution of “the model” 
and “the phenomena”? Let us start with similes. At the level of similes there is still some ambiguity about 
what constitutes a simile and what does not. At least we can agree that similes operate by making 
appropriate comparisons between members of distinct kinds. “ Jack is as hungry as Jill” is not a simile 
whereas “Jack is as hungry as a horse” is. However, the notions of “distinct kinds” and “membership” are 
themselves both problematical and controversial. We can appeal to conventional notions of “kinds” and 
sets of conventional similes, or speech habits, such as “I am as hungry as a horse”, or “You are as big as a 
mountain”, but we find that substituting similes does not necessarily work as well. For example, “I’m as 
hungry as a mountain” does not work, whereas you are “You are as big as a horse” does. We find that not 
only do our similes need to be an appropriate juxtaposition of members of inappropriate kinds, i.e. you and 
a mountain, but there also needs to be appropriateness at the point of similarity, hunger or bigness. At the 
level of simile we are seeking appropriateness in the form of a vivifying, illuminating, and exaggerated, 
likeness, rather than a matter of feet comparison. It is a caricature. Are metaphors similar in this respect? 
The ambiguity of metaphorical usage is heightened because we are not making a comparison between “the 
Sun” and “Apollo” but rather superimposing one over the other. This is a substitution between incongruous 
and incompatible meanings if we take them as being definitely equal. A metaphor preserves the sense of 
“the Sun” not being “Apollo” whilst being taken as “Apollo”. A metaphor involves equating the previously 
unequal whilst preserving the sense of their inequality and simultaneously treating one as the other. In the 
case of experimental physicists' use of metaphorical exchange between “the model” and “the phenomena” 
there to is the sense of their inequality whilst they are simultaneously being treated as interchangeable. The 
model is both taken to be the phenomena and also is not the phenomena. By using a model as a metaphor, 
physicists are able to treat the model as the phenomenon, replacing the phenomenon with the model, whilst 
distancing themselves from any commitment to that equation by maintaining that their model "is just a 
model" and is not identical to the phenomenon. The use of models as metaphors brings novelty and 
invention into experimental physics by allowing transactions between distinct contexts.22 In experimental 
physics, metaphors allow the transference of technological objects between distinct machine-femilies and 
machine-kinds. For example, Morpurgo, by moving from an analogy to a metaphor, was able to construct 
an experiment to measure free quarks by using Millikan's oil drop apparatus as a template. A template 
allows physicists to use models to transfer metaphorically across machine-family boundaries by using 
models from analogous projects as templates. It allows them to tentatively explore the possibilities and 
actualities of the experiment and its meaning, without any certain knowledge, utilising the novelty and 
invention of the model metaphorically in order to secure it as a plausible approach to making the 
phenomena intelligible. It also allows the possibility of novel machine hybrids. In this sense, modem 
physics does not differ from poetry in that it generates new ways of seeing aspects of the world through
22 This general point about metaphors was made by Richards in The Philosophy o f Rhetoric. New York. 
1965, p. 94.
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metaphorically facilitating, via a sense of appropriateness and intelligibility, a transformation of convention 
by bringing together heterogeneous technological objects.
Despite his lack of formal mathematical training, Faraday's electromagnetic field diagrams are 
constructed through technographe that he invented. They provide, within the context of a hermeneutic 
system developed by Faraday, the means by which geometry of electromagnetic field strength could be 
drawn and visualised. The development and use of this non-Euclidean geometry in physics shows the 
flexibility and creativity of technographic inscription. It permits the mathematical projection of novel 
construals and exoframes over the techno-phenomena of experimentation in such a way as to facilitate 
creative mappings between manipulative innovations in the design, construction, operation, visualisation, 
modelling, and interpretation, of machine performativity. Furthermore, it allows an intimate and revisable 
connection between theoretical and experimental practices whilst both are situated within the 
"technological framework" of research. Thus, for Bachelard, “the poetic art of physics is done with 
numbers, with groups, with spins.”23
The poetic art of physics is a techno-poetics in which the technographe, pictures, models, and 
metaphors, of experimental imagination are physically embodied, through manipulative practice, in the 
mapping out of the contours of the interactions between human interventions and machine performances. It 
is akin to making an automaton from other automata and situating it within a world-picture. If we consider 
the case of the ULT physicists use of "superconductivity" to model "cosmic strings" then we can readily see 
the techno-poetics of experimentation. What is the metaphor here? It is through the juxtaposition of two 
trajectories of techno-poetics, the poetics of quantum fluids and those of cosmological topologies in the 
inflating manifold of the quantum flux of space-time, that the poetics is technically operational. Two 
previously distinct clusters of techno-phenomena are reflected against each other and one is presented as a 
model of the other. The metaphor is the substitution of the contours of the ULT physics interactions for the 
theoretically simulated exoframe of dark matter cosmology. The metaphor is the substitution of one 
technical trajectory for another, it is a techno-poetics of technique itself. It is in this sense that experimental 
physics is a poetical and performative art This metaphor opens the aloof world of cosmological 
technographics (currently accessible to the human hand only through the use of pen and paper, and the 
computer keyboard and mouse) to the cluster of technological objects available to the ULT physicist The 
transdicted invisible dark matter remnants of creation (something beyond perceptual acquaintance or 
"direct" experience, but used as a corrective to explain the existence of galaxies) come ready to hand 
through the techniques of ULT physics. Such a project is beyond the "rigors" of positivism! The 
experiences of digital outputs and technographic computer simulations of the performance of ULT 
cosmological experiments are techno-poetical disclosures of events that allegedly occurred billions of years 
before the Sun was bom and, allegedly would be evaporated, without trace, by the sizzling heat of a 
snowflake. There is nothing immediately sensory about such disclosures. They are transdictions designed to 
solve the cosmological absence of the theoretically required number of visible galaxies. The “mechanisms”
23 Quoted and translated in Tiles (p. 66).
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disclosed through the ULT experiments are substituted as proposed mechanisms in operation to explain the 
animation of their instrumentation and computer outputs. The vibrations of the thin wires submerged in the 
near nothingness of superfluid He-3 are poetically transdicted as a form of "reverse engineering" which 
attempts to reconstruct the performalivity of the machine in terms of the invisible interactions between 
quasi-particles, cooper-pairs, and energy gaps. It is then used as a working model of the motion of dark 
matter across empty space. The “invisible” is made visible through the metaphorical substitution of another 
“invisible”. How could we not see the poetry of this?
As producers of metaphors, physicists are engaged in directed creativity towards making aspects 
of the world intelligible. Physicists do not (at least yet) possess the techne and episteme to claim certain and 
complete knowledge. They should not situate these new ways of seeing as objectively corresponding to 
something “out there”, but they can claim that they are genuinely engaged in attempting to make parts of 
the world intelligible in novel and interesting ways. However, what they have missed, through familiarity, 
is that these parts of the world are made. In this respect physicists are engaged in a very human pursuit that 
is located, anchored, and directed from within a world-picture. A picture, as a metaphor, can only be 
understood if it is constructed by using culturally familiar pictures.24 It was only in virtue of being 
anchored, located, and directed, within a cultural background that physics has been able to create and 
disseminate the poetical “mechanical world-picture”. Metaphors allow the utilisation of present cultural 
pictures and technological objects in novel and unpredictable ways but are also bound up within the culture 
from which they emerge. Metaphors allow a disordering and ordering of cultural pictures and technological 
objects in such a way as to say something about one thing in terms of another. Metaphors allow selections, 
emphases, suppressions, reductions, and organisations, of the components of novel subject matters to be 
made in terms of other subject matters. Metaphors are more than “dispensable graces and ornamentation” 
and are essential to the development of new ideas.25 The development and evolution of language requires 
metaphors in order to be able to transfer usage and meaning across boundaries between contexts. It is for 
this reason that Leatherdale (1974, p. 102) argued that metaphors are essential for language to develop and 
evolve in any contexts where novelty is possible. The evolution and development of language is essential 
for the purpose of describing novel phenomena Metaphors are essential for the development of novel 
technical languages from established technical languages and ordinary language.26 The metaphor is not 
only essential for the construction of scientific discourse based on models, by substitution of models for 
phenomena, but it is also essential if that discourse is to be intelligible in terms of allowing the unfamiliar 
to be articulated in terms of the familiar.
24 This general point about using pictures as metaphors was made by McCloskey in Metaphors, Mind, 73, 
1964, pp.215-33.
25 This point was made by Black (1962, p.44).
26 This point was made by E.H. Hutten, The Language o f Modem Physics, London, 1958, p.84. The 
necessity of metaphor for the development of abstract and intelligible scientific language was also argued 
for by Black (1962, p.242).
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However, when we begin to lose the sense that what has been made equal is not equal, when we 
loose the sense the “the Sun” and “Apollo” are not the same, then our metaphors cease to be metaphors and 
become literal truth claims. How does this happen? The strategy of rhetoric is to establish something as 
plausibly true in terms of the current conventions. This occurs in relation to current perceptions, beliefs, 
standards, values, presumptions, dispositions, assumptions, prejudices, etc. However, if a metaphor is 
continually used it becomes part of our available cultural stock of metaphors with appropriate contexts for 
use. When these metaphors become habitually and conventionally established within our language then 
they often are treated as if they were literal expressions. Once this occurs then there is an established and 
accepted literal object in the world for potential use in future metaphorical innovation. This provides literal 
objects for the background against which our metaphors are emergent All theoretical cognition takes its 
departure from a background of language use that precedes the theoretician.27 The transformation of the 
metaphorical innovation of language into literal usage is a transformation of the background of 
conventional language usage available for future transformation. Literalness is a sedimentation that occurs 
through practical and concrete language use. As such it is always determined within contexts of agency. 
The meaning of words occur in respect to practices and goals. Given a plurality of modes of human agency, 
literal and concrete usage is supported upon a pluralistic “ground” of conventional usage and innovative 
metaphors. The development of novel physics is bound up with a mode of being-in-the-world that can not 
be divorced from the cultural background that makes that mode possible. This cultural background gives 
modem physics its reality. The metaphorical use of pictures and technological objects is an extension of 
this cultural background and, as a consequence, it is an extension of reality. Physics is a mode of agency 
directed towards the innovative production of models and technological objects by using metaphors to 
transform and extend the reality that it is making This involves the poetical and rhetorical use of metaphors 
in constructing pictures of Nature and also the innovative use of technological objects metaphorically 
across contexts of production. The reality of physics is brought forth into Being. It is in this sense that 
physics participates in poiesis and “world-making”, as well as in the sense of providing the world with 
world-changing prototype machines (such as the electric motor and the atomic bomb) which the physicists 
“brought into being”. As Nelson Goodman put it,
“What I have said so far plainly points to a radical relativism; but severe constraints are imposed. 
Willingness to accept countless alternative true or right world-versions does not mean that everything goes, 
that tall stories are as good as short ones, that truths are no longer distinguished from falsehoods, but that 
truth must be otherwise conceived than as correspondence with a ready-made world. Though we make 
worlds by making versions, we no more make a world by putting symbols together at random than a 
carpenter makes a chair by putting pieces of wood together at random.” (1978, p. 94)
Truth on this account is a form of truth that cannot be divorced from the beings for whom it is a truth 
without making it unintelligible. It arises as truth through a mode of agency and is disclosed through
27 This point was made by Cassirer in Language and Myth, New York, 1946, p.28.
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making it into a disclosure. It is brought-forth as truth. It is aletheia and, in Heidegger’s sense (1977a, 
pp. 11-3), discloses the way that experimental physics belongs to bringing-forth and techne. The 
establishment of belief occurs when models are taken literally instead of metaphorically. This substitutes a 
model as a phenomenoa The techne induced and abstracted from the ongoing productive practices of 
experimentation, and is disclosed as episteme. This facilitates the removal of that knowledge from the 
context of working practices and social agents through which it occurred. Once this has been achieved then 
that knowledge can be presented as “abstract general principles of how Nature works”; presented as yet 
another confirmation of the mathematical projection. It is through taking literally the metaphorical 
substitution of mechanistic models “of Nature” for the mechanistic techneic modelling process that allows 
the machine performances and manipulative procedures of the experiment to be dropped from physicists’ 
accounts and replaced with abstract mathematical “Natural Laws” and causal mechanisms. It is due to this 
literalisation and abstraction that experiments can be seen to test hypotheses, falsify theories, and that the 
phenomena in question are presented as the product of a set of “natural mechanisms”. The metaphor of 
“natural mechanism” has been established in our culture for at least 400 years and is the cornerstone of 
experimental physics. As I argued in chapter 2, the establishment of experimental physics was 
simultaneously the rhetorical establishment of the literalness of “natural mechanism” and the transparency 
of experimentation as a means of disclosure. The establishment of the method of experimentation as a road 
to truth was only possible because of the metaphysical precepts of mechanical realism. Techniques and 
machines could be treated as transparent means to the truth about natural mechanisms. The discourse of 
physicists could be then presented as directly reading the Book of Nature rather than writing it. Gooding 
argued that Faraday’s aim was the publication of his discoveries in a form that could be communicated to 
the public. The wider social context informed Faraday’s work and shaped the construction of his 
“discoveries”. From Faraday’s notebooks Gooding has been able to show that in transference from the local 
context of the laboratory to the wider public sphere, Faraday’s procedures became transparent. Faraday 
successfully transformed his experiments into “observable phenomena” by transforming months of 
experimental work and highly complicated conceptual, perceptual, and technical manipulations into a 
single paragraph of published text Latour and Woolgar described how the work of scientists is the 
transformation of modalities into unqualified and unconditional facts. They described the work of 
experimental scientists as a process of securing fictions as literal truth based on the situating of a 
publication within networks of allies and actors which disseminates scientific facts. The acceptance and 
criticism of scientific writings are situated within interplay between the credibility of the experimenters in 
question and the financial costs of experimental replication and falsification. Scientists have to balance the 
risk and investment of any experimental work that they are considering. In the process of constructing 
scientific writings experimental apparatus are “inscription devices” and are black-boxed.
Scientists very rarely invest their time, resources, and reputations, trying to falsify or replicate the 
work of others. Shapin and Schaffer (1985) described how Boyle managed to use literary technologies to 
make it possible for others to witness an experiment by proxy, as if the reader had performed the
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experiment, even though one would not have been able to replicate the experiment from Boyle’s accounts. 
Collins (1985) argued that even when replication is attempted it is far from a straightforward technical task. 
There is often considerable controversy as to whether an experiment has been built and operated correctly. 
By considering examples from parapsychology and graviton physics he shows that there are highly 
significant social factors at play during the attempted replication of an experiment, which determine its 
success or failure. Innovative modelling developed in the process of making the work of making material 
practices intelligible, is a metaphorical process that is used rhetorically and poetically. Not only is the 
physicist homo faber and homo narrator, s/he is also a techno-poet, innovator, and persuader.
The Art of Physics:
Ellul elucidated the difference between premodem craft practices and modem industrial technology.28 The 
latter drives towards the creation of new instruments, in response to new needs, whilst the former continued 
by extending, refining and perfecting the same means to achieve the same ends. The craft base for 
premodem societies was a consequence of their unchanging stability whereas modem societies are 
inherently unstable and constantly changing. Modem experimental physics operates upon the boundary 
between these two modes of production. It is both radically driven towards novelty and is conservatively 
attendant to its own self-perfection and refinement of well established means. In Heideggerian terms, 
modem physics is both bound-up with Ge-stell and poiesis. It is destined to order itself as standing-reserve 
for future work and brings beings into the world for their own sake. The “magnetic field” is both a 
technological object available for future work as a tool and is also an object for reflection in its own right. 
This two-fold character of the objects of physics is a manifestation of the two-fold character of physics. 
Physics operates across both the “premodem” and “modem” spheres of crafts and industrial technology. It 
is a bridge between the two. Modem experimental physics has its origins in the craft practices of the 
sixteenth century and provided the conditions for the industrial machineiy of the nineteenth century. The 
mechanical realist precepts made this bridging possible. The “natural mechanisms” disclosed by 
experimental work could be taken to be truths and potential instruments for the ongoing trajectories of 
research. However, when Ellul (1964, p. 74) wrote “the search [for efficiency] is no longer personal, 
experimental, workmanlike; it is abstract, mathematical, and industrial”, he did so without a close 
inspection of the technical practices of experimental physics. In experimental physics the search for 
efficiency is personal, experimental, workmanlike, and, it is abstract, mathematical, and industrial. If 
spontaneity and chance are eliminated by the technical imperative (as Ellul argued that they are) then 
experimental physics can not be circumscribed by technique (as Ellul defined it). Without spontaneity and 
chance there is no space for discovery and innovation. It is for this reason that experimental physics must 
remain on the border between craft practices and modem technology. Furthermore, the performativity of 
the objects of experiments can not be determined in advance (otherwise there would not be an experiment 
at all). The underdetermined character of the technological objects studied in experimental physics, as
28 As discussed in chapter two above.
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objects of research, lends research a need for the innovative attentiveness of the “know how” and skills of 
the experimenters as craft practitioners. It is this need for innovative attentiveness and craft practices which 
makes experimental physics an art This is a necessary condition for experimentation because, as an art, 
experimental physics allows a dialectical variability, in the construction and performance of an experiment, 
which is a condition for being an experiment at all. If experimental physics were to be a purely industrial 
and mechanised process then it could not be experimental. It is the underdetermined character of the objects 
of research which provides physics with a pre-industrial character because the objects of experiment need 
to be stabilised, in terms of mechanical and repeatable performances, before they can be repeatably 
assembled and mechanically integrated into industrial production. Once this has been achieved then the 
performative character of the objects has been determined and, consequently, is no longer of any 
experimental interest For example, the electromagnet started as an underdetermined object for 
experimentation in the work of Faraday et al. but, in contemporary physics, it has been stabilised as a 
technological object to be used, as a determined and repeatable performer. It is a component in the cooling 
process in the experiments performed by the Lancaster ULT physics group on the superfluid properties of 
He-3, or as a component in the focussing of electronic (or positronic) beams in the CERN experiments on 
the properties of fundamental particles. The performances of electromagnets have transformed from being 
the end of research to being a means for research into the performances of other objects. The connection 
between poiesis and Ge-stell is premised upon the conception of change as being the product of the 
exercising of a natural mechanism. Thus the productive aspect of physics is the disclosure of mechanisms 
as standing-reserve for Ge-stell, whilst the poetical aspect involves situating these disclosed mechanisms 
within a world-picture. The Ge-stell aspect of physics is the challenging of poiesis to bring-forth 
mechanisms for the sake of disclosing them. Experimental physics is artistically and instrumentally situated 
between reiterated cybernetic feedback loops between the production of intelligible information as an 
internal good and as a technological object for future implementation.
The strata of machine-families provide physics with a technical-material infrastructure that is its 
standing-reserve as a technical background and concrete reality. The technical-material infrastructure is a 
connected cluster of techniques and machine-families described in terms of an ensemble of fundamental 
mechanisms operating upon a specific class of materials (defined in terms of their technological 
performativity) according to mathematical laws. In physics, technology legislates which practices are taken 
to be efficient and rejects the rest Mechanical realism allows the assumption that efficiency is the 
fundamental principle of Nature. Newton's Third Law of Motion, The Conservation of Energy, The Second 
Law of Thermodynamics, and Mach's Principle of Least Action, are exemplary products of this assumption. 
The specification of “a universe” as the object of technoscientific activity is the metaphorical substitution 
of the techneic knowledge of machine performativity for the epistemic knowledge of natural “efficient” 
causes. As both of these kinds of knowledge are ideals then the whole final object of physics is the 
ambiguous metaphorical inter-changes between two imaginary ideals. Mechanical realist metaphysics 
provides a means by which the contingent human tactics, models, and practices, can be eliminated from the
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final account. The “know why” questioning of scientific questioning is enframed by the question of why 
something works and, consequently, it is reduced to the “know how” causal account of an ideal and 




THE ANVIL OF PRACTICE:
“Hephaestus, the God of Fire, has become the supreme master of the world. His furnaces are roaring. 
He has dispelled the clouds of Asiatic mysticism which obscured his native mountain. He has girdled 
the world with hoops of steel. In plain unmetaphorical language this is the age of science, of 
machinery... Every weapon, every machine is the embodiment of human thought and purpose. The 
user adopts that thought and purpose, and behold - the machine has found its soul.”
E.E. Fournier D'Albe, 1962, p. 1
“Our modem worship of technique derives from man's ancestral worship of the mysterious and 
marvellous character of his own handiwork.” Ellul, 1964, p. 24.
Modem experimental physics is directed by the “how does it work?” questioa By directing 
research towards the identifications of the “workings” of that which causes the phenomenon in 
question, modem experimental physics equates “the real” with “the mechanism”. Thus modem 
experimental physics requires a tri-partite ontology: (1) what is moved (the object); (2) what moves it 
(the mechanism); (3) what governs or describes that movement (the law). By presupposing mechanical 
realism, modem physics operates upon a conception of the unity of its object (Nature), a unity of its 
means (the methodology), and, consequently, is able to present itself as a unified science aiming to 
disclose natural laws. The ontology of the part of the world presented by modem physics as Nature, 
the complex of machine-families, has only extended itself. The tri-partite ontology of physics has 
remained invariant in its structure throughout this extension, and its content only varies according to 
which particular machine-family member (with its associated mechanisms and laws) is under 
investigation. What enables us to build machines? This question is a central question for both realist 
and constructivist positions. The realist will claim that acting in accordance with "the laws of Nature" 
will enable us to build machines. The constructivist will claim that machines are passive objects that 
only achieve their functionality from human agents, social organisations, conceptual frameworks, 
networks, or rhetorical discourse. For example, on Bruno Latour’s account (1990), machines are quasi­
objects used to tie together social networks. Andrew Pickering presented an alternative constructivist 
interpretation in The Mangle o f Practice (1995). He termed this as a posthumanist interpretation in 
which the results of experimental physics emerge from a dialectical relationship between “human 
agency” and “material agency” that occurs on the interface of machine performativity. His 
interpretation of modem experimental physics is that it is a performative and productive process. 
Pickering characterised modem experimental physics in terms of social labour processes of material 
practices that are transformed in response to the agency of the materials that experimenters work upon. 
There are many points of similarity between Pickering's position and my own. In this chapter I shall 
discuss the merits and flaws of Pickering's thesis. This will complete my groundwork for the 
development of an account of modem experimental physics as a performative, agential, and
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technological process.
The Mangle of Practice:
Pickering, like Marx, Lukacs, Kuhn, Latour, Bachelard, Bhaskar, Hacking, Ellul, Gooding, Mueller, 
Heidegger, and the members of the neo-marxist Frankfurt School, identified knowledge based upon 
emergent material practices to be a product of a “historical trajectory”. Pickering (1995, p.3) wrote that 
“...an irredeemable historicity of scientific knowledge (and culture in general) in what counts as 
knowledge now is a function of the specific historical trajectory that practice has traced out in the 
past”. Furthermore, like Marx and Ellul, et al., he argued that history should be written in such a way 
as to place “the Industrial Revolution” in the place of “the Scientific Revolution” in the history of 
science. For Pickering, the material practices of human agents were central to his understanding of 
experimental physics. He used the following examples: Glaser’s development of a bubble-chamber 
(pp.39-63), Morpurgo’s search for ffee-quarks (pp.72-99),1 Hamilton’s invention of the quaternion 
system (pp. 135-43), Noble’s study of the incorporation of numerically controlled machine tools at the 
General Electric Aero Engine Group plant in the 1960s (pp. 159-76), and, the work of the US Radiation 
Laboratory during WWII on the development of radar for military purposes (pp.236-40), for the 
purpose of elucidating his metaphor of “the Mangle”. In the following analysis of this metaphor, I 
shall restrict my discussion to Pickering's interpretation of Glaser and Morpurgo’s work.
In traditional approaches to agency the concepts of agency and intentionality are bound up 
with one another. It is assumed that only human beings have intentions, and therefore only human 
beings can be agents. Pickering was critical of this approach. He agreed that only human beings have 
intentions. However, he argued that “material resistances” to human intentions, and the modifications 
made to intentions in response to those resistances, which he termed as "accommodations", can only 
be understood if we consider materials to be agents. He argued that the problem with humanist 
sociological studies of science is that they tend to reduce scientific agency to particular modes of 
human agency. He maintained that these studies are more sociological studies of scientists than 
sociological studies of science. I agree with Pickering that sociological studies often present accounts 
of experimental apparatus as passive components of human agency. He cited Bloor, Barnes, Shapin, 
and MacKenzie as examples of this tendency2. Pickering argued that this reveals an asymmetry in
1 On the controversy with Fairbank see pp. 210-12.
2 He was also critical of Kuhn, Lakatos, Collins, and Hesse, because, he claimed, that they have 
assumed a “monolithic” scientific culture and that there is a general principle characteristic of all 
science. In my view, these criticisms are unjustified. Kuhn, Lakatos, Collins, and Hesse did not base 
their analyses on any such notions. Kuhn characterised science (mainly physics) in terms of collections 
of beliefs, values, assumptions, techniques, and practices, for given periods of time, and claimed that 
theories from different periods of time were incommensurable with one another. He did not provide 
any general principle by which these elements were organised. Lakatos characterised sciences, at given 
time periods, as collections of research projects without identifying any general principle by which the 
research projects were selected or conducted. Collins, following Hesse, characterised science in terms 
of the social ordering of conceptual nets but offered no general principle by which they were
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sociological studies of science. Using the example of Glaser’s attempt to “build a bubble-chamber”, 
Pickering pointed out that Glaser had to find many different solutions to “the triggering problem”, 
during the course of developing a working bubble-chamber that could detect “cosmic rays”, because 
each proposed solution failed, one after the other, despite Glaser’s expectations of success with each 
new solutioa Pickering asked the following questions: if each of these “solutions” were socially 
constructed as “expected successes”, and “the detection of cosmic rays in bubble-chambers” is also 
socially constructed, then, why should we see this sequence of failures? Where was the social causal 
factor here? Who was constructing the failures? Pickering argued that we cannot provide an 
intelligible account of scientific practice solely in terms of social construction theories because, as well 
as human agencies, there must be other agencies at work against which human agency can organise, 
and be organised, in interaction with. Pickering claimed that this is actually a single agency, which he 
termed “material agency”. He defined material agency as “simply the sense that Glaser’s detectors did 
things -  boiling explosively or along the lines of tracks or whatever -  and that these doings were 
importantly separate from Glaser.” (p.51) Pickering’s point was that the state of affairs, which arose 
through Glaser’s relation with the bubble chamber, was something that was not under his control and 
occurred in the performance of the machine. He attributed the source of this to be “material agency”.
Using Kreiger as support, Pickering argued that physicists deal with the world as a field of 
agency with machinic and material dimensions -  the scientific world is “amply stocked with material 
agents”, (p.7)3 Pickering addressed the essence of experimental physics by focussing his description of 
what experimental physics is by what experimental physicists and materials do. He called this "the 
performative idiom". As he put it: “My basic image of science is a performative one, in which the 
performances -  the doings -  of human and material agency come to the fore.” (p.21) Through both an 
analysis of the “internal performances” and the “external discourse” of science, Pickering attempted to 
“get a closer look at material agency”. He claimed “that we should see the bubble-chamber as effecting 
a capture of material agency, as a particular combination of particular elements that acts in a particular 
way.” (p.52) He argued that the interests and identities of scientific agents are at stake within scientific
constructed. All of these analyses are consistent with the view that scientific culture is comprised of 
diverse cultural elements which are brought together in localised projects. Pickering’s criticism seems 
to be based on a misrepresentation of their ideas. He was also critical of Gooding’s (1992) studies of 
the experimental work of Faraday and Morpurgo, because Gooding, claimed Pickering (p.97 fh. 22), 
whilst emphasising agency in experimentation, only considered human agency and, by doing so, was 
“remaining faithful to the representational idiom”. In my view, Pickering’s criticisms of Gooding were 
unjustified. Pickering missed the point of Gooding’s analysis. Gooding did not reduce scientific work 
to human agency but emphasised human agency in experimental work in order to make points within 
particular debates in the philosophy of science. Gooding explicitly argued that the empirical 
observability of “phenomena” depends on the inter-relation between activities and skills that have both 
material and social dimensions. Gooding argued that these material and social dimensions complement 
one another in making experimentation meaningful.
3 Krieger, M., Doing Physics: How Physicists Take Hold o f the World. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press.
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practices rather than “causal principles lying outside (behind, above) and explaining the extension of 
scientific culture.”(p.64) He distinguished between resistance and Durkheimian constraint on the basis 
that the former occurs during the interaction between material agency and human agency, whereas the 
latter occurs within the human realm.
Pickering’s analysis of scientific practice began with “intentionality”. He defined 
intentionality as the setting of specific plans and goals that occur in the human realm. Once an 
intention to build a specific machine has been initiated human agency and material agency interact 
Pickering termed this as “a dialectic of resistances and accommodations” in which machines are 
intermediaries between human and material agency. For Pickering, “[t]he machine ... is the balance 
point, liminal between the human and the nonhuman worlds.”(p.7) The machine is the interface 
between human and material agency. In his analysis Pickering intended to produce “a performative 
image of science, in which science is regarded as a field of powers, capacities, and performances, 
situated in machinic captures of material agency.”(p.7) This “field of machines” constitutes the 
established performativity of science -  these machines’ performativity is enveloped by the “human 
realm” through human practices such as skills and “whatever [is] required to set machines in motion 
and to channel and exploit their power.”(p. 16) Machine performativity and human performativity 
occurs simultaneously and, consequently, in experimentation, performativity is that of human-machine 
relations. The process of this relationship is one of "tuning", or feedback, of both human and machine 
performativity in relation to the other. It is through this process that both material agency is temporally 
emergent as "captures" and human agency is temporally emergent as "discipline" (or skills). Both 
“reciprocally and emergently define and sustain one another”, remaining “constantly intertwined”, and 
“interactively stabilized”.(p. 17)
In Pickering’s analysis of experimental physics the notion of “temporal emergence” was 
central. But what does temporal emergence mean? For Pickering, this ultimately meant that “things 
just happen”. As he put it, “there is no substantive explanation to be given for the extension of 
scientific culture... [i]t is the pattern... of open ended extension through modelling, dialectics of 
resistance and accommodations.”(p.47) Pickering asserted that this “open-ended extension” was 
something which, in principle, could not be explained because “[n]othing substantive in scientific 
culture or anywhere else... necessarily endures through and explains the process of cultural extension; 
everything in scientific culture is at stake in practice; there is nothing concrete to hang onto there.” 
(pp. 111-2) He argued that material agency is “temporally emergent” only through practice because the 
“contours of material agency” cannot be known in advance and only arise as resistances to 
accommodations to previous resistances, (pp.53-4) In other words, material agency only arises as a 
result of scientific exploration finding new problems that arise when new machines are used to solve 
problems. Human and material agencies are both temporarily emergent through “a dialectic of 
resistances and accommodations” when they are capable of being stabilised. This stabilisation is 
produced as a result of a “constitutive intertwining” between human agency and material agency. This 
dialectic is what Pickering referred to as “the Mangle of Practice”. Reality is continually, and 
dynamically, undergoing production through this dialectical process. For instance, using the example 
of Glaser’s project, Pickering wrote that
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“[i]t is clear that Glaser had no way o f knowing in advance that most of his attempts to go beyond the 
cloud chamber would fail but that his prototype bubble-chamber would succeed, or that most of his 
attempts to turn the bubble-chamber into a practical experimental device would fail but that the 
quenched xenon chamber would succeed. In fact, nothing identifiably present when he embarked on 
these passages of practice determined the future evolution of the material configuration of the chamber 
and its powers. Glaser had to find out, in the real time of practice, what the contours of material 
agency might be.” (p. 52, my emphasis)
It is practice that intertwines the contours of material agency with modes of human agency in such a 
way as to inextricably mix together material agency and human agency as mutually ontologically and 
epistemologically productive. As Pickering put it,
“I need to stress that the trajectory of emergence of material agency is bound up with that of human 
agency. Material agency does not force itself upon scientists. There is, to put it another way, no such 
filing as a perfect tuning of machines dictated by material agency as a-thing-in-itself; scientists, to put 
it yet another way, never grasp the pure essence of material agency. Instead, material agency emerges 
via an inherently impure dynamics that couples the material and the human realm.” (p.53-4)
It is the machine that constitutes this coupling. For Pickering, the contours of material agency emerge 
as resistances to human agency, without human agency these contours would not exist. This was a 
central premise for Pickering’s thesis because
“[t]he resistances that are central to the Mangle in tracing out the configurations of machines and their 
powers are always situated within a space of human purposes, goals, plans; the resistances that Glaser 
encountered in his practice only counted as such because he had some particular end in view. 
Resistances, in this sense, exist on the boundaries, at the point of intersection, of the realms of human 
and nonhuman agency. They are irrevocably impure, human/material hybrids, and this quality 
immediately entangles the emergence of material agency with human agency without, in any sense, 
reducing the former to the latter.” (p.54)4
Human agency and intentionality are transformed and restructured throughout the process of trying to 
achieve the original intention. The scientist may, in the process of trying to succeed in achieving any 
original goal or project, end up succeeding in a different goal or project. Human intentionality is, in 
Pickering’s terms, “emergenfiy reconfigured in its engagement with material agency... because they 
are configured in response, as accommodations, to the resistances emergent through precise material
4 It still seems to me that a realist could argue that this still allows the possibility that there are real, 
pre-existent, material causes that we can only be aware of when we perform certain practices and build 
certain machines which actualise them. Pickering did not provide an argument to counter mechanical 
realism. He made a judgement against it
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configurations.”(p.54) Accommodations take the form of adjustments to intentions, adjustments to 
practices, adoption of alternative techniques, changes in the material configuration of the apparatus, or 
employing expertise as a resource. These accommodations transform the original intentions because 
they “can amount to a revision of plans and goals, to a revision of the intentional structure of human 
agency... Goals, then, have to be seen as subject to mangling in practice.”(p.57) However, intentions, 
although transformed in interaction with material agency, remain with the human realm, because 
although these transformations produce an ambiguity between means and ends, “both means and ends 
are bound up in human intentionality”(p. 57 fii.19). Pickering maintained that because both 
intentionality and choices of particular accommodations are bound up in the human realm, scientists 
creatively arrive at particular strategies of accommodation (p.58). Human intentions operate in “a field 
of existing machines” in such a way that the goals of scientific practice are emergent in relation to this 
field as they take advantage of “prior captures of material agency”. It is this relationship between 
disciplined human intentionality and machines, in which both are mutually modified through 
“reciprocal tuning”, which keeps human intentions “bound up and intertwined with” material agency.
Material agency is emergent in the form of resistances to human intentions which, in turn, are 
modified, transformed, as accommodations to material agency. This dialectical process is actualised 
when human beings construct a new machine and the material agency arises when human beings 
passively observe the response, the performance, of the machine. As Pickering put it, “As active, 
intentional beings, scientists tentatively construct some new machine. They then adopt a passive role, 
monitoring the performance of the machine to see whatever capture of material agency it might 
effect.”5 This is apparent in Pickering’s analysis of Morpurgo’s observations when he wrote “As a 
classic human agent, Morpurgo assembled his apparatus, switched it on, and then, surrendering his 
active role, stood back to watch what would happen -  literally, through a microscope. Swapping roles, 
the material world was in turn free to perform as it would; the grains levitated and moved away from 
their equilibrium position when the electric field was applied.” (p.79) Neither human agency nor 
material agency can be separated from one another nor reduced to one another. Pickering described 
this relationship in terms of a “struggle”, or a “dance”, in which both are “reciprocally and emergently 
intertwined”.6
It is this dance, or struggle, which Pickering referred to by “the Mangle” metaphor. He used 
this metaphor to describe the goal-orientated and goal-revising dialectic of resistance and 
accommodation, that he took to be a general feature of scientific practice, by conjuring up the image of
5p.21 (My emphasis.)
6 Pickering seemed to be claiming that the dancers only exist during the dance. At the end of the book 
he referred to this “dance of agency as the dance of Shiva” and there is the impression that Pickering 
did seem to suggest that this struggle or dance is eternal. I wonder to what extent this metaphor is a 
throwback to Pickering’s “earlier incarnation” as a particle physicist. It is quite common amongst 
young particle physicists to make much of “the dance of Shiva” metaphor to express the way that the 
inter-relation and relative motion between particles, forces, and each other, can be observed, and even 
modelled, but still remains impenetrably shrouded in mysteiy and somewhat illusionary. I believe that 
Hindus term this dance of mystery and illusion as may a.
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unpredictable transformations emergent as material and human agency are transformed and delineated. 
This metaphor operated within Pickering’s analysis as a device that allowed him to articulate a 
universalisable account of scientific practice as an evolving field of human and material agencies, 
which are reciprocally intertwined in a play of resistance and accommodation.
Pickering’s analysis presented a structure of scientific practice which has humans as 
intentional agents, material agents as “emergent brute resistances”, and machines as the intermediaries 
between the two. The situation is one of continual feedback, in which, to use Pickering’s terminology, 
the dialectic of resistance and accommodation is a mutually occurring inter-relationship between 
humans and materials that transforms both sides. This dialectic is primarily interactive and, therefore, 
intentionality cannot be assumed to be straightforwardly structured only within human agency. 
Although Pickering maintained that neither human nor material agency could be reduced to the other 
(humans are not materials, and vice versa) he also maintained that there is not any purely "human 
realm" nor “material realm”. He could only define the poles of the dialectic negatively in terms of not 
being the other. Pickering argued (p.92) that resistances are “situated right on the boundary of the 
realms” and those accommodations work “impartially upon both sides of the material-conceptual 
divide.” Pickering’s analysis required and utilised, in order to sustain a concept of dialectic, a two-fold 
interactive unity. On one side we have human agency construed as “contours of the social” in terms of 
knowledge, representations, abstractions, concepts, intentions, and disciplines. One the other we have 
material agency construed as “contours of material agency” in terms of resistances. Both of these sides 
are held together, emergent through, machine performativity in terms of disciplined human agency and 
captures of material agency.
How did Pickering relate making machines and the knowledge of Nature? Pickering argued 
that conceptual and material elements are emergently arranged together through practice. These 
arrangements are then taken as “conceptual chains” and “linked” to representations. It is these 
structures of conceptual chains and representations that constitute articulated scientific knowledge. 
“The Mangle” brings conceptual and material elements together and interweaves them. Pickering 
made this point about Morpurgo’s search for ffee-quarks when he wrote (p.69) “Morpurgo’s practice 
was organised around the construction of associations or alignments between [material and conceptual 
elements] that would lead outward from his material apparatus and its performance into the world of 
articulated knowledge and representation.” Pickering refused to make a sharp distinction between 
conceptual and material elements in the construction and operation of experiments. In the construction 
and operation of an experiment, the material elements are construed in terms of function within a 
larger ensemble of functions. However, the functionality of a material element is dependent upon how 
it is conceptualised within the organisation of the ensemble of functions in which it is situated. Each 
and every functional element within an ensemble of functions is simultaneously a material and a 
conceptual element7 Even if one were to take a part of a machine, say a bolt, and clank it upon a table 
to demonstrate its materiality, its “stuffiness”, then due to the demonstrative role of such a 
performance, the clanked “stuff’ still has a conceptual element as an example of a material.8 It is
7 Gooding (1992) made this point regarding Faraday’s experimental work.
8 This is my example.
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through this interweaving of conceptual and material elements that a representation of the experiment 
is allowed to be constructed in terms of framing the interactive stabilisation of human and material 
agency, because “such stabilizations involve a precise framing of machinic performance in relation to 
the conceptual structures with which they are linked.” (p.69) Conceptual structures constitute a frame 
upon which articulate “external accounts” and representations of material machinic performances can 
be constructed. Pickering emphasised throughout his analysis of scientific knowledge that theories and 
representations constructed upon conceptual framing of machinic performativity are themselves only 
emergent through practice. As he put it (p.69), “scientific knowledge is sustained in extended 
representational chains spanning multiple levels of theoretical abstraction, and that alignments along 
such chains should themselves be understood as subject to, and the products of, mangling in practice.”
Pickering proposed that scientific culture is a patchy, scrappy, disunity of diverse cultural 
elements in which scientific practice is nothing more than making associations between these 
elements. Technical knowledge, abstract laws, expertise, models, experiences, techniques, machines, 
concepts, etc., are elements, resources for mangling, within his analysis, that could not escape “the 
Mangle”, and can not guide it. His analysis left nothing that can help us to make associations because 
it would have to be outside “the Mangle” and there is nothing outside “the Mangle”. In his analysis 
there is literally nothing that could enable us to build machines. It is all just happenstance. We feed 
our intentions in, “the Mangle” transforms them, mixes up a load of cultural elements, and spits out a 
product as an element for future mangling. If that product fulfils our original intentions, or our 
transformed intentions, then that is simply a matter of good fortune. “The Mangle”, as “a dialectic of 
accommodations and resistances”, interacts on the machine interface between human and material 
agencies to produce “interactive stabilizations” as “temporal emergences” in the real-time of practice. 
These “interactive stabilizations” are the associations between the diverse cultural elements. But how 
are these “interactive stabilizations” produced in the real-time of practice? Pickering could not provide 
any general answer to this question. If he did then he would have undermined his own thesis because 
he would have provided us with a general principle, which would enable us to build machines. In other 
words, Pickering could not provide us with a general account of how “the Mangle” works; he could 
only, retrospectively, map out the mangling process in particular cases. He explicitly rejected the 
notion that there could be transferable skills, any general knowledge of machine building, experiences, 
or even guidelines, which could enable us to build machines. All of these are nothing more than 
elements for mangling; they do not shape the mangling process.
Pickering went further than this. He argued (pp. 188-91) that particular interactive 
stabilisations, or associations of cultural elements, are, in feet, incommensurable with one another. For 
example, he argued that post-1970s and pre-1960s particle physics are incommensurable with each 
other.9 He claimed this because these two phases, or regimes, of particle physics have a different 
collection of machines and instruments they consequently have a different machine performativity. In 
Pickering's analysis, a different machine performativity meant that the captures and contours of 
material agency would be different because the nature of the dialectic of accommodations and 
resistances will be different. For Pickering, it followed from this that they produce different
9 See also Pickering (1984). sections 6.4 and 6.5
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associations between cultural elements and therefore have different ontologies.
Unmangling the Mangle:
I agree with Pickering's claim that conceptualisations and representations of machinic performativity 
in experimental physics are transformed and produced by actually building and performing the 
experiments. I think that this is a fairly uncontentious claim. However, this raises some very important 
questions. How are the associations actually made? How is the framing constructed? How are 
representational chains constructed? How are these chains connected to theoretical abstractions? 
Pickering did not address these questions. His claim that “scientific knowledge should be understood 
as sustained by, and as part of, interactive stabilizations situated in a multiple and heterogeneous space 
of machines, instruments, conceptual structures, disciplined practices, social actors and their relations, 
and so forth.”(p.70) This is central to my own analysis of experimental physics in this thesis. However, 
Pickering left more important questions unaddressed. How are “interactive stabilizations” achieved? 
How is “Nature” linked to the production of “interactive stabilizations”? Furthermore, Pickering did 
not provide any discussion of the way that scientific knowledge is fedback into other projects in such a 
way as to actually inform the scientists involved. For Pickering; knowledge was a product but never 
involved in the production process except as an element for mangling. He did not allow knowledge to 
actually guide the process of mangling in any way and consequently the development of technical 
know-how seems quite inexplicable. He went as far to say “that nothing -  in Collin’s or the scientists’ 
sense -  “enables” us to build machines: when we succeed in doing so, it is via a fortune passage 
through the mangle...”, (p.102, fn.25) Why did Pickering reject the possibility that there could be 
something that enabled us to build machines? On what basis did he make such a judgement?
In Pickering’s analysis, scientific thinking is described as a two-fold process of intentionality 
and modelling. This process of modelling takes the form of making analogies and metaphors. If we 
accept Pickering’s premise that modelling is central to the practices of experimental physics, which is 
something that I argued for in the last chapter, then we can not sharply distinguish between conceptual 
elements and material elements within experiments because modelling is central to the construction, 
operation, and interpretation of experiments.10 In his analysis of Morpurgo's experiment, Pickering 
pointed out that “[t]o move from observations of the response of the grains to an applied electric field 
to statements about the electric charges carried by the grains, Morpurgo drew upon his interpretive 
account of the MLE [Magnetic Levitation Electrometer], his conceptual understanding of how it 
functioned. The basic form of this was very simple, being given by the laws of classical 
electrostatics.”(p.74) I agree that an interpretive account is required for this move. However, such an 
interpretive account is also required to make “observations of the response of the grains to an applied 
electric field”. Models are implicitly involved in the construction of the apparatus, the development of 
operational procedures, and the making of observations. In Morpurgo’s experiment we cannot sharply 
distinguish between conceptual, manipulative, and material elements, because all of these elements are 
interweaved in each and every stage of the experiment11 The material form of an instrument is
10 This point was also made by Gooding (1992).
II This point was also made by Gooding (1992)
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simultaneously a conceptual form; without this interweaving of materials and concepts there would be 
no instrument because instrumentality implies purpose. An apparatus is constructed and interpreted in 
terms of performance and production; it is constructed and interpreted as an ensemble of functions, 
theoretical significance, and technical procedures (i.e. turning a particular dial will change the 
electrostatic force upon a grain suspended in a magnetic field). I agree with Pickering up to this point. 
However, I think that Pickering utilised a distinction between “the material” and “the conceptual” 
which he maintained was untenable during “the real time of practice” and could only be made 
retrospectively using the reconstructed accounts of the experiment Pickering's analysis was 
inconsistent on this point Pickering (p.78) took the construction of Morpurgo’s “material apparatus” 
as a starting point which then required a subsequent analysis of “how Morpurgo threaded his material 
apparatus into the field of articulated scientific knowledge and vice versa.”
However, by doing this, Pickering was ignoring the extent to which the apparatus was already 
interweaved with pre-existing fields of articulated scientific technique during its conception and 
construction. What Morpurgo had to do was weave what he has learnt from constructing the apparatus 
back into the pre-existing fields of articulated technique and transform them This shows that Pickering 
did not allow technology to guide action; it is a product of mangling, or an element for mangling, and 
nothing else. In my view, without constructing the apparatus in terms of pre-existing fields of 
techniques Morpurgo would not have had a starting point The apparatus was an embodiment of a 
synthesis of pre-existing fields of techniques and also a means by which those fields could be 
transformed. Morpurgo did not begin in a state of innocence, with lumps of functionless “stuff’ which 
he somehow assembled into a functioning machine, and only then related to a field of articulated 
techniques. At each and every stage of construction his choices of components, and their 
interconnection, were based on his current scientific background in such a way that the apparatus was 
already, at least partially, situated in a pre-existing field of scientific technique. As we can see from 
Morpurgo’s own accounts his apparatus was a variant of, and comparable to, Millikan’s already 
established oil-drop experimental apparatus to measure the electron’s charge.12 This was a reasonable 
strategy, within the terms of pre-existing articulated scientific techniques, because, by analogy, what 
Millikan had established about discrete electronic charge, Morpurgo could potentially establish about 
fractional electronic charge (the theoretical characteristic of quarks) and consequently use Millikan’s 
apparatus as a model for an apparatus to search for free-quarks. The Morpurgo example offers an 
interpretation which causes problems for Pickering. Pickering neglected to attend to the extent that the 
“conceptual” and “material” elements were already mangled prior to constructing the experiment 
Morpurgo’s work did not consist in only mangling these elements further, though it seems that did 
occur, but it also consisted in unmangling, disentangling, the whole process into distinct elements of 
theories and techniques. It is this unmangling which allowed a “material apparatus” to be distinguished 
from “a theoretical model” and consequently work as an experiment to demonstrate the existence or 
inexistence of free-quarks by comparison (rather than correspondence). It seem that in order to 
understand scientific practice we need to analyse the way that it involves unmangling as well as
12 A Search for Quarks (a Modem Version o f the Millikan Experiment): One Researcher’s Personal 
Account. Genoa. Mimeo. 1972. p.5-6.
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mangling. Without unmangling the experiment into distinct “theoretical models” and “empirical 
observations” then experiments could not work as “tests” for the “correspondence” of models to facts. 
The question is: how do physicists unmangle the mangled? Pickering quoted a technical report about 
the effect of platelet separation on the gradient of the applied field made by Morpurgo, et al,,13 in order 
to support his argument that “[a]t this detailed level of conceptual analysis, therefore, Morpurgo’s 
transformations of the material configuration of his apparatus went against his interpretive account of 
it, and the success of the former led, in turn, to a further revision of the latter.”(p.85) However, 
Pickering’s construal of this technical report as a conceptual analysis is misleading because he ignored 
the extent to which concepts, formula, representations, and interpretations, in that report, are 
ambiguously interweaved in the analysis of the functional effect of plate separation on the behaviour 
of the apparatus. The identification and distinction of separate analytical elements in that report could 
only be done reconstructively. What technical reports, like Morpurgo’s, show is that revisions of the 
interpretive account arise due to the plurality of possible choices available as to what are significant 
and important mechanisms within the application of any model. What Morpurgo’s report shows is the 
transformation of his estimation of plate separation on the performance of the apparatus. It does not 
show any distinction between discrete elements in terms of conceptual analyses, interpretive accounts, 
and material configuration It remains a report of technique and performance. These are still 
“mangled” at this stage of Morpurgo’s work. The crucial distinction made in this report is between 
platelet separation functionality and MLE functionality and how the former effects the latter. It was 
only subsequently that Morpurgo was able to make an interpretive account in which theoretical 
conceptualisations and machine performances were sufficiently distinct to allow the identification of 
“spurious charge values” that were “a product of the apparatus” rather than “a natural phenomenon”. 
Pickering (p.86) emphasised that there was a “three-way interactive stabilisation between Morpurgo’s 
material procedures and conceptual analyses, interpretive and phenomenal, in which manoeuvres in 
the field of material agency played a constructive role alongside conceptual ones, and material 
performances and conceptual understandings guaranteed and underwrote one another, back and forth” 
However, in my view, Pickering actively and retrospectively identified those elements as constitutive 
of scientific work, whereas those elements were, during scientific work, components of one another to 
such an ambiguous extent, that the work of Morpurgo was that of producing a distinction between 
them; it is only after this work had been done that there could be said to be elements which were 
interactively stabilised. Contrary to Pickering’s view, scientific work occurs in the face of mangled 
ambiguous plurality, rather than on a conveyor belt of cultural elements leading into the Mangle. The 
aim of that work is to un-mangle this plurality of possibilities into discrete, intelligible, and 
comparable elements. As such scientific practice is not “the Mangle” but rather an attempt at un­
mangling it by using its methodology as a template for techniques.
Pickering was correct to identify the ontology of particle physics as the product of modelling 
machine performativity but he misunderstood the connection between distinct phases of particle 
physics. His claim that the pre-1960s and post-1970s phases of particle physics have different
13 ‘The Magnetic Levitation Electrometer and Its Use in the Search for Fractionally Charged Particles’, 
Nuclear Instruments and Methods, 1970, 79: pp. 95-124.
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ontologies and are incommensurable is only possible due to his positivistic conception of ontology. 
Such a conception makes particle physics unintelligible. The mechanical realist metaphysics underpins 
both phases of particle physics and allows both to participate in the disclosure of the same ontology. 
Both phases of particle physics share some of the same components (electromagnets and ionising 
fluids, for example) and the models utilised to interpret machine performativity shared some of the 
same functives (i.e. charge, spin, and mass). In order for these two phases of particle physics to be 
incommensurable they would have to be absolutely distinct and have nothing in common whatsoever. 
It certainly is evident that the Glaser bubble chamber and the LEP-ring at CERN are very different 
machines. However, they do share important functives such as voltage, current, magnetic field 
strength, momentum, energy, etc. If we look at the models of the post-1970s and pre-1960s particle 
physics, we can readily see that they both share common elements, such as differential calculus, 
statistics, algebra, arithmetic, SI units, etc, as well as common mechanisms, such as radioactive decay, 
electron and photon interactions, electron and positron production and anihilation, spin and energy 
levels coupling, virtual particles, etc. They also share common functives like charge, mass, spin, force, 
momentum, energy, half-life, etc. Both also utilise special relativity, Maxwell’s equations, and the 
periodic table etc. Many of these elements were used to construct, operate, and interpret both Glaser’s 
bubble chamber and the LEP-ring. Of course, many components of the LEP-ring, such as the barrel 
RICH14 in the Delphi detector, and the CRAY supercomputer at CERN, were not available for pre- 
1960s physicists. However, does it follow from the fact that these machines were unavailable to pre- 
1960s physicists that the two phases of particle physics are incommensurable with one another? 
Contemporary undergraduate students often use cloud chambers, and bubble chambers, as part of their 
studies. Although much of the theoretical physics of the post-1970s is incommensurable with the pre- 
1960s (i.e. Quantum Electrodynamics, the electroweak interaction, Quantum Chromodynamics, etc.), 
in the sense that it utilises functives, technographics, and exoframes which have no place in the earlier 
physics, the converse is not the case because most particle physics postgraduate students have to learn 
the pre-70s theory before they can learn the post-70s theory. Both phases also use the same metaphors: 
particle, wave, track, spin, creation, annihilation, basic building blocks of matter, etc. It seems that 
even if we could say that pre-1960s particle physics is incommensurable with post-1970s particle 
physics it does not follow that the converse is true. However, the general models of pre-1960s and 
post-1970s particle physics share some common features (such as basic functives, the theory of special 
relativity, and mechanisms of material-particle interaction) and, at most, could be said to be partially 
incommensurable. However, I think that even this much would be going too far. The ensemble of 
machines used in both phases of particle physics are distinct, but related machines. They are related as 
members of the same machine-family because the post 1970s machines share components with the
14 Ring Imaging Cherenkov Radiation detector. One could say that the barrel RICH was partially 
incommensurable with post-1970s physics too, at least up to 1995, because the DELPHI physicsts and 
engineers could not get it to work properly all of the time, nor provide a complete account of why it 
would not work properly all of the time. However, the basic principle of this detector is to provide 
calometry of the ionisation produced by charged particles in a dense liquid and, at least in terms of its 
basic principle, is commensurable with the basic principle of a bubble chamber.
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pre-1960s machines. Furthermore, computers are connected to the post 1970s detectors. These 
machines run reconstruction programmes that technographically represent the "data" as "bubble 
chamber" pictures of "tracks" on the computer screen15 These computers are part of the detector 
performativity. In terms of technographic presentation, there is little difference between a computer 
printout of a white circle with black lines, broken curves, and splotches, and a bubble-chamber 
photograph of a black circle with white lines, broken curves, and splotches. Nor is the basic particle 
physics used to interpret these images significantly different. Furthermore, the post-70s detectors, such 
as the CERN detectors, were hybrids between the liquid-based detectors such as the bubble chambers 
and the gas-based detectors such as the geiger counter. These two types were related through the 
mechanism of ionisation. This connects them in the CERN detectors as electronic devices. The 
DELPHI detector is, to put it crudely, not much more that a massive barrel of thousands of modified 
geiger counters and bubble chambers (each one is a detection cell), surrounded by a massive 
electromagnet Each cell, when triggered, transmits a voltage peak, a time signal, and an ID number. 
That's all! Computers and reconstruction techniques do the rest As a hybrid machine, it is a member 
of both the machine-families of the bubble chamber (cloud chamber, drift chamber, etc.,) and the 
geiger counter (xenon tube, arc lamp, etc.) connected by the ionisation mechanism. All three are 
connected with the electromagnetic machine-family. It is this membership of the same machine-family 
that provides the shared components of pre-1960s and post-1970s machines with transfactuality. They 
are linked historically and technologically as innovations of the same project (i.e. the physics of the 
motion of interactive particles in electromagnetic fields) that was projected using the same ground- 
plan (mapping out the connections between the geometry of kinds of events with the material 
conditions of those events). It is this link that allows the extension of the pre-1960s machines into the 
post-1970s machines to be presented by the mechanical realist as a process of disclosing ontological 
depth. The post-1970s machines are presented as allowing the exploration of a “deeper” level of the 
same reality disclosed by the pre-1960s machines. The mechanical realist metaphysics is foundational 
for both phases of particle physics to be phases of the same field of physics and, as such, are taken to 
disclose the same ontology. They achieve this unity through the projection of the methodology.
If we accept Pickering’s argument, and accept that both of these phases of physics are 
incommensurable with one another, then this causes physicists some very serious problems indeed. 
Why should we consider the LEP-ring at CERN, DESY-ring in Hamburg, SLAC in the US, or the 
proposed LHC at CERN, to be commensurable with one another? Or, for that matter, the DELPHI, 
OPAL, L3, or ALEPH detectors in the LEP ring? These are different machines. Why stop there? Why 
should any two different analyses of data from DELPHI be commensurable? It seems to me that if we 
define incommensurability on the basis that no two stable performances are the same then no scientific 
work could be commensurable with any other. Each and every machine performance would be 
incommensurable with any other machine performance. If we follow this line then of argument then, 
eventually, we reach a point when we would have to conclude that every cultural element is 
incommensurable with every other and stable interactions are impossible (or an illusion). At that point
15 These are not obligatory; histograms, graphs, and scatter-point plots are also common 
technographics.
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“science”, “culture”, “element”, and “practice”, become meaningless atoms and Pickering’s analysis 
collapses into the Mangle. We can avoid this by accepting that interactive stabilisations, made 
associations, can remain stable, but with no guarantee that they will do so in the future, and as such 
can be shared between different projects as techniques and machines. It does not make sense to 
consider a scientific practice part of a scientific culture if it has a unique set of cultural elements at its 
disposal. It would be disconnected. However, this does not mean that all scientific practices need to 
share an identical set of cultural elements and form a unified scientific culture. Instead, scientific 
practices share some elements, but not all, with other scientific practices, e.g. an archaeological project 
and a biological project could both use electron microscopes but have not much else in common. 
Instead of considering scientific projects as incommensurable islands, I consider them as chains of 
overlapping techniques, models, and machines. Each of these chains is a stratum and distinct strata are 
incommensurable with one another. Technological objects on the same strata are transfactual when 
they are used in different projects on the same strata, providing that the are repeatable, and are 
commensurable. Some particular scientific projects might not share any technological objects with 
other specific scientific projects, and they would be incommensurable. They must share at least one 
technological object with at least one other particular scientific project to be considered part of a 
scientific culture. For example, all experimental physics projects use machines and mathematical 
projection as their methodology. It is through the overlapping machine components, models, 
mathematical techniques, etc., that distinct experiments can be said to all participate in the same 
unitary discipline called “physics”. Not all experiments need to share all the elements of every 
experiment. All that is required is that each experiment shares at least one element with another 
experiment in such a way that a connecting chain of shared elements can be stretched across all 
experiments. Thus the ontology of physics is circumscribed by overlapping strata of distinct machine- 
families that are unified by the methodology of the projected template and mechanical realism If 
projects share stable elements then scientists can transfer between projects and build up a set of stable 
elements, a standing-reserve, which can be used as possible accommodations in future projects. In 
other words, scientists can built a stable set of experiences of making stable associations and use these 
as possible accommodations in other projects. Although this does not guarantee success it does mean 
that scientists can develop experiences, skills, tactics, strategies, and techniques, which can guide them 
in making selections of possible accommodations and, perhaps, improve their expectations of their 
chances of success. Technically rational choices can be made against the paradigmatic background of 
clusters and constellations of the standing-reserve of elements. By allowing scientific practices to 
share stable cultural elements, and scientists to learn from the experience of making them, it is possible 
that scientists can acquire a cultural stock of elements, which enables them to choose particular 
accommodations as possible solutions to particular problems. It is conceivable that scientists might 
even be able to acquire some degree of general knowledge of how to make machines. Techne lies on 
the horizoa It is because Pickering did not allow this possibility in his analysis that the choice of 
particular accommodations that particular scientists made to deal with particular problems is 
inexplicable to him except as ad hoc tinkering.
How do physicists un-mangle “the Mangle”? For Pickering this was inconceivable because he
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did not allow physicists to place “the Mangle” in the context of their pre-existing technologies and 
experiences; in his analysis, technologies and experiences were themselves only cultural elements fed 
into “the Mangle” for further mangling. He claimed that “...Morpurgo found that the charges on iron 
cylinders seemed to drift overtime -  from zero to e/10, for example. Tinkering once more in material 
practice, Morpurgo found a new way to frame material agency, discovering that he could achieve 
stable measurements, again of zero charge, if he spun the cylinders.”(p.59)16 By treating this new 
technical practice of “spinning the cylinders” as “a new way to frame material agency” Pickering 
ignored the extent that “measurements of charge” are socio-technical evaluations which are situated in 
a theoretical and experimental context. What led Morpurgo to consider “that the charges of iron 
cylinders seemed to drift over time” to be a problem? And, what led Morpurgo to consider spinning 
the cylinders as a possible solution? Pickering, by not allowing “the Mangle” to be placed in a 
technological context, answered the first question by appealing to “resistances of material agency”, 
and could not answer the second question at all. Although he did account for why Morpurgo had to 
make an accommodation he cannot account for why Morpurgo chose the accommodation he did 
except by explaining it away as “tinkering”. Why didn’t Morpurgo try slaughtering a chicken and 
dripping its blood over the apparatus? It might have worked! I would suggest that the reason why 
“spinning cylinders” appeared to be a possible solution, and “ritual sacrifice” did not, was because the 
legitimate choices available to Morpurgo were constrained by the paradigmatic technical background 
and by his current experiences. They were challenged, destined, and enframed. The drift, as a 
resistance, was a product of Morpurgo’s expectations of what a good measurement would have been in 
that situation. The spinning, as a possible solution, an accommodation, was more a product of 
Morpurgo’s technical experiences, and theoretical interpretations, of charge distributions and the 
properties of iron, than it was mere tinkering. I am not suggesting that Morpurgo knew what he was 
doing. Nor that his past experiences guaranteed that his solution would be successful. My point is that 
Pickering’s isolation of this tactic as “material practice” was one which arose after a reconstruction of 
the mangled complex of expectations, perceptions, and evaluations, and is only possible if we take 
Morpurgo’s work out of the wider context of experimental particle physics in which it is situated. 
Pickering claimed that Morpurgo developed an interpretive account as a consequence of his tinkering. 
I want to argue the reverse of this; Morpurgo only tinkered in this way because he had an interpretive 
account of why there would be charge drift on the iron cylinders and what he could possibly do about 
it. I am not suggesting that mere tinkering does not occur in experimental physics, not for an instant, 
but I do not agree that it is all mere tinkering, and I think that Pickering was suggesting that it is.17
If scientific practice is mere tinkering then is there any place for discipline? Is scientific 
practice all free-play? Pickering, paradoxically, emphasised the importance of discipline, which he 
termed “disciplinary agency” in the construction of conceptualisations and interpretive accounts. What
16 My emphasis.
17 Gooding argued (1990, p. 141 and p.270) that materialism is an extreme which can be avoided by 
emphasising the connection between knowledge and the world through thought and action’s 
interdependence. This is the point that I wish to make providing we emphasise that the connection is 
between possible knowledge and the rest o/the world.
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did Pickering mean? His concept of “disciplinary agency” was that of the sedimented, socially 
sustained routines of human agency which accompany conceptual structures as well as machines. He 
did not allow any notion of constraint, or demands, to be placed on human disciplinary agency by 
machines, or material agency for that matter, but instead had human disciplinary agency modified, as 
accommodations, as a response to resistances. For Pickering, disciplined agency occurs entirely within 
the human realm. Pickering contained discipline in the human realm because “the open-ended dance of 
agency that is scientific practice becomes effectively frozen at moments of interactive stabilization into 
a relatively fixed cultural choreography, encompassing, on the one side, captures and framing of 
material agency, and, on the other, regularised, routinised, standardised, disciplined human practices.” 
(p. 102) Given Pickering’s thesis of productive “temporal emergence” of mangling, then, how could he 
incorporate fixity, regularity, stability, and discipline, into his thesis? He had to locate this stability 
into the human realm otherwise it would represent fixity in the emergent contours of material agency 
and we would be able to acquire some knowledge about how machines work in such as way so to 
enable us to build them. So how does this frozen choreography occur? It is because he rejected the 
notion of constraint, and did not discuss demands, that disciplinary agency could only be located into 
the human realm. If he were to allow constraints and demands of machines upon human agency then 
he would have been able to conceive of disciplinary agency in terms of sedimented human-machine 
relations in which discipline did not occur only in the human realm but as a consequence of 
constructing challenges and practices in terms that can be re-produced.
Pickering analysed disciplinary agency as occurring within the human realm in terms of 
passivity. He described this as transcription: the human agent is forced to copy the practices associated 
with the old model. However, by construing discipline as passive, Pickering misunderstood two things. 
Firstly, transcription is simultaneously, ambiguously, passive and active. Secondly, discipline involves 
more than copying. For example, writing 2+3=5 is not an example of discipline; it is an example of 
mimicry. Pickering treated discipline if it were something fixed and static which replaces human 
activity and intentionality. However, if we view disciplinary agency as an organised practice, which is 
productive and agential, then, especially in terms of Pickering's “open-endedness of cultural 
extension” thesis, it is inconsistent to treat that discipline as if it were complete. I can say that I 
understand how to do algebra, but does this mean that I can passively solve any and every algebraic 
problem merely by transcribing the disciplined agency of doing algebra? I would say not. Disciplined 
transcription requires interpretation as to whether or not it has been done correctly. Recollection of 
what has been done before is not sufficient to guarantee “perfect” transcription This is the case with 
playing music, ballet, yoga, martial arts, gymnastics, and mathematics. Disciplined practice requires 
directed, continually interpretive, improvement and innovation of the practice towards perfection. The 
content of how to transcribe is underdetermined until every conceivable transcription has been done in 
the best way possible. In this sense there is constant ambiguity between this and what Pickering termed 
as filling. We can never be certain that we have “followed the rules” correctly and are always forced to 
take an interpretive stance. Pickering claimed that transcription is “a sequence of passive, forced 
moves... that follow from what is already established concerning the old model.”(p. 129) How could 
we know whether we have done this? In terms of Pickering’s analysis, this must be “temporally
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emergent” in the real-time of practice. We could not know in advance whether we had correctly 
transcribed or not By claiming that there are two distinct and identifiable phases of scientific work, 
actively constructing the apparatus and then passively observing the results, Pickering has built the 
human-material distinction into his analysis. This obscures the way that experimenters, like Morpurgo, 
simultaneously actively and passively perform experiments. The active choices that Morpurgo made in 
the construction of his apparatus were simultaneously passive responses to what, according to his 
current expectations and the paradigmatic technical background, was the best thing to choose. The 
passive observations that Morpurgo made, after switching the apparatus on, were simultaneously 
active as he attempted to make sense of what he was seeing, interpreting, in terms of his current model. 
Making observations involves simultaneously passively/actively interpreting what is happening during 
the experiment as the experimenter both orders the observations in terms of the structures of her/his 
current expectations, and orders her/his expectations in terms of her/his current observations. This is 
apparent when Morpurgo observed an anomaly. He was simultaneously confronted with this 
observation as an anomaly in terms o f his current expectations whilst attempting to make sense of it, 
integrate it, in terms of what he already knew. When he could not, he had to adopt an alternative tactic, 
which Pickering characterises as conceptual. This involved modifying the formula for calculating 
charges on the grains by adding an additional term to the equation. However, contrary to Pickering, 
this tactic was both passive and active because it was an active modification of the formula that was 
passively part of the way that physicists have been taught to do physics. There was nothing radical or 
unusual in Morpurgo’s practice here because he was choosing a possible solution from a considerable 
arsenal of tactics at his disposal (acquired throughout his education and experiences); this is how 
physics is done. This mathematical modification was made in relation to what Morpurgo could 
measure using his apparatus, how he could expect to interpret that modification as a physical 
mechanism, and simultaneously what he could expect to demonstrate using an electromagnetic- 
mechanical apparatus. The configuration and functionality of the apparatus was constructed within the 
interpretations and tolerances of Morpurgo’s current knowledge, and, his expectations of the 
functional and demonstrative potentials of his models. At this stage of his work Morpurgo’s models, 
interpretations, and apparatus’ functionality, were all mangled together. At this stage his work was far 
from complete. His task was to disentangle these elements in order to be able to differentiate between 
theoretical expectations and actual observations. It is only by differentiating material agency and 
human agency that Morpurgo could establish his experiment as a demonstration of the existence or 
inexistence of free-quarks. It is in this sense that experimental practice is a “unmangling” of “the 
mangled”.
Machine Agency:
In Pickering’s analysis the emergence of material agency was dependent on two assumptions: (a) that 
intentionality occurs in the human realm, (b) that physicists adopt a passive role. Are these 
assumptions justifiable? How can physicists know when they have been suitably passive or not? In my 
view, a physicist has to interpret her/his posture, in relation to other physicists, in order to answer this 
question. The judgement on whether or not this has been correctly done is one of interpretation and
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consequently the physicist is always in an active role even when evaluating her/his own passivity. The 
physicist has to attempt to control her/his control in order to distance her/himself from the 
performativity of the experiment. S/he has to answer questions like: “What is the apparatus doing?” 
and, “Why is it doing it?” before s/he can be confident that her/his inteipretation is that of the 
apparatus “doing its own thing”. Hence the desirability of techne. Once we allow this activity in 
interpretation then we have to concede that judgement is involved in the decision of whether or not 
material agency has been captured. This inability to extract human agency from material agency on the 
basis of passivity makes Pickering’s assumption (b) very problematical because there is no stage 
during the dialectical process of accommodation and resistance that we could identify material agency 
qua material agency without arbitrarily doing so. Pickering had resistances primarily localised in 
machine performativity due to material agency, rather than due to human agency, although not 
consistently throughout the analysis.18 As he puts it (p.39), “I use “resistance” in just this sense of 
practical obstacle, and I do not mean it to refer to whatever account scientists might offer of the source 
of such obstacles.” However, I do not think that Pickering could separate the two, without arbitrarily 
doing so, because the extent to which something is “a practical obstacle” will depend, in part, on 
scientists accounts of not only what constitutes “a practical obstacle” but also her/his account of the 
source of that obstacle. Physicists' accommodations to interpreted sources o f resistance will vary 
depending on what they take those resistances to be. Some interpretations may lead them to cease the 
project completely as being far too expensive or highly unlikely of being successful. Moipurgo serves 
as a good example here. He eventually stopped trying to find free-quarks, after fifteen years of making 
accommodation after accommodation, to resistance after resistance, including changing his theoretical 
models, redesigning and rebuilding his apparatus, enlarging the size of his group, etc. What was the 
resistance that finally compelled him to stop? He finally interpreted the machine performativity to 
mean that either free-quarks did not exist or that he would not be able to find them with this type of 
machine. It seems that the final resistance that ended the project was Morpurgo’s own account of why 
the experiment had not shown any free-quarks. Such accounts of the nature and source of a resistance 
have a vital role in the perception, selection, and evaluation, of the practicality of any possible 
accommodation or intention.
Was Pickering’s assumption that intentionality is located in the human realm justified? 
Pickering had to locate intentionality in the human realm because he had rejected that constraint and 
demand play any role in the construction of intentions. He rejected the former as a humanist concept 
and did not discuss the latter at all. In Pickering’s analysis of Glaser’s project of building a bubble- 
chamber, Glaser’s intentions were only transformed as accommodations to machine performativity, 
and material agency, in terms of what Glaser did next (pp.37-63). Pickering claimed that, although the 
actual form die bubble-chamber eventually took was “dialectically transformed” throughout the
18 For example, p.42 emphasis mine, “Here another resistance was apparent Since cosmic rays arrive 
at the surface o f the earth erratically, there was little chance o f detecting interesting cosmic ray events 
by expanding a bubble-chamber at random intervals: the odds were high that nothing would be 
happening at the instant chosen.” Here we see a physicist’s account acting as a resistance against 
“expanding the bubble chamber at random intervals” as a possible accommodation.
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process of building it, the original project of “building a bubble-chamber” had its origin in the human 
realm. It was only in terms of how Glaser modelled a working bubble-chamber, and went about trying 
to build one, that we find any transformation of intentional structures. So, according to Pickering, 
although Glaser’s intentional structures of goals and plans were “emergently mangled”, through “a 
real-time dialectic of accommodations and resistances” between “Glaser’s practices” and “machinic 
captures of material agency”, the original intention of “building a bubble-chamber” had its locus in 
Glaser when “he set himself a new goal”. To what extent did this new goal have its origin in Glaser?
In my view, if Pickering allowed constraint and demands to play a role in his analysis then he 
would not have been able to locate intentionality only in the human realm. Machines and tools form 
part of any set of cultural resources (or cultural elements, as Pickering puts it) and, combined with 
techniques, and experiences of when, and how to use them, provide a set of technologies. These 
technologies are as much a part of the “diverse set of cultural elements”, that Pickering feeds into the 
Mangle, as are concepts, representations, interpretations, and materials. As I have already argued, 
particular technologies, as means to ends, are connected to the teleological positing that they promise 
to satisfy. These positings are also a cultural resource. These are the perceived potentials, possibilities, 
and challenges that are associated with any technology which arise out of an innovative culture 
destined towards ever increasing transformative powers. There are expectations and notions of 
appropriate usage which facilitate the selections and choices made when deciding which technology 
should or should not be used. The existence of technologies provides possible goals and projects that 
would be inconceivable, or considered unachievable, without them. When a new technology becomes 
an available cultural resource it brings with it a whole range of potentially achievable new projects and 
goals. Without access to these new technologies, human choices are constrained by what are perceived 
to be achievable (or technically rational) using the already existent technologies. In the context of 
experimental physics the physicist is constrained in her/his choice of technology according to the 
consensus of other physicists regarding what can or can not be demonstrated by using particular 
techniques. A physicist also has a technological demand placed upon him/her to use only theories, 
interpretations, and intentions, which contain measurable elements and consequently the choice of 
theory, interpretation, and intention, is constrained by the limitations of the available measuring 
technologies. The physicist is enframed by the template of methodology. Furthermore, once a 
technology has become established, and particular positing have become routinely accomplished using 
those technologies, then the cultural sedimentation of those positing is simultaneously a cultural 
sedimentation of those technologies. If culture can be said to be a stable form of life then it is also a 
stable set of technologies. In this sense there are both constraints and demands placed on intentionality 
by technologies when human agents elect to only choose goals for which they have the technologies 
by which they can achieve them There is also a consensual demand placed on human agents to choose 
the technologies that have become established as the means to achieve culturally acceptable purposes 
and goals. Furthermore, the imperative to innovate is central to experimental physics; it challenges 
human agents to innovate solutions to technologically produced problems. Thus Glaser was challenged 
to invent the bubble chamber in accordance with the positing, potentials, demands, and constraints of 
the technical background of cultural resources in which he was situated. Glaser was destined as soon
179
as he took up the challenge. If Pickering were consistent in his “posthuman” thesis then he would have 
treated intentions as cultural elements that are not localised in the human realm but as products of “the 
Mangle”. Using the Glaser example, the intention to “build a bubble-chamber” was a possibility, 
conditional on the existence of various technologies and goals, which became a potential as they found 
their way into the field of particle physics. As an intention, it was available to anyone who had access 
to all the cultural elements which made it possible, and, “it just happened” to be Glaser who picked it 
up and tried to make it work. Such a goal could only exist as a result of the promises and limitations of 
the technological culture in which Glaser was situated. There is no reason to presuppose that it began 
with him. As a physicist there is a demand on Glaser to actually do some physics. What “doing 
physics” involves will depend upon the culture in which he is situated, and due to this dependency 
upon culture, Glaser found himself in a culture where only specific potentially achievable projects and 
goals were perceivable. I accept that he could have chosen to attempt something for which there were 
not perceivable cultural resources, like building a time-machine, but the perception would have been 
that failure was likely and Glaser would have taken a considerable personal career risk by electing to 
take up that challenge. Building a time machine was not a culturally available goal or project, in the 
context of the technical background in which Glaser was situated, but building a bubble chamber was. 
As Pickering argued, perceptions of success or failure are themselves emergent as a result of the 
Mangle. It was inconsistent of him not to extend this thesis to perceptions of likelihood of success or 
failure. Intentions must be emergent in the same way as any other cultural element and cannot be 
localised in the human realm. Pickering has taken die intention of “building a bubble-chamber” out of 
the context of a technological history which preceded Glaser’s work and has neglected the role that the 
available technologies of that period had in offering up substantial directions of exploration and 
potential success. Human choices, decisions, and intentions are shaped by the technologies that are 
culturally available. The existence of particular technologies is a pre-requisite for particular choices, 
decisions, and intentions. Glaser could not have intended to “build a bubble-chamber” if he were bom 
into Galileo’s culture; it would have not been a possible choice. Nor could Morpurgo have intended to 
search for free-quarks by sacrificing a white ox at Stonehenge during the summer solstice; it would not 
have been an appropriate technology within his culture. Particular research projects require particular 
technologies and particular technologies suggest future research projects. Research projects, choices, 
decisions and intentions, are shaped by the technologies that are available.
However, I am not attempting to attribute intentionality to machines. Even in the fields of AI 
and robotics it would be contentious to claim that there are machines that have intentions. When I say 
that machines have agency then I do not mean to imply that they voluntarily do so. So in what sense 
can machines be said to be agents that cause specific intentions? Technology is not merely comprised 
of machines or tools; a machine or tool is not a technology. A technology is comprised of machines, 
tools, expectations o f tasks that are achievable with that technology, the know-how to use those tools 
and machines, and bodily organisation. Without know how and expectations we could not know when, 
or how, to use tools and machines, and we would not expect them to work in particular contexts and 
perform specific productive acts; tools and machines are useless without technique and expectations. 
Both humans and machines transform each other. The situation is one of feedback. It is in the context
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of feedback that machines can be said to have agency. Technology is constituted through interaction of 
human agency and machine agency. My point is that Pickering treats intentionality in a way that is 
inconsistent with his thesis. In terms of the Mangle, intentions should occur as interactive stabilisation 
of human agency and machine agency, as cultural elements, and should not be localised only in the 
human realm.
As I have argued above, Pickering’s assumptions that human agents adopt a passive role, and 
that intentionality is located in the human realm, are both problematical and are the source of 
inconsistencies throughout his analysis. His argument did not support the notion of “material agency” 
because it is an ad hoc construct, designed only to account for resistances to human intentions, that is 
only apparent when periods of human passivity are assumed to happea Machine agency is the 
experiential ground of such resistances and accommodations that arise through experimental uses of 
machines. It is an assumption to consider these machines as intermediaries. Material agency is a 
metaphorical substitution, which occurs when machines are made transparent as mere means and are 
treated as intermediaries. He required material agency because he has no space in his analysis for 
machine agency except as the machine-like intentionality of human agency, in disciplined relation 
with material agency, and as an intermediary for the accommodations and resistances of the interaction 
between human and material agency. It seems to me that if Pickering was to offer us an analysis that 
was based upon cybernetics, which is something that he alludes to but does not systematically work 
through his own analysis, then he could not consistently contain intentionality in “the human realm”. If 
we restrict our analysis of experimental physics to its performances, as Pickering implored us to do, 
then we have no experience as machines as intermediaries except in terms of what is said about them. 
What we have are machines and our interpretation of their performativity in terms of mechanisms. It 
seems to me that we can only describe these machines as intermediaries between human agency and 
material agency only because such a way o f discourse is a product o f removing the machines from the 
account and replacing them with Nature (or material agency in Pickering’s case). It is a part of our 
cultural tendency to accept that the Archimedean, Baconian, and Galilean faith, that Nature can be 
disclosed by mechanical devices and mathematical inscriptions, is justified. It is this cultural tendency 
that I have referred to as mechanical realism. The belief that this faith is justified is presumptive. 
Whether or not experimentation can provide us with such knowledge is something that we are not in a 
position to answer one way or the other without arbitrarily doing so. It is because Pickering has an 
inbuilt asymmetry in his account, that human agency attempts to “capture” material agency, starting 
from human intention and passively responding to material agency, intentionality is situated on the 
human side of the dialectic. He has made the traditional assumption that machines are nothing more 
than a means, a transparent intermediary, for the capturing of material agency. It is this assumption, 
that machine performativity and material agency are intimately connectable but not the same thing, 
that has led him to make the essential concession to this tradition. If we examine machines qua agents 
rather than intermediaries or mere machines then we can develop a rather different description of 
experimental physics than Pickering does in terms of human-machine interactions and relationships.
Material agency is a metaphorical product of particular modes of human-machine relations, 
directed to the production of a knowledge of general principles of mechanism and functions of
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mathematically abstracted mechanised agencies, in order to metaphorically make the world intelligible 
to human beings in terms of mechanisms and functions. I agree with Pickering that neither the social 
constructivist nor realist accounts of physics, taken on their own, provide us with a satisfactory 
account of experimental physics. The challenge is to take both accounts into account, without taking a 
partisan position on either, with the aim of producing an intelligible account of experimental physics. 
Although Pickering is partially successful, by showing the deficiencies in both the social constructivist 
and realist accounts of physics, by holding that there a nonhuman agency which is emergently 
produced through human agency working on machines, he has ultimately assumed that machines are 
intermediaries between human and material agencies. If we do not accept this assumption, that 
machines are intermediaries, then what does this imply about “material agency”? “Material agency” is 
a fictional product of particular human-machine relations and is not a pole (or terminus). It is a product 
of interpretations of machine agency. It is only through particular conceptual structures, socio- 
technically constructed and inherited, on the basis of metaphysical presuppositions, that notions such 
as “material agency” can be emergent. The “material” is a product of particular modes of agency rather 
than a mode of agency itself. It requires further rhetorical and conceptual work to transform it into a 
mode of agency (as Pickering has done). This work metaphorically transposes the machine into an 
intermediary. The nonhuman agency in question is the agency of the machine. The nonhuman agency 
of a machine does all the work that Pickering wants material agency to do. Human agents and machine 
agents are distinct but inseparable from one another in the context of experimentation and knowledge 
production. Machines are products and embodiments of intentions, expectations, beliefs, choices, and 
values, and as such are constructs. Conversely, human beings are machine users, and as such, new 
machines, when used, generate (not just transform) new intentions, expectations, beliefs, choices, and 
values, through the powers, constraints, challenges, and demands, that they make upon us. Human and 
machine agencies shape each other. Human agency and machine agencies are products of each other.
Furthermore, the materials used in scientific work are themselves integrated into machine 
agency in order to determine their properties. In the construction of an experiment, each material is a 
component that is integrated into the apparatus on the basis of what that component, that material, does 
to the other components, the other materials, to which it is connected and acts upon. Each component 
is organised in terms of its productive agency, as an input-output function, within the structure of the 
machine in which it is a component. These machines, in turn, can be analysed in terms of the larger 
organisational structures in which they are integrated as components. The material agents are other 
machines that, when connected together, form “emergent brute resistances” in accordance with the 
degree of incoherence that occurs as a result of these connected machines having divergent centres of 
transformative power. This resistance occurs when transformative powers interfere with one another. 
Coherence is achieved, resistance disappears, when these divergent centres of organised agencies are 
brought together into a single centre of organised agency. At that point a working machine has been 
made which operates as a stable unitary agent. For example, in Glaser’s work, by attempting to 
connect diverse components together with the aim of constructing a unified machine, the bubble 
chamber, each of those components began as its own centre of agency (as a result of previous 
unification within the work of others) and the problem Glaser faced was bringing these diverse agents
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together into a coherent whole with a single centre of agency. The resistances arose through the 
problem of achieving stable co-operation of functionality as each component was connected. When 
components competed, each had divergent functionality, and the outcome was a dysfunctional 
configuration of components. This divergent functionality is a consequence of components being 
brought together to perform functions, for which they were not designed, developed, and stabilised. 
Each component, as a centre of functional power, unless brought together with all the other 
components, as an integrated whole during the process of innovation, undermines and interferes with 
the functional power of the components it is connected with. This incoherence cannot be identified 
with an “emergent material agency” precisely because it arises due to the fragmentation and 
disharmony of agencies rather than from a unitary source. It is a product of heterogeneous agencies. 
Glaser had the additional problem of having to integrate his bubble chamber into the wider context of 
particle physics. This involved connecting his machine, as a componential complex, as a component in 
the larger technology of particle detection. Achieving stability involved not only integrating all the 
componential agencies of the parts of his machine but also integrating his machine, as a component, 
into particle physics. His work required integration on both a micro and macro level before he made a 
working bubble chamber. This interaction between micro and macro level organisations of agencies 
involves not only integrating electrical components, glass tubes, and strange gases, but also involves 
integrating techniques, interpretations, conceptualisations, political institutions, economic factors, 
social organisations, beliefs, values, and expectations, together into a stable centre of functional power. 
It is only by doing this can new machines, like bubble chambers, be made to work and become part of 
scientific culture. As such, resistances are the result of sociological, psychological, political, economic, 
and technical incoherence. By treating “the source” of such resistances as the interaction of human 
agency and material agency, Pickering has substituted “material agency” for the wider context of the 
integration of innovations into pre-existing technological and social orders.
After all, what is a machine? It is not merely a particular configuration of matter (metals, 
plastics, glasses, gases, etc.) but it is a particular configuration of functions. Even the so-called basic 
“stuffs” from which this machine is built are functional components with their own histories of 
stabilisation. Take iron for example, this “stuff’ is itself identified in terms of its functions of hardness, 
durability, tensile strength, availability, cheapness, etc., and all these functions have taken considerable 
work to organise into a coherent unity. Iron does not “come out of the ground”; iron ore does. Iron ore 
is dug up; iron is made. Machines are anything that is made to reproduce a performance, function, or 
functions, through integrating diverse agencies into a coherent functional unity, and, as such, may be 
mechanical, mathematical, computational, social, political, military, biological, medical, scientific, 
analytical, or sexual. Functionality does not come “of itself’; it requires work (organised power) to set- 
upon otherwise heterogeneous objects, gather them together, order them, and integrate them into a 
stable, coherent, and unitary function, from an embodied technological background. It takes effort, 
resources, and power. Functionality is made upon the anvil o f practice.
Despite Pickering’s insistence that “the Mangle” decentres intentionality from the human 
subject, his characterisation of “the Mangle” as a struggle between human agency (described as 
intentional structure and its social contours) and material agency (described as an emergent brute
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resistance with its material contours) is one which maintains the mental-material distinction in the 
form of an intention-resistance distinction. Without this distinction there can be no notion of a 
struggle. This notion of a struggle is implicit to Pickering’s analysis and, consequently, it is readily 
open to interpretation as a reconfiguration of Marx’s concepts of “dialectical materialism”, “history”, 
and “labour”, in order to apply them to modem experimental physics. Pickering wrote “resistance 
emerges at the intersection of human and material agency, and as the present argument suggests, 
serves to transform the former in one and the same process as it delineates the latter. Just as the 
mangle, then, pulls material agency onto the terrain of human agency, so it materially structures the 
goals of human agency. Just as the evolution of material agency lacks its own pure dynamics, so too 
does the evolution of human intentions.”(p.58) Here we can see the difficulty that the inherent mental- 
material structure in his analysis was causing him because his analysis required that intentionality is 
contained within human agency but is structured by material agency to the extent that there is neither a 
pure human dynamics nor a pure material dynamics. And yet, he introduced the notion of resistances 
from material agency in order to account for the way that human intentions are not immediately 
successful, but has ended up concluding that there is neither any pure material agency nor any pure 
human agency. If that is the case then intentionality cannot only be described in terms of human 
agency and therefore there is no need for the introduction of the mysterious material agency to account 
for resistances. Resistances can be accounted for by examining the structure of intentionality, in terms 
of means-ends relations, in the dynamic interaction between heterogeneous agents, which may cohere 
or incohere with each other, and, consequently, dynamically produce stable or unstable intentional 
structures. In such an analysis a stable intention occurs when there is the technique available as 
standing-reserve to achieve the challenge in question and an unstable intention is one in which either 
the technique or the challenge is indeterminate or unavailable. If all we can analyse is the “interaction” 
in terms of properties and characteristics, then we are limited, in experimental physics, to analysing 
machine performativity of particular machines, in terms of the relations, structures, organisations, 
orders, and agencies, from which those particular machines are constructed, and the ways that those 
machines relate to knowledge as an ideal. In other words, if we are to genuinely attempt a 
“posthuman” analysis of experimental physics then we are directed towards a deconstruction and 
analysis of machine agency the contexts within which machine agency is situated and constructed. In 
Pickering’s terms, if there is no pure human realm and no pure material realm then both must be 
internally related; that is to say that they only exist in relation to one another as aspects of the Mangle. 
The Mangle is the interaction between the two aspects of itself. What sense can we make of an 
intersection, or boundary, of two things that only exist on that boundary? What sense do the concepts 
of interaction, intersection, and boundary make here? Surely there can be no such identifiable 
boundary, intersection, or interaction, and the notions of “resistance” and “accommodation”, except 
that of machine agency. If Pickering wished to fully develop a “posthuman” conception of scientific 
practice, in a consistent fashion, then, in his terms, human agency, material agency, machine 
performances, history, temporality, practices, concepts, models, representations, intentionality, 
resistance, and accommodation must be products of machine agency. In a posthumanist analysis, 
machine agency must be both “posthumanist” and “postmaterialist”. The scientific processes of
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machine agency could only be analysed as processes by which its own constituents were its own 
products; where its own possibilities, potentials, and actualities, were its own object. In short, the 
mechanical realist ontology is both its own product and resource, extended through its own machine 
agency, in order to produce itself, and nothing else. Machine agency can only be analysed in terms of 
the elements that were produced by it and re-iteratively fed-back into it And so on.
Pickering offers us an interesting metaphor. This metaphor functions to make 
experimentation an unintelligible, mysterious, magical, and, as C.S.Peirce put it, “an occult power”. 
By taking this metaphor literally Pickering has made experimental science as opaque and mysterious 
as “the dance of Shiva”. However, as I have argued throughout this thesis, we can analyse the role that 
techneic ideals, underwritten by mechanical realist metaphysics, has had in the production of “the laws 
of Nature” and “natural mechanisms”, without either accepting the validity of that metaphysics, or 
making a miracle of the “progress of physics”, whilst examining how knowledge, as techne, can be 
used to guide the productive processes of machine agency, as an ideal. Perhaps, we should invoke the 
metaphor of Hephaestus, the Greek god of fire and making, to stand by Shiva, the creator and 
destroyer, when discussing possible divine patrons for experimental physics. After all, in the terms of 
my argument, "the laws of Nature", the transdicted technai of experimentation, are products of the 
"anvil of practice" that are given up to the eternal and universal “realm of the gods”.
Does Anything Enable Us To Build Machines?
Pickering, by answering negatively, has pre-empted a judgement on the validity of mechanical realist 
metaphysics and arbitrarily asserted a response. In many ways this is the central but unasked question 
of experimental physics as a whole. Or, to put it another way, the construction of experimental physics 
is itself a performative attempt to answer this question by building machines and attempting to present 
causal accounts of how they work. Experimental physics, as a mode of Ge-stell challenged to achieve 
its own techne, is an ongoing process of producing causal accounts of the technological innovation of 
transformative powers as technological objects for further innovation. The challenge for experimental 
physics is to explore every conceivable possibility of its own destining. It can not end until it has 
undertaken every challenge that it sets upon itself. In other words, the task of experimental physics is 
to design, build, operate, innovate, and perform every possible experiment upon every possible 
machine-kind. However, even if we imagine this to be a finite task for which completion is a 
possibility, this still raises the question of whether experimental physics will ultimately provide the 
answer it was set up to provide. Whilst the object of experimental physics remains the mechanisms 
disclosed through machine agency it will not answer this question. Why? Physics is challenged to 
build novel machines to explore the laws and mechanisms in operation upon the interface of machine 
performativity. Thus it is destined towards the question of what enables machines to be built as i f  the 
answer was itself something mechanical. However, what physics can not address is the being that 
builds machines in order to understand how they work. It can not address the “us” of the question. This 
is a question of the poiesis that is emergent through the interactive relationships between human 
agency and machine agency. It is a question of the psychophysical processes of human-machine 
productivity. The question of what enables us to build machines is a question of the origins of the 
possibilities and conditions of the processes of labour themselves. This is a questioning of our Being
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and the Being of the world. The mystery at the heart of the labour process is the mystery at the heart of 
our being-in-the-world. Why is the world like this? Why are we able to act in the world in the ways 
that we do? Why are we like this? This questioning has been with us since the ancients and remains 
answered. The presupposition of natural laws does not answer this questioning. It only conceals it For 
even if there were natural laws we still would not know why there are natural laws at all, or why they 
have the form that they do. Whence the resistance? Technological objects combine with one another. 
The greater the number of technological objects the more combinations of technological objects are 
possible. Technological objects exercise their transformative power in interaction with other 
technological objects. This transformative power is the product of an ensemble of technological 
objects in which each technological object is itself an ensemble of other technological objects. Errors 
are always possible because it is impossible to foresee all of the consequences of implementing any 
technological object Experimentalists do not know what they have done. The technological object can 
only be determined in relation to the ensemble in which it has been integrated as a component. The 
innovation and integration of any novel technological object in an ensemble of other technological 
objects transforms the productive equilibrium of that ensemble. It disturbs the context by changing the 
context. This is the nature of innovation. Ellul (1964, pp.111-2) provide a good example of this in his 
discussion of weaving. The eighteenth centuiy invention of the spinning jenny by James Hargreaves 
allowed the production of more yam than could be used by weavers. Cartwright invented his famous 
loom in response to this disequilibrium. The problem facing us with the question of the origin of 
resistances is how do we locate the source of resistance. Labour processes are complex and are situated 
within contexts of heterogeneity. It is the experimenters’ efforts to determine the transformative power 
of any object that permits experimental physics to participate in discovery. This discovery is the 
discovery of modes of agency and not simply the discovery of truth. If truth is implicated then it is as 
aletheia rather than veritas. It is disclosed as reality rather than corresponding to reality. Agency can 
not be readily divorced (or abstracted) from its context of occurrence and, consequently, the claim that 
experimentation discloses a pre-scientific truth (or reality) requires a reification that is itself the 
product of the mechanical realist precepts. This means that any technological object only achieves the 
status of a natural object in virtue of the additional work of the metaphysical projection of the human 
participants. This participation is itself a mode of agency in which the precepts of mechanical realism 
are themselves characterisable as functioning technological objects. The transformative powers of any 
technological object can not be evaluated independently from the environment in which that 
technological object interacts. The transformative powers, as causal powers, are established in relation 
to the change that occurs as a result of that technological object and its environment. What is a 
mechanism? It is an index for a reproducible change. What is a machine? A machine is an 
interconnected ensemble of mechanisms that when acted upon reproduces functionality. This 
production is the agency of the machine. It is a centre of transformative power. Each component 
mechanism reproduces a centre of transformative power. If these component centres are integrated into 
the network of the machine coherently then the machine works. It produces the desired actions when 
acted upon. It works. Coherence occurs when the centres of power of the components are converged 
upon a total action. Incoherence occurs when there is more than one total action. The centres of power
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are divergent and the machine does not produce the desired action when acted upon. It does not work 
properly, or at all, because the centres of power interfere with each other, or cancel each other out. The 
malfunction of a machine is the result of incoherence between actions. It is a state of disorder and 
diversity leading to conflict and competition between centres of functional power. The construction of 
a machine involves bringing together, integrating, separate mechanisms. This involves integrating a 
diverse collection of centres of transformative power into a single centre of transformative power. It 
involves totalling them into a single total action. The construction of a machine is to make 
transformative powers coherently reproduce functionality. It is an ordering process aimed at making 
coherence to produce a single centre of functional power. Building a machine is a process of 
integration of diverse agencies into a single agency.
The selections and demands that occur in the development of new machines and practices 
cannot be localised on either side of a human-machine relation because both act upon each other. The 
process of construction is an interaction both; it orders action according to a template analogously 
taken from another machine. The cybernetic process of control-information feedback is the interaction 
between coherence and incoherence. Any machine is a particular framework of interactions, which 
itself interacts with the agencies of the environment in which it is contained. The boundary of the 
machine is ill defined. It is open. Machines are frameworks within larger frameworks. Making a 
machine work can be done in one of two ways: (1) Adding agents to the incomplete framework until 
coherency are achieved; (2) changing the incomplete framework to contain more agents until 
coherency is achieved. There is no depth to this process. It is merely a process of extension and 
integration. It is a process of Ge-stell. Pickering oversimplified building machines by analysing it in 
terms of two agencies: human agency and material agency. In my view, we cannot make building 
machines intelligible by analysing it in terms of dialectic between these two types of agencies. 
Building machines involves integrating a diverse set of agencies. Each agency is simultaneously social 
and technological in construction and as a consequence of this dual nature cannot be situated as 
originating in neither a human realm nor a material realm It requires analytical agency in order to 
identify “a human realm” and “a material realm”. If “the realms” are interpenetrating, as Pickering 
suggested, then the selection of origin of types of interaction, namely intention and resistance, is an 
arbitrary selection. Agency is always a culturally situated productive dynamic orientated to effecting 
change and making things happen. Agencies, in this sense, are centres of functional power, 
organisation, and ordering. These agencies can be of a psychological, logical, philosophical, 
economical, political, componential, mathematical, functional, textural, interpretational, conceptual, 
sociological, historical, dextural, procedural, technical, semiotic, moral, analytical, or engendered 
function. Whilst we remain at this level of analysis we can make “modernist” analyses of science 
which allow the construction of definite statements about, and deconstruction of, practices in terms of 
characteristic types of agent. However, if we deconstruct each of these agencies to analyse their 
components in terms of any, or all, of the other components, e.g. economic agencies in terms of 
gender, or gender agencies in terms of political agencies, then we move towards “postmodern” 
analyses of science which open up the construction of experiments, and their intergration within wider 
culture, to a potentially infinite multiplicity of interpretations. Although such analyses are always
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incomplete, selective, and ephemeral, they help us to unmangle “the mangle” and see how the various 
agents interact in the construction of experiments, techniques, and machines. Philosophers, historians, 
and sociologists have examined experiments in terms of their rhetorical, organisational, economic, or 
epistemological role, but it has only relatively recently that the question of how experiments are 
constructed has been raised. There is some literature on the exploration of experimental science in 
terms of material practices.19 Experiments have also been analysed in terms of skills and social 
networks.20 Following on this body of work, this thesis has taken practices as the starting point in the 
analysis of experimental physics. But what are practices? The above commentators discuss their role at 
length but largely leave the term undefined. The following definition is consistent with the above 
analyses. A practice is a repetition of a juxtaposition of agencies in order to gain reproducible 
transformative power. It involves performing an action repeatedly, or habitually, in order to gain 
transformative power. Practices involve a set, or collection, of repeated actions in the context of a 
project or programme of work. Practices are organised bodily movements and technological objects. In 
the context of experimental physics they are linked with the apparatus through the process of working 
upon it Practices are mechanised actions when linked with a machine that transforms the 
undisciplined body and the experimental apparatus into a cybernetic organism. When the machine has 
become transparent the human body has become empowered by becoming more machine-like.
Throughout this thesis I have described the objects of scientific discourse as technological 
objects. These objects can be both intransitive and artificial. How can we make an intelligible account 
of such objects without assuming realism? This depends upon what we take such objects to be. If we 
take them to be the causes or mechanisms at work in an experimental apparatus, as Bhaskar does, then 
we can still provide an intelligible account of these objects without assuming realism. They are the 
points of linkage between machines in two respects. Firstly, scientific discourse utilises the general 
concepts of “cause” and “mechanism” during the process of determining which particular causes or 
mechanisms are actually in operation during particular experiments. A discursive space is created in 
scientific discourse prior to any commitment to particular mechanisms or causes. Even though 
scientific discourse is techneic there are stages in the construction of that discourse prior to any claim 
to techneic knowledge. There are pluralities of possible mechanisms that can be inscribed upon any 
technological process and, consequently, the process of inscription does not require any complete 
knowledge. Such knowledge is to be a product of this process rather than a conditioa During the 
stages of inscription, particular mechanisms have not been permanently inscribed upon the apparatus 
and the “intransitive object” is the space for such future inscription. The design of the mechanism to be 
built is still on the drawing board as a challenge. Secondly, as any apparatus can be inscribed with 
alternative functives, and their associated transdicted mechanisms, when novel technographe are 
innovated and alternative interpretations of machine performativity are proposed, the “intransitive 
object” cannot be taken to be any particular technographe or interpretation either. These particulars are
19 For example, Shapere (1982), Hacking (1983), Cartwright (1983), Ackerman (1985), Pickering 
(1984a, 1984b, 1995), Galison (1987), and Gooding (1990).
20 Collins (1976), Latour & Woolgar (1979), Knorr-Cetina (1981), Pinch (1986), Galison (1987), 
Gooding (1990).
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“transitive objects” whilst “the intransitive object” is the space created to be filled. It remains 
intransitive whilst particular machines are subjected to processes of inscription with technographic 
functives whilst the particular inscriptions used are transitive. As such, it remains independent from 
any particular objects that may have been produced by such processes but remains dependent upon the 
process itself for its existence. The “intransitive objects” of scientific investigation are independent of 
particular statements of scientific speculation but dependent upon the technological process of 
scientific investigation. Without the process of scientific investigation no such objects would exist. For 
example, early experiments upon photoelectric devices sought a mechanism through which the 
working of such devices could be explained and inscribed. It is this project which created a discursive 
space for such a mechanism which, subsequently, was filled with Einstein's formulation of “the 
photoelectric effect”. Prior to filling this space it was the space itself that was the “intransitive object” 
and it remains available for de-inscription and re-inscription by any future formulations. Within the 
process of inscription, this discursive space is an intransitive technological object as a challenge, and 
not necessarily a natural one.
Once we have established an intransitive object, such as “the diffraction of light”, through 
technological enframent, then we can have a plurality of ways of inscribing such an object. It is in this 
sense, that the technological object is independent of any particular form of inscription. It can be 
inscribed in terms of the technographe of classical wave geometry, the technographe of Newtonian ray 
geometry, or the technographe of Feynman's Quantum Electrodynamics. Provided that the same 
technological template is used to produce this technological object, “the diffraction of light”, then 
these different technographe are commensurable. They can be compared by their utility in inscribing 
the technological object, their success at tracing its performativity (its predictive success), their 
extendibility throughout the machine-kind (optical machines), and their transportability to other 
machine-kinds (i.e. electronic machines). They are commensurable, as functives, in terms of bounded 
technical rational judgements regarding their instrumentality, aesthetics, and transportability. 
Functives transdicted into entities, such as “light waves” or “neutrino oscillations”, cannot be said to 
have predictive success until they are transdicted back into functives and used, successfully, in the 
design, construction, operation, and interpretation, of the extensions of machine-kinds. This can be 
seen in the increasing acceptance of the “neutrino oscillation” transdiction. This has been made in 
response to the successful implementation of it as functive in an exoframe for the KAREL II machine. 
This feedback process is an essential feature of the development of novel experiments, the progress of 
physics, and the postulation of the existence of theoretical entities. The “acid tests” of any scientific 
theory is whether it (1) provides functives for the further development of machine-families and 
techniques; and, (2) whether it provides intelligible causal account of the phenomena in question. One 
of the prime difficulties for quantum theory, for instance, is that it satisfies condition (1) but does not 
satisfy condition (2). However, the success of quantum theory in satisfying (1) is sufficient for it to be 
continued as a part of mainstream physics until an alternative theory, which satisfies (1) and (2) for the 
same kinds of machines (and perhaps new ones), can be found. However, it does not follow from 
condition (1) and (2) that any such theory is (a) true of Nature or (b) the ultimate explanatioa Neither 
technological utility nor explanative intelligibility are necessary or sufficient criteria for objective truth
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about Nature. It is logically possible that objective truths about Nature are both technologically useless 
and incomprehensible. My point is that useless and incomprehensible truths will never be a part of 
physics, and any truth that is part of physics has been disclosed by building a machine. But what of 
their transformative power? Hiroshima was not a shadow. Radios work more often than not 
aeroplanes fly, and lasers can bum through metal. How can we argue against the scientific realist? In 
the next chapter I shall turn to the central question. What is the fire of Hephaestus? What empowers 
the creation of machines? What is the source of transformative power? Is it Nature?
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CHAPTER SIX:
THE FIRE OF HEPHAESTUS;
“...truth consists in a conformity to something independent o f his thinking it to be so, or of any man’s 
opinion on that subject... the only reality there could be, would be conformity to the ultimate result of 
inquiry.” C. S. Peirce. Collected Papers, 5.211
“The fact that an idea emanates from a particular class, or accords with their interests, of course proves 
nothing as to the idea’s truth or falsity.” Kautsky, 1902.
“The criterion for truth is the enhancement of the feeling of power.” Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to 
Power, Aph. 534)
Hvle and Resistance
The innovation of electricity, nuclear power, aeroplanes, plastics, etc., has changed the world. I do not 
doubt that the experimental sciences have brought new transformative powers into the world. What is the 
source of transformative power? Is it Nature? Is it a case of acting in accordance with Natural Law? What 
is the source of the reality disclosed by experimental physics? Can experimentalists understand the powers 
that they release into the world? Oersted, Biot, and Davy's experiments with a magnetic needle, a chemical 
battery, and a wire, provides a simple example of a case of bringing-forth a transformative power. The 
integration of a magnetic needle, a chemical battery, and a wire, is a machine put together to disclose a 
transformative power. Oersted reported in 1820 that a magnetic needle moved when placed near a wire that 
was connected to a battery. Oersted proposed, on the basis of this discovery, that an electric current causes 
magnetic effects. In his report, he provided us with instructions about how to perform this experiment and 
see this effect for ourselves:
“...The opposite ends of the galvanic battery were joined by a metallic wire, which... we shall call the 
uniting conductor or the uniting wire... Let the straight part of this wire be placed horizontally above the 
magnetic needle, properly suspended, and parallel to it... Things being in this state, the needle will be 
moved, and the end of it next the negative side of the battery will go westward...”1
Oersted provided us with a technique to produce this effect for ourselves. Try it. It is not as easy as is 
rumoured Without fearing the risk of going native, I have tried to produce this effect for myself, and the 
needle does move, but it does not move in a clear and stable way. It is rather chaotic and it is difficult to 
witness the effect and keep the needle from touching the wire. It is this chaotic behaviour that Gooding
1 Oested, H.C., 1820, “Experiments on the effect of a current of electricity on the magnetic needle”, Annals 
o f Philosophy, 16, pp. 259-276, p. 274. Quoted from Gooding (1990) pp. 30-1.
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termed “the participation of nature” and Pickering termed “material agency”. Both terms echo with 
Tartaglia's potentia, Moletti's natural principles, Bacon's natural powers, and Giovanni di Guevara's 
natural motions, in that they were all referent to the response to human intervention (or violent motions'). 
Gooding termed the way that the needle does not move according to human dictate as “the recalcitrance of 
nature”; Pickering termed it as “material resistance”. Both terms echo with Tartaglia's material hindrances. 
Latour and Woolgar (1979, p.243 fh.17) also termed the way that reality is not under human control in 
terms of resistance. How can we make sense of this kind of event without adopting scientific realism? In 
the Aristotelian scheme this chaotic behaviour and resistance is an example of hyle.
It is through the movements of the craftsman that materials are changed into products. These 
movements impose shape (morphe) and form (eidos) into hyle and produce substance (informed and shaped 
hyle).2 Hyle is unknowable and incognate formlessness (agnosis).3 The techne of making is the inscription 
of form into hyle. Hyle is the formless potential to receive form that is active in the reception of it. There is 
a definite limitation to the extent that techne can guide the shaping and informing of hyle", it is only to the 
extent that hyle can be grasped by “the rational part of the soul”, as form (eidos), that it can be known (and 
consequently a part of techne)? Every technai has its appropriate forms, tools, and materials. These 
materials, tools, and forms govern the making (poiesis).5 Although the form is in the mind of the craftsman, 
its union with hyle is partially directed by techne and partially directed by hyle. The extent to which hyle 
can be informed and shaped is not entirely in the control of the craftsman S/he must attend to hyle. Form 
cannot be imposed upon (forced into) hyle and the craftsman must be responsive to the way that hyle 
receives form. It is for this reason that Aristotle argued that both techne and perception are necessary to 
guide the practices of making.6 The craftsman must attend and be responsive to the capacities and 
tendencies of hyle that arises from the particularity of materials as experienced by the craftsman as s/he 
attempts to produce the object appropriate to her/his techne. No two lumps of clay are identical.7 Hyle is the 
particularity of any particular lump of clay. Hyle gives particulars their particularity. Aristotle defined hyle 
as the particularity o f the particular,8 A potter cannot make the same pot twice; each experience of making 
a pot is particular and each crafted pot is particular. This emergent particularity is hyle. The hyle emergent 
during production would not occur without the initiation of production, but it is the hyle that prevents the 
craftsman from having complete control over the production process and the form of the final product. The




6 N.E. 2.9.1109b23. Note that perception is not limited to sight. In fact, for Aristotle, touch is an essential 
mode of perception.
7 Note that hyle is not the clay. Clay is a substance in virtue of being informed hyle (given the form of 
clay). Hyle is the particularity (the individuality) of any one particular lump of clay.
8 Meta. 7.8.1033b20-1034a7
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word hyle captures something of Pickering’s term “material agency” because it is emergent through 
productive practices. It also captures something of Gooding’s phrases “the participation of Nature”, 
“recalcitrance”, and “plasticity” in his description of the development of craft practices in the early 
experiments by Faraday et al. Due to hyle, individuals cannot be known in their particularity through the 
general logos of techne. No general principle is capable of being applicable to all particulars and there are 
no universal statements that are always correct. 9 It is hyle that prevents any techne from being completely 
characterised by a complete set of rules (or instructions) that can be verbally transmitted from craftsman to 
apprentice. Logos is necessary but not sufficient. Although techne is comprised of formal, communicable, 
general, and abstract, principles of making, it is primarily learnt through imitation and attending to the 
particularity of the appropriate materials.
According to Heidegger (1939, pp.209-10), the term “appropriateness” also gives meaning to the 
term hyle. In ordinary Greek hyle meant forest, thicket, or woods, in the sense of a place for hunting and 
gathering material for building. From this ordinary meaning, hyle came to mean material for any and every 
kind of building or production. However, hyle did not mean raw material. It meant the capacity, or the 
appropriateness, for use in the construction of a product. The wood to make a table is selected and cut to 
order and, consequently, the very character of its appropriateness is decided in relation to the making of the 
table. It is in this sense that the properties of a natural entity, say a tree, are determined in relation to its 
appropriateness for a task of making. Thus the term hyle captures both the sense of resistance, or 
recalcitrance, and also the sense of appropriateness. However, we need more than this. What of the 
transformative power? To understand this requires further inquiry into the way that transformative powers 
are “brought forth” by the complex processes of experimentation
The Theory of the Real:
In the case of experimental physics, I have used the word techne to characterise the objective asymptote of 
distinct strata of causal accounts of the applicability of techniques in the design, construction, operation, 
and interpretation of the performances of particular kinds of machine (i.e. mechanical, thermodynamic, 
electromagnetic, quantum, etc.), and show how the interconnection between these kinds, in terms of 
technical convergence and integration, leads to novel strata of kinds of machine. Thus magnitudes of 
measurements cannot be simply attributed as properties of the object measured; the magnitude of 
measurements must also be linked to the techniques used to make those measurements. It is for this reason 
that, given that scientific objects are defined in terms of “their” measurable properties, I have termed all 
such objects are techno-phenomena. Thus scientific progress, positivistically defined in terms of predictive 
success, is a matter of the increased technological enframing of phenomena into the "framework" of 
technique and bounded technical rationality. Thus empirical investigation is itself a manifestation of Ge- 
stell in which each progressive refinement of accuracy is a standing-reserve for the future challenging of 
the “technological framework” to become increasingly precise and exact. The objects and measurements of
9N.E. 5.10.1137bl3-15
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“empirical research” are bound-up with the destining of technique that cannot ultimately be satisfied 
because it has no end apart from itself as a means. It is itself an experiment into its own possibilities.
Modem physics simultaneously establishes itself and differentiates itself in its projections of 
specific object-spheres. The development of object-spheres (projection-plans) occurs by means of a 
corresponding methodology that is made secure via the rigorous application of procedure. This 
methodology is adapted and established, at any given time, in ongoing activity. Projection and rigor, 
methodology and ongoing activity, mutually requiring one another, constitute the essence of modem 
physics and transform it into research. The unity of this system is not contrived by relating object-spheres 
according to their content. Again Heidegger's analysis was correct but left crucial questions unaddressed. 
How was the unity of this system conceptually possible? How do the sciences achieve "solidarity and 
unity" upon this conception? How does planning provide this basis? How does modem science achieve and 
maintain conceptual unity, given its particularisation (specialisation) within institutionalised ongoing 
activity, if the unity of the system is not contrived by relating object-spheres according to their content? 
Heidegger was only able to account for the unity and performativity of modem sciences by appealing to the 
amenability of Nature towards the methodology of science and, therefore, he implicitly presupposed the 
unity and passivity of their object. For Heidegger (1977c, p. 127), research calls Nature to account insofar as 
Nature “lets itself be put at the disposal of representation” and, consequently, is calculated in advance and 
“set in place” by research.10 He explored the relation between modem science and culture in Science and 
Reflection (1977c) and critically assessed the view that science, together with its cultivation and 
organisation, is a part of culture (1977c, pp. 155-82). In his view, science is given cultural value and is 
pursued by human beings from a variety of motivations. However, asserted Heidegger, we can not 
understand the essence of science and its scope if we take science as cultural only this sense. He asserted 
that the same holds for art. For Heidegger (p. 156), science “is one way, and indeed one decisive way, in 
which all that is presents itself to us" and "is no more a cultural activity of man than art.” Western European 
science determines the fundamental characteristics of the reality within which “man of today moves and 
attempts to maintain himself’. Science has developed unprecedented power that is “ultimately to be spread 
over the entire globe”. Heidegger raised the question as to whether science is “nothing but a fabrication of 
man” or whether “something other than mere wanting to know on the part of man” rules in science. 
Heidegger's intention, from the onset, was to reveal what this “something other” could be.
He started this inquiry by equating this “something other” with “a state of affairs” that reigns over 
all the sciences but is hidden from them. However, argued Heidegger, we need to adequately clarify what 
science is before we could bring this "state of affairs" into view. His starting point was premised upon the
10 Lovitt noted (fit. 11) that "set in place" is a translation of gestellt. The verb stellen, with its meanings of 
to set in place, to set upon, to challenge forth, and to supply, is fundamental in Heidegger's understanding 
of the modem age. Heidegger used it to characterise the manner in which science deals with the real (1977c 
pp. 167-8) and the related noun Ge-stell characterised and named the essence of modem technology 
(1977a).
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importance of a description of the scientific enterprise of our day that shows how the sciences have 
intersected with industry, commerce, education, politics, warfare, and journalism. Heidegger proposed that 
science should be situated within this description, as the theory o f the real. What did Heidegger mean by 
this single concise statement? Heidegger elucidated “the theory of the real” by means of an etymological 
analysis. He analysed the modem conception of “the real” in terms of “that which works”. The central 
question for modem science is: how does it work? In the modem conception of “the real”, according to 
Heidegger, performing and executing became central to the setting-forth and self-exhibition of reality. It 
was this concept that allowed the factual to follow from “deeds and doings” whilst retaining the 
connotation of certainty. It was for this reason that Heidegger considered that the transformation of the 
conception of “the real” into "the certain" was characteristic of the post sixteenth century modem age. 
Henceforth, “the real” could be presented as present in the occurrence of consequences.11 “The real” was 
presented in such a way that allowed it to be encountered and demonstrated, in terms of consequences, as 
an object. It is this characteristic of “the real” as “that which presences as object” which provided that kind 
of presencing characteristic of the modem age: objectness. (p. 163) For Heidegger, how the objectness of 
that which presences was brought to appearance, and how that which presences became an object for 
representing, could only be understood in relation to theory. How is Nature, supposedly the object of 
modem science, presencing itself? What is the “itself’ here? Heidegger noted that the fundamental 
conceptual change was that of conceiving of Nature in terms of its objectness.
Heidegger used arbeiten and its compounds (bearbeiten, “to work over or refine”, zuarbeiten, “to 
work toward”, and unmarbeiten, “to work around or recast”) juxtaposed with wirken (“to work”), in order 
to set in place the performative way in which modem science brings “the real” (as an object in a causal 
sequence) into presence. Modem experimental science involves working towards and striving after reality 
in order to capture and secure it. Theory as Betrachtung meant capturing, entrapping, and secure refining of 
“the real”.12 In the experimental sciences “the real” is “what presences as self-exhibiting”, refining it 
corresponds to a fundamental characteristic of “the real” itself, but its presence is brought forth to stand in 
objectness. Wrought by work, scientific theory challenges and sets-upon “the real”.13 “The real” is ordered 
into place as “an interacting network” of a surveyable series of related causes and, thus, is made into 
something that is capable of being followed out in its sequences. This secures “the real” in its objectness
11 This meaning of “the real” was central to Bhaskar's transcendental arguments.
12 Reminiscent of Popper's use the metaphor of the net to describe the use of theory. Heidegger was aware 
of the capacity of nets to let things pass through as well as trap things.
13 Lovitt noted (p. 167 fa 21, and pp. 167-8 fit 22) that "challenges" translates herausforden (lit. demands out 
hither). "Sets upon" translates stellen (cf. QCT p. 15 fh 4). Heidegger used the following verbs to 
characterise the conduct of modem science as theory: nachstellen ("to entrap"), sicherstellen ("to make 
secure"), bestellen ("to order" or "to command"), festellen ("to fix" or "to establish"), vorstellen ("to 
represent"), umstellen ("to encompss"), erstellen ("to set forth"), and beistellen ("to place in association 
with").
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and provides object-spheres and object-areas for scientific observation to capture. The work of modem 
science is one of performing representational captures that refine “the real” in accordance with the 
objectness through which everything real is recast in advance into a diversity of objects available for 
representational captures. Heidegger's interpretation of experimentation as a performative labouring activity 
upon materials, as a process of making representations of reality through planned material practice, has 
parallels with the approaches of Hacking, Gooding, and Pickering. This approach can be seen in Francis 
Bacon's prescriptions for the “new sciences” and was central to the advance foundation of modem 
experimental physics.
For Heidegger, modem science, as the theory of the real, was not self-evident, nor was it merely a 
human construct. Modem science was essentially defined by the setting-forth of presencing into objectness, 
by Heidegger, but he did not provide any account of how this was conceptually possible. For Heidegger 
(p. 169), the essence of science was “rendered necessary” the moment that this setting-forth occured, but 
that moment, and its possibility, remained mysterious. As I have attempted to show throughout this thesis, a 
closer phenomenology can reveal the possibility of this “moment”, and its subsequent “necessity”, to be the 
conceptual synthesis, the spirit of the enterprise, that I have termed mechanical realism. However, if we 
accept Heidegger's characterisation of theory, as a process of making secure a region of “the real” as an 
object-area by specifically mapping out in advance the possibilities for posing questions, then this still 
leaves crucial questions unanswered. How is this advance mapping possible? How is a region of “the real” 
made secure? In order to address these questions we need to examine how new phenomena emerge within 
an object-area. For Heidegger, every new phenomenon emerging within an object-area of science is refined 
to such a point that it fits within the normative coherence of theory. This view has parallels with Kuhn and 
Feyerabend Heidegger maintained (p. 169) that normative coherence is itself changed from time to time 
whilst objectness remains unchanged in its fundamental characteristics. This idea of changes in normative 
coherence has parallels with the notion of “paradigm shift” (as coined by Kuhn).14 How does objectiveness 
remain unchanged? What are its fundamental characteristics in modem experimental physics? For 
Heidegger, if representing in advance is the basis for strategy and procedure then science is determined by 
pure theory directed towards the objectness of what presences. Thus the validity of classical physics was 
limited but not contradicted by modem quantum physics and relativity. Modem subatomic and space-time 
theory refined the object-spheres of their respective researches but did not invalidate them. The narrowing 
of the realm of validity was a confirmation of the objectness normative for the theory of Nature. How is the 
what of “the objectness of what presences” chosen in order to set-forth the objectness of “the real” in such a 
way that there is not any fundamental change in objectness between classical and relativistic quantum 
physics? According to Heidegger, it is Nature that “presents itself for representation as a spatio-temporal 
coherence of motion calculable in some way or other in advance” in accordance with theory (p. 169).
14 It also addresses the two-fold dimensionality of experimental science in Bhaskar's RTS. Changes; in 
normative coherence corresponds to the “transitive dimension” whilst objectness invariance corresponds to 
the “intransitive dimension”.
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Nature, according to Heidegger, is clearly an amenable participant in the work of modem science. What is 
the Nature that presents itself in this way? Or, to be more precise, which parts of the world are taken to be 
instances of Nature presenting itself in this way? And, how is the temporal coherence of motion calculable 
in advance “in some way or other” for these parts? Heidegger maintained that modem science, by defining 
the real to be the measurable, provides a method that permits a decision regarding what may pass as science 
by limiting certainty and knowledge to the measurability supplied by the objectness of Nature and the 
possibilities inherent in the measuring procedure. What allowed the real to be defined as the measurable? 
How does Nature supply measurability? How are the possibilities of measurement inherent in the 
measuring procedure? Heidegger argued (p. 170) that the methodology of science sets up Nature as an 
object of expectation. All objectification of “the real” secures and guarantees some coherence of sequence 
and order. Mathematics participates in this methodology by setting up, as the goal of expectations, the 
harmonising of all relations of order and “reckons” in advance with one fundamental equation for all 
possible order, and is not merely a reckoning by performing operations with numbers for the purpose of 
establishing quantifiable results. How does mathematics set up the harmonising of all relations of order? 
How is this set up secured and guaranteed in relation to the objectification of “the real”? Heidegger did not 
address these questions.
For Heidegger, modem science, as the theory of the real, is necessarily compartmentalised into 
departmentalised sciences because it depends upon the procedure that attaches to its method, and therefore 
must, if it is to secure its object-areas, delimit those areas and localise them into compartments. Novel 
procedures necessarily lead to the compartmentalisation of modem science. Investigation of an object-area 
must, in the course of its work, agree with the particular form and modification possessed at any given time 
by the objects belonging to that area. This agreement with the particular transforms the procedure of a 
branch of science into specialised research. Specialisation is not a degeneration of modem science but is, 
rather, the necessary consequence of it. How do objects come to belong to an object-area? How do objects 
come to have particular form and modification? How is agreement between the particular and investigation 
achieved? He argued (pp. 170-1) that new scientific questions and specialisations occur through the “border 
traffic” across the boundaries between delimited object-areas. These boundaries provide the “source of a 
special impetus” that produces new questions and specialisation However, Heidegger conceded that this 
“source” was itself enigmatic and, consequently, so was the essence of science. According to Heidegger, 
the “inconspicuous state of affairs” which conceals the essence of science can be revealed by taking 
particular sciences as examples and attending specifically to whatever is the case regarding the ordering, in 
any given instance, of the objectness belonging to the object-area of those sciences (p.171).15 For 
Heidegger, physics (in which he included macrophysics, atomic physics, astrophysics, and chemistry) 
observes Nature insofar as Nature exhibits itself as inanimate. Nature is observed in its manifestation as the 
objectness of coherence of motion of material bodies. The elementary objects of classical mechanics were
15 Lovitt noted (fn.25) that “state of affairs” translates the noun Sachverhalt but a more literal rending 
would be “relating or conjoining of matters”,
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the motions of geometrical points, in nineteenth century physics these objects were fields and atoms, and in 
the twentieth century the interaction of elementary particles is the manifestation of the “impenetrability of 
the corporeal” (pp. 171-2). However, an understanding of the "source of special impetus” is essential for an 
understanding of modem experimental physics. How do the boundaries between object-areas produce this 
“special impetus”? What is transferred in the “border traffic”? How are new questions and specialisations 
produced? Heidegger, by generalising from Galileo’s Assayer, Newton’s Principia, and Heisenberg’s 
positivistic interpretation of quantum mechanics, had not attended to modem experimental physics closely 
enough, and, consequently, was compelled to consider the source of novelty and the essence of modem 
physics to be enigmatic. However, if we attend to how experimental physics is actually done, and what it is 
actually done to, then we can attend to the specific ordering of the objectness belonging to particular object- 
areas of physics without preconceiving, from the onset, the nature o f the object o f that pursuit. Throughout 
this thesis, I have attempted to show that this object-area is strata of machines, techniques, and their 
associated techno-phenomena. The laws abstracted from the alethic modalities16 of the contours of machine 
agency are techneic. They are the produced results of exoframed labour processes.
Heidegger was correct to locate epochs of change, such as the change from classical physics to 
quantum physics, in the experience and determination of the objectness of the appropriate object-sphere, 
whilst emphasising that the essence of modem physics remains unchanged. However, for Heidegger, “in 
the most recent phase of atomic physics” the object vanished Heidegger (p. 173) alluded to a change in the 
objectiveness of Nature into “the constancy determined from out of Enframing” and made reference to The 
Question Concerning Technology. Heidegger noted, in reference to the Wilson cloud chamber, the Geiger 
counter, and the balloon flights to detect mesons, that modem subatomic physics, despite its aim to make 
elementary particles exhibit themselves for sensory perception, can only provide indirect, via a multiplicity 
of technical intermediaries, self-exhibiting of elementary particles. It is this indirectness which Heidegger 
alluded to as being indicative of the dominance of Ge-stell, as a fundamental change in the experience and 
determination of objectness, in the most recent phase of physics. Unfortunately he did not discuss this 
further. I agree with Heidegger's characterisation of modem physics as a mathematical projection of a 
ground-plan of the objectness of motion and his emphasis on work in the capturing of representations of 
Nature. However, by presuming that the object of experimentation in pre-quantum physics was present to 
perception, Heidegger revealed his bi-partite structure of experimental physics in terms of law-object. 
Given that, for Heidegger, law is something that we project over the phenomena in terms of cause-effect 
relations in order to map out the changing of the changeable, then the objects of investigation remains those 
aspects of Nature that are amenable to this project. It is an implicit consequence of Heidegger's analysis that 
the progressive criterion for selection of law could only be one of empirical adequacy of the laws 
description of the cause-effect relations to the changing of the changeable within the object-sphere. Thus 
Heidegger marked out “the most recent phase of atomic physics” as something distinctly given over to Ge-
16 These are the determinations of the estimated possibilities, actualities, necessities, impossibilities, and 
contingencies of the reproduced interactions between human interventions and machine performances.
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stell because the objects of its object-sphere are unavailable to direct perception. Heidegger’s interpretation 
of the aim of experimental physics as being directed towards the mathematical projection of law describing 
the coherence of motion of its objects, and the constancy of the changing of the changeable, betrays his 
positivistic conception of science in general and physics in particular. In essence the aim of science, on 
Heidegger's account, is that of empirical description in terms of universal law. This should be unsurprising, 
given that Heidegger’s two exemplars of scientific endeavour are Newton and Heisenberg, and that in 
Germany, at the time of Heidegger’s writing positivism was the dominant conception of science. I am not 
suggesting that Heidegger was a positivist (far from it!) but his conception of the goal of science was 
positivistic. Thus, for Heidegger, the object disappears in subatomic physics because it can not be directly 
revealed to sensory experience. However, the aim of modem experimental physics has always been the 
disclosure of mechanisms, and its ontology has had a tri-partite structure (object, law, and mechanism) 
since the sixteenth century. Particle physics is unconcerned with the detection of “particles”, mesons for 
example, except as a means of investigating its models of elementary particle interactions. Physicists do not 
seek the “truth/top quark” for its own sake but, rather, for the disclosure that success would bring. 
Mechanisms have never been brought into presence, as objects, but are central to causal explanations for 
“that which presences”. Here we can readily see how Heidegger's own phenomenological pre-occupation 
with “that which presences” obscured his view of the phenomena of experimental physics. Since Galileo, 
physics has had pretensions towards a “deeper” ontological relation with the mapping of temporal 
successions of cause-effect sequences than merely confirming or refuting the law. These explanations are 
given as the underlying workings of that which allows “that which presences” to presence. Is “the real” 
property an object or a mechanism? If “the real” was demonstrated in terms of the temporal sequences of 
cause-effect relations, as Heidegger claimed, then such sequential relations are characteristically 
phenomenal. “The real”, brought into discourse through die reality/appearance distinction, is more 
characteristic of the mechanisms that are proposed to link causes to effects and is not characteristic of the 
phenomenal. Thus the objectness of “that which presences” is taken to disclose “the real”. The objectness 
of the object-sphere and the constancy of the changing of changeable are means to the disclosure of “the 
real” as a mechanism of change. Modem experimental physics requires an appearance/reality distinction in 
which the object-sphere, procedure, methodology, and mathematical projection are tied together via a 
model of the mechanisms in operation in the changes of the changeable. It is the mechanistic model that 
allows mathematical projection, the object-sphere, methodology, procedure, law, and the ongoing activity 
of working towards securing representations, to fit together as a coherent process of research. Working 
novel experimental physics is not limited to sensory experience but, rather, explores what is disclosed by 
means o f sensory experience. Its object-spheres, object-areas, procedures, laws, advancing methodologies, 
and mathematical projections, have always been means to this end, and, in this respect, it changes the 
changeable in the object-sphere to suggest causal mechanisms which are “tested” by implementing them in 
the ongoing technological procedures of experimentation. Thus the use of objects as standing-reserve 
available for future use and ordering has been central to experimental physics since its onset. Ge-stell has
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been characteristic of modem experimental physics since its origins in the science of mechanics. Ge-stell 
has been operational within the unfolding and ordering of the ontology of experimental physics in all of its 
object-areas (i.e. mechanics, optics, thermodynamics, electromagnetism, acoustics, solid state physics, 
atomic physics, and subatomic physics) and is not restricted to the “most recent phase in atomic physics”. 
Heidegger’s positivistic conception of modem science concealed the operation of Ge-stell in experimental 
physics and, consequently, concealed the technological essence of modem experimental physics.
What Heidegger misunderstood is the objective of the pursuit of experimental physics. 
Experimental physics does not pursue the objects of its object-spheres, nor its object-areas, nor the 
“objectness of Nature”. Heidegger was correct to have considered objectness to be essential to the setting 
up of modem sciences in general and modem physics in particular, as a methodologically and procedurally 
secured mathematical research projection of the ground-plan of its object-sphere. Modem experimental 
physics could have not begun nor operate without this set-up. However, we need to look closer than 
Heidegger did and actually attend to the original object-sphere of modem experimental physics. This 
object-sphere was the six simple machines: the wheel and axle, the wedge, the lever, the inclined plane, the 
screw, and the balance. Each one of these machines is the material exemplar of a mechanical motion, this 
object-sphere was the first machine-family, and the mathematical project of mechanics was to determine the 
fundamental principles of their motions. The mathematical science of mechanics provided the “template” 
for all subsequent physics. The object of experimental physics is machine performativity, whether a 
pendulum or neutrino detector, and that this object could only be conceived as natural by presupposing 
mechanical realism. Particular specialisations in experimental physics have distinct machine-kinds as their 
objects. The ontology of experimental physics is limited to machine performativity, kinds, and families. 
Particular specialisations are delimited by specific machine-families, and that novelty and new 
specialisations arise from the innovative interconnection (the relating and conjoining) of machine-kinds. On 
this account, the function of an object-sphere is to disclose the fundamental mechanisms that generate the 
cause-effect relations actively produced and investigated by modem experimental physics. Modem 
experimental physics is only concerned with the motion of matter insofar as it discloses those fundamental 
mechanisms. In order to understand this disclosure we need to attend the nature of mechanisms and power.
Mechanisms and Power:
Bhaskar stated that things possess powers and liabilities in virtue of their internal structure (1975, pp. 87- 
90). He adopted a Lockean notion of “real essences” in his claim that its microstructure or internal 
constitution determines the powers of a thing17 His notions of “power unrealised” and “power unexercised” 
rest upon this notion. Bhaskar defined a power as unrealised when the power of something to act in a 
certain way is thwarted by the power of another thing. He defined a power as unexercised when a thing is 
not in the context in which it can exercise its power. Bhaskar identified power as belonging to the thing in 
question and, thereby, had an atomistic conception of power. He used this conception to identify the
17 Cf. Locke, J., An Essay Concerning Human Understanding m, HI, 13.
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essence of a thing.
“Dogs cannot fly or turn into stones, but they can move around the world and baric in all kinds of ways.” 
(1975, p. 112).
However, by identifying “moving” and “barking” as the powers that identify the essence of a dog, Bhaskar 
used an Aristotelian schema. This is at odds with Locke’s definition of real essence. Aristotle’s definition 
of a thing’s essence as “being what something is” in virtue of the matter of that thing possessing a certain 
form.18 The identification of the essence of a thing, as an empirical problem, involved the identification of 
which characteristics are essential in the sense of being causally fundamental to the identification of that 
thing as a member of a specific kind. This was not done in terms of a microstructure, or hidden reality, but 
was done according to the phenomenal appearance of a thing. The characteristics of barking, moving, four- 
leggedness, etc., were clustered as a multiplicity of characteristics for the purpose of classifying an 
individual as a member of a species. The classification of an individual as a dog involves an assertion of a 
set of normal canine characteristics within an environment that is taken to be natural for dogs. The dogs 
involved in the Soviet space program not only flew but also reached an orbit of the Earth. The dogs of the 
Palaeolithic on display in museums have petrified into stone. Dogs cannot bark in a vacuum or underwater. 
They cannot move around the world when they are caged or trapped in a box. Bhaskar, by associating 
barking and moving as the powers of dogs, was simultaneously asserting a normal environment for dogs to 
be in and a normal set of interactions within that environment. By doing this, he had not only presented an 
atomistic account of power but had also hidden an account of a normal existence for certain kinds of being. 
My objection to Bhaskar is not that he had presumed that outer space is not a natural environment for a 
dog. My objection is the hidden appeal to norms that Bhaskar attempted to use to rhetorically move from 
dogs to a general account of power in terms of mechanisms. This arbitrarily asserts conventions and pre­
empts the scientific inquiry he advocated. In Locke’s terms, Bhaskar identified a “nominal essence” as a 
“real essence”. Such statements are merely a conventional association of the predicate of a sentence as the 
property of the subject. Bhaskar’s normic and atomistic association of powers are merely a consequent of 
standard uses of language and do not, necessarily, reflect any natural order of things (except via assertion). 
They are an example of episteme, in Foucault’s (1994) sense. Such statements reflect how Bhaskar 
substituted a transitive dimension of certain language structures as an intransitive dimension of “Nature”. 
This is an expression of the extent that he is a prisoner of the thought of the past. He does not provide any 
necessary nor sufficient reason why we should follow suit. We can interpret power as contextual and the 
power of dogs to bark, move, turn into stone, or fly, arises through the contexts in which dogs are agential 
participants. Bhaskar attempted to describe the things of open systems, i.e. dogs, in terms appropriate to die 
things of closed systems, i.e. mechanisms. Bhaskar attempted to simultaneously adopt an Aristotelian 
empirical analysis of the phenomenal characteristics of things in their natural environment and a Lockean
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analysis of things in terms of their internal mechanics.
If things exercise and realise powers and liabilities in virtue of the contexts in which they are 
situated, as Bhaskar claimed at first, then his attribution of powers to the things themselves was contingent. 
If the attribution of powers and liabilities to things is based upon their possible interaction, and possible 
outcomes, with other things, as Bhaskar later claimed to recognise (p. 88), then it was arbitrary to attribute 
powers to the things themselves rather than the interaction between things. If the powers are attributed to 
the interaction between things then there can be no notion of either “power unrealised” or “power 
unexercised” because both of these are merely statements of the absence of any empowering interaction. 
They are reconstructions. For example, the power of a hydrogen atom to combine with a chlorine atom, 
under suitable conditions, to produce a molecule of hydrochloric acid is not, as Bhaskar claimed (p. 109), 
necessarily a property of the “internal electronic structure”, but is, alternatively, a property of all the agents 
involved in the interaction. This will include the presence of a hydrogen atom, a chlorine atom, and the 
suitable conditions. It will also include all the conditions in virtue of which hydrogen and chlorine atoms 
exist and are brought together. It is a power of the whole process of reproduction, from beginning to end 
Thus we do not need a notion of “power unexercised” to describe the inability of hydrogen to produce 
hydrochloric acid when chlorine is absent. Nor do we need a notion of “power unrealised” to describe the 
inability of hydrogen and chlorine to produce hydrochloric acid if the conditions are unsuitable for the 
reaction. Hydrogen has no power to produce hydrochloric acid at all. Only the whole interactive process of 
hydrochloric acid production has this power, and hydrogen is only an agent in this process. Hydrogen has 
no power, exercised or unexercised, realised or unrealised, in isolation, as an atom By adopting a 
mechanical conception of essence, Bhaskar defined the is-ness of a thing is defined in terms of what that 
thing does. Thus die being of any thing is de-limited by its productive agency in context, and the 
knowledge of a thing within a context of production is techneic rather than epistemic. Given that hydrogen 
is only identifiable qua hydrogen in virtue of what it repeatably does in certain kinds of interaction then it 
has no identity in isolation Can we say that something without power, without identity, exists? Not on 
Bhaskar’s mechanistic account. In my view, this forced Bhaskar's hand He rhetorically stepped outside his 
mechanistic account in two ways to preserve his mechanistic account. Firstly, he defined an entity in terms 
of what it has the potential to do. Secondly, he defined a set of normal conditions in which an entity would 
exercise its potential. However, by insisting that the potentials of entities were to be determined by 
experimental science, he has presented the closed system as i f  it were the normal conditions of an entity. 
Thus how an entity is revealed by science is how die entity truly is, if it were not for the interference of 
other entities in the messy open system. However, this causes Bhaskar serious problems. If something, say 
hydrogen, is identified in terms of what it repeatably does in certain kinds of interaction, and repeatability 
(as a deterministic regularity) only occurs within closed systems, as Bhaskar claimed, then without the 
notions of “power unexercised”, or “power unrealised”, then objects, such as hydrogen atoms, cannot be 
said to exist in open systems at all. When we claim that we detect the presence of hydrogen in an open 
system, we have, in Bhaskar's terms, subjected the open system to closure by using the artificial closed
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system of the detection apparatus. The detection of hydrogen requires certain kinds of interaction to take 
the form of constant conjunctions. This may at first sight seem strange but the power of a hydrogen 
detection device to detect hydrogen in an open system is not simply a matter of hydrogen being present in 
the open system. It is characteristic of an interactive technological process of closure in terms of a 
deterministic confirmation or denial of the existence of hydrogen according to an anticipation of what the 
detectable properties of hydrogen are. This is itself a productive process. The interactive behaviour of 
hydrogen, its is-ness, is dependent upon what it interacts with, if we adopt the mechanists’ view. The 
identity of hydrogen is dependent upon a context in which hydrogen can only be said to be a participant. 
The term “hydrogen detection” is an index for a set of interactions within that context It can only be said to 
have transcontextural identity, transfactuality, to the extent that its contexts of interaction have a shared set 
of participants. The contexts of using hydrogen in the production of hydrochloric acid and as the nuclear 
reactant in fusion bombs are taken to be independent because die processes of the industrial extraction and 
production of quantities of hydrogen, required by both chemical and nuclear utilisations of hydrogen, and 
the shared hydrogen identification instruments used to check purity, are not taken into account. Once we 
take the shared production processes and identification instruments into account then we can see how the 
so-called “independent contexts” are, in fact, historically and technologically related via machinic agency. 
The transcontextural, or transfactural, identity of hydrogen is a product of concealing the shared processes 
and instruments within the so-called “independent contexts”. The transcontexturality arises by concealing 
the overlapping of technological enframents and machine-kinds. Furthermore, the processes of 
hydrochloric acid production, in closed systems, require technological processes for their empowerment. 
Thus the power to produce hydrochloric acid is a property of these technological processes, within which 
hydrogen and chlorine are agents. These technological processes empower the mechanised interaction of 
agents, including human interventions and machine performances. The power to produce hydrochloric acid 
arises through the interaction of all these agents and cannot be isolated from the context of interaction. It is 
a property of the technological enframent that brings together and interacts these diverse agents.
Bhaskar's account of power, causes, and mechanisms in open systems may well provide the 
conventional structure of a realist theory but it does not, in practice, provide us with any method by which 
we can identify which are necessary and which are apparent (i.e. the effects of “deeper” causes, powers, or 
mechanisms). To use Bhaskar’s examples, an unhappy childhood or a stray bullet (pi 19) are only 
identifiable as causes in hindsight, by isolating them from the phenomenal continuum of existence. This 
kind of isolating act is both artificial and arbitrary because (1) such “causes” are simultaneously “effects”; 
(2) we cannot know whether such “causes” were actually responsible for the “effects” that we ascribe to 
them. We can unpack the “causes” of any phenomenon as the “effects” of other “causes” ad infinitum. The 
unhappy childhood may have been caused by the parents’ neglect of the child or the stray bullet may have 
been caused by the distracting effect of the bark of a dog, etc. These other “causes”, in term, can be 
unpacked as “effects” of further causes. The parents’ neglect of the child may have caused by their unhappy 
marriage or the bark of the dog may have been caused by the presence of next door’s cat, etc. There will
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also always be a plurality of possible alternative “cause-effect” sequences for any phenomenon. The 
unhappy childhood may have been caused by the child’s own lack of self-worth, the stray bullet may have 
been caused by the gunman’s own fear of dogs, etc. In total, the cause-effect structure of any phenomenon 
is a non-linear structure without scale: an infinite pluralistic continuum of imaginable possibilities. We are 
faced with an indeterminate chaos of possible “causes-effect sequences” for any phenomenon in open 
systems. The action of a closed system is to produce an actual “cause-effect sequence” from this 
indeterminate chaos. It is arbitrary to take the single resultant chain as the only possible one. Furthermore, 
due to the unrepeatability of phenomena in open systems, each “cause-effect sequence” will be temporarily 
open, dynamic, and incomplete. We cannot have any law-like knowledge of the causes of the phenomena 
of open systems. If we resort to claims of plausibility for any single “cause-effect sequence”, in open 
systems, then we are no longer proposing “necessary connections” but “probable connections” instead 
However, the establishment of “probable connections”, as an establishment of likelihood, can only be made 
with reference to the expectations of a social group, and, as such, is made rhetorically in terms of the 
experiences and prejudices of that group. “Probable connections” are not universal and their establishment 
is a local social construct A different social group, with different expectations, will have a different 
estimation of the likelihood of any “probable connection”. Furthermore, “probable connections” are 
themselves the product of the reconstructive analysis of the history of the phenomenon in question. We 
should not divorce the agencies brought together to perform that analysis from the products of that analysis.
Bhaskar maintained that the identification of “mechanisms” must be left to die experimental 
sciences. Mechanisms, by definition, are indices for the repeatable processes by which a cause generates 
effects. On my account, these can only be identified in closed systems and are restricted to the artificial 
contexts of experimental sciences. Bhaskar did not provide us with any reason why we should believe that 
“mechanisms” occur in open systems at all. By the qualification that they are “repeatable”, a quality denied 
by Bhaskar to the phenomena of open systems, there are good reasons why “mechanisms”, even by 
Bhaskar’s account, could be taken to only occur in closed systems. My argument is that “mechanisms” are 
ontologically restricted to the kinds of machine-families and productive contexts in which they occur. They 
are technological objects and do not necessarily occur in Nature at all. They are the products of a 
technoscientific process that is itself empowered through its non-linear relations within the wider world. 
Once the technoscientific character of the experimental sciences has been addressed then the realist notion 
of “causal power” is open to the criticisms that it is overly simplistic, culturally situated, uncritically 
supportive of the status quo, and reactionaiy. It is the reification of technique as neutral and normal. The 
inter-relationships between technosciences, and the wider world, in which they are situated, need to be 
analysed in terms of complexity rather than causality. This approach attempts to situate the modem 
experimental sciences within “the big picture” and phenomenologically understand modem science from 
within as broad a social and historical perspective as is possible. Science, technology, human agency, and 
human experience (in the technoscientific cultures and societies of the current era) permeate and penetrate 
each other to such an extent that it is impossible to separate them. The relationships between technoscience
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and the world in which it is situated are understandable in terms of non-linear “feed-back” loops in which 
both are defined and transformed in relation to the other. Modem science legitimates and circumscribes 
definitions of “Nature” whilst being legitimated and circumscribed by society, culture, technology, human 
agency, and human experience. These definitions of “Nature” are then used to legitimate and circumscribe 
science, technology, society, culture, human agency, and human experience. On my account, the primary 
relationships between scientific discourse and “Nature” are reproduced relationships of power and agency 
situated within a mechanistic world-picture. The scientific attempts to identify “truth”, “efficiency”, 
“natural law”, and “causality”, are attempts to reproduce techniques, interpretations, practices, values, 
dogma, institutions, orthodoxy, and authority, through acts of closure and the exercise of social power, in 
the face of contingency, plurality, controversy, and chaos. They are attempts to impose order upon the 
world.
The directions of scientific research have been bound up with political, commercial, and military 
ambitions since its beginning. Physicists have contributed to the development of military technologies from 
the sixteenth century Venetian Arsenal to the twentieth century Manhattan Project. The “big science” 
projects, such as CERN, are only possible because of massive international co-operation and the 
development of the “atom-splitting” technologies of military weapon research and civilian electricity 
generation.19 Research projects are selected and shaped by the criteria of nation states, industries, religious 
groups, corporations, bureaucracies, universities, entrepreneurs, and military planners. They are chosen 
according to estimations of their value, productivity, feasibility, and results, by the groups that provide the 
resources required for those projects. They are selected and shaped according to the criteria of social 
interests and are dependent upon social structures, agencies, and powers for their existence. The realist 
notion of scientific rationality is not easily sustained once we address the extent that technosciences are 
embedded in trans-scientific fields of Ge-stell. The claim for the rationality, truth, and universality of the 
technoscientific enterprises of Ge-stell is simultaneously a claim for the legitimacy, power, and 
globalisation of Ge-stell. It is for this reason that scientific realism has been heavily criticised by social 
theorists, political theorists, psychologists, phenomenologists, and philosophers.20 These writers largely
19 See Galison (1987) andKrige (1989) for historical accounts of the development of experimental physics 
at CERN. I would like to add that the CRAY supercomputer used to process the massive amounts of data 
generated by the CERN detectors (ALEPH, OPAL, DELPHI, and L3) is itself a product of US military 
research.
20 Cf. Gordo-Lopez & Parker (1999); Stiegler (1998); Aronowitz et al. (eds.) (1996); Pickering (1995, 
1992,1987); Adomo (1994); Fuller (1993); Street (1992); Haraway (1991,1989); Ihde (1991,1983,1979); 
Latour (1991, 1987); Jamison (1989); Yearly (1988); Bijker et al. (eds.) (1987); Habermas (1987, 1971); 
Elsea (1986, 1983); Harding (ed) (1986); Ince (1986); Kenny (1986); Marcus (ed) (1986); Jonas (1984, 
1974); Hughes (1983); Baudrillard (1981); Knorr-Cetina (1981); Levidow & Young (eds.) (1981); Latour 
&Woolgar (1979); Durbin (1978,1972); Winner (1977); Horkheimer (1974); Hall (1972); Mathias (1972); 
Mathias (ed) (1972); Greenberg (1967); Gadamer (1966); Marcuse (1966); and Arendt (1958).
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present themselves as directed towards the development of free and just human relations within the 
technoscientific cultures of Western Civilisation. They have taken an ethical stance against the dominance 
of technosciences within modem society and culture, because they hold that Western Civilisation is an 
inherently unjust and dominating mode of social organisation because of its obsession with power and 
advantage. Their critiques of science and technology are effectively moral critiques. These writers identify 
the technoscience of physics as an historical, cultural, and moral phenomenon, that can not be isolated from 
the contexts and trajectories in which it is embedded and emergent from, and can not be considered as 
ethically neutral. It is from within this “tradition” that I wish to situate this thesis. However, in my view, if 
we aim to understand how experimental physics, as a “technoscience”, has achieved the status of a “natural 
science”, then we need to understand how science and technology have been “internally” connected 
through the mathematical science of mechanics. This is evident in Locke’s notion of primary and secondary 
qualities. This distinction is itself a product of the technological enframent of phenomena. That which can 
be mechanised and mathematically abstracted is considered primary, objective, and part of non-human 
nature. That which can not is considered secondary, subjective, and part of human nature. This distinction 
is itself a technological enframent of human thinking which transforms the limits of machines and 
mathematics into the boundaries of Nature and human psychology. This establishment of a dualism 
between the objective and subjective is a metaphorical de-centring of the relations between humans and 
machines. Once Nature was reduced by this technological enframent then the nonhuman nature of 
machines could be presented as the nonhuman nature of objective pre-scientific reality. This move is itself 
the two-fold process of reification of machine performances into idealised mathematical abstraction and the 
subsequent removal of the machine from the account This leaves us with the writing on “the Book of 
Nature”. All models in physics are based on the conceptual instrument of mechanisation, the mechanisation 
of Nature, and consequently models are seen as essential tools for describing the processes of Nature; and 
consequently, the central question in modem physics is: how does Nature work? This is the “intransitive 
dimension” of physics.
It is this approach that reveals the extent that episteme has been transformed by modem physics in 
order to be presented as a techneic answer in terms of general and abstract causal principles which take the 
form of mathematically abstracted mechanisms. The centrality of this question to modem physics reveals 
the extent to which techne as a directional principle and episteme as a directional principle have 
converged. Techne has become exoframed and episteme has become mechanised. The distinction has been 
shifted by the historical development of epistemic techne and techneic episteme, where the former is the 
knowledge of mechanical principles involved in an experiment and the latter is the knowledge of 
mechanical principles of Nature itself. The single point of distinction between these two is that the former 
has the experimenter as the efficient cause and the latter has “the inner workings of Nature” as the efficient 
cause. The work of modem physics is to generate a praxis that removes the experimenter from the account. 
What is left is then taken to be non-human Nature. This work can be done because nonhuman Nature has 
been constructed as the mathematically abstracted workings of nonhuman machines. This is the
206
methodological work of mechanical realism. The machines themselves, through mathematical abstraction, 
have been removed from the account and the transformed techne is presented as episteme. What has made 
this transformation possible? This transformation is possible because the nature of episteme was historically 
pre-empted and techne and episteme have been treated as metaphors for one another. This pre-emption 
allowed two important desires to be offered a source of satisfaction The first was the possibility of a 
comprehensible world picture of the world, human beings, and how human beings are situated in the world. 
The second, was the promise of novel experiences and novel powers as the fruit of human labour and skill 
at making. The mathematical science of mechanics offered the second; the mechanical world-view 
promised the first. Furthermore, the conflation between techne and episteme in experimental physics is the 
transformation of the ideals of the human character: the Baconian dream for the human character was that 
of a rational material agent whose primary function was to labour, and whose reward would be new powers 
and new challenges for labour. Heidegger argued (1939, p.220) that modem science treats phusis as if it 
were a self-making artifact and has been interpreted as if it were a kind of techne. Heidegger posited that 
this interpretation of phusis is a consequence of the modem metaphysical conception of the essence of 
“nature” as a “technique”. For Heidegger (1999, p.259), the essence of materialism does not consist in the 
assertion that the world is exhausted by the physical interactions between particles of inanimate matter, but, 
consists in a metaphysics that reduces every being to a material available for labour. The articulation of this 
metaphysics was anticipated, according to Heidegger, in Hegel's Phenomenology o f Spirit as the self- 
establishing process of unconditional production, experienced in human existence as subjectivity, is the 
objectification of the actual. The essence of materialism was concealed by the essence of technology, Ge- 
stell, and, as a derivation of techne as a mode of aletheia, is a form of truth and rendering beings manifest. 
As a form of truth, modem technology is grounded in the history of metaphysics. Heidegger wrote
“The greatest care must be fostered upon the ethical bond at a time when technological human beings, 
delivered over to mass society, can attain reliable constancy only by gathering and ordering all their plans 
and activities in a way that corresponds to technology.” (1999, p.268)
This still leaves us with the question of what is a technological human being. To that end, we need to take a 
closer look at artifice itself. What is artifice?
The Meaning of Artifice:
If we treat technology as the making and using of tools, techniques, procedures, materials, resources, skills, 
and machines, as means to ends, as embodied in our everyday practices, then it is largely an unreflective 
activity. Technology largely remains an unattended to preconscious background, directed towards 
unreflected-upon ends, that produces and manipulates unreflected-upon objects. Put simply, any technology 
is a collection of tools, techniques, procedures, materials, resources, skills, and machines. Artifice is the 
skill of how and when to use specific technologies in order to manipulate things in the world to achieve
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specific desired goods (or ends). Artifice is skilled technology use. We largely take it for granted. By 
embodying artifice, human beings are enframed by, and immersed in, technologies that extend beyond the 
individual human body. Technologies are socially organised structures that, through the embodiment of 
artifice, are integrated into the agency of the individual human body and organise that agency. Artifice 
involves acts and effects of inscribing and making.21 Inscribing is an act of writing, carving, drawing,, 
marking, or measuring. Making is an act manipulating things in the world to bring other things into the 
world. Artifice involves a spatial and temporal ordering of productive practices, in order to effect change, 
transform things into other things, and brings things into the world. Artifice enframes material practices, 
inscriptive practices, materials, and human bodies. It is an ordering structure that directs the practices 
through which things are brought together, arranged in temporal and spatial sequences, and transformed 
into other things. Artifice is effective through being embodied in human activities involving materials and 
inscriptions. In order to become technological, a human being must embody the material and inscriptive 
practices that artifice imposes. The motility and intentionality of the body is enframed by the template of 
artifice. The would-be skilled practitioner must leam how to use specific tools to perform specific 
activities, upon specific materials, to transform those materials into specific products. S/he must also leam 
how to use specific tools to perform specific inscriptive activities, upon those specific materials, as part of 
the productive processes of the artifice of carpentry. By habitually embodying these activities in practice 
the would-be skilled practitioner becomes a skilled practitioner and is empowered to make specific 
products. The process of embodiment of the enframent of practices upon materials is an embodiment of the 
discipline/power of artifice. The discipline/power of artifice generates productive human agency qua 
technological human being upon specific things in the world Human agency qua technological human 
being is directed, through embodied artifice, towards a horizon of specific ends or goods. The process of 
transformation of specific things into other specific things brings things that did not exist before into the 
world. Embodied artifice upon materials towards a horizon of specific ends is a process of poiesis: bringing 
entities forth into the world It is this that for Aristotle, and Heidegger, related techne to phusis. Techne 
“brought forth” the Object through the agency of the craftsman upon the materials. Phusis “brought forth” 
itself without the aid of the craftsman. Phusis was bringing forth in the highest sense, for both Aristotle and 
Heidegger.
Tools are extensions of the body.22 Tools extend the controlling organ, or limb, of the human 
body; they are an “organ projection”.23 This extensional relation between tools and the human body has 
existential import upon human agency in terms of power, identity, and the horizon of our poieUc 
possibilities. Tool use has to be learned The controlling organ, or limb, must be disciplined to use a tool
21 The etymology of artifice is from the latin artifex: one possessed of a specific skill. This derives from ars 
(skill) andfacere (to make). [OED]
22 Cassirer (1928), Kapp (1877), Emerson (1860), Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics 7.9.1241 b24), Ihde (1979, 
1983).
23 Cf. Kapp (1877, pp. 44-5) for a discussion of the idea of “organ projection”..
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effectively. Human agency is both constrained and empowered through extension. Discipline/power are the 
Janus-faces of artifice. Tools achieve their effectiveness through labour.24 Tools amplify and reduce human 
experience and capabilities by shaping the embodiment relations in which they gain their effectiveness. 
Hammers amplify the agential power of the human hand by reducing its motile freedom, sensitivity, and 
softness. Microscopes and telescopes amplify the perceptive potentials of the human eye by reducing the 
depth and breadth of vision. Tools exchange increased power for the naturalness of the human experience. 
They extend human manipulative power and the field of material practices for achieving specified ends. By 
constraining and empowering human agency, artifice channels and extends human agency towards an 
otherwise unobtainable horizon of possibilities. Artifacts, such as computers, measuring instruments, and 
maps, organise and order technographe to extend the human capacity to manipulate, record, and visualise 
abstractions. Instruments, such as thermometers and weighing scales, organise and order parts of the world 
in terms of abstract quantities. These devices are effective in virtue of being embedded in a set of 
interpretive and inscriptive practices.23 The human cognitive imagination is enhanced and channelled as 
technologies extend the human capacities for intellectual agency at the expense of absolute freedom of 
thought. The human agent can exert considerable creativity and free play when using these technologies 
only to the extent that s/he acquires the appropriate artifice for achieving specified ends an otherwise 
unobtainable horizon of projected alethic modalities.
Artifice provides an otherwise ineffective and undisciplined body with agency and intentionality. 
Hie existence of specific artifices permits the existence of specific intentions. Artifices provide us with 
both means and ends. They shape intentionality and agency by shaping the horizon of possibilities available 
to us, as well as the ways of reaching that horizon It is this set-up of this shaping that Heidegger refered to 
as destining. Ge-stell is involved in what it is to be a technological human being. Human life entails an 
interactive relationship between intentionality and artifice, and, consequently, “human nature” is not given 
by “Nature” but is created by disciplined and empowered agencies. Human life is projected beyond 
“organic necessities” in terms of self-interpretive and self-creative destining that start from a challenge and 
ends with its material realisation. Human beings utilise techniques. The interactive relationship between 
intentionality and artifice, in order to realise projects, and consequently “human nature”, is itself technically 
mediated through the template of how to proceed. The centrality of technique to human technological 
existence, and consequently “human nature”, cannot be overestimated However, there is not a singular set 
of techniques for each project. For some projects there are no available techniques (e.g. interstellar travel, 
world peace, immortality, or time travel) and consequently they remain in the human imagination, fears, 
dreams, and desires. They are barely challenges. For other projects there are a plurality of techniques (e.g. 
burning fossil fuel, building nuclear power stations and their networks, building wind power turbines, 
building tidal power ducts, and using solar power technologies, are techniques for electricity generation).
24 Cassier (1928), Heidegger (1962), Lukacs (1978), and Ihde (1979).
25 Cassirer (1928); Ihde (1979).
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The question is: how do we choose between them? We should not be radically individualistic and locate the 
origin of challenges and the destining of their satisfaction in the imagination of the human-subject. This 
would ignore the social origins of human aims and ends. It would also ignore the technological origins of 
human aims and ends. Furthermore, if we take technology to be the means by which we move from the 
challenge to realisation, but resist locating intentionality in the human-subject, then technique is itself only 
part of artifice. Artifice, by shaping both our horizon of possibilities and the means by which we reach it, 
provides both intentionality and techniques. Human agency, to the extent it is defined in terms of what 
human beings can do (as well as by what we can not do), is constructed through artifice and can not be 
simply taken to be created by human beings. “Human nature” is created by the power/discipline of artifice 
in the construction of human agency and the destining of the projected horizon of alethic modalities.26
Control can not be simply located in the human body. It is only once the embodiment of 
artifice has become transparent during the construction of the human agent qua technological human being, 
that control can be taken to be the property of the human agent. The centre of control lies in artifice itself. It 
operates between the human body and the objects to be transformed through discipline/power and 
embodiment relations of artifice. Poiesis is a labour process of feedback relations, mediated by artifice, 
between the human body and the objects to be transformed It is primarily a productive process directed 
towards the manufacture of specific products through feedback adjustments occurring between the 
practices, technologies, and the materials to be transformed I shall term this kind of labour process as an 
economic process. A carpenter making a chair to sit upon, give away, or sell, or a musician performing for 
pleasure, or for payment, are examples of economic processes. Economic relations with artifice and its 
horizon of specific goods are primary relationships. Can we make sense of Aristotle’s claim that techne 
“resides in the soul of the craftsman” and that the products of poiesis find their origin in the producer? As 
an enframent of practices and materials, using socially embedded technologies, artifice can only be said to 
be the property of a human agent in virtue of its successful embodiment. We would have to take Aristotle’s 
claims literally in order to make sense of them in terms of the definition of artifice as enframent. Techne 
would reside in the soul of the craftsman qua technological agent. If the soul of the eye is “to see” then the 
soul of the craftsman is “to craft”. The soul would be the destining of the craftsman qua craftsman. This 
soul is itself bom through the embodiment of artifice as a human body is transformed into a craftsman 
through such an embodiment. The products of poiesis find their origin in “the producer” in the sense that a 
human body is transformed into “the producer” through the successful embodiment of artifice. Artifice 
enframes through the disciple/power of ordered practice. It conceals itself by its embodiment in practice. 
Mastery occurs through the successful embodiment of practices as habitual practices conducted with 
confidence and productivity. The acquisition of technical expertise is not a mastery over artifice itself but, 
rather, a process of publicly becoming one of artifice's competent servants. The skilled craftsman is an
26 Of course, artifice is not the only characteristic of “human nature”. “Human nature” is also emergent 
through communicative narrative and social relations (i.e. love, trust, faith, laughter, happiness, authority, 
etc.). These can be transformed into techniques, but they can also be goods-in-themselves.
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exemplar of artifice rather than a master of it. The apprentice imitates the practices of the craftsman and, by 
doing so, participates in the perpetuation and dissemination of artifice. The craftsman, as an exemplar, is 
the focus of the apprentice's attention. S/he is taken to be the source of artifice and, consequently, the 
illusion of mastery is propagated. Furthermore, as the horizon of possibilities is sedimented into human life 
and artifice is taken to be the property of human masters, the intentionality made possible through artifice is 
taken to be simple human ends. Artifice is concealed as human means to human ends.
Now artifice has been discussed, I can return to the question of whether there are technai involved 
in the building of machines, especially experimental apparatus. If technai are involved, which definitions of 
techne are appropriate at which stage of the process of constructing experiments? Given the fact that techne 
is the term for craft-knowledge, and the Ancient Greeks are not famous for their experimental practices, it 
may well seem odd to the reader to characterise the knowledge at work in highly technological modem 
experimental physics in terms of ancient craft knowledge.27 My argument has been that, in order to 
understand the role of techne in modem experimental physics, we need to also understand the role of craft 
practices, mathematical practices, and hyle in experiments. The pre-socratic usage of techne captures 
something of Pickering’s term “accommodation” and also Hacking’s term “intervention”. The word hyle 
captures something of Pickering’s term “material agency” because it is emergent through productive 
practices. It also captures something of Gooding’s terms “the participation of Nature”, “recalcitrance”, 
"phenomenal chaos", and “plasticity”, in his description of the development of craft practices in the early 
experiments by Faraday. Plato and Aristotle’s definitions of techne were premised upon knowledge 
providing the highest degree of communicability, precision, and repeatability, on the basis of “a true course 
of reasoning”. This “true course of reasoning” is given in terms of the unchanging principles of change, 
and, as the knowledge of the Being of Becoming, is highly characteristic of the alethic structure of the 
theoretical knowledge of modem physics. This sense of the word techne is an important one for the 
characterisation of scientific knowledge aspired towards during experimentation because “the true course of 
reasoning", in modem physics, involves the reduction of natural processes by the question “how does it 
work?” It is constructed in terms of the mathematical representations of “natural mechanisms and causes” 
as guides to human interventions. Since Moletti and Galileo, the interchangeability of techne and episteme, 
based on the belief in the universality and etemality of mathematics, has provided experimental physics 
with an epistemological warrant for accessing the causal mechanisms of Nature by inscribing machines and 
mechanical ensembles. It is this sense of techne, as an ideal, that is applicable to experimental physics. If 
we take techne to be characteristic of the knowledge aimed for by building repeatable experiments, then 
hyle provides us with a meaningful term to express part of the phenomenological experience of 
experimentalists of the way that experiments “do their own thing” and resist perfect reproduction. Techne is 
concerned with complete knowledge given in terms of “a true course of reasoning”. Such knowledge,
27 According to Sambursky (1987) and Waterlow (1982) there was a notable lack of experimentation in 
Ancient Greece for a period of over 800 years. The works of Archimedes and the exploits of the legendary 
Daedalus were exceptional.
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should it occur in experimental physics, would be the end result of experimentation. In Gooding’s terms, it 
would lie upon the imagined asymptotic point of convergence. It would provide the abstract, general, and 
communicable knowledge of how to repeat the experiment.
Novel experiments must occur without techne or else there would not be an experiment. If  
experimentation is to be understood as a form of artifice then we need to define a different kind of 
productive process. This is the innovative process. In order to define innovative processes we need to 
analyse how artifice is formed and transformed. It is distinct from invention, which remains an economic 
process. Invention is the process by which a novel form of artifice is itself produced in order to achieve a 
specific end. The starting point is that of a challenge and what is lacking is the artifice to achieve it. 
Invention proceeds from a cultural technical background of artifices, technologies, tactics, and challenges, 
towards specific end products. Artifices, technologies, and tactics are selected from this cultural 
background with the aim of constructing an artifice, technology, and techne, which will produce the desired 
product. This constructive process is itself one of the convergence of technological objects from strata of 
machine-families and integrating them into a unified technological object. These diverse artifices, 
technologies, and challenges, are brought-together, ordered, and integrated towards the projected 
asymptotic horizon of techne. Diverse artifices, technologies, and technological objects each constitute a 
centre of transformative discipline/power in their own right. The process of integration requires bringing- 
together these diverse centres of transformative discipline/power into a coherent single centre of 
transformative discipline/power. Constructing a new process of destining is itself the object of invention. 
The construction of destining, the conclusion of the ordering process, is itself the construction of the 
desired artifice. This process is an undetermined process. We cannot know, from the onset, whether or not 
an artifice, and its technologies, can be produced to produce the desired outcome. Whether a time-travel 
machine, an anagathic anti-ageing pill, or a cure for cancer can be invented is undetermined This remains 
undetermined even when the desired product is produced. The destining, challenges, and transformative 
powers of even burning coal have yet to be determined The “trial and error" processes, readily 
characterised by Pickering's phrase "a dialectic of accommodation and resistance", are an extension of the 
technological background The generalisation of this process into an abstract and communicable form of 
knowledge is the construction of a techne. This can be disseminated as instructions of how to repeat the 
process of production. Experimental physics is inventive when the aim of the experiment is to construct an 
apparatus to perform a specific task, measurement, or manipulation. Thompson was inventive when he 
constructed a means to measure the charge to mass ratio of a cathode ray by devising the means to 
manipulate and inscribe a cathode ray in a cathode ray tube. The construction of the techne of how to repeat 
this experiment brought the Thompson experiment into the public realm. It was also presented, via its 
techne, a something causally understood. Innovation occurs when the productive possibilities of artifice are 
explored in the absence of a specific end product. This is an alethic process of mapping out the horizon of 
productive possibilities and the routes that a particular artifice takes to reach them. When a musician 
explores the productive possibilities of her/his instrument, without aiming to compose a specific musical
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piece, s/he is engaged in a process of innovation. For innovation to occur there must already exist an 
artifice and its technologies. However, artifice and its technologies must be underdetermined, in the sense 
that all of their productive possibilities, and their uses, have yet to be determined. The process of innovation 
is the process of determining the productive possibilities of artifice and the uses of its technologies. For 
example, music is a complex of artifices, technologies, and challenges. These artifices and technologies are 
underdetermined because, as of yet, all their productive possibilities have not been performed and written 
and, consequently, the artifices of composition and performance are not fully explored. Novel experimental 
physics also takes the form of innovation The international community of physicists and engineers at 
CERN are in the process of exploring the productive possibilities of the LEP ring and LHC machines. The 
Lancaster Ultra-Low Temperature Physics group is exploring the productive possibilities of their dilution 
refrigerators. These projects are an underdetermined complex of artifices, technologies, and challenges. 
Their task is one of innovation. Innovative processes are more sophisticated than economic processes. 
Processes of this kind are both the subject and the object of themselves. An innovative process is fedback 
onto itself as both its own means and its own end. In these processes the development of the process is 
itself the product of itself. It is a non-linear process that turns upon itself to explore its own possibilities. It 
involves the feedback of the uncontrolled control of control back into the process as control-as-information. 
In experimental physics, as in music, this involves mapping out the contours of human interventions and 
machine performativity. The physicist learns that when s/he performs a particular intervention then the 
machine performs in a particular way. Thus the physicist can make a mapping between a range of particular 
interventions and a range of particular machine performances. However, experimental physicists do not 
stop at merely mapping out the contours of human interventions and machine performativity. A central part 
of the art of experimental physics is inscribing these contours with technographe and producing 
mathematical inscriptions of novel transformative powers. Each machine is an integrated composite of 
components (which are machines themselves). It is the sum total of an integrated nexus of distinct centres 
of transformative powers coherently converged into a single centre of transformative power. Associated 
with each machine are collections of artifices to design, construct, operate, maintain, repair, and interpret 
the machine performativity. Also associated with each machine are a collection of fragmentary specialised 
templates to build the machine and its components. These collections, for even moderately complicated 
machines, will not be embodied in a single human agent. They will be distributed throughout the whole 
teleological organisation of expertise in which the machine can be brought into existence and integrated as 
a functioning entity. This will involve the division of the embodiment of these collections among many 
human agents. Human agents are transformed into functioning technological objects. In experimental 
physics, as well as engineering and other technosciences, collections of technologies, specialised tools, 
mathematical techniques, functives, and technographe, will be associated with machinic agency. These 
interacting clusters of ensembled technological objects constitute machinic agency. Machine agency is 
constructed as an integration of transformative powers together to produce transformative powers. 
Thermodynamic devices, electromagnetic devices, electrochemical devices, etc., are all examples of such
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transformative powers emergent from hybrid machines. These unions are the members of machine-families 
and the history of their development is a machine-family-tree. Each machine-kind has a cluster of 
associated transformative powers. These are juxtaposed with the clusters of other machine-kinds when a 
hybrid is produced; the clusters are transferable throughout a machine-family-tree along the lines of the 
“genetic” machine-kind Highly complex machines, such as the DELPHI detector at CERN and an ULT- 
physics dilution refrigerator, are composites of the members of several machine-family-trees. It is the 
transferability of clustered technological objects along the “genetic” lines of machine-family-trees that 
gives these technological objects transcontexturality. This occurs through the overlaps that occur between 
the machine-kinds used in the construction of complex machines and their templates. For example, the 
principle of leverage has a “transcontexturality” in so far that it is utilised in the construction of every 
machine that has a lever as a component Each historical generation of proto-types constitute strata of 
machines. The experimental physics of each historical generation is characterised by these strata. The 
“independence” of the members of any strata, and the “transcendental” nature of the entities involved, is an 
illusion that occurs through hiding the historical development and the interconnectedness of these 
machines.
The history of experimental physics is the history of the poiesis, inscription, and extension of 
machine-family-trees through the invention and innovation of prototypes. The ontology of physics is 
restricted to these interconnected lineages of prototypes and their associated clusters. Prototypes, such as 
Thompson’s cathode-ray apparatus to measure the charge-to-mass of cathode corpuscles and Millikan’s oil 
drop apparatus to measure the quanta of electric charge were not as independent as Hacking and Bhaskar 
would like to believe. These experiments shared members of the same machine-kind, electromagnets and 
capacitors, for instance, and both utilised the same inscription practices. It is the argument of this thesis that 
“Natural Laws” disclosed through experimental physics are technai (in a stratified sense) and the ontology 
of entities such as electrons, for instance, is limited to the interconnected strata of machines for which 
electrons are utilised in the inscription and interpretation of their performativity. Electrons are intelligible 
as technological objects of an equivalent ontological status as G-7 chords. Both of these objects, electrons 
and G-7 chords, are transcontextural indices that arise through particular modes of enframent (artifice) and 
are implemented, as principles of organisation and cognition, in the interaction between human agents and 
machines (or instruments). In this thesis I have raised the question of how technological objects, such as 
electrons, have been taken to be natural entities. The argument of this thesis is that the transferability 
between members of natural kinds and machine-kinds is based on the metaphysical precepts of mechanical 
realism. It is this set of precepts that allows the shadows projected upon the cave wall, from the interactive 
constructive arts of shadow-puppet making and the performative arts of shadow puppetry, to be taken as 
representational of the truth of reality. It is in this sense that every theoretical and material practice and 
scientific experience is constructed upon the anvil of practice. The next question is; what is the fire?
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The Fire of Hephaestus:
Bhaskar presupposed a mechanical realist ontology from the onset. He argued that if the world were not 
encapsulated by this ontology then experimental sciences would not exist. I agree that the experimental 
sciences do presuppose a particular ontology. However, it does not follow from this that (i) that the 
ontology presupposed by experimental scientists is definitive of the ontology that they actually explore; or, 
(ii) that the world is exhausted by the ontology of the experimental sciences. Bhaskar asserted, without 
argument, that “ ... if science is to be possible the world must consist of enduring and transfactually active 
mechanisms ...that account in their complex manifold determinations for all the phenomena of our world.” 
(1975, p.20) This is nothing more than a statement of grandiose reductive mechanical realism of the kind 
that is written in the books of Galileo and Descartes. My argument against Bhaskar is that we cannot find 
any rational or empirical grounds for deciding between physics-as-discovery and physics-as-productive 
once we address the technological character of experimentation. What physics does is produce its 
discoveries as the process of learning how to produce them as an innovative process. Whether or not we 
presume mechanical realism is a matter of arbitrary choice or cultural practice. Providing that human 
beings are not the centre and limit of control during the activities of experimentation then experimental 
physics is intelligible either way. This is sufficient to undermine Bhaskar’s assertion that a realist 
interpretation of experimental science is necessary. At most, it is only necessary that experimental 
physicists presume mechanical realism However, the “internal rationale” of any group of practitioners 
(whether they are experimental physicists, shamanic healers, or whatever) is insufficient as a justification 
for the validity of that practice to anyone else. It does not follow from the fact that shamanic practitioners 
claim to contact and use spirits that spirits exist in a realist sense. Nor does it follow from the fact that 
experimentalists claim to discover and use natural mechanisms that any such mechanisms exist in a realist 
sense. From an outsider’s perspective we can understand the motives of physicists without uncritically 
accepting their beliefs. Providing we attend to how physicists use their motivations, and beliefs, in the 
construction of their practices, and their significance, then we can explain how they produce knowledge, 
and progress, without accepting those beliefs. Furthermore, machines are a part of the world. It does not 
follow from any success that physicists might achieve in obtaining knowledge about mechanisms at work 
in mechanical, thermodynamic, electromagnetic, or quantum mechanical machines, that these mechanisms 
exist outside of those machines. It certainly does not follow that these mechanisms somehow comprise the 
entire worlding of the world. At most, experimental physics can only justify a modest mechanical realism 
by revealing the real mechanisms at work in machines. Physics, at most, can only reveal how a part of the 
world works. That part of the world is restricted to the machines involved It does not justify the grandiose 
reductive mechanical realism that Bhaskar presupposed.
I agree with Bhaskar that the mechanisms generated through experimental activity exist 
independently of that activity only if we construe that activity as an “atomistic event of making a constant 
conjunction of a set of events” as Bhaskar did (p. 13). It is for this reason that Bhaskar considered 
empiricism to be unintelligible. If experimental activity is atomistic then generated mechanisms must be
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transcendental to the constant conjunction. However, if we examine experimental activity as an innovative 
process, situated within an historically generated technological framework that sets-up the trajectory of the 
process of ordering the technological objects within that framework, then we do not need to examine 
experimental activity atomistically nor accept a realist interpretation of the emergent mechanisms. They are 
complex technological objects. We do not need to accept that “the real basis of causal laws are provided by 
the generative mechanisms of nature” (p. 14) if we do not accept that Nature is circumscribed by the 
machinery of physics. Bhaskar’s assumptions lead him into a problem that has haunted the mechanical 
realists since the seventeenth century. The concept of natural mechanism requires an ontological basis upon 
a concept of natural necessity. According to Bhaskar (p. 14), his concept is that mechanisms “necessarily 
occur in nature independently of men or human activity”. However, his concept of natural necessity was 
based on two related assumptions: (i) that the “necessity” revealed by experimental physics is natural; (ii) 
that there is any “necessity” revealed by experimental physics. Both of these assumptions are implicit to his 
mechanical realism. He did not provide any argument for these assumptions and merely asserted them He 
had little choice; his only alternatives were to renounce his realism about physics or remain silent. The first 
assumption can be countered equally by asserting its arbitrariness. The second assumption can be countered 
as false. It can be argued that “necessity” revealed by experimental physics is an expression of the closure 
of discussion and exploration that occurs when the agencies of production and communication have been 
stabilised against any criticism and controversy. Closure is a product of social and technological processes. 
Once these processes of production and demonstration have been successfully invented and disseminated, 
from the standpoint of a scientific community, then the interests of that community can move on. Necessity 
arises in hindsight through the successful production of acts of reproduction. The maxim that “necessity is 
the mother of invention” can always be countered with the maxim that “invention is the mother of 
necessity”. The assumption of mechanical realism allows the term “artificial” to be dropped and the 
adjective “natural” to be inscribed in its place. Nothing more.
Bhaskar argued (p.91) that closure cannot be universal if it has been artificially established It is a 
characteristic of techne that it is the general knowledge of causal principles in artificial contexts of 
production. The establishment of such knowledge is simultaneously an establishment of a closure of what is 
considered as “a true course of reasoning” involved in bringing something into being. As an act of poiesis, 
any productive closure is itself, if repeatable, potentially universalisable. In physics, the universalisability 
of any poietic closure depends upon its successful integration into a nexus of machine-families and its 
successful utilisation (as a set of functives, techniques, material practices, and interventions) in the 
extension of a machine-family-tree or the innovation of a new machine-family. Invariance arises as the 
repeatability of a result through the repetition of intentions, interventions, material practices, and the “true 
course of reasoning”. The invariance is itself a techneic and poietic creation of the transitive process from 
which it came about. Bhaskar was unable to provide any account of how scientists actually know when they 
“have produced a theory which correctly describes the mechanisms by means of which the effect in 
question is produced” (p. 110). If we recognise that the theory produced by scientists is techneic in character
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then we can recognise its establishment in virtue of its repeatability and its successful integration into a 
machine-family tree (or nexus of machine-families). A techneic theory is one that is used to repeatably 
produce a specific object utilising the same cluster of technographe, techniques, material practices, and 
machines. Physical Law, as described by Bhaskar (p. 105), has all the characteristics of techne. It 
techneically ascribes the contours of agencies that are utilised in acts of re-production. Techne ascribes 
contours, boundaries, limits, and prescriptions, to a set of agential possibilities that are indexed in terms of 
causal mechanisms and their effects. As such, it satisfies all the criteria for Natural Law that Bhaskar 
demanded (pp. 105-6) except that it is not necessarily of natural origin. This kind of knowledge can only be 
described as Natural Law by assuming mechanical realism.
Bhaskar did not provide any account of how we can “distinguish between natural and logical 
necessity, and between natural and epistemic possibility” (p. 38) but his argument depends on establishing a 
certain and unambiguous method by which we can make such a distinction. There is not any adequate 
conception of natural necessity, or natural kinds, in Bhaskar's theory of science. He merely presupposed 
mechanical realism and substituted concepts of alethic modalities for natural tendencies. Bhaskar’s 
argument required mechanical realism as a premise. Once the role that mechanical realism plays in 
justifying the technological activity of experimental science has been addressed then we can understand 
experimental sciences, such as physics, without actually being committed to realism about those sciences. 
When Bhaskar argued for the "Intransitive Dimension" of the transitive (p. 17) he was arguing for the Being 
of Becoming. Knowledge of the "Intransitive Dimension", in the context of production, is the knowledge of 
the Being of Becoming This kind of knowledge is techne. The human agent, within technological 
enframent, is “the efficient cause” but is not the controller. The phenomenological experience of 
“independent behaviour” of the object of experiment, as a resistance to human intervention and inscription, 
is captured by the Greek term hyle. This is an emergent feature of substance that occurs during the human 
attempts, guided by techne, to inscribe form into materials. It is neither controlled by human intervention, 
nor does it exist independently of human intervention, and is a property of the context of production guided 
by techne. Techne, as the knowledge of the Being of Becoming arises at the end of any particular scientific 
work, by generalising the intransient causal principles of change within that work, and offers a repeatable 
guiding knowledge. The acquisition of techne is posited as “the end of experimentation”.
Bhaskar made two realist claims about the “intransitive objects” of knowledge (p. 22): (i) they are 
invariant to our knowledge of them; and, (ii) they are science-independent objects of scientific 
investigation. The assumption of mechanical realism is required before these “intransitive objects” can be 
categorised as natural objects. It is unsurprising that he concluded that a realist interpretation is necessary. 
It is essential for any argument for scientific realism that an argument for the ontological categorisation of 
“intransitive objects” as “natural objects” is provided Bhaskar merely asserted that they are. This assertion 
can be countered without any difficulty whatsoever. We need only assert that they are not. However, we 
can do better than that. Throughout this thesis I have argued that we can examine the objects of scientific 
discourse as technological objects. These objects can be both intransitive and artificial. How can we make
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an intelligible account of such objects without assuming realism? This depends upon what we take such 
objects to be.
Bhaskar argued (p. 146) that “...for transcendental idealism the imagined mechanism is imaginary, 
for realism it may be real, and come to be established as such.” An imagined mechanism is taken to be real 
if it can be pragmatically used as a tractive or transdiction in the production, operation, and interpretation 
of a new machine. I discussed this in chapters three and four. The real/imaginary distinction is based on an 
immediacy/potentiality distinction of functive utility in the process of extending machine-families. The 
process of “empirical testing” that Bhaskar described between the imaginary and the real is the process of 
poiesis that in which a potentially utilisable functive is successfully inscripted and taken to be an 
immediately utilisable functive. It still requires a presumption of mechanical realism to transdict these 
functives as representative of “natural mechanisms”. The rationale for this step is “justified” by conflating 
the understanding of truth with the achievement of success in inscribing novel technological powers. The 
reality of the mechanisms postulated in the model are “subjected to empirical scrutiny” by innovating 
machinic agency. Bhaskar argued that any philosophy of science must attend to both “the transitive and 
intransitive aspects of science”. It must be capable of sustaining both (i) the social character of science; 
and, (ii) the independence from science of the objects of scientific thought. However, if we interpret the 
objects of scientific thought as technological objects, we can produce a philosophical interpretation of 
experimental physics which satisfies (i) and re-qualifies (ii) providing we take “independence” to have two 
senses. Scientific realist arguments rhetorically play upon an ambiguity in the meaning of “independence”. 
This ambiguity is that “independence” can be taken to mean either that the objects of scientific thought are
(i) not dependent upon scientific thought for their existence, or (ii) not controlled by scientific thought 
However, if we examine the objects of scientific thought as technological objects then we can accept sense
(ii) without accepting sense (i). We can propose an interpretation of experimental physics that is neither 
realist nor idealist. Given that science would not exist without scientific thought then the technological 
objects depend upon scientific thought as a condition of their existence. Unless human agents had thought 
that technological means could discover natural mechanisms then there would not be any experimental 
sciences. Without the existence of experimental sciences there would not be any technological objects of 
scientific thought. However, as technological objects, produced in technological contexts, they are not 
controlled by scientific thought and are independent from any particular thought about those objects. These 
objects depend upon the existence of the process of experimental science for their existence. There is 
nothing more mysterious about this than any creative act of making (e.g composing a piece of music or 
inventing a novel dance). As a technological process experimental science is a process which involves the 
innovation of machinic agency. This process depends on scientific thought, only as a condition of its 
existence, but it is not controlled by scientific thought.
Bhaskar claimed (p.20) that “the realist principles of substance and causality are shown to be a 
condition of the intelligibility of experimental activity and the stratification of science... It attempts to 
express the former in real definitions of natural kinds and the latter in statements of causal laws, i.e. of the
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tendencies in things.” As I have maintained throughout this thesis, even if we accept that experimental 
physicists seek and achieve causal accounts, in terms of kinds of natural mechanism, it does not follow that 
these causal accounts actually refer to kinds of natural mechanisms. At most, for the existence of 
experimental physics as a human activity to be intelligible, it is only necessary that experimental physicists 
are mechanical realists. It does not follow from the fact that experimental physics exists that mechanical 
realism is epistemologically justified. The concepts of substance and causality cm1 be made intelligible in 
experimental physics by examining it as a productive technological activity that operates epistemologically 
by substituting techne for episteme, transdictions for natural mechanisms, and machine-families for 
disclosures, on the basis of assuming mechanical realism. The realist needs to provide an argument for the 
epistemological warrant of mechanical realism before s/he can claim to have produced an intelligible realist 
theory of experimental physics. Bhaskar has not provided any such argument.28 Bhaskar’s claim that 
“[o]nly transcendental realism... can sustain the idea of a law-governed world independent of man” (p.26) 
should not be surprising because it is merely the definition of transcendental realism. The interpretation of 
physics proposed in this thesis is not a transcendental realist position and makes no attempt to sustain “the 
idea of a law-governed world independent of man”. In fact, it rejects the notion that such an idea is 
sustained by experimental physics. There are not any good reasons why any interpretation of physics in 
particular, or experimental science in general, should attempt to sustain such an idea. The idea proposed in 
my interpretation is that physics is a rule-guided technological process that is not controlled solely by 
human agency. The laws produced by experimental physics are techneic and only relate to the parts of the 
world that are contained within the processes of experimental physics. These parts of the world are non­
human participants: they are the machines involved in the physicists’ experiments. Even if we accept that 
physics can successfully produce knowledge about the first and necessary causes at work in such machines 
it does not follow from this that this knowledge is applicable to any other part of the world Grandiose 
reductive mechanical realism is not justified by the results of experimental physics. At most, only modest 
mechanical realism can be justified by experimental physics. Physics does not need to correspond to any 
reality outside of itself. It only refers to Nature rhetorically and poetically as a metaphor. When a physicist 
uses these technological products to ask how natural phenomena come to be, how stars work or how birds 
fly, s/he is, in fact, asking how s/he would use these products to make a star shine or make a bird fly. S/he 
makes a model. Even if physicists could make shining stars or flying birds, which presently they can not, 
they still would need to assume mechanical realism in order to claim that there was only one way to do it, 
and they knew how Nature did it.
Bhaskar argued that transfactuals, intransitive objects exist, and we need a distinction between 
sequences of events and causal laws. Even if we accept the existence of transfactuals, or intransitive 
objects, we are still left with an open question regarding their ontological status. It does not automatically
28 I do not wish to single Bhaskar out on this point. To my knowledge, no realist (including Galileo, 
Newton, Descartes, Hobbes, or Hooke) has ever provided an argument for the assumptions involved in 
mechanical realism.
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follow that such objects are natural entities. Of course we need a distinction between sequences of events 
and causal laws, because these are different kinds of things, but it does not automatically follow that the 
former are artificial and the latter are natural. It could equally be argued, as I have, that the former are the 
interactions between human intervention and machine performance; whereas the latter is an abstraction of 
the mapping of the contours of those interactions in terms of causal principles. Both of these entities are 
artificial. It is only when mechanical realism is assumed that causal laws are automatically taken as being 
Natural Law. The distinction between human activity and the causal law is complex. The latter is a product 
of the former, which can be used as a guide in the process of repeating the activity of productioa A 
technological object is “a man-independent thing” to the extent that within the context of technological 
enframent, in which it exists, the individual human agent is only one causal agent among many. The other 
causal agents are the machines, tools, devices, and instruments, also acting within the context of 
technological enframent, as well as the other people involved. The intransitivity of such agents emerges due 
to the enduring reproduction of the whole process of experimental physics. However, the existence of 
physics does not prove die truth of these metaphysical precepts.
It is essential for any realist ontology that it is premised upon the assumption that the world is 
structured and differentiated If we are to understand whether or not the world of this ontology can be 
secured, as differentiated and stratified, by scientific realist argument then we must look at the particular 
structures and differentiations presented by science. Bhaskar refused to do this on the ground that this is the 
task of science and not the task of philosophy (p.30). I reject the validity of this division of labour. My own 
argument is premised upon the commitment that any understanding of the ontology disclosed by 
experimental physics must be premised upon how that disclosure was achieved. We must also examine how 
science reveals and presents these structures and differentiations. Again, this is a task that Bhaskar 
delegated to science. In my view, this refusal to examine experimental science, as it is in practice, is the 
source of Bhaskar’s erroneous presumptions. A philosopher of science cannot neglect how science is 
actually done, and present a philosophical argument for its validity (or invalidity), as an activity or process, 
without, at bottom, doing no more philosophical work than merely asserting a set of a priori assumptions 
and their (possibly) logical conclusions. In other words, the philosopher merely discusses the forms of the 
shadows of the wall. The weakness of Bhaskar’s realist theory of science resides in the fact that he has done 
nothing more than re-assert the assumptions of the seventeenth century mechanical realists, such as 
Descartes; whilst simultaneously recognising die historicity of the experimental sciences and their products, 
as has everyone in science studies since Thomas Kuhn and Michel Foucault. In continental philosophy 
historicity has been currency since Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche. Since a discourse of causally efficacious 
universal invariances at work in the contexts of production and control, is characteristic of techne, it does 
not follow from the existence of such a discourse that there is any reference to natural invariances, kinds, or 
causes. Nor does it follow that they are mere fictions either.
Bhaskar asserted that there are levels of reality defined by distinct kinds of mechanism operating 
under distinct kinds of law-like behaviour. I agree with Bhaskar's assertion for the following reasons. These
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distinct kinds of mechanisms are transdicted to explain different kinds of machine performativity; their kind 
is the machine-kind to which they are connected as transdictions. The kinds of law-like behaviour are 
techneic and are connected to distinct kinds of technique. Each technique is itself connected to a 
technological object (or set of such objects). It is only through the metaphorical use of machine-families 
that Bhaskar is able to present them as disclosing distinct levels of reality. Integrating members of different 
machine-kinds will innovate novel levels of complexity for which new rules and abstractions are required 
The claim for the pre-existence of laws to explain complexity is premised upon a deterministic (linear) 
conception of evolution. However, as an alternative, we can attempt to analyse this process as an 
underdeterministic (non-linear) transformative process of ordering heterogeneous technological objects. It 
is experimental and creative. Bhaskar assumed that experimental science encounters “intransitive objects” 
and produces “transitive knowledge” about them. His “transcendental argument” is a response to the 
question of what science must be like to provide knowledge of objects of this kind Bhaskar presumed that 
science does give us knowledge of intransitive objects, that these objects are natural and pre-scientific 
objects, and that the “internal rationale” of an activity is sufficient to explain the existence of that activity. 
However, these are the very assumptions that are at stake in an argument for scientific realism I accept that 
Bhaskar has captured the spirit of the enterprise, but we need to ask the transcendental question at a deeper 
level. What conditions must exist for experimental physics to be possible? No one would deny that there 
are conditions that make physics possible. However, this fact does not, in itself, support (i) any single claim 
as to the nature of those conditions; nor, (ii) any claim that those conditions exhaust the content of the 
world. It is also not an indubitable fact that “the nature of the world can only be known from (a study of) 
science” as Bhaskar claimed (p.30). This would only be necessarily true if (1) the nature of the world was 
exclusively created by scientific activity; or, (2) something only constituted knowledge if it resulted from 
scientific enquiry. Bhaskar explicitly rejected condition (1) and, therefore, we should presume that he 
endorsed condition (2). However, if he did endorse this condition, this leads to serious problems for his 
transcendental argument for a realist interpretation of science. He cannot claim to know that realism is the 
only intelligible interpretation of science unless that is itself a scientific fact. Nor can he establish any 
intransitivity of any scientific fact without knowing that realism is die only intelligible interpretation. This 
contradiction results in the irresolvable circularity in Bhaskar’s argument: the ontology of science is 
restricted to that which mechanistic sciences can reveal whilst the epistemology of science is justified by 
presuming that the ontology of the world is mechanistic. Bhaskar’s interpretation is based upon the very 
"conflation of epistemology and ontology" that he rejected throughout.
Bhaskar stated the following conditions for the intelligibility of experimental activity: (i) the 
experimenter is a causal agent of a sequence of events; (ii) the causal law identified by the experiment is 
independent from the experimenters' activities. He defined “law” by using the analogies of chess and 
cricket. These are the rules that provide us with the “special power of acting in accordance with a plan or in 
the light of reasons.” (p .Ill) It is a law that allows us to act as causal agents and make a conjunction of 
events. His analogies are premised upon a metaphorical substitution between a techneic law and an
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invariant one. The laws of a game are only the rules that we must learn before we play that game according 
to the rules defined in advance by people who insist that we should play by the same rules. They are as 
transcendental as the game. They are both instructions of how to proceed and limits to our behaviour. The 
laws of chess and cricket are positive and negative liberties: they are rights and duties. They are 
generalisations of how we could repeat the game. They are part of the techne of playing chess, or cricket 
For a realist, however, the laws of physics should be of a different kind They are not known, in advance, 
before we could be said to be doing physics. The aim of physics is supposedly to work out the laws of 
physics as a result of doing physics. This is the reverse of the games of chess and cricket. Nature is, 
supposedly, the invisible referee of our actions qua physicists and it is only in virtue of whether we can 
repeatably perform any particular action, or not, that we can say that we are discovering the laws of 
physics. But when we take the technological character of physics into account we can actually see how the 
laws of physics and the laws of a game can be taken to be analogies. Physics is bounded by rules as to what 
constitutes a legitimate move. Physicists do not investigate the laws of magnetism by dancing naked in 
woodland groves. They might learn more about Nature if they did, but I have not found any example of a 
published record of such an experiment. Physicists are limited to specific kinds of material, technical, 
social, and mathematical practices. These, in many respects, constitute rules of physics. They are 
instructions of how to proceed, limits to behaviour, and techneic. Furthermore, if the laws of magnetism, 
for instance, are determined by abstracting the feedback contours between the material and mathematical 
practices utilised in the experiments, then they too are techneic. The difference between physics and chess, 
in this respect, is that we learn the rules of chess before playing a game, and these are the same rules for 
each and every game of chess we henceforth play, but in physics we only leam some of the rules of physics 
before we can start and discover the rest as we proceed. Furthermore, the rules of physics differ in each 
kind of experiment we perform according to the different kinds of machine used in that experiment The 
argument in this thesis is that the activities of experimental physicists are inscribed within enframing 
contexts of technological innovation and human agents cannot be considered as the controllers of 
production. Technology is not completely controlled by human agents despite the fact that its enduring 
existence is dependent upon the activities of those human agents. Any human agent is only one of the 
causal agents, at play, in technological activity.
The notion of stratification was essential to Bhaskar's interpretation of science. He argued that 
explanation and “the real world” are both stratified (pp. 169-70). Geometrical optics is explained in terms of 
Young and Fresnel’s wave optics and that, in turn, is explained in terms of the quantum theory of radiation. 
Bhaskar claimed that a notion of stratification enables us to understand meaning-change providing that the 
strata of the real world do not change. However, strata of machine-kinds can be re-interpreted by new 
models, just as they can be re-inscribed with new technographe, and, consequently, we can explain how 
meaning-change occurs without requiring any notion of “the strata of the real world”. The strata of 
machine-kinds and “the real world” are conflated once mechanical realism has been presumed. The 
historical development of any science, such as physics or chemistry, can be mapped out in terms of
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machine-family trees, their innovative interconnection, and the associated clusters of techniques, tools, 
instruments, technographe, and techniques, that surround machine-kinds and are transported between them 
at points of interconnection. Such a mapping can represent the totality of the progress of such sciences and 
the stratification of those sciences. On this account, the stratification of the sciences is identical with the 
strata of machine-kinds. Ontological depth is the use of subsequently developed strata within a process of 
“reverse engineering” to transdict the performativity of earlier strata in terms of the later. This is a mode of 
ontological extension through innovation that is metaphorically used as a mode of explanation of the 
technological innovation of novel strata. It is my proposal, posited as an alternative to Bhaskai's realism, 
that the innovation of novel strata can be understood as a creative process. Realism presumes that the world 
is complete and every possibility is determined in advance. We have no way of knowing this. I have argued 
that experimental physics does not require such knowledge, or even its possibility, in order to progress. 
Each innovation of a new stratum is a revolutionary moment A creative event. These are singular moments 
in which it is impossible to determine whether the novel prototypes will disintegrate into chaos or integrate 
into a new order. It emerges from the interconnection of prior strata of technological objects and a synthesis 
of their associated orders. This requires the invention, the creation, of a new order. This is a process of 
mutating trial and error that spontaneously generates a novel shift in the ordering process in which 
heterogeneous objects are combined together into novelties. In any complex process, new levels of 
complexity can be achieved (almost randomly), which cannot be understood in terms of the previous levels. 
New rules are in operation and a new organisation is brought into being from the old This is a new stratum 
and it is non-reducible to the former. Their rules do not apply. There is no reason to presuppose that this has 
a unitary source. In fact, it only can occur as the unpredictable and non-linear resultant of heterogeneity. 
There is no single unitary source of transformative powers. A single source would be homogeneous and, 
consequently, novel non-reducible strata would be impossible. Unlike cricket, or chess, in a complex 
process the process creates the rules, because what is brought-forth partially depends on how it is brought- 
forth and partially depends upon what it is brought forth into. It is the whole process of innovation that is 
experimental.
Experimental physics, as a technologically innovative process, is directed towards two goals: 
disclosing mechanisms and making them intelligible. Due to its innovative character, secured within a 
culture of technological innovation, driven by the psychological desire for novelty, power, and absolute 
certainty, experimental physics looses interest in its past very quickly. It has no interest in what it has been. 
It is only concerned in the becoming of itself. Its focus is on the expansion of its boundaries and not upon 
its histories. The physics community is a heterogeneous convergence of technological objects, groups of 
humans and machines connected to each other via machines and humans, that is constantly directed 
towards its own techne as the object of its expanding horizon. It seeks out heterogeneity to transform into 
prototypes of machines, models, and techniques. These strata are standing-reserve as resources for future 
innovation. Its end is the expansion of itself and an exploration of its own subtleties during that expansion. 
As an innovative process it is directed towards itself. To understand itself, in its own terms, is to understand
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the Universe. In order to understand itself, to understand the Universe, it must explore all its possibilities 
and potentials. It must become everything that it can become. It must consume Nature and replace it with 
itself. Once it has done this then it will be its own truth. There will be nothing left to do, nowhere to go, and 
physics will simply cease to exist. All that will be left will be its technologies and no possibility of further 
innovation. It is a destining driven by the socio-technical organisation of expansive innovation. It is 
productive of itself through innovation: poetical and technological. It discovers the real by producing the 
real. It is a form of poiesis that enframes itself as its own resource and object. It is an Art. It looses interest 
in what it has already done and forgets the tentative poeticising in the construction of its own metaphors. In 
its forgetfulness, it finds its own truths. When it was forgotten that these models were “representative” then 
they could be presented as the real things. It is this habitualness, and forgetfulness, combined with a 
innovative headlong rush to discover new powers, that transforms metaphors into techniques, and 
techniques into truths. On this account, the reality disclosed by experimental physics is not independent of 
“scientific thinking”, but it is also not circumscribed by that thinking. The unfolding character of that 
reality would not have occurred as it does without past efforts to “bring it forth” and, at least in part, those 
efforts were guided by what was thought to be the best way to proceed The character of the unfolding 
reality is, at least in part, dependent upon the character of what is thought about the unfolding reality 
because that thinking is part of what is “brought forth”. Furthermore, the future unfolding of reality 
depends upon the efforts and projects of the present and those are instigated, at least in part, thoughtfully. 
Thinking is a part of the reality “brought forth” by experimental physics. However, it is only a part of the 
"bringing forth”. For the “scientific realist”, this thesis will express an anti-realist view of science because 
reality, for the realist, must somehow be independent of what is thought about it. I accept that my position 
is an anti-realist one, in this respect. The scientific realist insistence on this “independence” is something 
that not only is arbitrary, historically contingent, and rhetorical, but it is also an “epistemological obstacle” 
to a deeper understanding of the nature of reality. The notion of “Natural Law” is an archaic mask that has 
been placed over the mystery that occurs during every act of making. This mystery is a mystery of 
“bringing forth” itself. “Natural Law” does not help us to understand this mystery. It says nothing more 
than “it must be so.” What is Nature? The mechanical realist will answer that “it is what is necessary”. Is it? 
Perhaps the mechanical realist has pre-empted Nature with her/his mechanistic view. Perhaps “Nature” is 
not complete and “what is necessary” is perpetually undergoing periods of destabilisation and change. 
Perhaps it is beyond our comprehension altogether. Any genuine realist must accept that possibility. 
However, in this thesis, I have been discussing the reality that is intimately bound up with comprehension 
and mechanistic reasoning. It is that reality which is dependent upon our participation. If we were to stop 
mathematically innovating new machines then reality would cease being unfolded in that way; unfolding in 
another way would begin. This ontology is distinct from the idealist identity of reality in the “mind” or “the 
Absolute”. It is a phenomenological ontology in which both reality and truth are “bought-forth” by the 
process of disclosing reality and truth. Human beings are only a part of that process and do not control its 
unfolding. Experimental physics is just one possible mode of disclosure amongst all the others. Music is
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another such mode. It has all the characteristics of physics as a mode of “bringing-forth”. It also occurs 
through human interventions and machine performances, it is also an art directed towards its own 
perfection, it is a Ge-stell which discloses itself as standing-reserve destining towards perpetual novelty ; its 
contours are also inscripted in terms of the artificial technographe of musical composition The only 
difference between music and physics, on my account, is that music does not attempt to explain how it is 
possible in reference to “Nature”. As a “bringing-forth” it is also a truth. Not a truth in the sense of 
“correctness”, although it can be precise, but a truth in the sense of aletheia. It discloses its own truth as 
disclosure. No one claims that music “corresponds” to an external and objective reality, nor do they claim 
that it exists only in the mind The realist-idealist classification does not apply to music. My view is that it 
does not apply to physics either. The reality disclosed by physics and music is artificial; yet neither are 
completely controlled by human agency. The question is: what is the source of the artificial? My answer is: 
why do we think that there is a single source? The possibilities of innovation arise from heterogeneity 
itself.
It is quite arbitrary to isolate a single component of the interconnected complex that constitutes 
socio-technical agency as the single element responsible for its success. Predictions derived from a theory 
are only components of the whole socio-technical agency of exofiramed experimentation. If we aim to 
understand any particular experiment in terms of its components then we must examine the complicated 
and intricate interactions, from their set-up to their completion, in productive processes in which the total 
connection of the complex involved has primacy over its components. It always remains a question of how 
these components were used and how they were connected within the whole complex. The task of tracing 
the function of any single component within a complex is one which is itself another challenge and, as 
such, it requires another socio-technical agency of analysis to be set-up and performed in order to complete 
that task. Thus the identification of a single element as responsible for the success of any socio-technical 
agency is itself a product of further socio-technical analysis. It is not the case that an infinite regression of 
analysis always leaves a space for the question of how the elements were connected, but, rather, it is more 
the case that an infinite extension of analysis is required before we could produce a complete account of our 
understanding of the process. As this always remains an unfinished task then it always remains a question 
and a challenge. That is destining, if we take up the challenge. The components involved in the whole 
complex can only be understood in terms of their total concrete interaction within the particular experiment 
in question as a single complex technological object. All technological objects are complex interactions 
between other technological objects. There are not any simples. The task of attempting to mentally 
reconstruct the experiment in terms of isolated components is an endless task. Concepts, functives, material 
practices, social practices, visualisations, metaphors, machine components, measurements, calibrations, and 
models are all inextricably bound together in the design, construction, operation, and interpretation of 
machine performativity. These components can only be understood within the context of a non-linear 
analysis of production of particular machine performances in terms of the functions that they fulfil within 
the whole complex. This involves understanding the whole process from beginning to end Components
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must be understood in terms of their purpose and performance, as teleological and non-linear, within a 
labour process and the wider world In this sense they can not be understood as isolated components at all. 
Their being is inextricably bound up with the destining of Ge-stell and its processes of gathering together 
and ordering. It is also destined by the organisation of the wider world No component can exist as a 
component without the interactions that empower its being. These interactions are themselves the 
teleological and ontological concrete exercise of transformative powers that can not exist without the whole 
complex of Ge-stell. On this account the notion of “unexercised power” is purely imaginary. Power is only 
power in virtue of being exercised and, consequently, can only be determined in hindsight from within the 
whole complex of beings exercising powers through interaction. Their potential arises as a consequence of 
the power that has been exercised upon them, and is only realised as a possibility upon its exercise. The 
realist project of isolating components in terms of linear “unexercised power” or “unrealised power” is 
something that is brought to the complex and laid over it as an expression of the imagination. However, the 
reality of the process does not permit such crudities because each component only achieves its being 
through the reciprocal interactions with other components, in which no component can achieve its being 
without others, as a non-linear exercise of transformative power. Each component is an irreversible 
precondition for the agency of other components and, consequently, the being of the whole process is an 
irreversible extension of reality through the teleological and ontological challenges of Ge-stell. This is the 
reality of poiesis and it is this reality which provides physics with the possibility of discovery. However, 
the disclosure of poiesis is not the disclosure of what existed prior to the experiment but is the disclosure of 
what the experiment has brought about. It is the disclosure of experimental physics itself. This can only be 
determined in hindsight and the intellectual process of analysing an experiment is always one that attempts 
to understand what was actually done. Thus the understanding of physicists always lags behind the 
transformative extension of reality that they are challenged to bring about and the physicist can not know 
what s/he is doing whilst s/he is doing it, because this can in principle be only known after it has been done. 
It can only be known after it has been done because there is no “it” until it has been done. On this account, 
experimental physics is a creative art that brings beings into the world. The “it” is manifest through the 
contingent interaction of components and, to the extent that “it” is constructed as a technological object, 
only achieves “its” transformative power as a consequence of the processes of labour. The processes are 
socio-technical, cognitive, and material processes, which are contingent upon both the paradigmatic 
background, against which they are foregrounded, and the teleological positings that emerge from the 
challenges of Ge-stell. They can be determined only from a position of hindsight.
The mathematical projection of the ground-plan of Nature is a form of teleological positing. This 
consciously executed project promotes detachment and distancing of the subject-object relation in the 
reflections upon Nature. The mechanical realist conceptual grasp of phenomena as products of natural 
causes and mechanisms utilises mechanical models as metaphors for the purpose of providing intelligible 
expressions and visualisations of phenomena as products. In order to understand the construction of such 
metaphors and their intelligibility we need to address the process of construction as an experimental
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process (involving social and material practices) that is both challenged as the ongoing process of Ge-stell 
and is underwritten by the mechanical realist precepts. The construction of intelligible communicable 
accounts of novel phenomena is inextricably bound up with the processes of labour that produce those 
novel phenomena. During the construction of such accounts there is a continuous interaction between the 
labour processes involved in the innovation of novel communicative, representational, and material 
practices. The ongoing mechanical realist process of Ge-stell is one that continually challenges physicists to 
order their practices into a concretely structured complex of inter-related mechanisms available for future 
innovation. However, due to the metaphysical precepts of experimental physics, the production of 
intelligible accounts of the causal processes at work in the production of natural phenomena according to 
natural law is the revealing of truths, in Heidegger's sense of aletheia: disclosure for its own sake. 
Experimental physics is intimately bound up with poiesis as a craft and art. It is also bound up with modem 
technology as Ge-stell. It bridges modem technology and craft practices and, as such, reveals Nature as 
both standing-reserve and truth. The production of technological objects is both a means and an end for 
further innovation. The end of physics is the innovation of itself. Physics is itself an experiment. If we 
accept the historical account presented in chapter two then we can see how it began in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries and it has been innovating itself ever since. By analysing experimental physics in terms 
of labour processes we are able to address the fact that its successes and failures are the results of protracted 
historical struggles of heterogeneous organised efforts to stabilise and reproduce socio-technical practices 
involved in the design, construction, operation, inscription, and interpretation, of machine peformativity, 
whilst simultaneously situating that process within a world-picture. These efforts are always able to draw 
upon a background of prior successes and failures. In this respect the successes of experimental physics are 
not a “miracle” and are quite unsurprising. Or to put it another way, the successes of experimental physics 
are no more miraculous or surprising than any and every act of making. Making, as one mode of being-in- 
the-world, is itself only as miraculous or surprising as any other mode of being-in-the-world. Once we have 
reached this level of truth then we are confronted with the reality that it is Being which is surprising and 
miraculous. This reality is not explicable by scientific realism and, as a consequence, the successes of 
experimental physics are not explained by affirming realist metaphysics. The world remains surprising and 
miraculous however we attempt to explain it, because we need to explain why our explanation should be 
the case and then explain that further stratum of explanation. This stratified process of explaining could 
continue indefinitely and still require further explanation. Explanatory realism only functions within the 
ongoing process of stratification and is perpetually incomplete, and, as a consequence of this 
incompleteness, does not have any epistemological privilege in the face of the enduring mystery of Being. 
It can only conceal that mystery. Realism is far from being the only position that does not make a “miracle” 
out of the successes of physics because it can not fully explain the possibility of experimental physics at all. 
If it could then what need would we have for experimental physics as a route to truth? We would know the 
reality that made physics possible. We would know its truth from the onset. Or, was that truth already laid 
down in advance as the metaphysical precepts at the heart of mechanical realism? My argument has been
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that it was.
In the above thesis I have argued that the truths and reality disclosed by the processes of 
experimental physics are ’'brought forth" as alethia rather than mere "facts". Physics aims to disclose 
mechanisms (reproducible agents) and situate these within its ongoing activities rather than merely 
compare linguistic truth propositions with experience. The interpretation of experimental physics presented 
in this thesis situates it upon the boundary between techne and Ge-stell. Its aletheic modalities are both 
goods in themselves and standing-reserve for future work. Bhaskar argued for an alethic conception of 
scientific truth (rather a correspondence notion) in that the transitive dimension of human productive 
activity produces it. On this point I agree with Bhaskar. However, he did not fully escape the traditional 
correspondence notion of truth because he limited alethic possibilities by his commitment to the intransitive 
dimension of natural laws. Labour and its possibilities are circumscribed and delimited to the possibilities 
permitted by natural laws. Only that which is permitted by natural law can be "brought forth" because 
natural laws govern the conditions and possibilities of discovering, exercising, and realising mechanisms. 
Thus, for Bhaskar, human freedom does not consist in an independence from natural law but, rather, in the 
knowledge of natural laws and the possibility of making them work towards definite ends.29 Bhaskar 
equated increased freedom with increased techneic knowledge and the productive powers associated with 
it. However, my criticism of Bhaskar's conception of alethic truth is that it maintained an implicit 
connection with the more traditional correspondence notion. It already presupposed a duality between the 
transitive and intransitive dimensions to the extent that successes must be as a consequence of the correct 
correspondence between human activity and the possibilities permitted by reality. Success occurs as a result 
of the convergence between these two dimensions. However, I wish to reverse this "order of rank". 
Bhaskar's conception of alethic truth maintained the traditional reification of the labour processes of 
experimental work. If we posit that the intransitive dimension is emergent from the trajectories of the 
transitive labour process as a totality then an alternative non-realist interpretation is readily available to us. 
The teleological positings of labour provide the poiesis of agencies with a trajectory destined by the 
challenges of Ge-stell. These challenges are themselves emergent from a background of past efforts and 
their satisfaction. As Lukacs observed,
"realization is not simply the real result that real men accomplish in struggle with reality itself in labour, but 
also what is ontologically new in social being in opposition to the simple changing of objects in the 
processes of nature. Real man, in labour, confronts the entire reality that is involved in his labour, and in 
this connection we should recall that we never conceive reality as simply one of modal categories, but 
rather as the ontological embodiment of their real totality." (1978, pp. 122-3)
The objects of any experimental object-sphere are organised according to their appropriateness for the
29 This view was also central to Engels conception of the relation between natural laws and human freedom. 
For example, see Engels (1969, pp. 136-7).
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poiesis of modes of disclosure. Thus the productive possibilities of these objects are situated within the 
totality of the labour process according to the teleological positings associated with each and every object 
and the teleological positing of the whole labour process as a totality. The agential potentials and 
possibilities of any object should not be attributed to the object, on this account, but, instead, be regarded as 
properties of the way that they are situated within the organisation of the whole labour process from 
beginning to end These potentials and possibilities should not be divorced from the teleological positings 
of the labour process as a totality, and, without the organisation of agencies within the whole labour 
process, the objects within that organisation would have no potentials or possibilities whatsoever. Thus 
labour processes are genuinely creative and transformative. They "bring forth" the unfolding of 
transformative powers along posited trajectories. The act of "placing" the induced and abstracted techncd of 
such processes in correspondence with an intransitive dimension of natural laws, that supposedly pre-exists 
the processes of labour, is an act of reification of those labour processes. This masks the social ontology of 
labour with an autonomous "objective world" of mechanised reality. This act of alienation was one that 
Lukacs termed as "phantom objectivity" (1967, p.83). This "phantom objectivity" places an obstacle to 
genuine inquiries into the ontology of labour itself. Any genuine inquiry into labour processes should 
examine the teleology of those processes. Without addressing the goals to which labour is destined, as well 
as the posited means by which those goals are to be satisfied, then we cannot hope to understand those 
processes as a mode of organisation of agencies. Since the sixteenth century, experimental physics has 
posited the form of truth through its mathematical projection of the six simple machines upon natural 
phenomena. The organisation of the ongoing activities of experimental research has transformed those 
natural phenomena in accordance with the posited anticipation of the form of truth. Thus the reality 
disclosed by the labour processes of experimental physics should not be simply categorised as pre- 
scientific. Rather it should be seen as emergent from genuinely creative labour processes. The agencies 
"brought forth" by experimentation should be taken to be the products of those labour processes 
themselves. Thus physics does not necessarily disclose a precedent reality but, rather, produces its own 
strata of creative transformations of reality as enframed and destined ensembles of machine agencies and 
strata of transformative powers. However, the techneic causal accounts that are presented as abstracted and 
communicable understandings of those ensembles and strata are emergent as results of the reproduction of 
those labour processes. They are constructed in hindsight as a result of extending the closed system and 
removing all hindrances to its reproduction. The object of this extension is not the natural phenomena of the 
worlding of the world but is, rather, the creation of new labour processes. In this respect, the object of 
experimental physics is its own self-creation Experimental physics is a means of disclosing the potentials 
and possibilities of itself as both an end-in-itself and a means to future disclosures. It is an art engaged in 
the poiesis of its own trajectories and destining. It is extremely problematical to describe physics as simply 
a process of the transformation of natural entities, via interventions and representations. It is a complex 
process of transforming the background of technological organisation and social organisations according to 
emergent teleological positings made to challenge and transform an ontology comprised of human-machine
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relations and agencies. It is a "grand experiment"! Whether or not experimental physics could touch the 
asymptote of objective reality remains perpetually open to question because the art remains incomplete. 
The teleological positing of the mathematical projection, as a challenge, has yet to reach fulfilment in its 
own completion and perfection. It is for this reason that the scientific realist has pre-empted the conclusions 
of the "grand experiment" by declaring that physics has achieved successes. If we examine the reality of the 
labour processes of experimental physics, from its historical origins to its contemporary trajectories, then, 
at most, we should limit our pronouncements of success to the more modest acceptance that the "grand 
experiment” is still ongoing. We have yet to determine whether the "societal gamble" of experimental 
science was a good move. On this account, the scientific realist interpretation is far from necessary. It is an 
experimental interpretation of the whole process of labour and poiesis. As such it is merely a statement of 
allegiance and affirmation for the "grand experiment" that we call "experimental physics". At present we 
are unable to state certainties regarding the mode of being that we call "labour". We do not know the reality 
of our own being-in-the-world from which labour as a mode of being-in-the-world springs. The 
"innocence" arises from our state of thrownness in the world. The "societal gamble" is that science and 
technology will improve this state of thrownness. The gamble is that the world will become a better place 
because it will become more intelligible and human beings will become freer by becoming more powerful. 
Modem experimental physics is a consequence of the desire for certainty and technological power. It is this 
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